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Abstract
When we take apart big or complicated things—whether events, processes,
systems, objects or states—we find smaller or simpler things. Still, some
who purport that everything is physical also want to deny that complicated
things are sets of simpler things, their relations, and interactions. But that
view leads to some confounding puzzles. By contrast, I defend the view that
complicated things are nothing over and above simpler things, their relations,
and interactions. The latter are all physical and located in space and time,
and so are complicated things, like minds and people, and other things defined
by what they could or would do. That includes corkscrews and water soluble
things. However, the complicated properties of these complicated things show
that, very often, these things are either not quite what we think they are, or
they are not wholly where we think they are.
Sometimes things aren’t what we thought. There is no lumniferous aether
or phlogiston. But often, complicated things elude identification with their sets
of simpler things, relations and interactions, not because they don’t belong
in predictively successful models of our world, but because they aren’t wholly
where we tend to look. Their boundaries are wider and untidy. As it happens,
our minds are like that, and so are we. Finally, the fact that the extended
identity of things like us comes as a surprise means our self-engineering could
be more self-aware, and should be more self-reflective.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 We Are What We Make?
We call ourselves Homo sapiens sapiens. According to us, thinking, and the
mind we credit with thinking, is our distinguishing feature. Art, technology
and modern civilization are products of our special minds. These products
are modifications of environments we usually consider external to our essential
selves. We see ourselves moving freely through these environments as discrete
individuals that take our minds with us wherever our brains go.
In my view, however, that’s an incomplete concept of our minds and selves.
As far as minds are like software, they do not run on brains alone, but on a
broader suite of biological, technical, and social constituents. Our particular
minds and selves are products of technology as much as they are producers of
it.
In fact, technologies are much more like tissues than they are like parts of
the environment. I have explored this comparison elsewhere (Hubble, 2009),
and will not elaborate much further on it here. But briefly, it should first be
understood that technology includes not only those novelties the word popularly
brings to mind, but also those ubiquitous, ancient and now-mundane materials
of human life stretching back beyond memory from more recent mind-altering
creations like steam engines, to the Lighthouse of Alexandria, to stone tools for
making, controlling and feeding fires; from Calvin Klein to furs; from concrete
to adobe; from Gutenberg to papyrus and clay; from the daguerreotype to
the paintings at Chauvet. Considered broadly, technologies are like tissues in
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that they are living investments. They are adaptive assets, metabolic capital,
structures whose function is to contribute to human organisms’ homeostasis
and reproduction. Life without technology is not an option for our species. As
Barry Allen (2004) puts it,
Strip [modern sapiens] of tools, artifacts, material culture, and the
result is not a naked ape thrown back upon its animal nature. It is
an ecologically nonviable entity rapidly heading for extinction. A
sheltering fabric of artifacts is an existential presupposition of H.
sapiens, as much as fresh water. (p. 207)
Our extensive use of technologies is not just a side effect of an otherwise
technology-free process of getting smarter. As Clark and Chalmers (1998) put
it,
It may be that the biological brain has in fact evolved and matured in
ways which factor in the reliable presence of a manipulable external
environment. It certainly seems that evolution has favoured onboard
capacities which are especially geared to parasitizing the local
environment so as to reduce memory load, and even to transform
the nature of the computational problems themselves. (p. 11)
Our present reliance on technology is but the deepest point we have yet
reached in a channel that stretches back definitively through our ancestry.
Predating our species, stone tools began a techno-biological arms race in which
our species ultimately prevailed. In the course of hominin evolution, the brains
that survived were ones well suited to such dynamic technological coupling.
Our relatively static genome, rather than coding adaptations to the myriad
vicissitudes of social and ecological environments, sows the seeds of a rich and
flexible neural architecture that can plug into the whole memetically inherited
cultural package, social and technical. In short, our brains have evolved in
a technological body. That suggests our minds are technological, and that
we ourselves are technological. We are partly what we make. We are Homo
technologicus sapiens.
As I see it, two concerns motivate this comparison of technology with tissue
and ultimately understanding technologies as constitutive of human minds and
selves. One is the age-old question of how apparently law-abiding material stuff
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can be so arranged as to have a rich mental life that feels like it intervenes in
otherwise deterministic causal chains. I will not be providing a complete answer
to that question, but I do think that answering the question of what material
stuff is arranged into rich mental lives will make the remaining problem less
confusing than it has seemed. Technology, considered as tissue, helps begin to
explain the features of our minds and our selves better than do brain-centric
conceptions of minds. However, the ultimate motivation for the internalization
of technology into our concepts of self is a larger ethical concern, to which
I shall return in the final chapter. The concern arises from the observation
that Western culture attempts to live out a confusing and damaging paradox.
On one hand, the concept of the brainy self as a discrete and autonomous
rational agent dominates our treatment of roles, rights and responsibilities
within society. But while we’re big on personal freedom, most Westerners
take for granted the technologically-extended mode of life we inherit, with its
sprawling ecological footprint. Severely myopic but nonetheless human forces
drive a steady march of novelty-production which is implicitly endorsed in its
entirety as “progress”. We remain blind to our captivity in this march even
as (or perhaps partly because) we also fabricate superficial choices, like the
choice between buying a black device or a white one. We tout ideals of liberty
and self-expression, but excuse ourselves for being cogs in a machine when our
ways of life do come into question. The concern, then, is that our influence
spills well beyond our sense of responsibility. I suspect that is at least partly
because we haven’t adequately appreciated our boundaries as organisms and
corresponding moral agents. In short, thinking we’re smaller than we truly
are leaves us taking less than full responsibility for our selves. If our very
selves—minds and bodies—are bigger than we usually think, our agencies, our
freedoms and responsibilities, are greater than we usually think.
1.2 Thesis Outline
Of course, the claim that we are bigger than we think needs to be argued for.
However, such an undertaking turns out to be too big here. Instead, I concern
myself mainly with two related underlying and yet more general issues. I am
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concerned with the extent of the physical basis, constituents, or realizers of
complex or “non-categorical” properties—such as a thing’s being of a certain
kind or sort, having a certain disposition, having a certain function, or being
such that it would or could behave a certain way in certain circumstances. I
argue that anything on which an entity depends synchronically is constitutive of
that entity. Additionally, the thesis is concerned with the physical reducibility
or identity of such properties and their bearers. I argue that identity is the
relation between an entity or property and all that it depends synchronically
on.
Neither claim is uncontroversial. In favour of Unrestricted Constitutionalism,
I will argue:
[Differentiability Condition] If constitution is best analyzed simply as synchronic
ontological dependence, then anything on which an entity depends syn-
chronically is constitutive of that entity.
[Non-Differentiability of Constituents] Constitution is best analyzed simply as
synchronic ontological dependence.
So,
[Unrestricted Constitutionalism] Anything on which an entity depends syn-
chronically is constitutive of that entity.
Additionally, I argue that,
[Reducibility] Identity is the relation between an entity or property and all that it
depends synchronically on.
Here, note that I construe “entity” broadly, to include objects, states, pro-
cesses, events, phenomena and experiences. And I take synchronic dependence
to be the relation between an entity or property and those things, contempora-
neous with it, without which it would not be what it is (I defend this view in
more detail throughout).
To show why Unrestricted Constitutionalism at issue to begin with, in
Chapter 2, I argue that externalism about minds is contentious, for one thing,
because many theorists simply assume that the Non-Differentiability of Con-
stituents is false. That is, they tend to assume that not just anything on which
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an entity depends at some point in its duration is constitutive of that entity.
They assume, rather, that among the physical conditions upon which an entity
depends for its duration, some of those conditions are constituents, “proper
parts,” or “core realizers,” and others are mere background conditions.
To show why reduction is at issue in debates over externalism, I argue in
Chapter 2 that externalism about minds presupposes the scientific legitimacy of
certain higher-level entities characterized by functional or dispositional proper-
ties. Following the way reductionists have typically eschewed functional kinds in
order to combat multiple realization-based arguments against reduction, critics
of the extended mind worry that whatever model of minds and selves allows us
to imagine them as extended will not be a scientifically respectable one, ren-
dering such theses trivial. By contrast, I will later argue that antireductionism
is mistaken on different grounds.
Here’s how I will proceed to defend the underpinnings of my own externalist
view and brand of reductionism that does not eliminate functional kind (nor
other non-categorical properties). In Chapter 3, I introduce a variety of
synchronic dependence relations—constitution, composition, and realization—
and argue that they are closely related. Here, I join forces to an extent
with Karen Bennett, who, across various works (2003, 2008, 2011, 2017), also
connects issues of physicalism about minds to wider metaphysical issues about
dependence. For starters, Bennett (2017) thinks dependence relations—such
as causation, constitution, composition, and realization—are related to each
other. We disagree somewhat about how and to what extent they are related,
and whether synchronic dependence relations excluding causation are more
closely related. I think that composition, constitution, and realization are
identical—an issue I explore later.
Beyond sharing certain features, a further reason to think synchronic de-
pendence relations are related is that, as I show in Chapter 4, very similar
puzzles arise in each case in which an entity is claimed to depend on physical
conditions—whether composed, constituted, or realized by them—and yet
claimed not to be identical with those conditions. Specifically, “overdetermi-
nation” and “grounding” problems arise when we affirm physicalism but deny
identity is the relation between an entity or property and all that it depends
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synchronically on. These problems are prima facie reasons to accept reductive
physicalism.
In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, I defend a reductive view against the argument
from multiple realizability. I account for ubiquitous multiple realizability
as a transitive relation in a way that is amenable to reduction. I do so,
crucially, without consigning functional kinds to the flames as unscientific, or
“unprojectible.” The latter way of countering antireductionism would eliminate
those broadly “functionalist” notions of kinds such as minds and selves according
to which extended entities count among their members. A broadly reductive
functionalism would be required for the inference from our partial constitution
by technologies to our partial identity with technologies—which I’ve said is the
ultimate possibility I want to clear ground to consider.
In Chapter 7, I continue to defend a reductive view, once again engaging
with but departing from Bennett’s antireductive “compatibilism” that seeks to
redress worries about overdetermination. I diagnose a widespread antireductive
error in thinking about higher-level entities as distinct from physical conditions
on the basis of the former’s having differing properties from the latter. The
“sufficiency error” has two steps. First, we frequently hold fixed some set of
physical conditions occupying an obvious or convenient spatiotemporal region,
and we attribute properties to that set of physical conditions for which it
is, strictly speaking, insufficient. Those conveniently bounded conditions are
only sufficient under certain circumstances for the entity’s “non-categorical”
properties—whether kind, sortal, modal, functional, or dispositional properties.
In short, we first try to squeeze a property that is too big into a space that is
too small. Following Bennett, I call this first step, “circumstantialism,” which
would also deny Unrestricted Constitutionalism.
Circumstantialism is not, on its own, fatal. But it is trivial that a higher-
level entity is distinct from a narrow set of physical conditions not sufficient
for it. The second step in the sufficiency error is the further antireductive
inference to the wholesale distinctness of higher-level entities from physical
conditions. That inference is not valid, as I will show. Rather, if we hold
fixed some spatiotemporal region or specific physical conditions, then the latter
can be identified with all and only those properties for which it is sufficient
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all on its own. On the other hand, if we take as an explanandum some non-
categorical property, then the physical conditions fully sufficient to instantiate
that property determine the spatiotemporal extent of the entity to which that
property really belongs. I thus complete the argument for Reducibility, that
identity is the relation between an entity or property and all that it depends
synchronically on, whether constituents, parts, or realizers.
In Chapter 8, I argue against two ways of collapsing the distinction between
constitutive and causal dependence. One is to deny that there is any distinction
between them, and the other is to deny that such a distinction is theoretically
useful. I argue that constitutive explanations are separable from etiological
explanations and that it is useful to distinguish them. I grant, however, a point
motivating the second denial. I grant that causal interactions are constitutive
of temporally extended entities. But the question of which interactions are
etiological and which are constitutive, although relative to the explanatory
target, can nonetheless be sensibly answered. So the debate over externalism is
not merely terminological.
Now, broadly following the mainstream EM debate, I have formulated my
central argument for Unrestricted Constitutionalism in terms of constitution. In
fact, as we’ll see, externalists vacillate in their choice of synchronic dependence
locutions, using “constitution,” “composition,” and “realization,” among others.
I survey these in Chapter 3, because antireductive arguments also get made
in a similarly great variety of such terms. In Chapter 9, I argue that these
terms are co-extensive, referring to relations that share all of their features
and co-occur, and so, the relations themselves are identical. As predicates, the
terms are ontologically innocent with respect to one another. I defend that
view against some possible objections raised by Bennett (2011, 2017), who also
considers but rejects a similar thesis about dependence relations more broadly.
The upshot of my view is that it doesn’t matter which synchronic dependence
terminology is used to make externalist claims—a potentially surprising thesis
that externalists seem to have assumed, but not defended. Together with the
Reducibility claim, the interchangeability of these terms means that from our
partial constitution or realization by technologies, we can infer our partial
identity with them.
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In Chapter 10, I argue that there is no clear competitor to the notion of con-
stitution as captured by Unrestricted Constitutionalism. Specifically, I defend
the claim that constitution is best analyzed simply as synchronic ontological
dependence. For example, a hunk of marble may be said to constitute a statue
in certain circumstances, but any viable notion of constitution applies equally
to those circumstances; they also partly constitute the statue. Constitution as
synchronic ontological dependence alone does not distinguish the intuitively
most salient physical conditions from supposedly background ones.
I further defend this notion of constitution, and synchronic dependence
generally—against an objection based on the idea that we could be brains in
vats. This possibility can be taken to show that we could be wrong about
everything, such that what explains offline and illusory experiences is the same
as what explains apparently veridical experiences. So, brains explain experience
generally. This line of thinking tends to promote circumstantialism (specifically,
“internalism”) about the brain as constitutive, or as the core realizer, of our
minds. But I argue that brains in vats do not show that we could be wrong
about everything. I thus deny the analogy between offline/illusory experiences
and veridical ones. I also argue that the notion of explanation in play in a
valid rendering of the objection is not the relevant one.
Having earlier defended functional kinds as projectible, I then argue that
there is no prima facie reason that biotic–abiotic composites like human–
tool couplings cannot be members of projectible kinds. Now, it’s true that
we might sometimes eliminate certain equivocal or unprojectible functional
kinds and corresponding properties from our theories. On the other hand,
whenever apparently non-categorical properties—like those had by intentional
states—figure in successful predictions, they should be taken seriously as
objects of explanation. But we ought not to presuppose the boundaries of the
physical conditions sufficient for them. I conclude Chapter 10 by arguing that
the externalist should bite the bullet with respect to the apparent counter-
intuitiveness of the view. The “bloat” objection is roughly that on this view
minds might be constituted by anything and everything. While no such extreme
conclusion follows from my view, I account for the counter-intuitiveness of my
argument for externalism in terms of differing epistemic salience within the
9
ontological dependence bases of higher-level things.
I argue, albeit briefly, in Chapter 11 that there is a close relation between our
minds and our selves as targets of praise and blameworthiness. Most plausibly,
we are minds, which are identical with extensive physical conditions that
include our bodies and technological carapaces. In every case of psychological
continuity there is also circumstantial continuity constituting a person’s being
of a kind with their past and future selves. I argue that phenomenological
evidence of our personal boundaries suggests that our bodies are dynamically
extensible. The upshot is that our particular mental lives would fail to be
duplicated if our biological duplicates were to be transplanted into different
technical carapaces and wider technological circumstances.
Let me pause for a moment to reflect on the nature of this project. This is
obviously a very different approach to the question of externalism than usual.
Admittedly, the view that minds extend because it takes more than the thing
to which we attribute non-categorical properties to instantiate those properties,
might come as a sort of disappointment, an almost pyrrhic victory on behalf of
externalism. Indeed, my liberal view of constitution is rather deflationary in the
sense that it is a wholesale rejection of our intuitive restrictions on constitution
and other synchronic dependence relations, which I lump together. But I think
it’s the right view, and defending it also goes a long way toward establishing
a coherent physicalism about minds in the face of the putative mind–body
problem, the apparent mystery of consciousness, and general puzzles about the
relation between higher and lower-level objects of science. Moreover, settling
conceptual arguments about what sort of things minds depend on allows us to
move on to what might be more practical considerations that come fully into
view.
Thus, in Chapter 11, I gesture at a few interesting and morally salient
subsets of the complete constituents or total realizers of our minds and selves
from the rest. Technologies are on the inside of each of these. Specifically, our
technological parts are vast relative to our biological parts, in them we overlap
with one another, and they are among the conditions of our experience that
we can engineer and are responsible for, which has moral implications. Yet
these are parts of ourselves of which we are often unconscious, and when we
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are conscious of them, we are not conscious of them as parts of ourselves.
Wrapping Up
I am primarily occupied herein with the very notions of parthood, realization,
constitution, and the like, and the reducibility of things to their parts. But in
the end, I suggest that to be a person, on my view of the metaphysics, is to
be woven into a radically joint venture which is fundamentally technological.
Our particular mental lives would fail to transplant into bodies lacking these
appendages; in transplantation, minds—not necessarily our own—would be
made anew. Thus, tissue-like technologies, as life-supports, may be proper
objects of moral concern. I suggest that the beauty of the fact that we can
share huge parts of ourselves and our minds means that we could cultivate
more life—more mental life—out of less stuff, and that less stuff of certain
kinds would make for more flourishing all around. While it’s not obvious that
anything on which an entity depends synchronically is constitutive of that
entity, in this chapter, my aim was to summarize why I think so, what is
controversial about thinking so, and how I’m going to tackle those controversies
in the coming chapters.
Chapter 2
The Difficulties with Extended
Minds
Our minds are big. Not by having big ideas or contemplating the enormity
of the universe. Rather, minds are big because, supposing minds are made
of something, what minds are made of, and thus where they are to be found
in physical space, extends beyond brains. Since my central concern for the
better part of this thesis is with the question of whether that’s true, the
aim of this chapter is to understand what is controversial about thinking
so. I argue that existing arguments for externalism appear to make plausible
counterfactual dependence claims, but that they otherwise preach to the
section of the choir that shares other key intuitions. These are intuitions
about synchronic dependence relations which operate as implicit premises in
inferences from the dependence of a mental state or cognitive processes on
something extraneural to the latter’s being part of that state or process. By
and large, externalists haven’t set themselves to the difficult task of explaining
and defending the notion of constitution or other synchronic dependence
relations they’re working with. Nor have they defended the functionalism
that the substantivity of externalism also requires. To the contrary, there
is a trend toward casting vague aspersions in the direction of “metaphysics”
while nonetheless being implicitly bound up with particular metaphysical
commitments.
To show this, I discuss one particularly popular version of externalism, or
the idea that our minds are bigger than our brains. That is the “extended
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mind” (EM) hypothesis, as set out by Clark and Chalmers (1998).1 I offer a
new diagnosis of the dispute between this mainstream form of externalism and
its critics; I argue that the deeper battle lines have not been accurately drawn
by the major parties to the debate, and that their disagreements are special
cases of divided intuitions over metaphysical issues that run through a broad
swathe of philosophy. To show this, I discuss one particularly popular version
of externalism, or the idea that our minds are bigger than our brains. That
is the “extended mind” (EM) hypothesis, as set out by Clark and Chalmers
(1998).2 I offer a new diagnosis of the dispute between this mainstream form
of externalism and its critics; I argue that the deeper battle lines have not
been accurately drawn by the major parties to the debate, and that their
disagreements are special cases of divided intuitions over metaphysical issues
that run through a broad swathe of philosophy.
First, in Section 2.1, I highlight a deep divide between externalists and
their critics over the general nature of higher-level entities and properties as
objects of science. In Section 2.3, I highlight a related divide over the nature
of higher-level entities and properties’ dependence on lower-level ones. Now,
although I use debates over EM as a primary point of reference and a convenient
way to probe those deeper issues, I pause in Section 2.2 to examine Hurley’s
(2010) taxonomy of externalist positions in order to point out that the same
issues are crucial to the question of externalism more broadly. As I indicated in
Chapter 1, the same issues—the status of higher-level kinds as objects of science
and their dependence on lower-level ones—lie at the heart of the question of
our boundaries, which is why I want to bring them to the fore through the
present discussion of externalism.
This is not intended as a comprehensive survey of the literature and the
increasing interaction between the extended mind literature and emerging
branches of cognitive science. The bulk of the thesis is spent taking a rather
large step back to conceptual matters, and deals with the relevant literature
on those matters. The basic idea to be put forward is that considerations
of metaphysical sufficiency drive one to conclude that non-categorical prop-
1 Every reference to Clark and Chalmers in this chapter is to Clark and Chalmers (1998).
2 Every reference to Clark and Chalmers in this chapter is to Clark and Chalmers (1998).
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erty bearers reduce to their properties, which reduce to their wide realizers.
Extension, or embeddedness and intertwinedness, is the norm for entities bear-
ing non-categorical properties, including mental states and cognitive systems,
rather than the exception. The selective nature of the present survey is to be
expected, given the much broader scope of the thesis as a whole. The point
I wish to draw out is simply that those larger issues are at issue within the
extended mind debate.
2.1 The First Battle Line
Clark and Chalmers use two examples to make their argument that minds
extend beyond the skull. The first example is that of the process of rotating
a Tetris game piece on the screen of a computer or game console to test for
the best fit of the piece within the play area, a process that, if it was done in
the head by mentally “rotating” the piece, would be considered a “cognitive”
process. Clark and Chalmers suggest that the analogous and partly externalized
process is still cognitive. The second example is that of a mental state, such as
having a belief. A belief is a dispositional state that we say is about something,
for example, a museum, either because of its causal history in relation to
the museum, or because of the role that the belief would play, given certain
(perhaps museum-related) inputs, in driving certain (perhaps museum-related)
behaviours. For example, Inga desires to see a certain exhibit at the Museum
of Modern Art, and the belief that the museum is on 53rd Street impels her
there. Suppose now that a functionally equivalent disposition—to go to 53rd
Street given the desire to see the same exhibit—is implemented by a somewhat
different state of affairs. Otto, who has a poor memory for such details as
addresses, writes the address in a notebook. Clark and Chalmers say that the
notebook, in relation to Otto, partly constitutes his belief about the location
of the museum, since it drives the same or very similar behaviour in the same
or very similar circumstances that Inga’s “normal” belief does.
Clark and Chalmers discuss both cognitive processes and mental states.
Now, no one seems to think the argument hinges on whether it is put in terms
of cognitive processes, or mental states, or cognitive states, or mental processes,
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or some combination thereof.3 In any case, then, extended cognitive processes
or mental states, taken together with some plausible relation between these and
minds, yields externalism—the idea that our minds are bigger than our brains.
Candidate mind–cognitive relations might be that minds are i) identical with
cognitive processes and/or mental states, or ii) wholly constituted by cognitive
processes and/or mental states, or iii) partly constituted by cognitive processes
and/or mental states. Now, I think it’s fair to assume, seemingly along with
everyone else, that one way or another, whatever is true of cognitive processes
and mental states is true of minds. So I also think the argument stands or falls
independently of precisely which mind–cognitive-process relation is invoked.
But a bit more care must be taken here. First, there is a possibility of
equivocating on one or more of the notions in play in such a way as to invalidate
the inference from cognition to mind. Or, with clarified premises, there may be
a fallacy of composition. To see the problem, suppose that consciousness is a
definitive feature of minds. Suppose it’s part of what we mean by “mind.” Next
note that we are confident that minds depend on brains. In spite of our usual
mind–body problem—that there’s some sort of gap between neurological goings
on and consciousness—neurological goings on seem like good candidates for
a complete physical explanation of consciousness if there could be one. After
all, the intuition goes, wherever you have a (healthy) brain, you have a mind,
and wherever there is no brain—at least given the present state of AI—there is
no mind. We imagine brains in vats to have mental lives and so we imagine
that brains are sufficient and perhaps even nomologically necesssary, or at least
necessary in practice, for minds. As a result of this set of intuitions, there may
3 If there was a distinction between the cognitive and the mental (suppose there could
be something cognitive where there is nothing mental, or vice versa), arguments for EM
could be run in terms of just cognitive processes or mental states, and might fare differently.
But the distinction is not at all clear. First, I take it that states are temporal parts of
what are in reality dynamic processes, so I take it that mental states are parts of mental
processes, and cognitive processes can be modeled as involving “cognitive” states, and that
there would be nothing terribly unusual about speaking in terms of mental processes and
cognitive states. In fact, some parties to the debate, including critics, switch freely among
those terms (e.g. Adams and Aizawa, 2010, pp. 69–70). At any rate, second, no one appears
to endorse extended cognitive processes while rejecting extended mental states, or vice versa.
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be something fishy about involving non-living parts in whatever we take to be
responsible for minds, ignoring, as intuitions often do, the fact that at chemical
or atomic grain-level of description, brain parts are non-living, too. The worry,
then, is that the EM theorist is arguing:
[Extended Cognition] There are cognitive processes (or mental states) that are
partly constituted by extraneural entities.
[Mind–Cognitive Relation] Cognitive processes and mental states are constitu-
tive of minds.
So,
[Extended Mind] Minds can be partly constituted by extraneural entities.
It many seem to the critic of the Extended Mind thesis that whatever
notion of what it is to be a “cognitive” process or “mental” state that is
inclusive of extended ones must pick out a different notion than the one in a
premise the critic would accept relating the cognitive and mental to minds.
That equivocation would render the inference from Extended Cognition to
Extended Mind invalid. On the other hand, avoiding the equivocation and
invalidity by injecting the broader notion of the cognitive and mental into
the Mind–Cognitive Relation premise, the critic might think such a claim is
strictly false—that minds are constituted by only the conscious part of the
extended cognitive process or mental state. Finally, if the Mind–Cognitive
Relation premise were to be clarified in that way and made plausible in the eyes
of the critic, then the validity of the conclusion would then demand the further
false generalization that “if M is constituted by part of P+ (P ), then M is
constituted by P+.” That is a fallacy of composition; it attributes a property
(the relational property of constituting M) to a whole (P+), that belongs to
one of its parts (P ).
A similar point would apply even if we take some defining feature of minds
to be a defining feature of the cognitive and mental themselves. An analogous
objection migrates upstream to auxiliary arguments for extended processes
and mental states. Here, an equivocation between 1) a notion of an extended
state as a species of “belief”, and 2) “belief” as a species of the mental would
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render the inference from the specific to the general invalid. Again, the critic
might only want to allow that part of the extended process of believing or
state of having a belief should be called cognitive or mental. Hence we see
the critical response, characterized by Clark (2010a), that, “all Otto actually
believes (in advance) is that the address is in the notebook” (p. 46). And,
again, the inference from a mere part of P+’s being a G to P+’s being a G is
not valid without being committed to a fallacy of composition.
In short, a critic of EM may not be inclined to accept Extended Cognition
and the Mind–Cognitive Relation at the same time. In fact, the critic who
assumes that brains are sufficient for minds will tend to think the line of
reasoning for the premise he accepts tells against the other premise. The
form of the objection is that what could make something cognitive or mental
in a broader sense is different than what makes for minds as distinguished
by some other feature.4 Whatever the distinguishing feature of minds, the
point at present is twofold. First, the EM theorist must apply their theory of
what makes something a belief and what makes belief mental consistently in
order to avoid equivocating when claiming that extraneural entities can partly
constitute cognitive processes or mental states. Second, and crucially, it is no
good to avoid equivocation by changing all of the important terms to suit the
inferences such that whatever is extended is unlike what the rest of us mean
by “mind.”
So what notion of the cognitive and mental are Clark and Chalmers working
with? It is an unabashedly functionalist notion of minds. Functionalism about
minds takes them to be like other things characterized by what they do, such
as cars or mousetraps. What does it take to be a car? Something like the
ability to carry goods or passengers on roads. One might subdivide cars by
specifying further functionality or interoperability. Rail cars for railroads, and
toy cars for toy roads. Trucks carry more stuff. We can continue in this way,
perhaps specifying the precise functionality of a kind down to a class of things
4 I’ll return later to the assumption that motivated the particular version of the objection
as I introduced it, which took consciousness to be the distinguishing feature of minds. That
was the assumption that brains are sufficient for consciousness. By Chapter 10, we’ll see
why the externalist should deny as much.
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that are indiscernible. But we don’t usually do so. We, and other (non-human)
cognitive agents, classify things more generously, and it seems both quite
natural and practical to do so. For example, there are all sorts of reasonably
good predictions one would miss the benefit of being able to make if one utterly
failed to register any similarity between a Honda Civic and a Toyota Corolla.
Likewise, functionalism about minds answers the question of what a mind is by
reference to what minds do. Like cars, minds are identified by what they do.
And like cars, not just anything counts. Functionality constrains design, and
the more functional specificity, the more the constraint. Despite the rhetoric
of early functionalists, neither minds nor reliable cars could be made of Swiss
cheese, a point Block (1997) has called the “Disney Principle.” But they could
be made of anything that could get the relevant job or jobs done, the idea
goes, and that might be a lot of different things. Unless part of what we mean
by “cognitive” is “fully brain-based,” then membership in the cognitive kind,
or family of kinds, is at least in principle open to processes and states with
extraneural entities. And we should not consider being brain-based a criterion
for being “cognitive.” The denial of the possibility that extraneural entities
can constitute cognitive states or processes based on the requirement that
cognition be brain-based, in the absence of further reasons for that requirement,
would beg the question, as others have pointed out (see Menary, 2010; Clark,
2010b; Hurley, 2010). Rather, things like discrimination, awareness, flexible
action, intelligent behaviour, goal-seeking, harm avoidance, reason, information
processing, or perhaps consciousness, are what we seek to explain. We find
brains at the center of all that, of course. But most of us would agree the latter
is a fact we have discovered; it is no part of our concept of, say, “reasoning”
that it should occur in brains alone—an omniscient and omnipresent creator is
thought to reason, apparently without embodiment. Being reasonable, as is
typical of functional properties, is identified by what being reasonable does,
not by how it does so.
Clark and Chalmers thus presented their argument using what has become
known as the “parity principle.” The parity principle is the idea that a process
or state should be considered “cognitive” or “mental,” if some functionally
equivalent process or state in the brain would be considered cognitive or mental.
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Clark says Otto’s notebook is a “resource whose encodings, at appropriate
run-time moments, inform Otto’s behavior in the way characteristic. . . of
dispositional beliefs.” And, Clark claims, this is “all that matters” (2010b, p.
89). However, Clark’s is an appeal to the obviousness of functionalism, not
a defense of it. And insofar as functionalism seems incompatible—in ways
we’ll see in Chapter 4—with other plausible ideas (for example, a physicalist’s
typical commitment to the causal closure of the physical world), functionalism
about minds is not a foregone conclusion.
One way of rejecting functionalism about minds is to deny that functional
kinds belong in a properly scientific ontology. Thus, in contrast to Clark’s
functionalism, Adams and Aizawa (2010), EM’s “most outspoken critics” (Wal-
ter and Kyselo, 2009, p. 277) continue to defend their (2001) claims. One
is that, “A first essential condition on the cognitive is that cognitive states
must involve intrinsic, non-derived content” (2001, p. 48). Another is that,
“The second necessary condition is a condition on the nature of processing”
(2001, p. 51), and “The cognitive may, therefore, be assumed to be like other
natural domains, namely, the cognitive must be discriminated on the basis of
underlying causal processes” (2001, p. 52).
Aizawa and Adams (2005) spell out the derived/underived distinction
involved in the first condition. Some representations, such as mental images of
trees, “derive” their meaning from purely non-representational things. Others,
such as written sentences about trees, “derive” their meaning from mental
representations of trees, themselves underived. This condition is contentious
and arguably doesn’t work as Adams and Aizawa intend it, for reasons put
forward by others that I needn’t explore further (see Clark, 2005, 2010b, 2010a).
But here, I want to point out that it’s really not clear how the un-derivedness
criterion and the mechanistic criterion fit together. To see why, we must explore
the second condition in more detail. First, note that the second condition is
reminiscent of a point Kim (1992b), among others, has tried to make. Kim
reasons,
instances of M [some putative mental kind] that are realized by
the same physical base must be grouped under one kind, since
ex hypothesi the physical base is a causal kind; and instances of
M with different realization bases must be grouped under distinct
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kinds, since, again ex hypothesi, these realization bases are distinct
as causal kinds. Given that mental kinds are realized by diverse
physical causal kinds, therefore, it follows that mental kinds are
not causal kinds, and hence are disqualified as proper scientific
kinds. Each mental kind is sundered into as many kinds as there
are physical realization bases for it, and [psychology] as a science
with disciplinary unity turns out to be an impossible project. (p. 18)
Kim attempts, unsuccessfully I think, to distinguish his (1992b) view from
eliminativism. Eliminativism, or eliminative materialism, “is the radical claim
that our ordinary, common-sense understanding of the mind is deeply wrong
and that some or all of the mental states posited by common-sense do not
actually exist” (Ramsey, 2003). Though I’ll evaluate Kim’s view in detail in
Chapter 5, the sundering Kim refers to really does eliminate the sundered as a
scientific kind, since Kim thinks it lacks projectibility. I thus take this line of
thinking to be broadly eliminativist.
Notice that a view like Kim’s does not so much deny any of the premises
of the arguments we’ve seen as it changes the subject to something putatively
more amenable to rigorous scientific study. The issue changes from being about
how to account for what we now consider to be cognitive states and processes,
to whether the very things we’re trying to account for are really things that
should be accounted for at all (and, if not, the rather vexed question of what we
should be trying to explain). At any rate, to deny that intelligence, for example,
is a kind at all is not, or not directly, to deny that a particular “intelligent”
behaviour can partly depend on extraneural entities. No one is denying that
Otto-and-his-notebook exists, and depends on the notebook. They deny, rather,
that Otto-and-his-notebook is a member of a projectible kind.
Likewise, Adams and Aizawa (2001) suggest that extended-Otto’s disposition
is not a belief because it ostensibly—at least at some grain-level of description—
doesn’t work exactly the way brain-based beliefs work. Adams and Aizawa
say,
Human memory displays a number of what appear to be law-like
regularities, including primacy effects, recency effects, chunking
effects, and others. Further, human memory capacities are task
sensitive. Memories for images, faces, smells, and lists of words vary
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in properties of formation and recall. Consider, then, the range
of tools humans use as mnemonic aids. There are photo albums,
Rolodexes, computer databases, strings around the finger, address
books, sets of business cards, bulletin boards, date books, personal
information managing software, palmtop computers, hand drawn
maps, and lists of “things to do.” What are the chances of there
being interesting regularities that cover humans interacting with all
these sorts of tools? Slim to none, we speculate. There just isn’t
going to be a science covering the motley collection of “memory”
processes found in human tool use. (2001, p. 61)
If believing involves remembering, and brain-based remembering processes
can be more finely individuated as a kind by their other effects, then believing
can be sundered into subkinds. But it is odd that Adams and Aizawa imagine
the relation of a would-be science of extended cognition to a single extended
cognitive kind to be one-to-one. Rather, a “single” scientific discipline—unified
in terms of method, grain-level of description and/or range of phenomena
investigated—usually posits many kinds. Just as “memories for images, faces,
smells, and lists of words” vary in properties, so might various human–tool
couplings, each of which may be projectible. Something no one to my knowledge
has wondered aloud is whether a particular set of oft-encountered human–tool
couplings, taken as extended systems, might show more regularity as a kind
than their non-extended sub-systems (biological humans). Given our rather
great degree of neural plasticity, it would be unsurprising if more generalizations
could be made about iPhone-users than about Homo sapiens, not just because
all iPhone-users are partly constituted by Homo sapiens, but because iPhone-
users are also partly constituted by mass-produced bits that are very alike as
appendages. A similar line of reasoning would seem to apply to the states and
processes of these systems. And the properties of these extended systems may
show a remarkable degree of “homeostatic clustering” (see Boyd, 1999)—the
tendency of instances of a self-reproducing kind to share multiple properties—
since iPhone users don’t so much give birth to Achulean axe-makers as they do
to more iPhone-users.
I said above that it’s not obvious how the two criteria set out by Adams and
Aizawa (2001) are meant to work together, and now it should be clear why. It’s
not as if one can define the class of mammals first by their being warm-blooded
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and nursing, and then by their being divisible into marsupials, primates, canines,
felines, rodents, ungulates, lagomorphs, equines, chiropterans, and the rest, as if
to guarantee that any warm-blooded nursing animals we might later find would
fail to be mammals if they failed to be members of a known mammalian subclass.
Likewise, to require that all cognitive processes involve non-derived content,
and to further require that “the cognitive must be discriminated on the basis
of underlying causal processes” (2001, p. 52) looks ad hoc at best. The specific
effects of human memory can’t be what makes beliefs mental and remembering
cognitive, since beliefs are not the only mental states, and remembering is not
the only cognitive process. The specificity that would rule out Otto’s belief
as being of a kind with brain-based beliefs excludes the rest of cognition, too.
Just as planning needn’t be functionally equivalent with remembering in order
to count as cognitive, it is not clear why extended remembering would have to
be functionally equivalent to “normal” remembering to count as cognitive. And
of course, at some even finer grain-level of description, Inga’s remembering and
mine don’t work exactly the same way either. So it’s not surprising that, as
Menary (2010, p. 7) points out, other arguments for EM rely less on parity
between extended and non-extended processes and states.
Yet “remembering” remains a clearly functional characterization of a kind,
as does “problem solving,” etc., and perhaps even “involving non-derived
content.” With or without perfect parity between extended and putatively
non-extended processes or states, the notions of cognition and mentality in the
argument for Extended Mind are functional.
I’ve set eliminativism and functionalism up as competing alternatives; we’ll
see why in more detail soon enough. In Chapter 4, we’ll see what motivates
the eliminativist line of thinking and, in Chapter 5, why eliminativism is
neither a necessary nor a clearly viable road to take. Briefly, here’s how I
see it. Functionalism and eliminativism are incompatible views about kinds
and the appropriate objects of scientific enquiry. Either functional kinds can
be projectible, or they cannot. If they can be projectible, then we must
countenance at least some functional kinds as scientific kinds. I will argue in
Chapter 5 that they are projectible and we must countenance functional kinds
as scientific kinds. But if functional kinds can be scientific, and functional
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kinds are basically open to anything that does the job, then there’s no way to
ensure in advance that a particular functional kind is limited to the existing
card-carrying membership. Supposing we agree or can clearly stipulate what,
for example, “intelligence” does in some paradigm cases, it is nomologically
possible that something non-brain-based or not-fully-brain based is intelligent.
Although a defense of functional kinds is yet to come, suffice it here to draw
a few preliminary points from the discussion so far. First, with the elimination
of functional kinds goes our present cognitive science. Psychology and cognitive
science, among other “special sciences above the level of physics,” like biology,
now trade in functional kinds (see Fodor, 1974). So assuming for now that we
do indeed want to explain the likes of “remembering”, we ought to accept that
remembering is as remembering does, however it does so.
Second, the significance of EM hinges on the merit of functional kinds as
scientific kinds. I briefly raised questions about each of Adams and Aizawa’s
criteria on the cognitive simply to show what is at issue in the debate over EM.
Critics of EM don’t have an easy task of stating what is common to all and
only cognitive states, as if EM theorists had just misunderstood how to apply
a kind term that is perfectly clear to everyone else. Of course, Adams and
Aizawa (2010) acknowledge the lack of clarity in the concept of the cognitive
and its extension. They say, “in all fairness to Clark and other extended mind
theorists, it must be admitted that one of the shortcomings of contemporary
cognitive psychology is that there is no well-established theory of just exactly
what constitutes the cognitive” (p. 68). But neither do EM theorists have an
obvious case. That’s because, on the other hand, if proponents of EM intend
their thesis to be empirically interesting and relevant to science, as they do,
then claims about the instantiation of F assume—if they fail to state—that
F is a member of a kind about which useful things can be said. It’s not very
interesting to claim that my pinky and the equator are parts of an F , namely,
my-pinky-and-the-equator, that is of some kind, G, maybe fingery-things-plus-
circumferences-perpendicular-to-rotational-axes, that nothing very useful can
be said about, and it would be downright odd to worry about the constituents
of instances of a kind like phlogiston that doesn’t name anything we now
take to be real. The significance of the EM hypothesis thus hinges on the
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legitimacy of functional kinds as scientific kinds. Again, eliminativism isn’t a
direct counterargument; it’s just that if functional kinds aren’t scientific, the
Extended Mind thesis lacks teeth. It appeals to a kind that is not useful to the
overall project of discovering the world and dealing with it.
Finally, notice that the parties to the debate do not disagree on whether
there are any extended processes because some empirical data is lacking. I
take it that if the parties to the debate had before them a particle-by-particle,
field-by-field, instant-to-instant account of the event of Otto’s picking up
his notebook and making his way to the museum, they would still disagree
about the relation of the notebook to Otto’s mind. While the parties to the
debate disagree about the mark of the cognitive, Adams and Aizawa’s (2001)
mechanistic criterion highlights the possibility of disagreeing, not just about
which standard makes something a member of a given kind, but about what
sort of standards make something count as a member of any kind. In a closely-
related discussion of the functionalist doctrine of multiple realizability, Bickle
(2016, sec. 3) concludes:
What is at stake here should not be underemphasized: nothing
less than one of the most influential arguments from late-20th
century Anglo-American philosophy, one that impacts not only
the philosophical mind–body problem but also the relationship
between sciences addressing higher and lower levels of the universe’s
organization.
2.2 The Varieties of Externalism
I’m arguing that externalism requires further defense and hinges on larger
philosophical issues, but I want to pause for a moment to reflect on the scope
of “externalism” in that claim. I have made some fairly sweeping claims about
“externalists,” whom I defined at the outset of this chapter as those who think
that cognitive processes or mental states can depend synchronically on (or can
be constituted by) extraneural entities, or more than brains. This obviously
includes a variety of thinkers, and indeed, I am trying to help myself to some
general points about the state of a family of debates while nonetheless using
Clark and Chalmers (1998) as my main point of departure. While it is the locus
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classicus of the EM view, it is but one species of externalism. Presently, I’ll
address the “varieties of externalism,” as famously outlined by Hurley (2010) in
an essay by that name. I’ll explore Hurley’s taxonomy in order to explain why
externalists of every variety need a plausible account of synchronic dependence
and the merit of cognitive or otherwise functional kinds.
Arguments for externalism have historically been made in various ways and
have sometimes made reference to the extendedness of the vehicles (e.g. Clark
and Chalmers, 1998) and sometimes to the externality of the content of mental
states (Burge, 1986; Putnam, 1975b). And some have referenced qualitative
mental states, such as “enactivist” motor theories of perception (e.g. Noë,
2010; Thelen and Smith, 1996), and others (e.g. Clark and Chalmers, 1998)
have referenced intentional states (like Otto’s belief) or cognitive/behavioural
capacities (playing Tetris). Hurley (2010) organizes these apparent varieties of
externalism in a two-by-two matrix. She contrasts “what externalism” with
“how externalism,” and externalism about qualities with externalism about
content. We thus have the following possible positions, informal expressions of
which I take from Hurley.
[What-Content Externalism] “What-content explanations appeal to causal rela-
tions between an organism and its environment, understood to provide
constitutive rather than merely causal explanation of mental content
type, even though in many illusions and hallucinations, tokens of content
types do not participate in the type of causal process that is nevertheless
taken to explain, constitutively, their content” (Hurley, 2010, p. 106).
[Content-Enabling Externalism] “Most discussions of the ‘extended mind’ con-
cern extended cognition—externalism about vehicles of intentional con-
tents. They consider enabling explanations that cross internal–external
boundaries, including body, environmental objects, or both” (Hurley,
2010, p. 127).
[What-Quality Externalism] “What the world is like can be part of what explains
what experience is like” (Hurley, 2010, p. 145).
[Quality-Enabling Externalism] “What the world is like can be part of what
enables us to experience what it is like” (Hurley, 2010, p. 143).
Hurley (2010) herself defends each of the forms of externalism she dis-
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tinguishes. Moreover, her reasons for doing so often cross-cut those very
distinctions, for example, when she denies that illusions and hallucinations
“support what-quality internalism and enabling internalism,” saying that, “it’s
no objection when explaining quality type that the type-explanatory external
factors are absent in illusory cases, any more than it’s an objection when ex-
plaining content type” (p. 141). Hurley proposes distinctions between positions
that then, by her own lights, stand or fall together.
On the other axis, Hurley’s distinction between what and how externalisms
relies on a distinction between “enabling explanations” and other explanations
one would think must be “non-enabling”. This is most obvious in her char-
acterizations of What-Quality Externalism as compared to Quality-Enabling
Externalism. Note, too, that the distinction cannot be a matter of differing
grain-levels of description. My desire to eat fruit may be completely explained
by my brain or completely explained by my brain, other tissues, fruit, etc.
These are substantively different explanations (if one is true, then the other
is false) at roughly the same grain-levels of description. And supposing the
brain-only explanation is true, that would not make an explanation at the
grain-level of neurons false. Nowhere does Hurley (2010) cash out what she
means by “explanation,” but it appears to be something in the vicinity of
what others have variously called “metaphysical explanation”, “ontological
dependence,” “supervenience,” or “grounding”—very roughly, the relation that
obtains between a thing and all the stuff (potentially describable at various
grain-levels) that it takes to get the thing in question going and/or to keep it
going. And, at times, Hurley (2010) again seems to tie the fates of what and
how explanations together, saying that if “what enables qualitative experience
is ongoing embodied interactions of the brain with environment” (p. 141), that
is, if Quality-Enabling Externalism is true, then, “the extended what-quality ex-
planation and the corresponding extended quality-enabling explanation would
converge in the natural world” (p. 142). The implication is that Quality-
Enabling Externalism entails What-Quality Externalism. It is certainly not
clear that anyone wants to hold those positions apart.
Further, broadly citing Robert Wilson (2004), Hurley also says more gener-
ally, “how-externalism may require what-externalism” (p. 105). If anything,
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however, the what/how distinction appears to get some traction when one
contrasts the historical claims Hurley categorizes as What-Content Externalism
and Content-Enabling Externalism. That is, at face value, there is a difference
between the “semantic” externalism of Putnam (1975b) and Burge (1986),
and the “active” externalism of Clark and Chalmers, since there is an obvious
distinction to be made between Otto’s notebook and the museum his putative
belief is about. Semantic externalism is the idea that the museum is constitutive
of beliefs about it. It is silent on the status of Otto’s notebook. By contrast,
active externalism claims Otto’s notebook is a constituent of his belief about
the museum. It is silent as to any dependence relation the belief may have to
the museum. It certainly seems as if the notebook and the museum, even if
they are both determinative of the belief in some sense, are determinative of
it in different senses; Clark and Chalmers explicitly distinguish their active
externalism about “vehicles” from semantic externalism about “content”. So
one possibility is to include the notebook in the enabling explanation of Otto’s
belief, as Clark and Chalmers do, but still not extend the enabling explanation
as far as the museum. One might claim instead that the museum stands in a
causal relation to extended Otto. So it might then be tempting to think that
Hurley means to divide enabling explanations from non-enabling explanations
in the same way that we might divide metaphysically explanatory, ontological
dependence, supervenience, or grounding relations into causal and constitutive
species. Roughly, causal explanations are those which specify the bits we’d
wiggle to influence something prior to its occurrence. Roughly, constitutive
explanations are those which specify the bits we’d wiggle to alter something
during its occurrence.
But Hurley explicitly says that “the what–how distinction doesn’t align
cleanly with either a causal–constitutive distinction or an external–internal
distinction” (p. 106). Now the trouble is, it’s hard to see how one can have it
both ways. What-explanations can’t be distinguished from enabling explana-
tions unless by the causal/constitutive distinction she takes to be a separate
issue. One can’t maintain that features of the environment constitutively
explain mental content or quality types, while excluding those features from
the enabling explanation, without consigning the meaning of “enabling” to
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further obscurity. In other words, if the what/how distinction doesn’t align
with a causal/constitutive distinction, then it’s entirely unclear how one could
be a what-externalist without also being an enabling externalist. Instead, on
closer inspection, the difference between an account that takes the museum
to constitute Otto’s belief, and an account that doesn’t, is not a difference
between non-enabling explanations and enabling ones, but between enabling
explanations involving rival notions of constitution.
2.3 The Second Battle Line
We can now draw the second battle line, although it might cut across a corner
of the externalist camp. I’ll first deal with the matter of labeling because it will
help to see the terrain. Positions that disagree over What-Content Externalism
because of differing notions of constitution, though not best characterized as
“what” and “how” externalisms, might better be characterized as “unrestricted”
externalism and “restricted” externalism, following their views about constitu-
tion, particularly whether it is restricted or not. Define unrestricted externalists
as those who accept What-Content Externalism because they accept, among
other things, as I do, that,
[Unrestricted Constitutionalism] Anything on which an entity depends syn-
chronically is constitutive of that entity.
Then, one way of denying What-Content Externalism is to deny Unrestricted
Constitutionalism. Call that restricted constitutionalism. Here, then, is how
externalisms might be divided by notions of constitution. Recall that to arrive
at the Extended Cognition claim requires further argument. First, externalisms
differ in the examples of processes or states and extraneural entities to which
they appeal. They make claims of the form: “if not for x (an extraneural entity),
then not y (a mental state or process)”, where x and y temporally overlap,
and fill these claims in differently. On their own, these differences might be
shallow, except for precisely how the argument from the dependence claim to
Extended Cognition is cashed out. Going in for Unrestricted Constitutionalism,
Extended Cognition would straightforwardly follow from the truth of a cognitive
process or mental state’s synchronic dependence on an extraneural entity. On
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the other hand, one might think that constituents belong to a narrower subset
of things on which a process or state depends synchronically—a subset that
meets some additional criteria. And this notion of constitution may correspond
more closely to our ordinary one. So one might implicitly deny Unrestricted
Constitutionalism by supplying a notion of constitution according to which the
particular extraneural xs to which one’s example appeals are constitutive of y.
To my knowledge, however, no one has supplied such a notion. The
second thing to clarify, then, is what parts of the terrain just labelled are
actually occupied. Semantic externalism and enactivism almost certainly need
Unrestricted Constitutionalism, or something like it. This, I take it, is what
analogously leads Wilson (2001) to make the general remark that what he calls
“wide realization” “makes most direct metaphysical sense of the widespread
recognition that a range of mental properties are not individualistic. . . and
a view that externalists should readily agree with” (p. 6, my emphasis). But
it is difficult to know whether, for example, the active externalism of Clark
and Chalmers, while clearly a form of externalism, subscribes to unrestricted
or restricted constitutionalism. Interestingly, Clark and Chalmers do seem to
supply additional criteria for constituents of cognitive systems. Summarizing
the original (1998) position, Clark (2010c) offers, “a rough-and-ready set of
additional criteria to be met by nonbiological candidates for inclusion into an
individual’s cognitive system.” These are that such a candidate “be reliably
available and typically invoked”, “be more or less automatically endorsed”, “be
easily accessible as and when required”, and has been “consciously endorsed at
some point in the past and indeed is there as a consequence of this endorsement”
(p. 79). These (1998) criteria have spawned their own discussions (e.g. Sterelny,
2004), about the functional parity of notebooks and biological memories in
terms of trustworthiness, and so forth. However, these kinds of discussions
are relevant to deciding the extent of cognitive constituents only if restricted
constitutionalism is viable. I’m ultimately going to argue that it isn’t, that it
is unmotivated and sloppy.
More importantly at this juncture, it’s not clear that the above criteria have
been consistently intended as a positive stance on restricted constitutionalism.
For one thing, in the space of a couple of essays in a single volume (Menary,
29
2010), let alone in his larger set of writings, Clark uses such locutions as the
following. The mental or cognitive is said to be “grounded in” (p. 43), to
“supervene on” (p. 45), to be “composed of” (p. 48), or to “depend on” (p. 95)
nonbiological stuff. Going the other way, this stuff is variously referred to as
“physical vehicles of content and of cognitive processes” (p. 46), “aspects of an
integrated whole” (p. 52), “candidates for inclusion into an individual’s cognitive
system” (p. 47), “co-opted into playing a real cognitive role” (p. 53), “partially
constitutive of mind,” and most often said to be “part of” some “implementation”
(p. 52), “physical realization” (p. 84), or “supervenience base” (p. 86). And
Clark is by no means the only one to drift among these locutions. This drift is
perhaps understandable. We’ll see in Chapters 3, 4 and 9 that those relations
which have received the most attention in the analytic metaphysics literature
have received mostly separate treatment and have spawned their own literatures.
While the apparent complexity and contentious state of the debates on these
relations makes the lack of clarity within the EM literature understandable,
the conclusion EM theorists want nonetheless requires a sensible notion or
notions of what it is for one thing to depend synchronically on others. My own
simple view of constitution, and indeed my deflationary view that synchronic
dependence relations are identical, seeks to rectify just that. But as it stands,
the terminological drift in the literature makes it difficult to see what technical
notion is in play.
Moreover, while restricted and Unrestricted Constitutionalism are conflict-
ing,5 it’s possible that theorists vacillate between them. For example, Clark
5 It might seem like the restricted and unrestricted notions of constitution could co-exist
if theorists simply made their claims more precisely in terms of either. Wilson (2007), for
example, argues that we can account for the truth of the claims, “This water is nothing
more than the molecules that constitute it,” and, “This statue is something over and above
the marble that constitutes it,” in terms of differing notions of constitution. Wilson calls
the notion operant in the former claim “compositional” constitution, while “ampliative”
constitution is the operant notion in the latter. Ultimately, I’ll argue that there’s a problem
with the ampliative notion of constitution in the sense that it takes for granted the difference
between constituents and the rest of the physical conditions on which the constituted thing
depends, when that very boundary may be questioned, as it is in the present context. I’ll
suggest in Chapter 10 that these notions of constitution are, in fact, in tension for that
reason. For now, however, Unrestricted Constitutionalism can be understood as the claim
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(2010c) offers enactivist arguments for externalism as well, and concludes by
saying,
Confronted by the kaleidoscope of cases encountered in the previous
chapters, the proper response is to see mind and intelligence them-
selves as mechanically realized by complex, shifting mixtures of
energetic and dynamic coupling, internal and external forms of rep-
resentation and computation, epistemically potent forms of bodily
action, and the canny exploitation of a variety of extrabodily props,
aids, and scaffolding. Minds like ours emerge from this colorful
flux as surprisingly seamless wholes: adaptively potent mashups
extruded from a dizzying motley of heterogeneous elements and
processes.
As much as I share his overall perspective, what’s missing from Clark’s
ambitious project is philosophical clarity about realizers, mixtures, couplings,
exploitations, scaffolds, emergence, and wholes. The dizzying motley of termi-
nology makes it difficult to pin down the concept or concepts of dependence in
play so as to assess the conclusion that minds depend constitutively on extra-
neural entities. It turns out that Clark and others’ terminological liberties are
justifiable, it’s just that no one has yet provided that justification. In any case,
the immediate point is that insofar as we are asked to countenance somewhat
extraordinary or counterintuitive objects—extended states and processes—it is
not obvious that externalists’ notions of constitution are like our ordinary or
intuitive notion of one thing’s being part of or constituting another. So the
battle line between unrestricted and restricted notions of constitution might cut
across the externalist camp, but it’s not clear whether there are any restricted
externalists.
Might the internalist camp be divided by the same line? It would seem so,
but there is a similar problem: it’s not clear whether there are any unrestricted
internalists. Because critics of externalism like Adams and Aizawa disagree
about what makes a process or state cognitive or mental, it remains unclear
that “anything on which an entity depends synchronically is compositionally constitutive
of that entity,” and restricted constitutionalism can be understood as the claim that “not
everything on which an entity depends synchronically is compositionally constitutive of that
entity.”
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whether they think that the states or processes appealed to by externalists
like Clark and Chalmers are partly constituted by extraneural entities, and
just aren’t cognitive, or whether they think the states and processes in ques-
tion aren’t constituted by anything extraneural. One might expect Adams
and Aizawa to deny Unrestricted Constitutionalism and opt for restricted
constitutionalism, first because it accords with common intuition, but more-
over because they accuse EM theorists of committing a fallacy they call the
“coupling-constitution” fallacy. Adams and Aizawa describe the fallacy as
taking cases “in which some object or process is coupled in some fashion to
some cognitive agent,” and inferring, “that the object or process constitutes
part of the agent’s cognitive apparatus or cognitive processing” (2010, p. 68).
But, crucially, criteria for delineating restricted constituents from mere
circumstances upon which a thing synchronically depends are orthogonal to
the delineation of what is cognitive and non-cognitive. So Adams and Aizawa’s
marks of the cognitive—non-derived content and mechanistic homogeneity—
cannot be read as committing them one way or another as to unrestricted or
restricted constitutionalism. Let me put this another way. On the one hand,
there is the question of what makes an entity cognitive. On the other hand,
there is the question of what (if anything) would make some, but not all, of the
physical conditions on which an entity depends synchronically constituents of
that entity. And Adams and Aizawa do not provide criteria of the latter sort.
There is a further problem that suggests the “coupling–constitution” fallacy
may be a misnomer. Note that in describing the fallacy as taking cases “in
which some object or process is coupled in some fashion to some cognitive
agent,” and making the further invalid inference, Adams and Aizawa take the
uncoupled agent to already be independently “cognitive.” By contrast, EM
theorists take a whole process to be cognitive in virtue of the causal role that
process plays, and thus take Otto-and-his-notebook to be a cognitive system,
not so much because Otto is a cognitive system, but because Otto-and-his-
notebook function as one. So EM theorists are quite simply not guilty of the
inference pattern Adams and Aizawa accuse them of. In fact, no one to my
knowledge disputes Adams and Aizawa’s point that something’s being in causal
interaction with another thing does not make the first a part of the second.
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Yet, despite Clark and others’ insistence that EM theorists make no inference
of the sort they are accused of, Adams and Aizawa have remained unmoved.
What explains this impasse? A clue, I think, is that Adams and Aizawa say
they “have been impressed by the extent to which [inadequate attention to
the mark of the cognitive] appears to have been involved in so many process
externalists’ succumbing to one or another version of the coupling–constitution
fallacy” (2010, p. 78). They say,
So, if the fact that an object or process X is coupled to a cognitive
agent does not entail that X is part of the cognitive agent’s cognitive
apparatus, what does? The nature of X, of course. One needs a
theory of what makes a process a cognitive process rather than a
noncognitive process. (2010, p. 68)
Now, notice here that X first stands for an external object or process—a
mere part of a system or process that EM theorists claim is cognitive—while in
the last instance X might be taken to stand for a whole process whose nature
makes it cognitive or not. Clark understandably misses this equivocation when
he replies that,
Adams and Aizawa seem to think that some objects or processes, in
virtue of their own nature. . . are, as we shall now put it, candidate
parts (for inclusion in a cognitive process), whereas other objects or
processes, still in virtue of their own nature, are not. This, I think,
must be the way to give sense to that otherwise baffling question
“is some X cognitive?” (2010b, p. 85)
Again, while Adams and Aizawa’s marks of the cognitive—as involving
non-derived content and as mechanistically homogeneous—are problematic,
even accepting them would do little to clarify what, if anything, about parts
themselves would make them candidates as parts of cognitive systems (and
why that should rule out extraneural entities). But Adams and Aizawa do not
take their criteria to do this work. They claim,
the skull does not constitute a theoretically significant boundary
for cognitive science. More specifically. . . being inside the brain
cannot be the mark of the cognitive. This seems to us to be true and
obvious. The bounds of cognition must be determined by finding
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the mark of the cognitive, then seeing what sorts of processes in
the world have the mark. Following this method, we see that,
as a matter of contingent fact, the cognitive processes we find in
the real world all happen to be brain bound. It appears to be
just a contingent empirical fact that cognitive processes are not
transcorporeal processes. (2001, p. 46)
They defend this view consistently.6 Since they are mostly clear7 on the
specific point that the mark of the cognitive tells us what processes, as wholes,
are cognitive, X in the second instance in the equivocal passage above must be
understood as referring to a whole, of which the first X is merely a candidate
part. Since their question in that passage is about a whole cognitive process
6 For a sample, Adams and Aizawa say,
We do not propose that non-biological structures are incapable of supporting
non-derived content. Our view is that, as a matter of contingent empirical fact,
cognitive processing typically occurs within brains, even though it is possible
for it to extend. (2008, p. 47)
The point is not that the electronic processes in the computer could not be so
organized as to constitute a cognitive process; it is merely that as a matter of
contingent empirical fact they are not. (2008, p. 143)
7 Adams and Aizawa say,
Our view has always been that, as a matter of contingent empirical fact, pencils,
paper, eyeglasses, Rolodexes, and so forth happen not to be parts of any
currently existing cognitive economy. It is, in principle, possible that, say, a
pencil or notebook could be so employed as to be a contributor to a cognitive
process. This would happen if the pencil and notebook were, in whole or
in part, to satisfy conditions on the possession of non-derived content and
participate in the kinds of causal relations that we theorize are distinctive of
cognitive processes. This is just to say that portions of the body and tools in
the extracorporeal environment could be parts of cognitive processes, if only
they were to bear the mark of the cognitive. (2008, pp. 128–129)
I say they are “mostly” clear that the mark of the cognitive applies to cognitive wholes
rather than to parts of cognitive wholes because that’s the only way pencils might in principle
be among such parts. Obviously pencils on their own will not satisfy their criteria and still
be pencils. So there is something confused when Adams and Aizawa go on to say that in
order to be parts of cognitive systems, pencils themselves would need to bear the mark of
the cognitive. But I needn’t sort out their confusion. Beyond diagnosing the source of an
impasse in the EM debate as it has so far played out, what I want to pursue in the main
text is the question of what does remain problematic about the EM thesis.
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rather than a part of one, in fact, Adams and Aizawa don’t ask the “baffling
question” Clark attributes to them about the candidacy of parts in cognitive
systems. In fairness to Clark, Adams and Aizawa have not clearly articulated
their overall view, and even made remarks that further confuse matters.8
Anyway, if the question of what makes something a cognitive process and
what makes something part of a cognitive process are indeed separate in the
sense that the criteria for being cognitive apply not to parts but to wholes,
and the criteria for parthood might be synchronic dependence, plus, perhaps,
attachment or the like, then how should we understand the connection between
the mark of the cognitive and the alleged fallacy? I submit that the reason
Adams and Aizawa spot a fallacy in connection with a supposed inattention to
the mark of the cognitive is simply that Adams and Aizawa, for other reasons,
do not accept that extended systems, as wholes, count as cognitive. They
already and only count as cognitive what are in EM theorists’ view subsystems,
sub-states, or sub-processes of cognitive ones. So they understand EM theorists
as making a whole “cognitive” in virtue of having (on their view) a properly
8 At the outset to Adams and Aizawa (2010), the authors quip,
Question: Why did the pencil think that 2 + 2 = 4? Clark’s answer: Because
it was coupled to the mathematician. That about sums up what is wrong with
Clark’s extended mind hypothesis. Clark apparently thinks that the nature
of the processes internal to a pencil, Rolodex, computer, cell phone, piece of
string, or whatever, has nothing to do with whether that thing carries out
cognitive processing. (p. 67)
The first caricature of Clarks view suggests a reading of “whether that thing carries out
cognitive processing” as its doing so all on its own, in which case, it totally misrepresents
the EM theorist’s view, and leads Clark to respond,
the thrust of Adams and Aizawa’s rhetoric is, again, and again, to draw
attention to the evident absence of cognition in the putative part as a way of
‘showing’ that coupling. . . cannot play the kind of role it plays in the standard
arguments for cognitive extension. (2010b, p. 83)
And Clark says, it would be “crazy to think that a pencil might think” (2010b, p. 83). On
the other hand, if “whether that thing carries out cognitive processing” is understood as its
being involved in cognitive processing as a part, Adams and Aizawa would be on target, but
inconsistent with the reasonably clear aspect of their own view already noted. That is, while
they’ve told us what makes a thing cognitive, they haven’t told us what makes something
part of something cognitive.
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cognitive part: a brain, brain state, or brain process. But in that case—that
is, if Adams and Aizawa are right about which processes are cognitive—EM
theorists would be guilty of a fallacy of composition: attributing to the whole
a property of one of its parts. What might have been a minor equivocation on
X, combined with liberties taken in certain caricatures of Clark’s view (just
noted in Footnote 8), together with the likely case that Adams and Aizawa may
have misdescribed the inference that bothers them, has meant that defenders
of EM have failed to appreciate what might be a genuine concern, as we saw in
Section 2.1.
The upshot of my alternative diagnosis of this dispute as it relates to the
Unrestricted Constitutionalism premise is that it is not entirely clear whether
any parties to the debate over EM dispute the claim that anything on which
an entity depends synchronically is constitutive of that entity. Rather, Adams
and Aizawa appear to deny that anything cognitive depends at some time in its
duration on extraneural entities because, by their lights, the processes which
do aren’t wholly cognitive, and the part which is cognitive (the brain) does not
so depend. Again, while Adams and Aizawa name the fallacy they detect a
“coupling-constitution fallacy,” the fact that EM theorists plainly do not make
an inference of the form Adams and Aizawa suggest, together with the fact
that they detect the fallacy in connection with an “inadequate attention to the
mark of the cognitive” (2010, p. 78), suggests that their misdiagnosis doesn’t
amount to a separate objection to EM, but flows from their objection to the
scientific seriousness of functional kinds that would include as members both
Inga’s normal beliefs and Otto’s notebook-involving “beliefs.”
So it is clear that there is a disagreement about what makes something
count as cognitive, as a special case of a more general disagreement about what
makes any thing the kind of thing that it is. It is less clear whether there is any
disagreement over constitution. Nonetheless, as I signalled above, insofar as
externalists’ notion(s) of constitution (or similar) implies rather extraordinary
entities, such as human–notebook couplings, it is not obvious that these are
consistent with ordinary, restricted intuitions about constitution. As I said
above, it is not clear that there are any restricted externalists, but there are
probably unrestricted externalists. To put the same point another way, if
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anything on which an entity depends synchronically is constitutive of that
entity, then Extended Cognition follows, no matter what the extraneural entity
is, as long as a mental state or cognitive process depends synchronically on it.
By contrast, internalists plausibly need to deny Unrestricted Constitutionalism.
At least, it looks much more difficult to both affirm it and be an internalist,
as that would involve claiming that neural goings on are always completely
sufficient for mental life.
I highlight this particular battle line, and yet I overlay it cautiously onto
debates as they exist. That may seem like an odd position to be in. From one
perspective on the question of Unrestricted Constitutionalism—the intuitive
rejection of it—it might appear that I’m misidentifying the issues. But if
I’m right that the intuition is faulty and that restricted constitutionalism is
unmotivated and sloppy, then existing debates have failed to clearly identify
the issues. So I’m willing to go out on a limb. I take comfort in the fact
that the question—though it comes in different guises—of what makes one
thing constitute another runs through a whole range of issues in philosophy.
There is a significant debate to be had over Unrestricted Constitutionalism,
and what has in fact happened is that externalists have largely ignored certain
technicalities, outsourcing work on concepts of dependence as if to borrow
clarity from another part of philosophy where there is in fact further debate to
resolve—debate that crucially impacts the question of the physical extent of
minds and our very selves.
Wrapping Up
The goal of this chapter was to understand what is controversial about
externalism—the idea that minds are bigger than brains in the sense that
cognitive processes and mental states can frequently be constituted in part
by extraneural entities. I’ve argued that some key underlying assumptions
in arguments for externalism require further elaboration and defense. As ex-
emplified by the mainstream debate over EM, debates about externalism are
continuous with larger issues in philosophy. This, I think, is how Clark has
come to observe that,
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The notion of the extended mind draws strong reactions. Many feel
it is patently false. These same people tend to feel that the mind is
simply and obviously just the activity of the brain. Others regard
it as patently true, and they tend to be those who identify the
mind with an essentially socially and environmentally embedded
principle of informed agency. . . . My own feeling is that we have
not yet reached the philosophical or scientific bottom of this debate.
(2010a, p. 64)
Indeed, what one says about EM will be informed by what one says about
minds, full stop. I began by suggesting that consciousness is a defining feature
of minds as typically conceived, which, paired with certain intuitions about
what worldly machinery could explain our minds, produces discomfort with
the EM thesis, particularly as offered by Clark and Chalmers. The discomfort
is as serious and lasting as the intuition that consciousness has a merely neural
basis, an intuition we should ultimately reject. But the overall point here is
that the sort of worry that keeps EM from being an obvious thesis is generated
by disagreement about what could explain minds and thus how to understand
mind–physical world relations. Divided intuitions over EM are symptoms of
underlying disagreements over the relation or relations of objects of the special
sciences to the objects of fundamental physics.
In Section 2.1, I showed that a major fault line in the debate over EM runs
along proponents’ and critics’ differing notions of kindhood. Again, when Clark
likens Otto’s notebook to dispositional beliefs and claims this likeness is “all that
matters” (2010b, p. 89), he recapitulates functionalism rather than defends it.
A wider variety of functionalist externalisms cite different extraneural entities
and could be committed to different notions of constitution. But that does not
make for a “what” versus “how” difference between externalisms. Rather, it
makes for a possible disagreement about what belongs in a how explanation,
that is, a possible disagreement over the Unrestricted Constitutionalism premise
or what should replace it. In Section 2.3, I showed that a medley of synchronic
dependence relations or expressions are used when considering how to “account
for” (to use one such expression) our minds, and it is not clear that these terms
are being used consistently or in well-motivated ways. I’m ultimately going to
defend a notion of constitution as synchronic ontological dependence according
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to which what makes things like notebooks part of certain cognitive processes
also makes things like museums part of those processes, and according to which
the truth of the latter doesn’t change with a change in the terminology with
which the synchronic ontological dependence relation is described. I argue that
synchronic dependence relations are identical, that functional kinds can be
projectible, and that wholes are nonetheless identical to their complete parts,
constituents, or total realizers. I argue that externalism about minds follows.
I agree that we have not reached the bottom of the debate. Yet I suspect
we already have what empirical evidence we need to decide the issue when
it is framed in a coherent way. What we disagree on are large chunks of the
conceptual schemes in which the evidence is understood. What we should
say about the constituents of minds has everything to do with how to think
about higher-level kinds in general. An account of higher-level kinds is the
first step toward having a plausible theory of minds. After all, minds must
fit into an overall model of what exists if they are to be kept as a kind in a
scientific ontology. For my part, it is unsurprising that underlying issues with
externalism intersect with a great many other areas of philosophy. What makes
this a useful contribution to the philosophy of mind is that I explicitly tie the
question of extended minds to these wider issues in philosophy. It is these
issues that need to be addressed before a final assessment of externalism.
Chapter 3
Concepts of Dependence
The philosophy of mind frequently, if implicitly, relies on appeals to various
dependence relations thought to hold, or thought to fail to hold, between mental
states and other objects or events in the world. These primarily include claims
about identity, supervenience, realization, constitution, and composition, all
of which are usually held to be synchronic. These terms invoke dependencies
that, for example, persons might have on their bodies, minds might have on
brains, value might have on paper bills or works of art, and macro properties
of objects might have on their atomic or chemical compositions. Synchronic
dependence relations are usually held to be non-causal. Whereas causes precede
their effects, the molecules of an apple don’t cause it to be that apple at a later
time, nor does my body-at-a-time cause me-at-that-time to exist, as if at some
time later than it. So entities are contemporaneous, that is, synchronous, with
their constituents, realizers, supervenience bases, or component parts.
But as we saw in Section 2.3, philosophers don’t always use consistent
language or provide formal definitions of their terms. To further complicate
matters, formal definitions of dependence relations are each the subject of
philosophical debates in their own right. And, their separate treatments in
the literature explains the difficulty in untangling these relations. But, as
Karen Bennett (2011) notes, their overlapping use in application belies a family
resemblance. Somewhat surprisingly then, no systematic comparison between
these relations seems to have been made until the recent work of Bennett
(2011, 2017). Taking her as work as a starting point, I begin with a brief
descriptive survey of a few of the synchronic dependence relations most invoked
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in the extended mind literature and most relevant to the philosophy of mind in
general. Section 3.2 then summarizes Bennett’s view of what she calls “building”
relations, including those relations about to be discussed, and a few others.
Suspecting that “no one else has even claimed that the various building relations
form a conceptually unified family” (2011, p. 95), she formulates what she
believes they have in common. I agree that building relations have something
in common, but I characterize the resemblance differently in Section 3.3. Then,
after seeing in Chapters 4 to 6 how issues surrounding dependence relations are
tied up with questions about the nature of higher-level entities—and ultimately
with formulating a plausible physicalism—my characterization will allow me in
Chapters 8 and 9 to develop a more detailed taxonomy of dependence relations
and defend the view that higher-level things are identical with everything
they depend synchronically on, and that synchronic dependence relations
are identical with one another. That allows us to infer things about our
identity from our “constituents,” “realizers,” “parts,” “supervenience bases,” or
“implementations”—these being one and the same.
3.1 Synchronic Dependence Relations Sketched
3.1.1 Supervenience
Supervenience is a relation of covariance roughly captured by the slogan “there
cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference.”(McLaughlin and Bennett,
2014) Supervenience is (trivially) reflexive, meaning that there “cannot be
an A-difference without an A-difference.” And supervenience is transitive;
if A supervenes upon B, and B supervenes upon C, A supervenes upon C
(McLaughlin and Bennett, 2014). At least since Kim’s (1984) “Concepts of
Supervenience,” a feature of the concept of supervenience as covariance has
been that it is non-symmetric, meaning that supervenience can sometimes be
asymmetric, and sometimes symmetric. It is asymmetric when, for example,
the mental supervenes upon the physical. That is, for every mental difference
there is a physical difference, but not vice versa. Two worlds might differ in
physical properties without differing in mental ones, say, if one of Saturn’s
rings had one more molecule of ammonia than it does (Kim, 1987). On the
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other hand, there appear to be cases of symmetrical supervenience: the volume
of a sphere covaries with and supervenes on the surface area of a sphere, and
vice versa (McLaughlin and Bennett, 2014). Notice that bare supervenience
formulations, conforming to the slogan, “there cannot be an A-difference
without a B-difference,” (McLaughlin and Bennett, 2014) do not specify the
modal force of the dependence between A and B, whether logical, metaphysical,
nomological, or physical. What Kim (1984) calls “weak” supervenience, of
the form “there is no A-difference without a B-difference,” does not even
specify that the dependence relation is a necessary one (as opposed to a matter
of happenstance), and are therefore compatible with strong emergence or
even dualism if they are set to work capturing mind-body relations. Finally,
bare supervenience formulations do not capture the nature of the dependence
between A and B, whether the relation is that between a cause and its effect,
that between a thing and itself or its interrelated properties, or some other kind
of dependence. However, as Bennett (2011) puts it, “most actual supervenience
claims in philosophy were and are intended as building claims” (p. 85), which
are, on Bennett’s view, asymmetric. Although I won’t discuss supervenience
much herein, it is this use to which philosophers have put supervenience in
formulating physicalism as a general claim about how things are physically
built that puts it in the dependence relation ballpark. Note, too, that any
dependence relation is also one of supervenience in its most general sense, that
is, if A depends on B, A also supervenes on B by covarying with B.
3.1.2 Constitution
Constitution seems to be one of the less clear relations in analytical metaphysics.
According to Ylikoski (2013), constitution only began to receive much careful
attention in the decade previous. Note, first, that the literature diverges by
using constitution in two senses divided by a seemingly important axis. That
axis is what Bennett calls the “unification” axis:
as I have characterized them, some of the relations seem to involve
a certain kind of wrapping up into one, and others do not. That is,
some unify, or gather together a multiplicity, in a way that others
do not. This is reflected in a difference in logical form: some of the
relations are many–one, and others are not. (2017, p. 17)
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Bennett herself treats constitution as “one–one,” meaning that its relata
are both singular. For example, a piece of marble might constitute a statue
(see Baker, 1997, 1999; Wasserman, 2004, 2017; J. Wilson, 2009; R. A. Wilson,
2009). Such literature, on the topic known as “material constitution,” uses
constitution fairly consistently in this way, although even it may occasionally
slip into talk of “constituent parts” in the plural (see Wasserman, 2017; R. A.
Wilson, 2009). But there are other (admittedly overlapping) bodies of literature
that use constitution explicitly in the plural sense. What is sometimes known
as the “new mechanistic” approach in the philosophy of science and mind
(see Craver, 2014; Baumgartner and Casini, 2016; Gillett, 2013; Kirchhoff,
2015; Ylikoski, 2013) consistently uses constituents in the plural. Finally, the
extended mind literature is famous for claiming (or denying) that things beyond
the brain can partially constitute cognitive processes (see Clark and Chalmers,
1998; Adams and Aizawa, 2001, 2008; Clark, 2010c; Kirchhoff, 2015; Menary,
2010). Partial constitution, of course, implies plural constituents, and thus a
many–one relation between constituents and the constituted.
There is a consensus among all of the above accounts, however, that consti-
tution is a synchronic relation. Constitution is also generally considered to be
an asymmetric dependence of some “higher-level” entity on some other “lower-
level” entity or set of entities. Levels, in this context, are usually understood
as ontological “joints of nature,” for example, the atomic, the chemical, the
biological, or mechanical, and so on “up,” perhaps, to the psychological, the
economic and the sociological.
3.1.3 Realization
Realization has been employed to capture an asymmetric dependence that
is non-causal, not unlike constitution, but usually held to obtain between
properties rather than whole entities. The primary significance of the idea
of realization is a feature of the realized individual—its multiple realizability.
Realization has been employed by functionalists to emphasize the possibility
that differing individuals can play the same role. When things are defined
by what they do, multiple, indeed, very different, things could fit the same
specification. The classic example is that of a mousetrap, which can come in
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a variety of forms and materials while still being a mousetrap in virtue of its
ability to trap mice. More interesting for theoretical mind–body relations, and
the thought that made functionalism the dominant such theory, is the possibility
that the same functional or computational state might be implemented by
different hardware states (see Putnam, 1975a).
3.1.4 Composition
Composition is the usual relation of parts to wholes in a sense that has
historically, if controversially, been inclusive of a variety of relata. A few
examples of part–whole relations include: “The remote control is part of the
stereo system”; “The left half is your part of the cake”; “The contents of this
bag is only part of what I bought”; “The outermost points are part of the
perimeter”; “The first act was the best part of the play”; “The goalie is part
of the team” (Varzi, 2016, sec. 1). In its most general sense, composition
is considered to be reflexive, meaning that every individual is part of itself.
Composition is antisymmetric, meaning that if x is part of y and y is part of x,
then x is y. Otherwise, if x and y are distinct, and x is part of y, y cannot be
part of x. And composition is transitive; if x is part of y and y is part of z, x
is part of z.
On the other hand, what is known as proper composition, and, correspond-
ingly, proper parthood, can be defined as the relation between parts and wholes
such that nothing is part of itself. Proper composition, then, is irreflexive,
asymmetric, and still transitive. This will be an important difference. Bennett
(2017) takes proper composition, but not reflexive composition, to count as a
building relation in her sense.
Even the somewhat more restricted notion of proper composition as just
sketched is very broad, and there are of course many questions and issues that
arise, for example, about whether the same relation is really had by acts to
plays, components to mechanisms, points to lines, fractions to wholes, and roles
to organizations. With such an array of relata, some of dubious ontological
status, one might wonder whether to expect composition to always be an
ontological dependence relation. But I need not settle that. All that matters is
that any real individual ontologically depends on its parts.
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With such an array of relata, one might also wonder if the composition
relation is always synchronic. Yet, even the parts of the play together span the
same duration as the play. So composition is non-causal. The parts of the play
do not together cause the play at a later time, as causes precede effects, rather,
the duration of an individual contemporaneous with the span of its temporal
parts. Nor does the first act of a play cause the play, though it is among the
causes of later acts. The first act cannot cause the play because they begin at
the same moment.
3.1.5 Identity
Identity, or sameness, is usually thought of in two ways. First, there is what is
known as numerical identity; an individual is numerically identical only to itself.
Secondly, things can be the same in the sense of having one or more shared
properties. This is known as qualitative identity, and it comes in degrees.
I mention identity for two reasons. The second reason will become clear in
Section 4.2. But first, identity seems related to putative synchronic dependence
relations because it might seem like one such relation. Imagine that a batch
of pure water “just is” some number of H2O molecules. It doesn’t matter for
present purposes that this is actually contentious. Suppose that the water and
the set of molecules have all the same properties. We naturally think that
the water depends on the H2O. Like other dependencies, this is supported
counterfactually: delete the H2O, and you have deleted the water. Delete some
of the H2O, and you have changed that particular batch of water into another.
The two batches are not identical, for example, because they do not have the
same mass. But the opposite is also true: delete the water, and you have
deleted the H2O. That much, we should expect. If A is B, then B is A, and
every relation in which A stands to B, B also stands to A. But that is just
to say that everything stands in relation to itself just as it stands in relation
to itself, which is to say very little; identity is trivially reflexive. On the one
hand, to say an individual’s existence or character depends on its existence or
character is much less informative than to say what else it might depend on,
for example, its ancestors, or its parts. On the other hand, the dependence of
individuals on their parts raises the question of whether complete composition
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suffices for identity. Suppose that it does. Indeed, one might define complete
composition as the minimally complete set of physical conditions sufficient to
necessitate the individual. Individuals, after all, often have parts, and for at
least some individuals, like a particular mass of water, it seems plausible that
once you have all the parts, there you have the individual. Then, to say that
an individual’s existence and character depends on the existence and character
of its parts might well be explanatory: the relation between water and H2O is
indeed an empirical discovery that explains water’s reactivity with lithium and
that can be used to make predictions about the solubility of a hypothetical
molecule in water. Still, if it is plausible to think, as we shall see Bennett
does, that being asymmetric is essential to building relations, then the identity
relation, being symmetric, cannot be a building relation.
3.2 Bennett’s Resemblance Class of Building
Relations
I am now in a position to summarize Bennett’s (2017)1 view as to how certain
relations, including some of those I’ve sketched, form a resemblance class,
before motivating, in this chapter, a similar approach that culminates in a
rather different view, that synchronic dependence relations are identical, which
I defend in Chapter 9.
Bennett characterizes what she calls “building” relations, and I will follow her
in using that term for the class of relations with the features she specifies. First
of all, since resemblance classes are “cheap,”—meaning that they are not extra
ontological commitments—Bennett (2017) thinks a class should be theoretically
useful and “best answer to,” in this case, “our ordinary understanding of what
it is for one phenomenon to account for another” (p. 31-32). Bennett argues,
three features are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for a
relation to count as a building relation. All building relations are
i. directed, in that they are antisymmetric and irreflexive,
ii. necessitating, roughly in that builders necessitate what they
build, and
1 Every reference to Bennett in the remainder of this chapter is to Bennett (2017).
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iii. generative, in that the builders generate or produce what they
build. Built entities exist or obtain because that which builds
them does. (2017, p. 32)
Bennett’s overall argument, then, is that each of these features are part of
our ordinary understanding of what it is for one phenomenon to account for
another, and that the class of relations marked by these features is theoretically
useful.
3.2.1 Building is Directed
By “directed,” Bennett means asymmetric,2 so that “that nothing builds itself,
and no two things mutually build each other” (2017, p. 33). Note that
identity is excluded from the family here. Bennett goes on to deflect a couple
of arguments for the possibility of symmetric and reflexive “building”, and
provides positive reasons to accept asymmetry by appealing to “our pretheoretic
concept of building” (p. 39), paradigmatic philosophical uses of dependence and
necessitation locutions, as well as by appealing to theoretical utility. Bennett
argues that it is theoretically useful to use building concepts to explain relative
fundamentality (or ontological priority), according to which, “all it is for one
thing to be more fundamental than another is for certain patterns of building
to obtain between them”(p. 40). And the only way building can do this further
work entails that it be asymmetric, since the relation more fundamental than
is asymmetric.
3.2.2 Building is Necessitating
Bennett thinks that building relations all involve necessitation. Bennett’s
position is that building cannot be indeterministic, and goes to some length
to defend what she calls “building determinism,” the view that, “If something
is built, something [or set of things] necessitates it” (p. 51). This is “a claim
about full building, not partial,” because “no one thinks that mere partial
2 Asymmetric means antisymmetric and irreflexive. Bennett sometimes opts for pairing
the latter two terms to make the irreflexivity explicit, though it is part of the notion of
asymmetry.
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builders necessitate what they build” (p. 49). However, Bennett thinks it is
an interesting question whether what she calls “full” builders necessitate what
they build. So Bennett says, “I do not claim that each building relation B is
such that if x fully B’s y, it necessitates y” (p. 49). Bennett thinks one could
plausibly hold that “only something ‘larger’ than x, some x+ C, guarantees y,
even though x alone counts as the full building base [of y]” (p. 49). C could
be some further set of facts, enabling conditions, or circumstances. As we’ll
see in more detail in Chapter 4 and Chapter 7, formal characterizations of
“constitution” and “realization,” as one–one relations distinct from identity,
explicitly include something like C. So there are two ways to be a building
determinist. One is to be a building “necessitarian,” holding that,
[Necessitarianism] “For all x and y and all building relations B, if x fully B’s y,
then, necessarily, x→ y.” (p. 52)
The other way to be a building determinist is to be a building “circumstan-
tialist,” and hold that,
[Circumstantialism] “For all x and y and all building relations B, if x fully B’s y,
then, [(x+ C)→ y].” (p. 52)
Here, C is some “to-be-specified set of background circumstances” (p. 52),
with the further condition that C not fully include y or anything that fully
builds y, blocking “cheap” cases wherein anything necessitates y in C, because
C itself is fully sufficient for y. Bennett offers a few reasons to prefer the cir-
cumstantialist picture, but thinks nothing much of importance turns on which
version of building determinism one accepts, because building involves necessita-
tion on both accounts. Notice, however, that the Unrestricted Constitutionalism
on which my main argument is premised is a species of Necessitarianism. And,
as we’ll see in the next several chapters, the coherence of physicalism about
higher-level entities and properties—and with it, the EM debate—turns on
seeing that Circumstantialism involves unmotivated and misleading intuitions
about the boundaries of entities.
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3.2.3 Building is Generative
Finally, Bennett argues that all building relations are “generative,” that is,
they license a certain kind of talk. She offers the principle that,
For all building relations B, and all x and y, x’s B-ing y makes true
certain explanatory and generative claims. For example, if a builds
b, then b exists (obtains, is instantiated. . . ) because a does, b exists
(obtains, is instantiated) in virtue of a, a makes b exist (obtain, be
instantiated), and so forth. (p. 58)
Bennett says, “I take all these phrases—‘in virtue of’, ‘because’, ‘make’,
‘make it the case’, ‘explain’—to be getting at the same idea. The idea in all
cases is that builders generate the built” (p. 58). She thinks the generative
clause is needed because a relation can be asymmetric and necessitating without
being a building relation. I’ll have more to say about that idea in Section 3.3.2.
3.3 Rebuilding
With a picture of Bennett’s view in hand, I want to follow-up on some issues I
flagged while summarizing it. First, I want to discuss transitivity. Then I’ll
discuss generativity. At the same time, I’ll also flag issues with necessitation
and directedness to be picked up in Section 9.2. Then I’ll present my view of
how building relations are unified.
3.3.1 Transitivity
Interestingly, Bennett doesn’t think it is crucial that building relations be
transitive. Transitivity in the case of building would mean that if a builds
b, and if b builds c, then a builds c. Bennett thinks transitivity is obviously
false of the relation between a and the set {a}, given that the same relation
holds between {a} and {{a}}, because, she claims, a is not a member of
{{a}}. Bennett also notes that transitivity is mildly controversial in the case
of grounding,3, and in the case of composition. However, is a member of
3 Bennett (2017) cites Schaffer (2012) as denying the transitivity of grounding in contrast to
most others who think grounding is transitive. But although Schaffer offers counterexamples
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and equivalent uses of part of might be intransitive because of additional
criteria for membership beyond strict dependence, such as the condition that
members be of a particular kind. So, for instance, in the case of composition,
Varzi (2016) suggests that my left pinky is not “part” of the team of which I
am a “part.” What is crucial to notice is that there’s more than ontological
dependence packed into such a use of “part.” Likewise, although a is not a
member of {{a}}, in the usual sense involving membership criteria other than
or in addition to dependence, if a set-forms {a}, where “set-forms” means
asymmetrically necessitates and generates, whether partly or completely, then
a also set-forms {{a}}, partly or completely. If it sounds mistaken to say that
the team depends on my left pinky, that must be either because the team does
not depend on my membership, or because my membership does not depend
on my left pinky, or both.
Further, one would think the connection Bennett posits between building
and relative fundamentality, together with the transitivity of more fundamental
than would entail transitivity as much as the same connection and the asym-
metry of relative fundamentality entail the asymmetry of building relations.
However, Bennett claims that the intransitivity of building is compatible with
the transitivity of relative fundamentality. She explains,
Suppose that there is some nontransitive building relation B such
that aBb, bBc, but ~aBc. [A deflationary account of relative funda-
mentality in terms of building] entails that a is more fundamental
than b, and b is more fundamental than c. The transitivity of
more fundamental than entails that a is also more fundamental
than c. But that does not conflict with the assumption that a does
not build c: it simply has to be the case that one thing can be
more fundamental than another despite not standing in a building
relation to it. And that is clearly possible. Sodium ions are more
fundamental than benzene rings, but benzene rings are not even
partially built out of sodium ions—sodium is simply not involved.
A similar point holds for tokens of types that in general are building
related. Hydrogen atoms and oxygen atoms are more fundamental
than water molecules, but that does not entail that a particular
to the transitivity of grounding, I take him as ultimately defending it, once grounding is
reflected in contrastives (or, I think, adequately fragilized counterfactuals).
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water molecule in Ithaca is built out of hydrogen and oxygen atoms
located in Phoenix. (p. 47)
Actually, the point about sodium and benzene is the same as the point
about tokens of types that are in general building related. If sodium ions are
more fundamental than benzene rings, it is because atomic kinds of things
build molecular kinds of things. But it’s hard to see how any of this works
as an example of intransitivity of building and transitivity of fundamentality.
Suppose your pinky finger is not a member of the All Blacks. If your pinky
finger is relatively more fundamental than Mr. Rogers, on Bennett’s account,
that must be because pinky finger kinds of things (tissues) often build the
kind of thing Mr. Rogers is (an organism). And if Mr. Rogers is relatively
more fundamental than the All Blacks, on Bennett’s account, that is because
Mr. Rogers’s kind of thing (people) often build the kind of thing the All Blacks
is (a sports team). If relative fundamentality reduces without remainder to
building, it follows that the transitivity of relative fundamentality reduces to the
transitivity of building. Your pinky finger’s being relatively more fundamental
than the All Blacks is just a case of the general fact that tissues partly build
teams of people.
So I take dependence to be transitive: if x depends on y, and if y depends
on z, then x depends on z.
3.3.2 Generativity Reconsidered
Recall from the end of Section 3.2 that Bennett adds the generativity clause to
her characterization of building because non-building relations can be asymmet-
ric and necessitating. Something that I have until now left aside is that Bennett
considers “set formation,” and “grounding” as candidate building relations.
Why haven’t I discussed them? Well, I will discuss them here, and in Chapter 9,
to the extent that Bennett appeals to them as examples. But since there is
a huge literature on grounding that does not directly overlap with the EM
debate, grounding is mostly beyond my scope herein, and I must leave it to
others to decide whether the considerations in this part have any bearing on
the concept of grounding; I suspect they will, given a broad notion of grounding
as synchronic ontological dependence between any sorts of things. On the
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other hand, if grounding is taken strictly as a relation among facts, it might be
plausible to deny that grounding resembles synchronic dependence relations
used in scientific explanations, which posit dependence relations between things
other than facts, like neurons and minds. Similarly with set formation, I’ll
suggest that on a certain definition of what it takes to form a set, set formation
is not a relation of interest herein. And that might be enough to avoid the
example that compels Bennett to add the generativity clause. So, let’s hear the
example. First, Bennett says, “Socrates and {Socrates} mutually necessitate
each other, even though the building only goes one way; the necessitation is
symmetric but the building is not” (p. 56). She continues,
There is an antisymmetric and irreflexive necessitation relation that
holds between Socrates and {Socrates} that intuitively is a building
relation—namely, set formation. But there is also an antisymmetric
and irreflexive necessitation relation that holds between Socrates
and {Socrates} that intuitively is not a building relation—namely,
set membership. The account of building I have presented thus far
cannot distinguish between these. It does not settle which of set
membership and set formation is a building relation; it does not
settle, as it were, the direction of building. So the account thus far
must be supplemented. . . . (pp. 56-57)
I take the idea to be that Socrates’ asymmetric and necessitating membership
in {Socrates} is the “inverse” relation (as Bennett says just prior to the above
example) of Socrates’ asymmetric and necessitating set-forming of {Socrates}.
Socrates is a member of {Socrates}, but not vice versa. Or, if you prefer,
{Socrates} has Socrates as a member, but not vice versa. Then, I take the
idea above to be that, ({Socrates} → Socrates). That is, necessarily, if
{Socrates} exists, then Socrates exists. And yet we wouldn’t say Socrates exists
in virtue of {Socrates}. Just the opposite. But notice that the claim being
denied talks about existence. So, on the other hand, perhaps we would say
that Socrates “is a member” of {Socrates} in virtue of {Socrates}. So I’m just
not sure the example shows that being asymmetric and necessitating are not
adequate to make a relation a building relation.
However, suppose it does show as much. Then something more might be
needed to pick out building relations. But generativity, as Bennett formulates
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it, can’t distinguish between the cases in a principled way. Recall that both
Bennett and I set out to analyze certain concepts and ask whether they have
anything in common. Bennett introduces her project by saying,
we talk about building all the time, and have been doing so as
long as we have been doing philosophy at all. We do it whenever
we claim that some entity or phenomenon can be accounted for in
other terms, and also whenever we deny that it can be. Either way,
we are making claims about what builds—or fails to build—what.
(p. 2)
If there’s a further characteristic uniting the class of building relations, I
don’t see how it can be the characteristic of licensing building talk, unless the
point is that there’s just one building relation and all these turns of phrases
mean the same thing. But Bennett, as we’ll see in Chapter 9, denies as much.
So it is opaque to me how analyzing building relations can both illuminate our
generative talk while being illuminated by it. Moreover, I think there’s a way
to accommodate the intuition that {Socrates} doesn’t build Socrates without
adding a further criterion for building relations. Recall from Section 3.2.2 that,
“no one thinks that mere partial builders necessitate what they build” (p. 49). I
agree; only full builders necessitate what they build. That sets up the following
dilemma. If, on the one hand, set formation is understood such that in a world
with just one entity, A, there exists {A}, then, ex hypothesi, {A} just is A. It
cannot be anything else. The building relation can’t bring about anything that
the builders do not; Bennett herself argues (ch. 7) that building relations are
themselves built by the relatum in the first place of the relation. In that case,
it would be wrong to say that A exists because {A} does to whatever extent
it’s wrong to say that Socrates exists because Socrates does. If, on the other
hand, we want to say, non-trivially, that {A} exists because A exists, we are
employing an ontologically-laden notion of set formation itself. That is, if {A}
is not just A, it must be something more, and A alone is insufficient for {A}.
In that case, in addition to depending on Socrates, the existence of {Socrates}
also depends the empty set—some collector or cognizer or curly braces—so
that A and the empty set together build {A}. So, Socrates does not, all on his
own, necessitate {Socrates}, and the example fails.
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My view, then, is that we don’t need a seemingly circular appeal to licensing
of “in virtue of,” etc, to analyze uses of those very turns of phrase, since, I claim,
and will proceed to defend in Section 3.3.3, what all such locutions have in
common is simply that they express dependences that can be rendered as true
counterfactuals. {Socrates} doesn’t build Socrates since it is not necessarily
true that if {Socrates} did not exist, Socrates would not exist. Rather, it is
true that if Socrates did not exist, neither would {Socrates}. The dependence
here is asymmetric.
In fact, what I think the example shows is that partial building relations are
asymmetric, but not necessitating, and full building relations are necessitating,
but not asymmetric. I return to this point in Section 9.2.
3.3.3 Building and Dependence
The claim I just made, that all these relations express dependences that can be
rendered counterfactually, is contentious. So a discussion about the connection
between building and dependence is in order. Recall that Bennett argues that
building involves necessitation. She also thinks that necessitation is usually
reflected in what she calls, following Lewis (2000), “patterns of counterfactual
dependence.” However, just because some a builds some b, Bennett thinks it
isn’t always true that if a had not occurred or been instantiated, b would not
have occurred or been instantiated. She cites the possibility of preemption and
overdetermination as cases that don’t support true counterfactuals. Causal
preemption, for example, occurs when Suzy throws a stone at a glass bottle,
breaking it, and Billy throws an equally well-aimed stone at the same glass
bottle a split second later. Then the claim that the breaking of the bottle
depended on Suzy’s throw looks false, because the counterfactual claim that
had she not thrown the stone, the bottle would not have broken, is false—
Billy’s would have done the job (see Lewis, 2000).4 Causal overdetermination
is supposed to occur in cases where some effect is caused by many events
independently sufficient for that effect, such as a death caused by a firing
squad. Analogously, synchronic overdetermination might occur, for example,
4 Every reference to Lewis in this chapter is to Lewis (2000).
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when some general fact, like, “something exists,” is all too well grounded;
it is grounded by the fact that Bennett exists, and that her sunglasses do.
And Bennett thinks the problem of the many5 shows there is “an awful lot of
compositional overdetermination.” So Bennett says,
assuming the falsity of mereological essentialism, many composites
can exist in the absence of a few of their parts. And many nonfun-
damental properties—even fairly determinate ones—are such that
their instantiation can tolerate small differences at the microlevel.
I could probably be in exactly the same qualitative state of pain
even if one or two fewer neurons were firing. (ch. 3, note 18)
Mereological essentialism is the view that the numerical identity of wholes is
fragile, so that for any individual, that individual does not survive any change
of its parts (see Chisholm, 1973). In calling wholes “fragile,” I am borrowing
Lewis’s turn of phrase, which we’re about to see, with respect to events and
putting it to a corresponding use with respect to parts. I do this to highlight a
general principle analogous to mereological essentialism; let’s call it,
[Building Essentialism] The numeric identity of all entities is fragile, such that
for any individual, that very same individual does not survive any change
to its building base.
Now, one way to resist the examples of preemption and overdetermination,
while still assuming the falsity of Building Essentialism, comes through in a
footnote of Bennett’s. She makes the point that many counterfactual claims
in cases of building do come out true. One reason to think they do Bennett
adapts from Lewis, who says,
When asked to suppose counterfactually that C does not occur,
we do not really look for the very closest possible world where C’s
conditions of occurrence are not quite satisfied. Rather, we imagine
that C is completely and cleanly excised from history, leaving behind
no fragment or approximation of itself (p. 190).
5 The problem of the many consists in the incompatibility of my intuition that there is
just one desk at which I now sit, with the thought that no particular subset of its parts have
any greater claim to being a desk than do many other similar subsets.
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Bennett calls this “a ban on replacement evaluations of the relevant sort of
counterfactual. They are inappropriate in building contexts as well as in causal
ones.” And, she says, this ban “blocks a variety of putative counterexamples
to the claim that built entities counterfactually depend on that which builds
them” (ch. 3, note 18). It’s true that such a ban narrows the range of cases
where dependence is not reflected in true counterfactuals. Taking compositional
overdetermination as an example, a ban on replacement readings works to
maintain the truth of the counterfactual. So if Bennett’s pain, M , depends on
some neural state, P , then the counterfactual, if P had not occurred, M would
not have occurred, is true as long as we read the counterfactual as involving
P cleanly excised from history. The idea is that we ought not to imagine
something similar to P in its stead.
So the ban would repair a counterfactual rendering of compositional de-
pendence even in cases of compositional overdetermination. But what about
preemption and firing squads? The story gets more complicated here, because
as I read Lewis, though he toys with the idea, he actually imposes no ban
on replacement evaluations of counterfactuals, while resisting the apparent
counterexamples to the counterfactual analysis of causation. His solution is
more subtle. Lewis’s strategy is to make the generic counterfactual, “if C had
not occurred, E would not have occurred,” more fragile in one way or another.
The first way would be to espouse something like Building Essentialism. In
that case:
There is an obvious solution to cases of late cutting [or late preemp-
tion]. Without Suzy’s preempting rock, the bottle would still have
shattered, thanks to Billy’s preempted rock; but this would have
been a different shattering. It would, for instance, have happened
a little later. The effect that actually occurred depended on Suzy’s
throw, but not on Billy’s. (p. 185)
But Lewis is ambivalent here, noting that, “supposing that the event itself is
fragile. . . would fly in the face of much of our ordinary talk” (p. 186). A putative
alternative that Lewis modifies from Paul (1998) is to, “take a tailor-made
fragile proposition about that event and its time,” so that, “The negation of
that fragile proposition is the consequent of our causal counterfactual” (p. 185).
For example, we could change the counterfactual to read, “without C, E would
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not have occurred at all, or would have occurred at a time different from the
time that it actually did occur, or would have occurred in a manner different
from the manner in which it actually did occur” (p. 187). That gets the right
result, that Suzy’s rock was the cause of the shattering. But Lewis thinks we
can still do better, since we are ambivalent about the distinction between E’s
not occurring at all and its occurring differently. Instead, whether or not we
take events to be fragile, their “alterations” are, by definition:
Let an alteration of event E be either a very fragile version of
E or else a very fragile alternative event that is similar to E, but
numerically different from E. If you think E is itself very fragile, you
will think that all its alterations (except for the actual alteration)
are alternatives. If you think E is not at all fragile, you will think
that all its alterations are versions. You might think that some are
alternatives and others are versions. Or you might refuse to have
any opinion one way or the other, and that is the policy I favor.
(p. 188)
Then, we refer to alterations in our counterfactual, and get the right result.
“Suzy’s throw caused the shattering of the bottle and Billy’s preempted throw
did not because, without Suzy’s throw, the alteration of the shattering which
actually did occur would not have occurred, and a different alteration would
have occurred instead” (p. 188).
Now, all this time, we’ve been imagining that C does not occur at all. But
what if some alteration of C occurs? The apparent problem is that, on a
fragile view of C itself (about which Lewis is trying to be neutral), some minor
change to C counts as C’s not occurring, and in that case the counterfactual
might not have the expected truth value. Lewis worries that, “if almost− C
occurred instead of C, very likely the effects of almost-C would be almost the
same as the effects of C” (p. 190). But the eventuation of almost the same
effect doesn’t make a difference to the truth of a counterfactual that refers to
the effect’s actual fragile “alteration.” So the problem—a counterfactual that
expresses intuitive dependence coming out unexpectedly false—only arises if
some E was multiply causable, such that almost-C had the very same effect
as C. Note, but otherwise leave aside for the moment, that this is where it is
tempting to think a ban on replacement of C with almost-C could do some
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work. But I think Lewis can be read as saying, usually or implicitly, “When
asked to suppose counterfactually that C does not occur. . . we imagine that
C is completely and cleanly excised from history, leaving behind no fragment
or approximation of itself” (p. 190). I think usually or implicitly is the right
interpretation, because earlier, although Lewis says, “One repair would be to
rewrite our counterfactual analysis, or add a gloss on its interpretation, in order
to make this explicit,” he goes immediately on to say, crucially,
But there is another remedy. We could look at a range of alterations
of C, not just one. As on the side of effects, we need not say
which, if any, of these are versions of C and which, if any, are
alternatives to C. These alterations may include some in which
C is completely excised, but we need not require this. They may
include some that are almost but not quite C, but we say nothing
that restricts us to the closest possible alterations. Then we look
at the pattern of counterfactual dependence of alterations of the
effect upon alterations of the cause. (p. 188, my emphasis)
The upshot is that Lewis’s repair isn’t a ban on replacements; it encourages
them. The causes of an event are those that make differences to it, and
that influence does make true counterfactuals of the right, more precise, sort.
Now, I think that any fragilization strategy actually amounts to reading
dependence counterfactuals according to something like the principle of Building
Essentialism about events, one way or another. Lewis recommends expressing
dependence in counterfactuals that, unlike our ordinary ways of speaking about
events, refer to fragile alterations about which Building Essentialism is true.
That looks suspiciously like insisting that events really are fragile, despite our
ordinary ways of speaking. That is why the “mixed” fragilization strategy
works in the case of almost-C. If almost-C counts as C’s not occurring, that
is a fragilization of C which yields the right result as long as E is also taken
to be fragile, and provided that E itself, the fragile thing, is not multiply
causable by C and almost-C. If an individual fragile event could be caused by
distinct fragile individual causes, then referring to alterations in the antecedent
of the counterfactual won’t make the required repair anyway. I’ll say more on
this point shortly. Here, the point is that there is no deep difference between
permitting ourselves to suppose that almost-C counts as C’s “not occurring” or
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counts as a “version” of C. The point is simply that we ought not to read some
cause—for example, a particular neurological state—as fragile while reading
an effect—for example, an evasive action—in an ordinary or liberal way. If
we make that mistake, we’ll get what are obviously causal relations failing to
be reflected in true counterfactuals tested by this double-standard. “If C had
not occurred, E would not have occurred,” looks false in case, for example, an
alternative neurological state counts as a non-occurrence of the event whose
causative role in a behaviour is being tested, while an ever-so-slightly different
evasive action is taken not to count as the behaviour’s non-occurrence, that is,
it is counted as occurring. We must be even-handed in the fragilization.
We can adapt this strategy to cases of overdetermination in non-causal
building generally or synchronic dependence. That is, if a builds b, then, as
long as a and b are taken to be the actual alterations or fragile individuals, the
following counterfactual is true: if a had not been instantiated, then b would not
have been instantiated. Again, this fragilization strategy endorses something
like Building Essentialism about either fragile “alterations” or fragile individuals.
Supposing individuals are not fragile, some of our ordinary counterfactuals might
come out false. So we need counterfactuals that refer to fragile “alterations.”
But that, I have said, is much like supposing individuals really are fragile,
unlike our ordinary ways of speaking. And that is just to say that what we’re
really doing when we think we’re referring to an individual in our ordinary way
of speaking is referring to a kind (I return to this point briefly below, and in
Section 11.1). So, contra Bennett, I’m not inclined to assume the falsity of
mereological essentialism or Building Essentialism. I’m similarly not inclined
to trust intuitions about the “exact sameness” of two pains involving some
neurons on one occasion, and involving a few less on another occasion. Either
the first pain did not depend on exactly those neurons (among other things),
or the second pain is not strictly the same (though they are both kinds of pain,
probably the same kind of kind of pain, and so on).
Now, there’s still a problem with the fragilization strategy in the case
of causation, as I noted above, and it is a problem for testing synchronic
dependence, too. I said that the fragilization strategy works except if a
particular effect can be caused in multiple ways. And, as I’ll argue in Section 6.1,
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I think there are what I call “switches” in nature such that certain effects really
are multiply causable. Suppose “if exactly C had not occurred, exactly E
would not have occurred,” may be false even though, for example, a particular
neurological state is intuitively a cause of a particular evasive action. It seems
like a minor neurological difference might not make a difference to the action,
though it makes minor differences elsewhere in the causal network—for example,
it can be detected by a sufficiently accurate brain scanner. So there are cases
where almost-C occurred instead of exactly C, and an obviously causal relation
fails to be reflected in a certain counterfactual, even though we are even-handed
in our fragilization and reading both a cause and an effect alike as fragile
events or alterations of events. To repair that, we would have to, contra Lewis’
attempt at neutrality, insist that almost-C cannot count as not-C. That is, we
would indeed have to go back to imagining C cleanly and completely excised
from history to get the right result.
Correspondingly, one might press an intuition like Bennett’s about having
the same pain despite a neural difference, thinking, surely, there can be multiple
realizability just as there can be multiple potential causes of an effect. Indeed,
I’m going to argue in more detail in Section 6.1 that the former is conceivable
because of the latter. The familiar idea of multiple realizability is that certain
alterations to, for example, a neural state, might not change the mental state
that it realizes. Perhaps a “version” of pain involving some rearranged neurons
with the same functional profile can be said to be “the same” pain. Of course,
again, the fact that the rearrangement counts as an alteration entails that it is
a difference that makes a difference somewhere in the world. Still, we almost
never try to refer to all of a cause’s effects. When we variously say things
of the form, “if C had not occurred, E would not have occurred,” E doesn’t
stand for the entirety of events in the forward lightcone of C. If it did, then
any change to C could well count as C’s not occurring, since exactly the same
world would not result, and the counterfactual would come out true, no ban on
replacement evaluations required. But such dependence claims as, “if it had
not rained yesterday, something around here would have been different,” are
not particularly useful. In the case of synchronic dependence, however, we can
go more usefully in both of two ways. We might test the dependence of just
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such an entity—as individuated by all of its properties—on one of its parts by
removing that part. A change in any property affirms the dependence. The part
(say, a hydrogen atom) was indeed a part of just that entity (a fat molecule)
with just those properties (being saturated, having such and such mass, etc.).
But we also characterize things according to just some of their properties.
Similar neural states can have the same effect (play the same role) within a
particular downstream branch of a causal network, despite necessarily having
differing total effects in the entirety of their forward lightcones. Suppose, quite
plausibly, that to test the dependence of a pain on a neural state, we can modify
or entirely prevent the neural state, but we can only monitor some branches
of the downstream causal network (behaviour, etc) for effects characteristic of
the pain. Suppose now that we modify the neural state a little, but detect no
change in the pain or behaviour. We say “the” pain occurred anyway. But in
that case, the consequent refers not to a fragile alteration, but to a non-fragile
kind. A counterfactual where a replacement is allowed to count as satisfying
the antecedent can be false in virtue of the multiple realizability of that kind.
So when testing the dependence of a putative “entity” characterized by just one
or a few properties—individuated by just one or a few effects—we must once
again impose a ban on replacement evaluations of the causal counterfactual.
An objection to the counterfactual analysis on the basis of multiple realizability
fails because it still involves a double-standard, though less obviously. The
objection is that it can be false that, “if exactly P (a neural event) had not
occurred, M would not have occurred.” For example, the “same” pain, it might
be claimed, could have been realized by slightly different neural states or events.
But this objection counts P—the set of parts or physical conditions being
tested for dependence—as a fragile alteration. Replaced by a similar set, P
is taken not to occur. However, to count M as occurring anyway is to take a
mere subset of the full effects of P—those functions that characterize pain—as
characteristic of P itself, which is to take P as a non-fragile thing (a kind, in
fact). Rather, we can only legitimately test the dependence of a non-fragile
pain (M) on a non-fragile neural event (P ), which is to say, we ban replacement
evaluations of counterfactuals in which non-fragile “entities”—characterized
by few properties and effects—figure in the consequent, so that the antecedent
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isn’t satisfied on the cheap.
The point can be summarized this way. Building Essentialism is actually
compatible with the multiple realizability of properties and kinds. The way
to read a counterfactual expressing synchronic dependence is determined by
what is found in the consequent of the counterfactual, whether an individual
or a kind. To test the dependence of M on P where M is a kind (e.g. pain
generally), the antecedent of the counterfactual must be considered satisfied
only if “not P” involves no fragment or approximation of P (e.g. a neural
state). The upshot is that building and dependence go hand-in-hand and the
counterfactual analysis of dependence remains plausible. What it is to be a
builder, a cause, or a part is to make a difference to the built, the effect, or the
whole. Difference-making is reflected in true counterfactuals of the right sort,
and dependence is thus testable, at least in principle, if we could design the
right experiments.
Wrapping Up
In this chapter, I’ve sketched a variety of dependence concepts used especially
in physicalist, or would-be physicalist explanatory projects, including the
debate over what constitutes our minds, realizes our mental states, or what our
cognitive systems have as parts. I’ve summarized a set of features—directedness
(asymmetry), necessitation, and generativity—that Bennett thinks are common
to a group of relations that overlaps with the ones I’m most interested in. I’ve
questioned whether generativity does any work that the other features don’t,
and I’ve flagged concerns about asymmetry and necessitation to be picked up in
Section 9.2. I agree with Bennett that building involves necessitation and that
building is deterministic. But since only full builders (or perhaps full builders in
the circumstances), necessitate what they build, and since the building claims
we encounter most often are just partial building claims, they don’t obviously
involve necessitation. And although full building is necessitating, it looks
symmetric. Thus, I’ve also introduced but left underdeveloped the claim that
full building is identity: that claim is yet to be motivated in Chapter 4, defended
against worries about multiple realizability in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, and
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in Chapter 7 against the idea that dependent things have differing properties
that what they depend on. Rather than being picked out by directedness,
necessitation, and generativity, I think building relations express dependence
which can be rendered in true counterfactuals. I’m hereafter going to refer
interchangeably to building and dependence relations. I think “dependence”
neatly captures the resemblance class of relations Bennett calls “building”
relations, and it already refers, in a way that is amenable to both ordinary and





In Chapter 3, I discussed the way in which Bennett (2011, 2017) thinks building
relations are unified. In partial contrast, I have given a somewhat different
characterization of only the most common synchronic dependence relations
employed by philosophers of mind, but also by philosophers of biology, science,
and explanation. Synchronic dependence relations get used both in specific
explanations or proposed explanations, as well as in general to formulate a
variety of materialisms, physicalisms or naturalisms, or to deny them, with
respect to the objects of a given domain of inquiry, as well as to formulate ways
in which these domains themselves relate. I take it that the reason constitution,
composition, and realization get employed in these contexts is that there are
certain shared features among them. They are all counterfactual-supporting
synchronic dependence relations. On the other hand, there are many treatments
of each such putative relation, there is imperfect consensus whenever there is any
at all, and there are puzzles at every turn. And that might seem like a reason
to deny any sort of stronger unity among them. However, in this chapter,
I argue that synchronic dependence claims, with one other key ingredient,
give rise to puzzles that share the same basic recipe. Whenever some entity
(object, event, state, property, or phenomenon) is claimed to be composed
of, constituted by, or realized by some physical base that is considered to be
sufficient for it, and also claimed to be distinct from that base, there is born
1) a grounding-like problem—an unanswered in-virtue-of-what question—and,
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2) an overdetermination problem due to ontological overpopulation combined
with the physicalist’s commitment to the causal completeness of the world. I
suggest that the shared recipe for the twin problems, and the prospect of similar
solutions, are reasons to believe synchronic ontological dependence relations
are closely related. Finally, since these problems arise in the context of each
such relation, the antireductionist cannot appeal to any putative relation itself
for solutions. Although it will take further discussion in Chapters 5 to 10 to
demonstrate, the EM debate does not avoid questions about mind–physical
world identity or non-identity by couching itself in one synchronic dependence
locution as opposed to another. The EM thesis stands or falls with the more
complete theory of a mind–physical world relation it entails or is entailed
by. And, at last, no amount of constitution or realization of our minds by
technologies would amount to the view that we are partly what we make, unless
partial constitution and partial realization are partial identity.
Before considering, in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, the general puzzles that arise with
respect to our concepts of entities, their properties, natures, and dependence
on other things, it behooves us to review a handful of examples that deploy
those concepts. I do this in Section 4.1, but with one caveat. Readers who
have given the topics some thought are likely to think, hang on, there are no
problems here; we should simply reject this or that premise or way of speaking.
Indeed, that’s exactly what we should do. Still, I want to make the immediate
point that there is a common recipe for some very similar problems. I’ll argue
in Section 4.4 that this point is further substantiated to the extent that these
problems have the same solution: we should reject a particular sort of recurring
move or claim. So, of course I think there is a mistake being made in the recipes
for these problems. Note, too, that the fact that there must be a solution to
these problems does not mean there are no such problems. After all, part of
the problem, or perhaps the underlying problem, is that philosophers disagree
on the best solution. They disagree on where the recipe goes wrong. So, before
anticipating one’s preferred antidote to the unpalatable mixture, bear with me
while I commit some mistakes in order to say what it is. If I’m right about
the common recipe, there’s just one mistake. And if I’m right about what the
mistake is, to be discussed in the coming chapters, then we should think that
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identity is the relation between an entity or property and all that it depends
synchronically on, and, relatedly that anything on which an entity depends
synchronically is constitutive of that entity.
4.1 Molecules and Minds
Consider Otto. Otto has a body, and we might say that Otto’s body is composed
of some tissue, composed in turn of molecules. Otto has a mind, and we might
say that Otto’s brain realizes his mind. And Otto is a person, we might say that
person is constituted by either his body, his mind, their life histories, or some
combination thereof. So, in our toy ontology, we have a person, called Otto, a
mind, a body, a brain, and tissues. Now, let’s consider various alterations to
these. A rough sketch of a range of possibilities will suffice.
First alteration: one day, Otto eats a little extra, and gains a little weight,
more molecules composing a little extra tissue. Later, Otto does some exercise,
and loses some weight—in fact, he weighs a little less after exercising than
he did before overeating. Still, there is Otto, there is his mind, there is his
body, each respectively constituted by, realized by, and composed by an altered
fusion of molecules.
Second alteration: with the advent of artificial intelligence and with the help
of super-duper neuroscientists, Otto is able to undergo a procedure that uploads
his knowledge, memories, preferences, and goals into a nano-technologically
advanced bionic android capable of discriminating sights, sounds, smells, tastes,
and touches. It is capable of planning and executing complex movements, and
dynamically adjusting its responses according to changes in the environment.
The bionic duplicate of Otto speaks Spanish in a smooth, low baritone, and
improvises in a jazz band. The bionic duplicate of Otto passes Turing tests,
makes friends, has worked his way through a few normal jobs, and is dating
his most recent boss’s daughter. Many of us are inclined to think the bionic
body realizes a mind, and some even think these constitute a person.
Third alteration: as it turns out, in the upload process, biological Otto’s
brain is damaged such that he stares unflinchingly ever thereafter in whatever
direction he faces; he does not move of his own accord, or respond to sights,
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smells, sounds, tastes, or touches. In ordinary language, many of us will say
Otto’s mind is “gone.” But, Otto’s body, his damaged brain, and his tissues
persist. And Otto, the person, is right there, too. At least, his family loves
him, or tries to, and most of us will say he has the right to dignified treatment.
Final alterations: one day, Otto dies. And, one day, bionic Otto, chips
fried by some electromagnetic impulse, is beyond repair. What does not go
simultaneously out of existence, however, are the molecules composing the
tissues and the nano-technological materials.
So we have a body that survives, in the first alteration, gains and losses
of molecules and tissues. We have a mind that survives, through the second
alteration, replacement of its realizer parts with different kinds of realizing parts.
Through the third alteration, we have a person that survives drastic reduction
in mental capacities, or loss of them altogether. And we have molecules that
remain through the fourth alteration, despite not composing a living body,
realizing a mind, or constituting a person.
Now, it matters less that some of us would be inclined to resist a number of
the purported intuitions above (I certainly am) than it matters that ideas like
these are available and defensible. Most importantly, the intuitions in play are
arguably conflicting, as I’ll explain below. But first, there’s another ingredient
in the mix to discuss.
4.2 Antireductionism and its Discontents
A hallmark question arises wherever we find synchronic dependence relations.
The question is whether the dependent entity has all and only the same
properties as the physical conditions on which it synchronically depends, and is
thus identical with them, or is “something more,” or perhaps just something else.
Now, there is an obvious sense in which something can depend synchronically on
something else and not be identical to it, that is, when one thing partly depends
on another. I presumably depend on my right arm, today at least, but I am
not my right arm. But consider complete dependence. Reductionism, roughly,
is the view that when a synchronically depends on b, such that b is sufficient
for a, a just is b. Broadly “antireductive” views, on the other hand, hold that
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even when an a synchronically depends completely on some b, or some b-in-the-
circumstances, a can have properties that b does not, so that a and b are not
identical. Taking the higher-level entity to be something more is “emergentism.”
Taking the higher-level entity to be something else can be broadly called
“antireductive physicalism.” Now, notice that the key to having many of the
above intuitions is to think for some reason that persons are not reducible to
bodies or that minds are not reducible to brains, for example, because they
have differing persistence conditions or modal properties—pertaining to what
an entity is possibly or necessarily—like the ability to be differently realized.
Similarly, the idea goes, bodies are not identical with molecules because bodies
are wholes that survive changes of parts in everyday metabolism, let alone
surgery. And yet there is clearly some dependence that persons have on their
bodies, minds have on brains, and bodies and brains have on molecules.
So, whence the conflict among our ideas about the synchronic dependence
of nonetheless distinct things? Let’s consider a few traditional problems.
The usual grounding problem (see Burke, 1992; Bennett, 2004; Heller, Heller,
and Mark, 1990; Zimmerman, 1995) can be exemplified this way. Suppose
Otto’s body constitutes a person, Otto. Under normal conditions, Otto’s body
for a given duration seems fully sufficient for Otto: bringing it into being brings
Otto into being. Yet Otto’s body can undergo changes that Otto does not,
and vice versa. Otto’s body is still there when he dies, but his body no longer
constitutes a person. These “various ways a thing was, will, would, could, or
must be” (Wasserman, 2017) have been called “non-categorical properties.” So,
by the law of indiscernibility of identicals, Otto cannot be identical with his
body, since Otto and his body differ in their non-categorical properties. Otto
and his body seem to be spatiotemporally coincident entities. The grounding
problem is the question of what makes the difference between an emergent
property or irreducible entity and its physical conditions, if not something
among those physical conditions. What grounds their differing non-categorical
properties? As Bennett (2004) notes, one doesn’t avoid the problem by claiming
that something’s kind is grounded in its persistence conditions, any more than
one can avoid the problem by claiming that its persistence conditions ground
its kind.
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A related problem, the problem of the many, consists in the incompatibility
of my strong intuition that there is just one desk at which I now stand, with
the quite natural thought that no particular subset of its parts have any greater
claim to being a desk than do many other similar subsets. For example, certain
edges of my desk are rough cut, and there are little splinters that don’t seem
particularly core to my desk. Even now, I can pull some off without much
change, if any, to my desk. After all, my desk with a certain splinter and my
desk without it are perfectly functional desks. Even supposing the splinter
stays where it is, the thing without the splinter is right there, too. It is perfectly
real; after all, it is attached to the splinter. And it is a desk. In fact, there are
a great many overlapping groupings of wooden bits that have equal claim to
being desks. But this seems like an undesirable result, perhaps more so in the
case of bodies. Consider our strong intuition that human Otto has just one
body, with the quite natural thought that no particular subset of his body parts
have any greater claim to being that body than do many other similar subsets.
For example, certain bits of skin and sweat could be excluded, and certain bits
of protein could be included, and the body would still be a body—the body
has the property of being such that it would still be that body. Suppose the
largest fusion of molecules or tissues sufficient for that body includes a certain
fingernail. But a fusion without the fingernail is right there, perfectly real;
after all, it is attached to the fingernail. So it seems there are multiple sets of
cells equally functional as bodies.
Another connected problem is what I’ll call the problem of regularity
among functional kinds. Multiple realizability has long been used to motivate
antireductionism with respect to mind–body relations. The story goes that
certain neural processes realize pain in humans, quite different neural processes
realize pain in octopi, and very different processes could realize pain in martians
or androids. As in the second alteration imagined at the outset, Otto’s mind,
it is supposed, might be realized by different mechanisms with the same causal
profile over some significant range of inputs and outputs. Moreover, the usual
story (see, for example, Fodor, 1981) is that it doesn’t even matter whether
silicone transistors ever in fact realize pain; it only matters that it is possible in
principle for them to do so. It is possible in principle, the story goes, because
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functional kinds are indviduated by effects that can be brought about in various
ways. My mental state now, then, has the property of being such that it might
have been realized differently, and hence, by the law of indiscernibility of
identicals, is not identical with any particular physical bases, which have no
such property. Although the resulting issue has been picked up by others in
the philosophy of mind (see Shapiro, 2000; Polger and Shapiro, 2016), Kim
(1992b) was perhaps the first to argue in detail that we shouldn’t expect there
to be any induction-supporting, “projectible,” or law-like regularities among
multiply realizable functional kinds. Natural kinds, Kim argues, fall under
the kinds that they do in virtue of their causal powers. He argues physicalists
should believe that causal powers of higher-level entities are inherited from
their lower-level physical bases. Different physical bases will differ in their
causal powers, so they will not fall under the same natural kind, and there will
be no interesting (ie, “non-analytic”) truths about all instances of, for example,
“pain,” if “pain” can be realized by neurons or by silicone-based transistors.
We’ll see more of this problem in Chapters 5 and 6.
The last example brings us nicely to what is known as “the exclusion
problem,” which arises most often in the context of mind–physical condition
antireductionism. Consider the apparent spatiotemporal coincidence, but non-
identity, of Otto’s love for his most recent boss’s daughter with the realizers
supposedly sufficient for that love. As Wilson (2001) reminds us, “the suffi-
ciency thesis is implicit in standard conceptions of realization” (p. 4). That
is, realization is understood as a relation of determination. “Metaphysical
sufficiency would seem to have the strength to underwrite an account of mental
causation”, thus making “realization a metaphysically robust relation,” and yet
“problematic because, so-construed, physical realizers states, themselves being
physical, seem to have no room for distinctly mental causation” (pp. 2-3). The
trouble, then, is that if a mental state and its physical realizers are distinct,
which of these two entities causes Otto to send flowers? Normally, we say the
love does. But, quite clearly, with his bionic brain removed, no such behaviour
occurs, so it is difficult to say that Otto’s brain doesn’t also cause them. But
if Otto’s brain does the work, it seems that his mental states never cause
anything (see also Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson, 1982). Antireductionism, as
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a metaphysical thesis which claims that the brain state and the mental state
are ontologically distinct, can’t also say they are the same cause, but if they
both cause some wincing, such wincing would be causally “overdetermined.”
Causal overdetermination violates either of two other plausible notions about
the world, namely that it is causally complete (or “closed”), and that effects
don’t usually have more than one sufficient cause or set of causes. Bennett
describes the problem nicely, “As it is often put, the physical does all the work,
and there is nothing left for the mental to do” (2003, p. 471). We’ll see more
on this problem in Chapter 7.
4.3 A Recipe for Problems
The idea that these issues are related is not without precedent. Kim, for example,
has wielded worries about exclusion to produce reductionist arguments in a
whole array of contexts (see Kim, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2006, 2012). And Bennett
(2004, 2017) has made some cursory remarks about the similarity among these
problems (though perhaps not the problem of regularity among functional
kinds). Bennett (2004), while discussing the usual grounding problem, says,
[The problem of the many] concerns the idea that the world contains
any number of objects with only minutely differing spatial bound-
aries. The [grounding] problem here concerns the idea that the
world contains any number of objects with only minutely differing
modal boundaries. I therefore dub it “the modal problem of the
many.” (2004, p. 360)
Although this dubbing is appropriate, we’re about to see that the usual
problem of the many is also a modal problem of the many. Finally, Bennett
notes that “the problem of the many is a cousin of the exclusion problem” (2017,
p. 75). She thinks of the problem of the many as demonstrating compositional
overdetermination, and that compositional overdetermination resembles causal
overdetermination. It would be strange if behaviours were double-caused by
mental states and brain states, and,
it would be just as puzzling if, given one complete ground G1 of
some fact or thing A, we were forced to also countenance a second
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complete ground G2. After all, G1 is by itself enough, at least in
the circumstances, to guarantee that A obtains or exists; given G1,
what work is left for G2 to do? (2017, p. 75)
Thus Bennett gestures at, but doesn’t quite spell out, how these problems
are related. So I’m going to spell it out, because I think the problems are closer
than cousins, and I think they have the same solution, though I’ll come to that
later.
Take the following sets of claims considered in parallel:
A B C
1 x is composed of (n)y. x is realized by y. x is constituted by y.




y’ would be sufficient
for y, but not for x.
3 x 6= (n)y. x 6= y. x 6= y.
The A-set of claims roughly sets up the problem of the many. The B-set
of claims roughly sets up of the problem of regularity among functional kinds.
The C-set of claims roughly sets up puzzles of material constitution, and the
usual grounding problem. Below I’ll say what further physicalist commitments
turn these into puzzles, but first, I want to note the similarities among these
antireductive components of each setup.
First, notice the similar forms of A1, B1, and C1. It should be understood as
implicit in each claim that y or the ys are sufficient to synchronically instantiate
x. That’s the first key ingredient: x’s synchronic dependence on some fully
sufficient base. Without the sufficiency claim, none of the problems get off
the ground at all, because if y is just part of what it takes to make an x, then
there’s no problem with the non-identity of x and y.
Second, A2, B2, and C2 all involve claims about non-categorical properties.
That is, they all involve claims about the “various ways a thing was, will, would,
could, or must be” (Wasserman, 2017). Bennett (2004) calls these “sortalish”
properties. She says,
I will use the label “sortalish properties” to refer indiscriminately
to
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(i) persistence conditions, particularly modal properties like being
essentially shaped about like so,
(ii) kind or sortal properties, and
(iii) properties that things have partially in virtue of their instanti-
ation of properties in categories (i) or (ii). (2004, p. 341)
A2 and B2 involve x’s sortalish properties, and C2 involves y’s sortalish
properties. One of the ideas motivating the problem of the many is that it can
be indeterminate whether such and such a bit of stuff is part of some entity,
and that a thing with or without certain parts would still be the thing that
it is. This is another denial of mereological essentialism—the idea we saw in
Section 3.3.3 that parts are essential to their wholes (Chisholm, 1973). The
set up to the problem invokes the sortalish properties of even ordinary objects.
Likewise, the idea of multiple realizability is that some other kind of physical
base would be sufficient to instantiate a given mental state, event, or property.
The idea of constitution is that one entity can constitute another, but would
not do so if it was altered in a certain way or found in some other circumstances,
even while still existing as the entity it is.
Finally, the sortalish properties in the second claims entail the failed identity
in A3, B3, and C3. This distinctness is the second key ingredient. I should
note at this point that antireductionists have not typically invoked the sortalish
properties of things like desks in order to make claims about their distinctness
from bits of wood and so forth. However, by my lights, if antireductive
physicalism was true—though it isn’t—it would be true about tables as well as
minds. Indeed, as we’ll see in Section 4.4, one strand of reductionism has used
these problems as motivation to reject the reality of such entities and their
properties.
Two things result, in all three cases, regardless of their formulations in
terms of composition, constitution, or realization. The first is what I’m calling
a grounding-like problem for each. Rereading A1 in light of A3, we might ask,
what grounds the fact that some ys compose an x?1 In the case of multiply
realizable but irreducible functional kinds, we can ask, what grounds the
1 I take this grounding-like problem to be very similar to the question of “special composi-
tion,” due to van Inwagen (1995), which is the question of when some plurality of things
compose some single thing.
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supposed sameness (and projectibility) of multiply realizable functional kinds?
In the case of constitution, the grounding question is familiar: what grounds
the difference between supposedly distinct yet spatiotemporally coincident
entities? Notice, too, that there is a spatiotemporal coincidence of putatively
distinct realizer and realized entities. And notice that there is spatiotemporal
overlap in the case of the many possible slightly varying fusions that would
compose ordinary objects. Thus, in addition to the grounding-like problems,
the second result of each setup is an exclusion problem. When y gives rise
to x, they are supposed to be distinct, but real and causally efficacious. This
overpopulation is problematic when added to the physicalist’s commitment
to the causal completeness of the world and the plausible thesis that effects
don’t usually have more than one sufficient cause or set of causes. I noted
above that Bennett thinks the grounding and exclusion problems are cousins,
because compositional overdetermination resembles causal overdetermination.
I suggested that they are twins, because they are produced by the same basic
recipe: some y that is fully sufficient for some synchronic x, but not identical
to it. In fact what makes compositional overdetermination strange is that the
overpopulation would result in causal overdetermination. If there was an actual
plenitude of mostly coincident fusions of tissue building a plenitude of Ottos
when there appears to be one, then they would, oddly enough, overdetermine
my judgement that there is just one Otto. So, too, with the realization of Otto’s
mind by his brain. If his brain is sufficient for his mind, and yet not identical
with it, and yet both are real and causally efficacious, they overdetermine their
effects. So, too, with the bodies and the persons they constitute.
Now, the fact that A2 and B2 involve claims about x ’s sortalish properties
while the C2 involves claims about y’s sortalish properties suggests more room
in the logical space of problem setups than the three I gave. I suspect that a
puzzle can be set up for each putative way of altering some physical base (by
addition, subtraction, or partial or complete kind-replacement) such that some
higher-level entity persists, and one for each way a higher-level entity might
not persist while its physical base does. My hypothesis is that there will be a
grounding-like problem and an exclusion problem that arises for any case in
which we affirm the dependence of some thing on a fully sufficient base, yet
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deny the identity of the two.
4.4 Prospects for Grounding and Just Enough
Determination
Further evidence of the similarity among concepts of dependence is the way that
relations, relata, problems, and solutions are interwoven in the literature. This
interweaving, among other things, is part of what I take Bennett to mean when
she says, “we use the various terms like ‘compose’, ‘realize’, ‘arise from’, or ‘get
out of’, in so many mixed up motley ways, with so many kinds of relata. The
hard part is untangling the concepts, not seeing that they are somehow related”
(2017, p. 30). Take the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which comprises
articles on relations, such as “Material Constitution” (Wasserman, 2017), on
relata, such as “Ordinary Objects” (Korman, 2016), on problems, such as “The
Problem of the Many” (Weatherson, 2016), and on purported solutions, such
as “Relative Identity” (Deutsch, 2017), to mention just a few. It is not difficult
to see that each of these are inroads to much the same terrain—they intersect
everywhere and reference many of the same important issues and contributions.
For example, in “Ordinary Objects,” Korman (2016) discusses the prospects
of being permissive or eliminativist with respect to ordinary objects, and the
issues motivating those solutions with respect to ordinary objects are exactly
the ones we’ve seen: Korman (2016) canvases the problem of the many, puzzles
of material constitution and grounding, worries about overdetermination, as
well as others which can be understood as involving grounding-like problems.
Earlier, I said what mattered is that there are ubiquitous and conflicting
intuitions available about dependence and distinctness. Of course, these incon-
sistencies need to be remedied, and I’ll offer some remarks here before wrapping
up. However, rather than survey any solutions in detail, I want to draw out
two points. First, I suggest that any given line of solution to one setup of
problems is a potential solution to other setups. Second, I suggest that be-
cause grounding and overdetermination problems, and their possible solutions,
cross-cut concepts of dependence, appealing to the relations themselves won’t
fix anything. And while there are certainly differences between total sets of
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philosophical commitments, because of the orthogonality of such differences
to differences in synchronic dependence terminology, synchronic dependence
concepts themselves do not entail or even clearly mark any such differences.
Now, except for explicitly linking realization and its puzzles with other
synchronic dependence relations and their puzzles, I am by no means alone in
thinking that similar puzzles recommend similar solutions. One prima facie
reason to think so is that many of those philosophers offering such solutions have
intended them to solve more than one puzzle. To mention just a few examples,
Geach’s (1980) notion of relative identity, which denies the indiscernibility of
identicals, has been applied to both the problem of the many (see Weatherson,
2016) and to puzzles of material constitution (see Wasserman, 2017). Similarly,
constitution theorists like Johnston (1992) have intended their accounts to
offer solutions to both the problem of the many and to puzzles of material
constitution. Van Inwagen (1995) opens his broadly eliminativist account by
saying, “The metaphysically puzzling features of material objects [including
organisms] are connected in deep and essential ways with metaphysically
puzzling features of the constitution of material objects by their parts” (p. 18),
positioning his view as a solution to those puzzles. Chisholm (1973) considers
“a philosophical puzzle pertaining to the concepts of whole and part,” and then
says, “The proper solution, I believe, will throw light upon some of the most
important questions of metaphysics” (p. 581). I take it that this list could
be continued at length. As Bennett (2017) remarks, “The familiar problem
about causal exclusion does arise for determination more broadly, and the same
panoply of solutions is available” (p. 76). While Bennett is reasonable to take
that as obvious, I will flesh this out just a little further.
Let me sketch a few very broad lines of solution.2 First, one might deny the
2 Because my treatment is so broad, I offer the following caveat. There is a well-blended
spectrum of views and resulting uncertainty as to how a particular view should be charac-
terized, for example, whether as a form of deflationism or eliminativism. Chisholm (1973)
positions himself as deflationary insofar as he claims not to be rejecting any of the apparently
conflicting intuitions that give rise to a particular puzzle, but claims to be showing them not
to be conflicting when properly clarified. On the other hand, Wasserman (2017, sec. 4) says
that Chisholm’s is “an ‘eliminativist’ view insofar as it denies the existence of mereologically
ductile objects.” The rough taxonomy I’ll offer attempts to be exhaustive over a wide domain,
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distinctness that leads to the puzzles to begin with. There are two broad ways
of denying that some dependent entity is distinct from the physical conditions
upon which it synchronically depends, for any given concept of dependence.
Broadly eliminativist positions embrace the unintuitive claim that there is
no such x related to y in that way. For example, Unger (1979) famously denies
the existence of ordinary objects, and some eliminativists hold that composition
does not occur (for defenders of this view, see Korman, 2016, n. 3). Note,
here, a connection with eliminativism in the philosophy of mind. Eliminative
materialists, as I noted in Section 2.1, hold that our ordinary psychological
terms fail to carve the world at its joints, and that for the purpose of explanation
such terms should be—and, in the process of scientific investigation will be—
replaced by references to, for example, neurological processes or kinds thereof
(see Ramsey, 2003). The problems that suggest such a similar solution are
the same. Roughly, in the case of composition, if it is indeterminate whether
an object is composed by one of many possible similar fusions of parts, then,
strictly speaking, there is no such object. Roughly, in the case of realization,
if “pain” is not identical to its various realizers, because any of them are
sufficient and none of them necessary for the realization of pain, then, strictly
speaking, there is no such natural kind as “pain” that can figure in any useful
generalizations.
Broadly ontologically deflationary views argue that our talk of the synchronic
dependence of higher-level entities needn’t entail any further “ontological
commitments.” I take ontologically deflationary views to be reductive insofar
as they deny the ontological distinctness of the relata in cases of composition,
constitution, and realization (despite variously allowing epistemic, pragmatic,
explanatory, or predicative distinctness). For example, composition is a relation
that arguably holds between different grain-levels of description of one and
the same world. Lewis (1991) argues that composition is identity and that
mereology is ontologically innocent, and many have followed him (see Wallace,
2011b, 2011a; Cotnoir and Baxter, 2014; Smid, 2015). Constitution, too, has
at the manifest expense of detail. If I’ve done my job well, every particular brand of “ism”
should fall under the broader class for which I’ve borrowed the same label, but at the end of
the day, I’ll happily relinquish any particular label.
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been subject to deflation in terms of identity (see Noonan, 1993; Biro, 2017).
And the thought that realized entities are not reducible to their realizers because
different entities could fulfill the same role has been challenged, especially by
Kim (1992b), Shapiro (2000), and Polger and Shapiro (2016), who consider
their positions to be more deflationary than eliminativist.
To deny distinctness in either way is to be some sort of reductionist. Re-
ductionists do not face the grounding and overdetermination problems, but
may face other problems. For example, one might leverage overdetermination
worries in service of the claim that mental and aesthetic properties are physical
ones, only to accept the burden of showing how. And reductionists have to
account for variability and multiple realizability—a project for Chapter 6.
How does antireductive physicalism fare? Earlier, I suggested a possible
distinction between emergentism and antireductive physicalism. I hold this dis-
tinction among antireductionisms very lightly, for two reasons. First, although
it is certainly questionable whether any emergentism can count as a form of
physicalism (see Kim, 1999, 2006), some proponents hold that emergence is
compatible with physicalism. Of course, everything hinges on the details of
any given view, rather than the label a view claims for itself. So, some “emer-
gentisms” may be forms of antireductive physicalism. Secondly, and perhaps
more importantly, one question I am pressing here is how well antireductive
physicalism itself fares as a form of physicalism. By my own lights, then,
the distinction between emergentism and antireductive physicalism is not to
be taken as crucial here. But suppose that emergentism and antireductive
physicalism are at least distinguishable in a sense suggested by Jessica Wilson
(2015), albeit in different terms3: the former denies the causal completeness
of the world, and the latter denies the requirement that no effects have more
than one sufficient cause (or set of sufficient causes). It is the latter view, the
one that attempts to be a form of physicalism, with which we are concerned
3 Wilson calls what I’m calling emergentism and antireductive physicalism, “strong” and
“weak” emergence, respectively. It is not entirely clear whether Wilson takes her taxonomy
to exhaust the antireductive strategies, although its exhaustiveness is implied. If I’m right
to understand her taxonomy that way, then I’m right to make the rough correspondence
between her terms and mine.
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here, and in more detail in Chapter 7.
Various positions of the latter stripe embrace the somewhat unintuitive
ontological plenitude4 that results from coincidence and distinctness, and yet
attempt to be compatibilists with respect to the coincident entities’ causal
powers. Compatibilists take the further ontological commitment entailed by the
distinctness claim not be a matter of over-population, as I’ve called it, but more
like an enrichment.5 The strategy is to say how the spatiotemporally-coincident
yet distinct entities are not in fact causal competitors, by claiming that they
are somehow closely related, despite being non-identical. I discuss this strategy
in detail in Chapter 7, where I argue that it fails.
What about an even closer relation between, for example, mental and
physical entities? Consider “token identity” in the philosophy of mind. Token
physicalism is the view that mental kinds are not identical with physical kinds,
but that every particular mental entity (event, property, or state) is identical
with a particular physical entity (event, property, or state). Token identity, like
necessitation, thus appears to avoid exclusion worries. The token physicalist
can remain antireductive by denying the identity of mental kinds with physical
kinds. But token physicalism is more plausibly physicalist by accepting that
a given mental state is a physical state. Now, I don’t know of any very close
analog of token identity as a response to related problems formulated in terms
of constitution or composition. But if there is a defensible token physicalist
thesis with respect to the realization of minds by brains (or otherwise), it might
shed light on puzzles of material constitution and grounding problems. If it
did, that would suit my point here. On the other hand, the reason for the gap
in the literature corresponding to this part of the logical space might be the
incoherence of token identity in the case of more ordinary relata. And there
4 I emphasize the “ontological” aspect here because views I’ve characterized as deflationary,
like Lewis’s (1991) argument that mereology is ontologically innocent, can be “permissivists”
similarly accepting of “universalism,” the doctrine that any distinct fusion composes an
entity; it’s just that that entity is not a new one in the purported ontology. Whether anyone
can get away with this uncommitted permissivism is controversial, of course.
5 This, I confess, is just my own characterization. I leave it intentionally vague, except to
say that I mean to signal the oft-defended intuition that something is lost in the reductionist’s
picture of the world (especially the eliminativists’).
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is good reason to question the coherence of the view in the mind–body case.
Kim (2012) thinks no intelligible thesis of token physicalism has been offered.
That would be embarrassing. How could such a popular view be indefensible?
If Kim is right, it could be that token physicalism has stood on the apparent
merit of multiple realizability-based arguments against reduction, more than on
positive construals of the thesis. I will not rehearse Kim’s arguments against
his best reconstructions of token theses, however, because there is a very direct
way to see the threatened incoherence. The token physicalist claims that
mental entity types are distinct from physical entity types. But this means
that mental tokens, supposedly identical with physical tokens, have differing
sortalish properties (they fall under different kinds and the mental has the
modal property of being possibly otherwise realized). But if mental tokens
differ in their properties from physical tokens, they are distinct, offering up a
grounding problem. In short, if one hangs onto the difference in types, one gets
a difference in tokens as well.
I suggest that the grounding-like issues are similarly solved by antireduc-
tionism at the expense of distinctness. Let me illustrate this with respect to
Baker’s (1999) antireductive physicalism formulated in terms of constitution. I
understand Baker as antireductive because she explicitly takes her position to
have an “antireductive thrust,” (p. 152), and thinks constituted entities have
properties that their constituents do not. Baker thinks constitution, as she
formulates it, holds between persons and their bodies, art objects and their
media, monetary value and monetary instruments, national flags and bits of
cloth, to name a few. If we say that a paper note has some value, that is so
because the paper bill constitutes some thing with that value—a dollar—and
not the other way around. The constituent can “borrow” properties that really
belong to the constituted entity. Secondly, she thinks these properties aren’t
spooky. So she dissents “from Allan Gibbard when he says, ‘If the statue is
an entity over and above the piece of clay in that shape, then statues seem to
take on a ghostly air’ ” (p. 151). Her “antireductive” view aims to be a form of
physicalism because of her non-ghostly answer to the grounding problem: “it
is in virtue of its relational properties that David exists. . . . Piece could exist
in the absence of an artworld; David could not” (p. 151). The differing modal
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properties of Piece and David depend on, or are somehow “grounded in” cir-
cumstances, presumably physical ones. Plenitude-embracing compatibilists of
both constitution and realization stripes can (and do) appeal to circumstances
to get the grounding done, and they should. But once corrected in this way,
the resulting view fails to be antireductive in the way Baker takes her view to
be, as we’ll see in more detail in Chapter 7. Notice, for now, that this appeal
to sufficiency-in-the-circumstances is no self-sufficiency at all on the part of
pieces of marble or neural processes. At best, it shows that things like statues
and mental entities are not identical with the marble and the neural processes
on which they partly depend. But we already knew that wholes aren’t identical
with subsets of their parts. If the realization theorist or constitution theorist
retreats to sufficiency-in-the-circumstances as grounding sortalish difference or
sameness, and the necessitation of a realized or constituted entity by realizing
or constituting entities-in-the-circumstances, they solve grounding and overde-
termination problems by giving up distinctness—and thus antireductionism.
That is, it is no longer clear how David is distinct from all of Piece-in-the-
circumstances, or how a functional property is distinct from all of some physical
property-in-the-circumstances. In light of the grounding problem, antireductive
physicalism looks either less antireductive (on Baker’s account), or less like phys-
icalism. For an example of antireductionism as dubious physicalism, consider
Fodor’s (1997) conclusion that it is “entirely mysterious” why there should be
“macrolevel regularities at all in a world where, by common consent, macrolevel
stabilities have to supervene on a buzzing, blooming confusion of microlevel
interactions” (p. 161). Hence the persisting worry that truly antireductive
views have no answer to the question of what grounds the supposed difference
between spatiotemporally coincident but non-identical entities.
Moreover, because grounding and overdetermination problems, and their
possible solutions, cross-cut concepts of dependence, appealing to the relations
themselves won’t provide the required remedy. Stipulating that the dependence
between mind and body or between art objects and their media is a matter
of realization or constitution in the circumstances doesn’t on its own go any
distance to alleviating these problems while maintaining distinctness. It should
be especially obvious that it is no answer to grounding or overdetermination
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problems to insist on distinctness by saying that the relation which holds
between, for example, body and mind, is one of realization or constitution.
Yet this is arguably what at least early theorists about those relations have
done. Concepts of dependence can directly beg an outstanding question by
taking certain otherwise unaccounted-for intuitions about sortalish differences
and simply baking these into the concept that was supposed to do the work of
explaining, for example, mind–physical dependence. In the case of realization,
the antireductive lesson that was supposed to be drawn from the possibility
of multiple realization, but became baked into the very concept of realization,
remained unquestioned for decades (see Kim, 1992b; Shapiro, 2000), and might
still be the dominant view in the philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences.
Even more recent theories of realization (see Gillett, 2002b, 2002a, 2013; Aizawa
and Gillett, 2009) have been accused of relying on an unspecified “in virtue of” or
“grounding” relation (see Endicott, 2016a). Similarly, Chisholm (1973) appealed
to an unexplained notion of constitution to account for the persistence of objects
through change of parts. Baker’s (1997, 1999) view is largely stipulative in a
similar way: begin with the thought that a higher-level thing and its lower-level
constituents have differing sortalish properties. Use these properties to deny
their identity and to insist that the relation between them must be some other
relation: one of constitution. Finally, invoke constitution (in the circumstances)
to explain the sortalish differences.
Wrapping Up
In this chapter, I’ve argued that there’s a grounding-like problem for each of the
above three ways of denying identity while affirming sufficiency, and, although
the problem of overdetermination arises most often in the context of mind–body
antireductionism, it is actually common to every instance of putative sufficiency
paired with distinctness owing to differing sortalish properties. Following
Bennett (2004), but extending the analysis to realization, and calling the latter
the “many problems of the many,” highlights the problematic overdetermination
or exclusion problem resulting from overpopulation. Similarly, calling all of the
former “grounding-like” problems highlights the resulting “in virtue of what”
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questions: in virtue of what does just one of many possible fusions compose an
entity; in virtue of what are distinct kinds of bases sufficient for some unified
higher-level kind; in virtue of what are coincident entities distinct? Finally, no
putative synchronic dependence relation is immune to these problems. They
arise from antireductive approaches to the synchronic dependence of higher-
level entities on lower-level ones, whether formulated in terms of composition,
constitution or realization, which I suggest is a reason to suspect that these
may not be such different forms of dependence after all. At least, no mere
appeal to these relations secures antireductionism. Moreover, views appealing
to circumstances to get the necessitation and grounding needed to solve the
overdetermination and grounding-like problems simply doesn’t rule out identity.
If anything, the best efforts to deal with overdetermination and grounding-like
problems are appeals to circumstances that may yield a form of identity, if a
widened one, after all. But I am only just beginning to defend this view. It
remains to be seen, in the following chapters, why intuitions in the vicinity
of multiple realizability, as the initial motivations for antireductionism, fail to




We’ve seen that problems persist for antireductionism in a rather patterned way,
owing to commitments to both physicalism and to non-categorical properties,
when the entity bearing those properties is taken to be coincident with some
physical conditions on which it depends and yet which are insufficient for
those properties. While I take the puzzles as reasons to doubt antireductive
physicalism can be coherent, I don’t take them to be a reason to give up on
physicalism generally. Two straightforward reasons to pursue physicalism are
the lack of viable alternatives, and the historical tendency toward satisfactory
explanations of higher-level entities in terms of lower-level ones. Of course,
the idea that we are partly what we make, is an extension of physicalism—the
idea that we are physical things, and that physical things like technologies
can partly explain physical things like us. Part of my purpose in this chapter,
then, is to reject one of the arguments for antireductionism: the argument
from multiple realizability. But one central way of countering antireductionism
does so by rejecting the functional kinds to which the multiple realizability
argument appeals as being unscientific, or “unprojectible.” The idea is that
since the members of functional kinds inherit their causal powers from their
realizers, and scientific kinds are causally individuated, putatively reduction-
blocking differences between realizers will mean that they fall under different
scientific kinds. Correspondingly, those that do fall under a scientific kind
aren’t “multiply” realized; differences among members of such kinds are said
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to be “mere variations.” I argue in this chapter that these arguments against
antireductionism fail. I argue in the next chapter that realizers need not
share all their causal powers to fall under a kind, and that kinds come in
degrees of similarity between their members, and hence degrees of projectibility.
As I argued in Section 2.1, it matters to the seriousness of externalism that
functional kinds are not unscientific. That would threaten with elimination
those broadly functionalist models of mind current in the cognitive sciences
on which the appeals of EM—to parity or similarity with extended states or
processes—are based. It would in fact threaten many scientific kinds from
disciplines other than physics. My aim here, then, is to navigate between the
Scylla of antireductionism and the Charybdis1 of eliminativistic reductionism.
Externalists must be able to account for the projectibility of functional kinds,
and I must do so in a way that is amenable to reduction. As I said in Section 1.2,
a broadly reductive functionalism is required for the inference from our partial
constitution by technologies to our partial identity with technologies. The
question of EM hinges on nothing less than the question of mind–world relations,
to which issues about multiple realizability are central. Again, as Bickle (2016,
sec. 3) says, “what is at stake here should not be underemphasized. . . .” The
issue of multiple realizability remains central to the direction of fruitful sciences
of minds and human persons.
The issue will occupy us for this chapter and the next. In Section 5.1,
I introduce the antireductive argument in more detail and summarize some
ways it might be attacked. In Section 5.2 and Section 5.3, I explain that the
best existing line of attack fails. Then, in Section 6.1, I elaborate a notion
of similarity that puts kinds on a spectrum of similarity. This view of kinds
will eventually allow me in Section 6.3 to deny a different premise of the
antireductive argument.
1 In Homer’s Odyssey, Scylla and Charybdis were legendary monsters inhabiting two sides
of a straight so narrow that it was difficult to sail around Scylla without passing close to
Charybdis, and vice versa.
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5.1 The Argument for Antireductionism from
Multiple Realizability
A widely held view in philosophy, largely attributable to Putnam (1967),
remains that multiple realizability repudiates mind-brain identity, precludes
the reduction of mental states to brain or other physical states, and secures the
autonomy of psychology. Fodor’s (1974) “Special Sciences” then generalized the
argument from multiple realizability to all “special sciences”—those sciences
other than physics. The idea, in short, is that as much as the world is populated
by “lower-level” stuff like particles, molecules, and gravitational fields, it is
also populated by “higher-level” things like organisms, institutions, economies,
norms, values, art, people, goals, feelings, and minds. These are all quite
real and scientifically interesting things that are not just difficult to identify
with the lower-level kinds, but, the idea goes, impossible to identify with such
kinds because the higher-level things are just not the right kinds of things to
be so identified. They’re not the right kinds of things to be identified that
way because what it is to be an institution, value, norm, person, or mind
is to function in a certain way or set of ways. And functions are multiply
realizable: they can be performed by a variety of mechanisms, each supposedly
sufficient and yet none specifically necessary for the higher-level thing identified
by that function. A functional kind, then, is not identical with any physical
kind. But this gets us into the problems we saw in Chapter 4. And it would
preclude making claims about our identity on the basis of any mental properties
we might have that are realizable by partly technological physical properties.
Finally, if constitution and realization are as closely related as I suggest, the
same sort of considerations might apply to, for example, multiply constitutable
cognitive systems. Being partly constituted by technologies wouldn’t, on the
antireductive view, mean that we are partly what we make. The argument for
antireductionism, in a simple form which I adapt from Bickle (2016), may be
characterized as follows:
[Multiple Realizability] Many special science kinds are multiply realizable by
distinct physical kinds.
[Unity Condition on Kind Identity] If a kind is multiply realizable by distinct
86
physical kinds, then it cannot be identical to any specific physical kind.
Multiple Realizability and the Unity Condition on Kind Identity straightfor-
wardly entail,
[Non-Identity Thesis] Many special science kinds are not identical to any specific
physical kind.
This conclusion gets combined with a condition on reduction, such as:
[Identity Condition on Reduction] If a kind is not identical to a physical kind,
then it is not reducible to physics.
From the Non-identity Thesis and the Identity Condition on Reduction, we
can conclude,
[Antireduction Thesis] Many special science kinds are not reducible to physics.
I will endorse Multiple Realizability, but I’m eventually going to reject the
Non-identity Thesis, and the Antireduction Thesis with it.
Of course, the Antireduction Thesis has not gone unchallenged, and the
issues remain outstanding. In his review of the literature, Bickle (2016) says,
“the renewed critical interest in multiple realizability, begun more than a decade
ago, continues to the present day” (sec. 3). First, the plausibility of the
Identity Condition on Reduction has been questioned; the Identity Condition
on Reduction rests on Nagel’s (1961) account of intertheoretic reduction, or
something like it, and reductionists can deny that the Identity Condition on
Reduction captures the right condition on reduction, and can subscribe to
an account of reduction revised in light of multiple realizability (see Sober,
1999). But I will not dispute the Identity Condition on Reduction. To see why,
recall that physicalist commitments to non-overdetermination and the causal
closure of the physical, together with an entity’s dependence on lower-level
conditions sufficient for it, become problematically inconsistent when combined
with the thought that an entity has properties for which those conditions are
not sufficient. If one accepts the Non-identity Thesis, that many special science
kinds are not identical with any particular physical kind, one already has the
grounding and overdetermination problems for special science properties. So
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these problems arise independently of further inferences from distinctness to
irreducibility. So although I have been speaking of “antireductionism,” my issue
is really with “anti-identificationism,” a precursor to antireductionism, though
one can usually put these two positions together, as I did throughout Chapter 4.
From my point of view, what matters most is simply that we not posit coincident
but non-identical entities. That’s because a plausible physicalism, whether
properly called “reductionist” or not, must identify everything in the world
with physical conditions. If these physical conditions are expansive, “reduction”
seems to be a less apt label for the identification. But by denying the Non-
identity Thesis, I needn’t worry about the rest. Having said that, I suspect
antireductionism goes, too.2
The Multiple Realizability premise has also come under attack. There are
two ways of denying that Multiple Realizability is true of a particular special
science kind. The first is to deny that the same kind is realized by truly
multiple physical kinds (see Shapiro, 2000, 2008; Bechtel, 2001; Polger, 2007,
2009; Polger and Shapiro, 2008, 2016; Shapiro and Polger, 2012). The second,
related strategy is to deny that multiply realizable special science kinds can be
properly scientific (see Kim, 1992b; Shapiro, 2000). These two approaches are
closely related because a condition of the second strategy is that some putative
kind is realizable by quite distinct physical kinds. Together, these strategies
might be turned into a general counterargument to the Antireduction Thesis
by running an apparent dilemma in which the Multiple Realizability premise
turns out false in every particular case, like the dilemma posed by Lawrence
Shapiro (2000):
Either the realizing kinds truly differ in their causally relevant
properties, or they do not. If they do not, then we do not have
2 If the Non-identity Thesis is rejected, then the argument for the Antireduction Thesis
via the Identity Condition on Reduction is unsound. And it is not at all obvious what
plausible condition on reduction replacing the Identity Condition on Reduction could be
strong enough to block reduction without trivializing irreducibility (and reducibility). But,
again, I needn’t settle that. I take it that the best general picture of intertheoretic reduction
will be a consequence of an account of kinds and regularities in science and that reductionists
ought not to beg the question against antireductionism by redefining reduction or relying on
an account of reduction whose primary motivation is to deny the Antireduction Thesis.
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a legitimate case of multiple realization. If the realizing kinds do
genuinely differ in their causally relevant properties, then, it seems,
they are different kinds. But if they are different kinds, then they
are not the same kind, and so we do not have a case in which a
single kind has multiple realizations. (p. 647)
I think cases that slip through both horns are the norm, and that the
attempt to deny Multiple Realizability fails. Interestingly, I think the reasons
to believe that multiple realizability is common are reasons to believe the Unity
Condition on Kind Identity is false. Thus, to see why we should deny the
Unity Condition on Kind Identity, it’s important to see why no way of denying
Multiple Realizability is plausible.
First, in contrast to the claim that multiple realizability is rare, I argue
in Section 5.2 that it is ubiquitous. Second, in contrast to the claim that
multiply realizable kinds are unscientific, I argue in Section 5.3 that they can
be projectible. I will then argue in Chapter 6 that all kinds whose members
are physical individuals, and kinds of such kinds, are physical kinds, and it
is false that if a kind is multiply realizable by distinct physical kinds, then it
cannot be identical to any specific physical kind.
5.2 A Dilemma for Multiple Realizability, and
its First Horn
With a view to clarifying the notion of multiplicity involved in Multiple Realiz-
ability, Shapiro (2000) introduced a “causal” relevance criterion for the sorts of
differences that count as differences among realizers. Not just any difference
between mousetraps, for example, is relevant to the function of trapping mice,
so not just any difference makes them different as mousetraps. For example, we
shouldn’t think that if you take a regular old snap-trap and paint it aquamarine
on the underside that you have come up with another realization of a mousetrap.
Shapiro makes the same point with respect to differently-coloured corkscrews.
Shapiro believes that, “once various conceptual issues are clarified,” by which
he means testing claims of Multiple Realizability against a relevance criterion,
“the task of demonstrating multiple realizability smacks the hard surface of
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empirical fact, and, I shall argue, leaves MRT far more difficult to establish
than philosophers currently acknowledge” (pp. 636-7). Shapiro argues that
“realizations ought to be distinguished in kind only if they differ according to
how they achieve the capacity that serves to individuate the kind they realize”
(p. 650). Failure to satisfy this condition is the first horn of the dilemma for
putative cases of multiple realizability. And Polger and Shapiro (2016) further
challenge Multiple Realizability using a relevance criterion, arguing that multi-
ple realizability is special and not nearly so ubiquitous as some might think:
“Variation is everywhere in nature, but multiple realization is not” (p. 70). On
Shapiro (2000) and Polger and Shapiro’s (2016) view, multiple realizability
occurs, but is not ubiquitous, in contrast to especially Carl Gillett’s (2002a)
account of the realization relation.3 And it is on the issue of “relevant” differ-
ences that Shapiro (2000)4 and Polger and Shapiro (2016)5 stake this claim.
The criterion is supposed to vitiate apparent cases of multiple realizability. In
Shapiro, there are a few statements of the relevance criterion. The clearest
statements are, “to say that a kind is multiply realizable is to say that there are
different ways to bring about the function that defines the kind” (p. 644), and,
"realizations ought to be distinguished in kind only if they differ according to
how they achieve the capacity that serves to individuate the kind they realize
(p. 650). Let’s refer to it this way:
[Causal Relevance Condition] A kind is multiply realizable only if realizers differ
in how they bring about the function that individuates the kind.
3 Gillett (2002b, 2002a, 2007), Aizawa (2009), and Aizawa and Gillett (2009), have sought
to characterize realization as a sort of non-causal and synchronic dependence that instances of
a single property or function have on physical conditions that are not qualitatively identical
to one another, no matter where they fall on a spectrum of similarity. Because so many
differences, including small differences, among the implementations of a property or function
amount to multiple realizability on that account, Polger and Shapiro accuse Gillett, and
Aizawa and Gillett, of promoting a notion of realization that entails an “undesirable profligacy”
(p. 45) of instances of the realization relation.
4 Every further reference to Shapiro in this chapter and the next is to Lawrence Shapiro
(2000), unless otherwise specified.
5 Every reference to Polger and Shapiro in this chapter and the next is to Polger and
Shapiro (2016), unless otherwise specified.
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At a glance, there are at least two ways to understand different “ways”
and differing in “how.” One would emphasize parts and their arrangements.
Another would emphasize functionally-defined properties “belonging” to an
individual realizer. But no one should reply to the question of how a mouse trap
traps mice with, “by having the disposition to trap mice.” The how-question is
only sensibly answered in terms of parts and their arrangements. Shapiro says,
I do not deny Putnam’s [1979] claim that “two systems can have
quite different constitutions and be functionally isomorphic.” I do,
however, deny that two systems that are functionally isomorphic
are, in virtue of this fact, realizations of the same kind. (p. 638)
The denial here can be clarified in terms of scientific, natural, or projectible
kinds. Since the differences Putnam cites are differences in constitution—
most plausibly interpreted here in terms of parts and arrangements—and
the sameness he cites is functionally characterized, it would be consistent
with traditional appeals to Multiple Realizability to accept a causal relevance
criterion for differences when answering the “how” question in terms of parts
and arrangements. For instance, mouse traps differ in how they catch mice
by differing in the parts or arrangements without which they could not catch
mice. But this must not be what Shapiro means by “how,” because he uses the
criterion to “screen off” some differences of the above sort as not amounting to
relevant differences in realizers. On Shapiro’s view, a steel corkscrew and an
otherwise very similar aluminum corkscrew don’t count as different realizers of
corkscrews. They do not relevantly differ, apparently, since both are rigid. “The
means by which steel and aluminum achieve rigidity are, in this context [the
context of corkscrew realization], beside the point” (p. 645). Why? “Relative to
the properties that make them suitable for removing corks, they are identical”
(p. 644). By apparent contrast, Shapiro suggests that a lever-style corkscrew,
as compared to a winged corkscrew (which adds a rack-and-pinion), count as
different realizers of the corkscrew function.
One might wonder whether levers and rack-and-pinions could all be func-
tionally described, lumped together in much the way steel and aluminum are
lumped as having “rigidity.” That is, levers and racks-and-pinions could be
described as devices yielding mechanical advantage in applications of force.
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Wouldn’t that screen those differences off, too? In that case, as much as
Shapiro can say, “relative to the properties that make [aluminum and steel]
suitable for removing corks, they are identical” (p. 644), he should say that,
relative to the properties that make the two mechanisms suitable for removing
corks, they are identical. But this is like answering the how question by ref-
erence to a disposition. How do corkscrews remove corks? By being able to
remove corks. On the other hand, admitting differences between aluminum
and steel as differences between causally relevant parts, the appeal to their
being “relatively identical” is subsequently just the Multiple Realizability claim,
that things not identical in an absolute sense might perform the same function.
Aluminum is not rigid simpliciter; it is rigid enough as a lever of a certain
gauge in a certain application at a certain temperature and pressure. Steel
and aluminum don’t have identical rigidities, and their differences track all
the way in to their differing atomic structures. As causally individuated, then,
aluminum and steel, far from being identical, are only similar insofar as they
have similar effects or share particular effects as they do in corkscrew function.
Moreover, no physicalist would deny that all differences in corkscrews coincide
with microphysical differences. Winged and lever corkscrews also differ in
their parts and arrangements, and the other functional differences between
the steel and aluminum cannot hide behind the property of being rigid or a
specific functional description any more than the differences between levers and
other force-focusing mechanisms can hide behind the functional description of
providing mechanical advantage. No differences in parts of the corkscrew get
screened off simply by being differences among smaller parts; there is no other
source of difference.
There is a version of the difference criterion that I do not deny. I agree with
Shapiro that not all of what we might call a corkscrew does any corkscrewing
work. Lazy tag-along parts can be omitted. Shapiro notes that some properties,
like colour owing to paint, are causally irrelevant. Now, aluminum and steel
differ in colour. Does that make their colour properties relevant, since aluminum
or steel or some material must be involved in the work, and all have colours?
But this asks the relevance question of the wrong candidate. We will want to
deny that colour is a difference-maker to the function in question. Of course,
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for more specific dual-functions, for example, flaunting status while opening
a wine bottle, a certain kind of corkscrew, for example, a golden one, might
be required. But any downstream effects which are extraneous, ex hypothesi,
to the function or functions in question, while nonetheless being effects of
the working parts and their arrangement achieving the function or functions
in question, are pertinent to the question of multiplicity, because it is those
extra-functional effects that individuate the various realizers of a function.
It is differing parts, not functional properties, that can be tested as to their
relevance to the function in question. If the putatively property-bearing parts,
like paint, of the irrelevant property, colour, could be omitted altogether and
still get the job in question done, the paint is irrelevant, and the paint colour
goes with it. One cannot altogether omit certain materials, of one sort or
another (but not any sort), any more than one can omit a mechanism of one
sort or another (but not any sort) and still realize a corkscrew. What suggests
aluminum or steel and winged or lever-style corkscrews as potential cases of
Multiple Realizability, having such multiplicity in the realizers, are differences
between parts which are not just along for the ride, but doing work within
the sufficient base of the realized function—parts which, though they can be
traded, cannot be eliminated and still yield the realization. The appropriate
differences to be tested for relevance are differences in parts or arrangements,
and causal relevance should be decided counterfactually. I suggest that,
[Causal Relevance] An entity a is causally relevant to a function e, if and only if
without a, and without compensatory work performed by other parts,
and without replacement of a, that instance of e would not occur.
Two notes are in order. First, the “no-compensation” clause in Causal
Relevance above must be in place in order to test causal relevance, or else the
counterfactual will come out false because of multiple realizability. It must
be in place in order not to exclude working parts—for example, the very tip
of a very sharp corkscrew—as causally irrelevant just because a loss of some
degree of sharpness might not preclude general function. In contrast, Polger
and Shapiro claim that,
it is plain that isotopes of gold are not different ways of having
the atomic number 79 (i.e., being gold)—they are not multiple
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realizations of gold—because they all have their atomic number in
the same way: Namely, by having 79 protons in their nuclei.
Indeed, elements are grouped by the number of protons in their nuclei. That
number corresponds to the number of electrons the nucleus tends to attract,
and that relationship is somewhat more predictive or definitive of the reactivity
or causal profile of any one of an element’s observationally stable isotopes than
the number of neutrons in the nucleus. Thus, the property of being gold and
the property of being an element with 79 protons in its nucleus are identical.
Now, is the latter multiply realizable? Polger and Shapiro want to say, no:
isotopes have their atomic number “in the same way.” But that is like answering
the question of the way or the how of mouse-trapping by reference to a thing’s
being a mousetrap. Rather, according to the clarified causal relevance criterion
I have recommended, protons are causally relevant because, being gold is not
just being 79 protons; one from my left ear, another from your car steering
wheel, another from Shakespear’s corkscrew, another from Saturn’s ring, and so
on. Being gold is being any element-with-79-protons-in-its-nucleus, and being
an element with that many protons depends on having between 90 and 126
neutrons. Neutrons are essential to the stability of the nucleus, hence the range
of stabilities of isotopes of a given element. Without the neutrons, the element
would not be gold. Now, it happens that there is only one observationally stable
isotope of gold. But it would be false to think that a gold-195 (79 protons
and 116 neutrons), would not be gold, or that a block of it—if a block could
be synthesized—with a half-life of 186 days, would not be a gold–platinum
alloy over the course of its relatively leisurely change into increasingly pure
platinum (98% pure after a few years, by my calculations). Many isotopes of a
single kind of element are observationally stable. Hydrogen, for example, is
mostly two observationally stable isotopes—protium and deuterium. These
isotopes differ somewhat in their properties and reactivity—they can be causally
individuated—and can be sub-classified (see Bursten, 2014).6 Water with an
6 For some of the same reasons, Julia Bursten (2014) follows a number of philosophers of
chemistry in rejecting the microstructural essentialism—inherited from the Kripke-Putnam
view of the extension of our natural kind terms—that might underlie Polger and Shapiro’s
view.
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unusually high proportion of deuterium is known as heavy water, and differs
somewhat in its effects (e.g., on a weigh scale), but perhaps not in some of
its other effects in particular branches of a causal network, eg, slaking thirst.
Protium and deuterium differ in causally relevant ways. By way of analogy,
think of standard stud wall construction. A wall without enough studs is not
stable. The design of a wall with too many studs is not economical. Still, in any
case, the work of holding up a roof above is spread among the studs. Likewise
with corkscrews composed of levers differing in length, shape, or thickness. It
would be mistaken to think that a bit of aluminum was causally irrelevant—
not participating in force transmission—just because it could be drilled out,
or cut away. Lots of things—nuclei, houses, corkscrews, bureaucracies—are
overbuilt relative to their targeted or “safe” working loads. If differences in
underworked—but not unworking—parts or arrangements are screened off as
irrelevant because of functional similarity realized by a narrower set of parts,
Multiple Realizability is denied at one level of description or explanation only
by affirming it at another.
Second, the “no-replacements” clause in Causal Relevance above must be in
place in order to test causal relevance, or else the counterfactual will come out
false because of multiple realizability, as we saw in Section 3.3.3. It would be very
strange if there was no multiple realizability because of multiple realizability.
If differences in parts or arrangements are screened off as irrelevant because
of functional similarity realized by micro parts, Multiple Realizability is once
again denied at one level of description or explanation only by affirming it at
another. So it is quite puzzling that Shapiro says,
For all I know, rigidity is a disposition that is multiply realizable. If
rigidity is a disposition that can be brought about in various ways,
and if steel and aluminum differ in respect to how they produce
rigidity, then steel and aluminum are alternative realizations of
rigidity. But, relative to their function in a corkscrew, rigidity
screens off the differences between steel and aluminum (pp. 644-
645).
We’ll return to this presupposition of Multiple Realizability at one level
of explanation in order to deny it at another. And we’ll see that such a
boundary may play an explanatory role. But, there is no “rigidity” as such
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that could screen off these differences. If we sometimes speak this way, doing so
posits an intervening boundary that is not a metaphysical boundary. Imagine
reconstituting some aluminum oxide via electrolysis to produce some pure
aluminum. Now, must one do any further building, in any metaphysical sense,
to produce a lever or even a whole corkscrew? No; a specialized implementation
of the Hall–Héroult process might have built the lever or corkscrew directly
from aluminum oxide, and Hephaestus might have done so from aluminum
atoms. It is pragmatic divisions of labour, rather than issues of metaphysical
transitivity that restrict aluminum refineries to outputting stock material rather
than corkscrews. Ontologically, the corkscrew and its rigid parts are on par.
Shapiro provides no reason why realization isn’t transitive all the way in to the
finest available grain-level of description.
While Polger and Shapiro take winged and waiter’s corkscrews to be multi-
ple realizations of corkscrews, Polger and Shapiro follow Shapiro in viewing
aluminum and steel differences as insufficient for multiple realizability. Likewise,
while they think that camera eyes (like mammalian and octopus eyes) on the
one hand, and compound eyes (like those of insects) on the other are multiple
realizations of eyes, Polger and Shapiro think that mammalian and octopus
eyes, despite their differing evolutionary histories and the resulting differences
in the kinds of tissues that compose the parts of their eyes, are not relevantly
different as eyes.7 Further, it seems plausible that Polger and Shapiro have
causal relevance in mind insofar as they follow Shapiro in appealing to examples
of irrelevant properties like colour:
Because [waiter’s corkscrews and winged corkscrews] make use of
different mechanical principles—one levers, one rack and pinions,
and so forth—we conclude that they do the corkscrew job in different
ways, as considered from the point of view of our imaginary science
of mechanical artifacts. In contrast, if we consider two waiter’s
corkscrews that differ in the material of which they are made (e.g.,
7 Shapiro, and Polger and Shapiro, make a point of pitting Putnam’s analysis of the
camera eye example against Block and Fodor’s (1972) analysis. I intend my analysis of
explanatory versus causal relevance to help illuminate this interesting historical difference
among functionalists. Putnam must have something like Polger and Shapiro’s relevance
criterion in mind, and if so, will be subject to the same critique.
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aluminum, stainless steel, or wood) or in their color (e.g., silver,
black, or pink), the imagined science of mechanical artifacts tells
us that these differences are not relevant differences (Shapiro 2000).
The reason is that the same explanation of how the device does
its corkscrew job applies to all of them, regardless of material
composition and color. (Polger and Shapiro, 2016, p. 68. See also
p. 69, p. 99)
Moreover, Polger and Shapiro take it that “realization is a synchronic
ontological dependence relation, distinct from identity, and that transmits
physical legitimacy from physical realizers to what is realized” (p. 28). We saw,
however, that causal relevance doesn’t do the work Shapiro intended for it, and
that as a species of dependence, it is not obvious how realization could fail to
be transitive. Transitivity is arguably partly definitive of dependence relations.
Either realization is transitive, or realization is not an ontological dependence
relation. But Polger and Shapiro deny that realization is transitive.
On our view, eye is a multiply realized kind, but not because of
variation in cellular composition. That is not the right kind of
variation. Human eyes and octopus eyes are the same kind of
realizer of eye, namely, camera eye. But camera eye might be
multiply realized. . . . The differences between the cells in human
and octopus eyes may well constitute a difference in the realization
of part of an eye, or part of a part, etc. of an eye. But as it happens,
it does not suffice for multiple realization of eyes themselves. And
eyes do not inherit the multiple realization of their parts or realizers.
Multiple realization doesn’t percolate up in this way. (p. 64)
They then attempt to explain the intransitivity in a footnote to the latter
claim about percolation:
The reason is simple: Multiple realization is a claim about the
dissimilarity of two taxonomies, and dissimilarity is not transitive.
P might be realized by Q and Q might be multiply realized by R
and S; but that does not imply that R and S are multiple realizers
of P. One way this could happen is that the difference between R
and S is relevant to kind Q and irrelevant to kind P. (note 1 on
p. 81)
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I grant that dissimilarity is not transitive.8 If indeed “multiple realization
is a claim about the dissimilarity of two taxonomies,” I take the idea here to
be that the taxonomy in which eyes are a kind is dissimilar to the taxonomy in
which camera eyes are a kind, which in turn is dissimilar to the taxonomy in
which cellular components like proteins are kinds. From these dissimilarities
we cannot infer that the taxonomy in which eyes are a kind is dissimilar to the
taxonomy in which cellular components are kinds. Suppose these taxonomies
are somehow “similar.” I’m not sure what this is supposed to show. Consider an
example of such a possibility. Suppose cars are multiply realizable by those with
diesel and those with gasoline engines. Suppose that diesel vehicles are multiply
realizable by trucks and cars. In other words, one way of classifying vehicles
aligns with particular lower-level differences while ignoring others. Other ways
of classifying vehicles align with other lower-level differences, while ignoring
still other differences that are nonetheless causally relevant as counterfactually
judged. Diesel cars and diesel trucks—both diesel vehicles that can have
the same effect, say, getting to the office using vegetable oil—have differing
frames and engine sizes; these differing components cannot be omitted, and
they are part of how the individual does the diesel vehicle job. But this just
makes it plain that no way of classifying vehicles unless by individual serial
number can pay attention to every difference among ways of being a vehicle,
and that is what Multiple Realizability claims amount to. Notice, too, that if
kinds in two taxonomies are identical, and one is multiply realized by kinds
in another taxonomy, both are multiply realized in virtue of being identical.
Likewise, an identity in a synchronic ontological dependence chain that includes
realization doesn’t break the transitivity of the dependence. We saw this above
with gold. Atomic gold is any element-with-79-protons-in-its-nucleus. There
is more than one “way”—not in the question-begging functional sense, but
in the non-question-begging sense of differing compositional ways—to be an
8 For example, if A is dissimilar to Z and Z is dissimilar to B, one can no more conclude
that A is dissimilar to B than that they are identical. Apples are dissimilar to zebras, zebras
are dissimilar to bananas, but those dissimilarities are not a measure of the dissimilarity
between apples and bananas. Unlike relations such as “bigger than,” and “depends on,”
nothing about the relation between A and B can be known by their both being dissimilar to
Z.
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element-with-79-protons-in-its-nucleus. So, there is more than one way to be
atomic gold. Likewise, if A (a camera eye) is B (a lens focusing light on a
photosensitive surface), and B depends on C (cellular composition of the lens),
then being identical, A and B and must stand in the same relation to C, and
A also depends on C. And so with eyes generally. If Y (an eye) depends on
A, and A is B, and B depends on C, then Y depends on C. Nothing about
the intransitivity of dissimilarity bears on the transitivity of realization as a
dependence relation. When Polger and Shapiro claim that Multiple Realizability
“is a claim about the dissimilarity of two taxonomies” (note 1 on p. 81), they
might mean that realization, as they define it, is a special form of dependence
an individual of one kind has on one of a number of individuals of another
kind, such that the former kind is supposedly not reducible to the latter. But
the putative irreducibility of one taxonomy to another is a supposed further
consequence of multiple realizability; it is not, in the first place, what Multiple
Realizability is “about.” The invocation of Multiple Realizability, if realization is
a species of dependence, first of all involves dissimilarities other than taxonomic
ones, namely, causally relevant physical differences between realizers. It also
involves sameness, that is, sameness of function. It is simply off track to cite
putative intertaxonomic irreducibility and the intransitivity of dissimilarity
as bearing on the question of the transitivity of any proposed ontological
dependence relation.
Of course, it might be that Polger and Shapiro’s view is unclear as to the
notion or notions of relevance at work. Besides following and citing Shapiro’s
example of colour and the claim that realization is a synchronic ontological
dependence relation, it is not clear that the relevance criterion Polger and
Shapiro have in mind is a causal one. For one thing, whereas Shapiro named
his relevance criterion “causal” relevance, Polger and Shapiro do not name their
relevance criterion or criteria.
What might go some way to explaining the thought that there is an in-
teresting difference between winged and waiter’s corkscrews, but not between
aluminum and steel corkscrews, is the fact that a lever, for example, performs
a sub-function which can be taken as a sub-explanandum, and has as its de-
pendence base a subset of the whole corkscrew. Suppose there can be a more
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narrow range of mechanisms, like winged corkscrews, that can perform a more
specific function or functions. If the role of a lever as a part of this system can
be occupied by levers differing in causally relevant ways, then the idea might
be that the lever, not the corkscrew, is multiply realizable. This seems to be
Polger and Shapiro’s view in the case of camera eyes as realizations of eyes.
Camera eyes are realized by “lenses that focus light on a concave retina that is
located at the back of the eye” (p. 51). They say,
Vision scientists regard human and octopus eyes as the same in type
despite differences in their cellular composition. Cellular differences
do not make a difference to how the eyes perform their function:
They both focus light on a photosensitive surface in the same way.
They rely on the same kind of mechanism. (p. 64)
Again, while camera eyes may be the same kind of mechanism, it is not true
that camera eyes differing in cellular compositions focus light on a photosensitive
surface in a way that is in every sense the same. But what I want to highlight
now is Polger and Shapiro’s focus on what actual sciences say:
the sciences that deal with the putative realizers tell us which
differences in them amount to different ways of producing their
effects and which do not. . . . As before, the relevant differences are
those that make for differences in kind according to that science.
(p. 66)
This suggests that the notion of relevance that Polger and Shapiro are
applying to screen off compositional differences as “mere variation” (p. 209) is
what we might call “explanatory” relevance. For example, we might think that
we were doing a better job of explaining the situation with eyes by refraining
from saying that differing cellular compositions amount to different ways of
performing the eye function. Or, at least, we might think we’d do a better
job by being more specific. As an explanation, the fact that a corkscrew
depends on some aluminum sheds no light on, perhaps even obscures, the
arguably more interesting variety of ways that the very same material might
be arranged in various mechanisms able to perform the same function. On the
other hand, if aluminum and steel were more rarely found doing the same job
except in corkscrews, and if the range of mechanisms that could extract corks
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was narrower, it is conceivable that reference to materials at a finer grain-level
would be doing a greater share of the explanatory work, epistemically speaking.
Imagine a complex lock, for example, employing a retinal scanner, as a case of
a functional role that is more discriminating of occupants of the key role. The
explanation of how the retinal key works might well involve quite fine-grained
descriptions of blood vessels, particularly in the case that a spy is infiltrating a
high-security facility by impersonating a chief of defense. Recall, Polger and
Shapiro say that the differences between aluminum and steel are irrelevant
because “the same explanation of how the device does its corkscrew job applies”
(p. 68) to all corkscrews of the same mechanical type with differing material
types. But there is simply more than one “explanation,” available in the sense at
issue. If one asks how a corkscrew works, or how a bottle was opened, the best
answer depends on who is asking, why, when, where, and how. What’s difficult
to reconcile is that Polger and Shapiro acknowledge this very point. Following
Sober (1999), they reject, as I do, “Putnam’s claim that the microphysical
explanation of why the square peg will not go through the round hole is not
an explanation at all, or is at least a terrible explanation” (p. 200). Rather,
they think, “Both microphysical and macrophysical explanations can be good
ones,” and “this is what should be said about cognitive and neuroscientific
explanations, as well.”
There may of course be various reasons to prefer one over the other:
but the reasons will not be that one “explanation” fails to be an
explanation at all. (p. 200)
As Bennett puts it, the sort of explanation that “renders [some explanandum]
intelligible, sheds some light on how or why it happened, or perhaps puts an
end to a line of questioning” (p. 61), “is surely context sensitive in that it
matters what exactly we are asking, and what we already know; it is also
subject to Gricean considerations about cooperativeness and so forth” (p. 61).
The appearance of a sort of variability that is prima facie more interesting
than very small differences (“mere variation”), is a feature of cases like that
of corkscrews, in which the straight-forward constraints imposed by corked
bottles make for somewhat more (but not completely) open-ended engineering
possibilities. Of course, Polger and Shapiro are right that the job of the camera
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eye imposes constraints that make for less variation—less multiplicity—in
camera eyes than in eyes generally. But again, this is a matter of degree, and
less variation needn’t be less interesting; for example, the apparent convergent
evolution in the case of human and octopus eyes may be interesting in its
own right. So we ought not to decide what is “interesting” in advance. As it
happens, it is fairly common knowledge that aluminum and steel can perform
somewhat similarly in spoons and in bicycle frames. That, I take it, is old
news to some, and exciting to others. Suppose a culture of woodcarvers has
managed to make a great variety of things from wood. They are so adept at
carving and so mechanically ingenious that they do not find the differences
between wooden dovetail joinery and wooden gears interesting. But they are
novice genetic engineers interested in improving wood quality. Indeed, they
are even more intrigued when an alien arrives with corkscrews made of carbon
fiber. Closer to home, the case of the corkscrew might furnish an opportunity
to explain to an eight-year-old that the two levers and rack-and-pinions might
have been exchanged for a single lever, and it also might furnish an opportunity
to explain that the aluminum might have been exchanged for steel, this being a
case where those differences make no difference (by replacement) to the general
function, and yet, that such differences are indeed difference-makers elsewhere
and in other circumstances. Aluminum-single-lever corkscrews are preferable
when portability is at issue; double-lever-corkscrews are preferable (or not) for
their ease-of-use by eight-year-olds. By contrast, a “complete” explanation, or
“metaphysical” explanation, surely ought to mention the materials, since these
are what make up the items and ultimately make them able to do their jobs.
One couldn’t simply go without those materials. In the case of eyes again, it
may be that the fact that certain proteins compose a lens does not “explain”
why the eye of which the lens is a part counts as an eye. And “explains”—
understood epistemically—may not be transitive. However, I need not settle
that. None of this shows that realization is not transitive. If realization is a
synchronic ontological dependence relation, and if A realizes B, and B is or
realizes C, then A realizes C. And since many differences satisfy the plausible
Causal Relevance, multiple realizability is as common as “mere” variation. In
fact, we have no reason, so far, to see these as anything other than rough
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differences in degree of similarity.
5.3 The Second Horn and Similarity
That brings us to the second horn of the dilemma, which was that, “If the
realizing kinds do genuinely differ in their causally relevant properties, then,
it seems, they are different kinds” (p. 647). To clarify, I take it that Shapiro
means that if realizers differ in their causally relevant properties, then they are
different scientific kinds. Shapiro sketches an argument for that premise. First,
he advocates an inheritance principle for laws:
Microlevel laws determine the macrolevel laws, in the sense that
their truth physically guarantees the truth of the macrolevel laws.
Macrolevel laws about water are true because certain microlevel
laws about water are true. But, more significantly, macrolevel laws
about all samples of water are possible because the same microlevel
laws are true of all samples of water. (p. 649)
In order to generate an inference to Shapiro’s contention that, “if two
realizations contribute to a capacity in causally distinct ways, then this must
mean that there are no laws common to both of them” (p. 648), the inheritance
must be taken together with another plausible, albeit unstated, principle of
inheritance of differences. He must think that realizers that differ in their
causally relevant properties do so in virtue of differences in their lower-level
compositions or constitutions. Next, quoting and agreeing with Fodor in one
respect, Shapiro (p. 647) endorses a projectibility criterion for natural kinds:
What justifies a taxonomy, what makes a kind “natural,” is the
power and generality of the theories that we are enabled to formulate
when we taxonomize in that way. (Fodor, 1968, p. 119)
The reconstruction can now be fleshed out as follows:
(1) Microlevel laws determine the macrolevel laws.
(2) Realizers that differ in their causally relevant properties do so in virtue
of differences in their lower-level compositions or constitutions.
(3) Realizers that differ completely in their causally relevant properties have
no laws common to both of them.
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(4) What makes a kind natural is the explanatory power of generalizations
in which the kind figures.
So:
(5) Realizers that differ completely in their causally relevant properties are
different natural kinds.
But as we’re about to see with Kim’s (1992b)9 earlier and more thorough
argument to the same effect, the completeness of difference required for the
inference to be valid is a problem. Whereas Shapiro focuses on the first horn
of the dilemma he presents, which we saw above, Kim is aware that the second
horn is crucial for a general refutation of the Antireduction Thesis, and he
thus focuses almost entirely on offering an argument for the disastrous effect
of the second horn to the Multiple Realizability claim, and the Antireduction
Thesis with it. The second part of the dilemma is crucial, because if any of
the objects of a special science are multiply realizable, which no parties to
the debate deny,10 the promise of denying Multiple Realizability in general
rests with those “kinds” falling on the second horn of the dilemma, and not
being genuine scientific kinds. Notice, too, that the essential “condition on the
nature of [cognitive] processing” (Adams and Aizawa, 2001, p. 51) we saw in
Section 2.1 is reminiscent of this latter strategy. Recall that a corollary of a
notion of kinds according to which heterogeneous collections are unscientific is
that EM is trivialized to the extent that it relies on the similarity of classically
cognitive processes and mental states with extended ones. The objection is
that the similarity is too weak to support inductive reasoning or prediction.
9 Every reference to Kim in this chapter and the next is to Jaegwon Kim (1992b), unless
otherwise specified.
10 No one, to my knowledge, wants to go so far as to claim that no objects of any
special science are multiply realizable, even if they argue that multiple realizability is not
nearly so widespread as antireductionists have assumed. Shapiro (2000) and Polger and
Shapiro’s (2016) favourite illustration is that of corkscrews, and they think simple waiters’
corkscrews employing a single lever, and corkscrews employing a rack-and-pinion actuated
by double-leavers, are legitimately multiple realizations of the corkscrew kind. So, too, with
the compound eyes of insects as compared to the camera eyes of mammals—these are truly
multiple ways of realizing the eye kind.
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Kim opens by saying,
I will not here dispute. . . the possibility that extraterrestrial crea-
tures with a biochemistry radically different from the earthlings’, or
even electromechanical devices, can “realize the same psychology”
that characterizes humans. (p. 1)
Kim thinks this possibility entails the standard conclusion that multiply
realizable special science kinds or properties are irreducible and that special
sciences are thus autonomous. He then proceeds to argue that any such
multiply realizable and irreducible “kinds” can only be disjunctive sets whose
heterogeneity precludes their ability to figure in empirical laws. Witmer (2003)
summarizes Kim’s argument nicely:
Jaegwon Kim claims that [the argument for the Antireduction
Thesis] proves too much: if we accept its premises, we will block
psychophysical reduction only at the cost of being forced to accept
the further, disturbing conclusion that mental properties themselves
cannot appear in laws and are not genuine “kinds” in the first place.
Whatever is wrong with the property expressed by the disjunctive
predicate infects, so to speak, the mental property itself. This
is Kim’s challenge: if there is something about the “disjunctive”
property that prevents it from appearing in laws of nature, how
can mental properties themselves appear in laws of nature? (p. 60)
As Witmer (2003) also points out,
Kim’s [1992b] challenge. . . arises for anyone who is inclined to
accept both that there are psychological laws and that mental
properties are multiply realized. If (like myself) you think the
original antireductionist argument is fundamentally misguided, you
may still need to find an answer to Kim’s challenge. (p. 60)
In other words, the reductive functionalism I advocate requires me to
answer Kim’s challenge. Kim’s argument proceeds from what Kim calls the
“Physical Realization Thesis,” which Kim thinks physicalist proponents of
realization already accept, and which he describes as the conjunction of the
“Structure-Restricted Correlation Thesis”—
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If anything has mental property M at time t, there is some physical
structure type T and physical property P such that it is a system
of type T at t and has P at t, and it holds as a matter of law that
all systems of type T have M at a time just in case they have P at
the time (p. 5)
—with the belief that,
significant properties of mental states, in particular nomic rela-
tionships amongst them, are due to, and explainable in terms of,
the properties and causal-nomic connections among their physical
“substrates.” (p. 14)
To the physical realization thesis, Kim adds two more plausible principles
his interlocutors do not typically deny:
[Causal Inheritance] The causal powers of an instance of a property realized by
a physical implementation are identical with the causal powers of that
implementation. (p. 18)
[Causal Individuation of Kinds] Kinds in science are individuated on the basis
having similar causal powers. (p. 17)
From these principles we can conclude:
[Relative Homogeneity of Kinds] Properties realized by completely dissimilar
physical implementations cannot be constitutive of scientific kinds.
This conclusion, together with a Physical Realization Thesis about mental
kinds, or any functional kind, “effectively rules out mental kinds as scientific
kinds” (p. 18). I call this a form of denyingMultiple Realizability—the claim that
many special science kinds are multiply realizable—because Kim’s argument
denies that what is multiply realized is a kind at all. Then, insofar as the
autonomy of a special science is secured by the irreducibility of its objects of
study, such autonomy is bought at the cost of the projectibility and explanatory
power of the generalizations made by that science, that is, at the cost of being
a science at all.
But Kim’s argument appears to be susceptible to obvious and widespread
counterexamples. Thus, for example, Fodor (1997) replies,
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The very existence of the special sciences testifies to reliable
macrolevel regularities that are realized by [heterogeneous]
mechanisms. . . . . . . Unimaginably complicated to-ings and fro-ings
of bits and pieces at the extreme microlevel manage somehow to
converge on stable macrolevel properties. (p. 160)
Fodor continues,
On the other hand, the “somehow” really is entirely mysterious, and
my guess is that that is what is bugging Kim. He just doesn’t see
why there should be (how there could be) macrolevel regularities
at all in a world where, by common consent, macrolevel stabilities
have to supervene on a buzzing, blooming confusion of microlevel
interactions. (p. 161)
Note that Shapiro, Kim and Fodor, among others, seem to agree that
multiplicity, regularity, and reduction don’t readily mix (although this is exactly
what I’ll go on to deny in Section 6.3). Shapiro and Kim want to downplay
multiplicity, and keep the other two. Fodor wants to keep multiplicity and
regularity and dispense with reduction. So Fodor concludes, “Kim wants to
make it true by fiat that the only projectible kinds are physically homogeneous
ones” (p. 161).
But Fodor’s appeal to mystery is hardly preferable to Kim’s supposed
untenable fiat. Furthermore, there is no such fiat. Kim’s argument only
requires “similarity” for physical implementations of kinds, not “homogeneity.”
However, similarity is the real source of the problem with Kim’s argument.
Notice that I reconstructed Kim’s argument for the Relative Homogeneity
of Kinds with reference to “complete dissimilarity,” whatever that might be.
Since Kim says no such thing, it is perhaps more true to his view to omit the
completeness. But without completeness of dissimilarity, the argument simply
isn’t valid. In a crucial passage, Kim offers invalid reasoning as to why the two
principles rule out mental kinds as scientific kinds:
The reasoning is simple: instances of M that are realized by the
same physical base must be grouped under one kind, since ex
hypothesi the physical base is a causal kind; and instances of M
with different realization bases must be grouped under distinct
kinds, since, again ex hypothesi, these realization bases are distinct
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as causal kinds. Given that mental kinds are realized by diverse
physical causal kinds, therefore, it follows that mental kinds are
not causal kinds, and hence are disqualified as proper scientific
kinds. Each mental kind is sundered into as many kinds as there
are physical realization bases for it, and [psychology] as a science
with disciplinary unity turns out to be an impossible project. (p
18)
It does not follow that mental kinds are not causal kinds unless “diverse”
is understood as involving no similarity whatsoever. The argument involving
complete dissimilarity and the valid reconstruction above is thus not entirely
unwarranted. That’s because the notion that multiple realizability involves
complete dissimilarity is invited by the strong language antireductionists have
historically used in their appeals. Indication that the target antireductionist
thesis or principle involves complete dissimilarity is given in the quotations
Shapiro elects to cite from his primary disputants, especially Fodor (1968).
Fodor says that, “because it is (roughly) a sufficient condition for being a
mousetrap that a mechanism be customarily used in a certain way, there is
nothing in principle that requires that a pair of mousetraps have any shared
mechanical properties” (pp. 115-116, my emphasis). And Kim says,
the functionalist, especially one who believes in MR, would not,
and should not, look for something common to all pains over and
above H (the heart of functionalism, one might say, is the belief
that mental states have no “intrinsic essence”). (p. 23)
It might look as though the more dissimilar the implementations, the
better the antireductionist’s case. Putnam (1979) is famous for claiming that
“whatever our substance may be, soul-stuff, or matter or Swiss cheese, it is
not going to place any interesting first order restrictions on the answer” to the
question: “What is our intellectual form?” (p. 302, emphasis in original). But
Kim’s good argument against that sort of multiple realizability of scientific
kinds stands: complete difference among functional kinds would indeed preclude
their figuring as scientific kinds. So, despite rhetorical appeals to Swiss cheese
and a lack of interesting physical similarities, the complete dissimilarity or
difference that Kim’s and part of Shapiro’s argument target is not really a live
option—even if only in light of those arguments. Recognizing this, Polger and
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Shapiro say, “We know that realization theorists and functionalists made such
claims, but we think that they should not have done so” (p. 38). They cite
Block (1997), an antireductionist, who distances himself from this extreme by
appealing to the “Disney” principle—that teacups can’t really walk and talk
because, “constraints impose similarities” (p. 121). Multi-functional specificity
imposes further constraints, for example, among portable corkscrews, which
have to be relatively light, or among orally-administered antibiotics, which
have to be absorbable by the digestive tract. In the end, Kim’s argument
from causal inheritance and causal individuation of kinds is effective only
against an extreme position, even if that straw man is one of their opponents’
making. Kim’s arguments can’t guarantee that there are no regularities among
functional kinds because anyone granting that kinds are individuated on the
basis of their causal powers must allow that even very diverse mechanisms
underlying a function are just that similar.
Now recall the dilemma Shapiro offers against Multiple Realizability. The
general thought is that by the time realizers differ enough to count as multiple
realizations, they differ too much to be projectible and to count as members of
a scientific kind. From this Shapiro attempts to conclude that functional kinds
“never enter into (nonanalytic) laws of the form ‘All Ps are also _____’ ”
(p. 654). But this conclusion would also require that the claim, “if two re-
alizations contribute to a capacity in causally distinct ways, then this must
mean that there are no laws common to both of them” (p. 648), be clarified in
terms of complete distinctness. And the claim that there are no laws about
functional kinds is notably absent from Polger and Shapiro, anyway.11 De-
spite the multiple realizability of corkscrews, we can indeed specify regularities
like, cork extractors apply upward force > x to a cork,12 where x is the higher
11 Actually, this isn’t totally clear. Polger and Shapiro say, “the reality of corkscrews
is not redeemed by the regularity that corskcrews tend to have the capacity to remove
corks from bottles, for this regularity just repeats the functional specification of corkscrews”
(p. 196), and this is said in the context of the requirement that real properties be invoked in
regularities that are “empirical rather than analytic,” implying that corkscrew regularities
are analytic. By contrast, the regularity I gave is clearly empirical. And corkscrews are
indeed multiply realizable on their view.
12 I choose the more general functional kind “cork extractors,” to show that quite a broad
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limit of the range of frictional forces exerted by typical corks compressed into
typical bottlenecks. The range of rigidities and tensile/flexural, shear, and
compressive strengths among corkscrew parts can thus be predicted by those
of the other parts given x, as well as the properties of the compressed corks
to be penetrated, and the typical force-generating capacities of the actuating
organism. Now, if that’s not a very clear example of a useful projection, think
of something like an antibiotic as a member of a functional kind that we might
make generalizations about. Perhaps, antibiotics bind with catalytic enzymes
essential to cell wall biosynthesis. Notice, crucially, that these generalizations
involve facts about bottles and parasitic bacteria respectively. For the time in
the history of medicine that the generalization about antibiotics is or was a true
generalization,13 it is or was true in virtue of the particular enzymes essential
to bacteria. Indeed, Shapiro also seems to acknowledge that if realizers “have
no or only few causally relevant properties in common, then there are no or
just a few laws that are true of both of them” (p. 649, my emphasis).
So the counter dilemma for Shapiro’s dilemma is this. On one hand,
without completeness, the argument yields no strong conclusion about functional
kinds’ utter inability to enter into nonanalytic generalizations. Although the
generalization covers an even greater variety of mechanisms than “corkscrew.” Polger and
Shapiro take “corkscrew” to be an “anchored kind” that makes use of an “identity” (p. 39),
because it specifies the use of a screw, which they take to be a kind in the “realizing
mechanical science.” “Identity,” in this sense, is supposed to hold between two classes which
admit a degree of variation, or multiple realizability in my, and Gillett and Aizawa’s sense,
among their members. I’m unclear as to what the anchoredness is supposed to show, because
we can always add more specificity to pick out a subclass of functional kinds. “Aluminum
winged corkscrew” is one such subclass, and might be more suited to certain applications.
The location of a spark plug to be loosened or tightened might specify not just a 21mm
socket, but must be reached by a 21mm-socket-on-a-long-drive-with-a-u-joint-in-the-middle.
If kinds and individuals are causally individuated, it will be possible to specify a set of effects
more and more narrowly until just one individual satisfies the criteria, for example, when
retinas or fingerprints are used as keys in high-security locks.
13 This is indeed the way β-lactam antibiotics, the largest family of antibiotics, including
penicillin, works (Blair, Webber, Baylay, Ogbolu, and Piddock, 2014). Since penicillin was
the first pharmaceutical antibiotic to be developed, there was a time in history when the
above generalization was true.
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prevalence of multiple realizability might be questioned, in that case, a causal
relevance criterion for differences must do all the work. But according to a non-
question-begging causal relevance criterion clarified in terms of counterfactual
dependence, minor variation among realizers is not ruled out as causally
relevant difference. And explanatory relevance understood epistemically is not
relevant to issues of synchronic ontological dependence. On the other hand,
with completeness, the argument does not target any live claim of Multiple
Realizability. The valid conclusion involving complete dissimilarity doesn’t
cover functional kinds in its scope, and leaves a foothold for the antireductionist
in the standoff we’ve seen.
Wrapping Up
To summarize, the second horn of the apparent dilemma for functional kinds
works with completeness of difference among realizers, but doesn’t target
any live view. And since complete difference presupposes causally relevant
differences among realizers, the first horn of the apparent dilemma is only
pressed into service without imagining complete differences among realizers.
What look like horns of a dilemma don’t actually work together. Rather,
we’ve seen two distinct arguments against Multiple Realizability: one is a failed
argument against the prevalence of multiple realizability, and one is an effective
argument against the scientific seriousness of merely imagined functional kinds
like minds that could be made of Swiss cheese.
So far, antireductionism still has its Multiple Realizability to appeal to, and
still carries the day. Even supposing multiple realizability is less prevalent
than some of us think, it is not clear what such a conclusion would do to
advance the larger debate. Antireductionism still goes through for those less
prevalent functional kinds, and the puzzles to which antireductive physicalism
leads are left doubly unilluminated. First, because the restricted notion of
multiple realizability still grants the irreducibility of multiply realizable kinds
such that the same puzzles will arise in those cases. Second, because the
reducibility of kinds admitting of variation remains a starting assumption of
the identity theorist, and in the absence of a justification of that assumption,
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the antireductionist’s argument can thus be run in terms of variation. The
attempt to distinguish between variation and multiple realizability just focuses
the debate in the wrong place. Instead, as we’re about to see in the next
chapter, by justifying the reducibility of kinds admitting of variation, and
running together variation and multiple realizability on a spectrum of similarity,
reductionists can deny a different premise of the antireductionist’s argument.
Hence, they can dispense with antireductionism while keeping functional kinds,
which, as I said at the outset of the thesis and of this chapter, is what would




In the last chapter, I argued that it doesn’t work to counter antireductionism
by denying either the prevalence or the scientific legitimacy of functional kinds.
First, I argued in Section 5.2 that causal relevance doesn’t distinguish between
“mere variation” and multiple realizability. Causal relevance is no reason to
think that multiple realizability is not ubiquitous, and that way of countering
antireductionism fails. I then considered Kim’s (1992b) argument against
antireductionism premised on the idea that, “Kinds in science are individuated
on the basis of having similar causal powers” (p. 17). But unless the dissimilarity
between members of a functional kind is somehow complete, the idea yields
no strong conclusion about functional kinds’ utter inability to be projectible.
On the other hand, with completeness, a valid argument involving complete
dissimilarity doesn’t cover functional kinds in its scope, and leaves Multiple
Realizability intact as a foothold for antireductionism.
In this chapter, I offer a positive argument for the idea that variation between
members of a kind and multiple realizability of a kind involve the same measure
of sameness and difference. In Section 6.1, I offer a causal account of similarity
according to which kindhood and projectibility come in degrees. I concluded
the last chapter by noting that the attempt to distinguish between variation
and multiple realizability, even if it was successful, wouldn’t advance the debate
between antireductionists and reductionists. In Section 6.2, I explain why that
is, and hence why it is important, as groundwork for reductive functionalism
as a plausible form of physicalism, that variation and multiple realizability
be understood as ends on a spectrum of similarity. In Section 6.3, I argue
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that this view of kinds, even while granting the Multiple Realizability claim—
that many special science kinds are multiply realizable by distinct physical
kinds—allows us to deny the Unity Condition on Kind Identity. That was the
further premise: if a kind is multiply realizable by distinct physical kinds, then
it cannot be identical to any specific physical kind. We can hence reject the
Non-identity Thesis that would follow—that many special science kinds are not
identical to any specific physical kind. Having rejected the latter, even while
accepting a plausible condition on reduction such as the Identity Condition
on Reduction—that if a kind is not identical to a physical kind, then it is not
reducible to physics—we can reject the Antireduction Thesis. That was the
conclusion that many special science kinds are not reducible to physics.
6.1 Accounting for Similarity
A crucial claim in Kim’s argument was that “Kinds in science are individuated
on the basis of having similar causal powers” (p. 17). While I agree, this says
little about how to understand kinds and similarity. It is circular to define kinds
in terms of similarity if similarity is defined in terms of kinds, which it is. At
least since Leibniz, “the standard way of cashing out what it means for an object
to be similar to another object is to require that they co-instantiate properties”
(Frigg and Nguyen, 2016, sec. 3.2). “Famously, Leibniz construed identity
as the sharing of all properties and, analogously, similarity as the sharing of
at least one property” (Decock and Douven, 2011, p. 68). Goodman (1972)
criticized the very notion of similarity as “slippery.” “As it occurs in philosophy,
similarity tends under analysis either to vanish entirely or to require for its
explanation just what it purports to explain” (p. 446). Contra Leibniz, this
prevents us from meaningfully defining similarity in terms of shared properties,
an issue now well-known (e.g. Lewis, 1983, p. 346; Armstrong, 1989, p. 40;
Gärdenfors, 2004, p. 111; Maclaurin and Sterelny, 2008, p. 15), and which
remains controversial (see Yi, 2018; Weisberg, 2012). Goodman considers
the possibility that “a and b are more alike than c and d if the cumulative
importance of the properties shared by a and b is greater than that of the
properties shared by c and d” (p. 443). But Goodman leaves that direction
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unexplored, rejecting importance as relative—“a highly volatile matter, varying
with every shift of context and interest, and quite incapable of supporting the
fixed distinctions that philosophers so often seek to rest upon it” (p. 444). For
example, Goodman says,
suppose we have three glasses, the first two filled with colorless
liquid, the third with a bright red liquid. I might be likely to say
the first two are more like each other than either is like the third.
But it happens that the first glass is filled with water and the third
with water colored by a drop of vegetable dye, while the second
is filled with hydrochloric acid—and I am thirsty. Circumstances
alter similarities. (p. 445)
Goodman’s point here is that if similarity judgements are made on the
basis of properties, the relative importance of properties to those judgements
varies with context. Indeed, I think we must say something of the same form
if we take similarity as primitive and try to explain property judgements on
the basis of similarity.1 Yet, the possibility of making judgements at all, and
making more or less fruitful ones, must depend on the world being the way
1 Similarity judgements have received significant attention in the cognitive psychological
sciences and philosophy of psychology, following Carnap (1967), who took similarity as
primitive, and attempted to explain property attribution in terms of similarity. Contra
Carnap, Goodman (2012) introduced two problems. The problem of “imperfect community”
is a problem for defining kinds or properties by saying that a kind is a set whose members
“are more similar to one another than they all are to any one thing outside the set” (Quine,
1969, p. 9). This definition allows for strange disjunctions which are intuitively not kinds.
The problem of “constant companionship” is the problem of how unfavourable circumstances
might lead us to glean the wrong properties from the world, and to miss others altogether,
in ways which we ostensibly do not. The details do not matter here, and I simply note
that later elaborations seek to overcome difficulties with Carnap’s account (see Tversky,
1977; Gärdenfors, 2004, 2014). These may be good initial models of how we make property
attributions, but since they take similarity as primitive, they are silent on the question—if
it is a question—of what it is for entities to be more or less similar independently of our
judgements such that judgements are possible and more or less fruitful. Alternatively, if
similarity is defined, following Leibniz, in terms of the sharing of properties, we might
construct analogous models of human or animal similarity attribution in terms of properties,
and yet these models, taking properties as primitive, would be silent on the question of what
it is for entities to share in a property independently of our judgements. We can expect the
same issues to arise for kinds or natural resemblance classes. And this is the problem—in
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that it is somewhat independently of our judgments. As Quine (1969) says,
the “dubious scientific standing of a general notion of similarity, or of kind,”
“is itself a remarkable fact. For surely there is nothing more basic to thought
and language than our sense of similarity; our sorting of things into kinds”
(p. 6). Not unlike Goodman’s “importance” criterion, Quine (1969) thinks we
define similarity only by being more restrictive about the classes that constitute
properties. He appeals to the “significance” of similarity, saying,
If properties are to support [Leibniz’s] line of definition [of similar-
ity] where sets do not, it must be because properties do not, like
sets, take things in every random combination. It must be that
properties are shared only by things that are significantly similar.
But properties in such a sense are no clearer than kinds. To start
with such a notion of property, and define similarity on that basis,
is no better than accepting similarity as undefined. (p. 7)
Quine (1969) ultimately takes similarity to be more easily defined in terms
of kinds than vice versa. Quine gives “a somewhat limping definition” that
“works only for finite systems of kinds”:
a is more similar to b than to c when a and b belong jointly to
more kinds than a and c do. (p. 8)
For my part, I’m unsure whether the restriction to finite systems is a
problem. In any case, even if “the relation between similarity and kind. . . is
less clear and neat than could be wished,” Quine thinks the “notions are in an
important sense correlative” (p. 10). So, too, with properties.
While Quine perhaps took kinds, similarity and properties to be “unre-
duced,”2 the point is that no term we are seeking to define can figure in the
definition. We cannot meaningfully define similarities in terms of “similar”
whichever guise—of concern in the main text. I simply note that most philosophers seem to
have continued to follow Leibniz in thinking that similarity is more easily defined in terms of
properties or kinds than vice versa. So Quine says, “Definition of similarity in terms of kind
is halting, and definition of kind in terms of similarity is unknown. Still the two notions are
in an important sense correlative” (1969, p. 10).
2 If it’s right that Quine thought kinds are ultimately unreduced, I don’t think it is
entirely clear why. In answer to the question, “Why should our subjective spacing of qualities
have a special purchase on nature and a lien on the future?” (p. 13), Quine suggests,
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effects. We cannot define kinds in terms of having the same kinds of effects.
So, we cannot meaningfully—that is, non-trivially—say with Kim that “kinds
in science are individuated on the basis having similar causal powers” (p. 17).
That is true, but trivially so, given that similarity and kinds are correlative or
interdefined. For example, if similarity is understood in the way Quine suggests,
in terms of degree of joint kindhood, then Kim’s premise only says that kinds
have the same kinds of effects.
Yet, I take it that causal individuation of entities and properties still shows
promise. “Alexander’s Dictum,” named by Kim (1992a, p. 134) after a passage
in Alexander (1927), is the idea that what exists is causally efficacious. Kim
(1992a) argues that his functionalist interlocutors are committed to it as well
as he. Although Kim’s name for the principle is now popular, the same idea is
present in Plato’s Sophist (247d-247e). Elder (2003) says that the status of
Alexander’s Dictum “as a regulative principle seems unassailable,” and argues
that it is “as bland and as true as it appears to be. . . ” (p. 22). Add to it
the widely accepted notion of identity as the sharing of all properties noted in
Section 3.1.5. Taken together, these entail the “indiscernibility of identicals,”
and the discernibility of non-identicals. Properties are thus plausibly identified
with causal powers, and particular entities can be identified by their whole
particular sets of effects.
So we might start with the thought that to have a particular property is to
have a particular effect. But suppose that infinite shades of red are infinitely
many properties, since entities with those properties have correspondingly many
effects on, for example, an analog spectrometer. If those effects individuate
those properties, ex hypothesi, there is no single effect that can bring all
these shades of red under a single property or kind. As Quine (1969) puts it,
“Cosmically, colors would not qualify as kinds” (p. 14). Of course, it seems
intuitive that these effects of shades of red would be similar, and the world
There is some encouragement in Darwin. If people’s innate spacing of qualities
is a gene-linked trait, then the spacing that has made for the most successful
inductions will have tended to predominate through natural selection.
This, and a comment that Quine makes about more methodologically sophisticated systems
of kinds and similarity standards—which we’ll see shortly in the main text—suggest to me
that kinds are further analyzable.
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is full of examples bearing out this intuition. An elephant and a truck are
similarly massive compared to a proton, the former two having “similar effects”
on a weigh scale (on Earth). The more it rains, the more a mountain erodes.
The greater the solar incidence and absorbance of some material, the greater
the mean kinetic energy of that material when the sun shines. Again, however,
it is no analysis of kinds that appeals to the similarity of their effects. We’ve
already seen that similarity of effects just assumes what it is supposed to
explain. Causal powers, varying as finely as they often do, will not yield kinds
if we take there to be one effect per causal power or property, because such
effects would individuate properties too finely.
However, this just means we should not think that there is one effect per
property or causal power. After all, why should the causal power of reflecting
or emitting a particular wavelength of light be individuated by a spectrometer
and not something else—an eye, a piece of black-and-white-film, or a molecule
of chlorophyll b? It would seem that there can be many effects of the same
causal power of reflecting a particular wavelength of light: on eyes, on film,
on chlorophyll b. Moreover, I suggest that the relation between causal powers
and effects is many–many, and that if causal individuation is going to do
the required work in individuating kinds, what we need is a notion of causal
individuation in which the same effect or effects figure.
Indeed, the world is not only a collection of weigh scales and spectrometers.
Nature is also full of what I’ll call “switches”. Let me explain. Not only can
there be differing effects of the same causal power, differing causal powers
can have some of the same effects. That there is a planet hospitable to life
orbiting our sun, if the nebular hypothesis is right, is to be explained by
the distribution of matter and the resulting balance of forces—stellar wind,
gravitational accretion—operating in the protoplanetary disk surrounding our
sun as a young star. Mass scales smoothly, but some critical mass makes the
difference between a planet’s present being and non-being. Chlorophyll b is
excited to precisely the same degree by up to four quite different wavelengths
of light. Graphing absorbance on the y-axis and wavelength on the x-axis
yields a curve for chlorophyll b that resembles a double-peaked mountain, albeit
truncated at a threshold for x. There are thus four values for x that satisfy each
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of many values for y. In other words, four distinct wavelengths of light—four
otherwise distinguishable causal powers—can elicit a single effect as far as
photosynthesis is concerned. I think a hint of this idea of switches can be seen
in Quine (1969). In contrast to our “innate, scientifically unjustified similarity
standards” (p. 14), Quine describes,
a development away from the immediate, subjective, animal sense
of similarity to the remoter objectivity of a similarity determined
by scientific hypotheses and posits and constructs. Things are
similar in the later or theoretical sense to the degree that they are
interchangeable parts of the cosmic machine revealed by science.
(p. 19)
I take the notion of interchangeability of parts to be very close to the
idea of differences that make no difference to function, but are nonetheless
discernible differences among things required for the function. Consider, again,
the interchangeability of wavelengths for a photosynthetic effect. The light is
required, and the wavelengths differ. Outside the photosynthetic effect, among
other effects, the difference is detectable. For example, the same values are not
interchangeable as far as human vision is concerned. It seems characteristic of
organisms, in particular, to employ even apparently analog devices at sensory
surfaces in further state-of-affairs switching, allowing similar entities to have,
quite literally, the same effect. For example, a scale or balance can be used
as a sensor to discriminate among inputs, and in the simplest case, it can be
used as a switch that distinguishes between items in a binary way. It might
seem as though the input from an analog device should be kept raw to best
discriminate reality. But this, again, would have cognitive systems operating
only with particulars and without kinds, precluding induction. If comic strip
character Calvin uses a bathroom scale, recessed into the floorboards and
hidden under a rug, as part of a booby trap in the doorway to his room, he
can tune various functions on his (imaginary) “transmogrifying” gun to trigger
for various weight ranges, and thus discriminate victims by their weights. By
selecting trespassers under 20kg, he can transmogrify his neighbour Susie into
a frog. By selecting trespassers between 20 and 60kg, he can transmogrify his
Mom into a “scarecrow,” and so on for Dad and Mrs. Wormwood. Of course
Hobbes (usually Calvin’s ally) might fall prey to the prank intended for Susie,
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and Calvin will have to add another setting to avoid the technical difficulties
associated with de-transmogrification and Hobbes’ wrath. But if Hobbes
happens to be carrying a bowling ball or the like such that he approximates
Susie’s weight, it becomes obvious that no amount of tuning can safeguard
Hobbes with 100% accuracy. Calvin will have to dedicate other sensory modes
and thus even more resources to make the discrimination.
The point is that, given limited time and material, cognitive systems can’t
afford to respond differentially to an indefinite number of individuals as stimuli—
they must be treated in kinds. As Quine (1969) put it, “Color is helpful at
the food-gathering level” (p. 14). Looming objects within a size range—say,
bumblebee to bowling ball—might cause the same ducking response. Looming
protons won’t be detected, and larger looming objects should cause my diving
out of the way instead. Failing to dive, my being crushed is multiply causable
by trucks and elephants. Now, take the multiple causability of my being
crushed, together with what I’ll call the “branching” nature of causal networks.
The branching nature of causal networks is evident from the fact that two
simultaneous effects of a cause—or even nearly simultaneous effects of a cause
if they are far enough apart in space—cannot be causes or effects of one
another, because influence propagates spatially over time. The effect or effects
in question are thus spatiotemporally contained. Together, these features mean
that the sameness of at least one property of the event of my death in both
cases—my being dead—is confirmed by the sameness of subsequent effects of
that property or state of affairs, for example, my wife’s having to dispossess
our second car.
An objection here might be that it is only at some higher level of abstraction,
perhaps a propositional one, that the states of affairs in question are the same.
After all, my death by elephant might be slightly messier than my death by
truck; it might take that much longer to identify my body, that much longer
for my wife to arrive at the morgue, and that much longer to sell the car, and
the car might get sold to an entirely different buyer. Indeed, this objection
is like the response that we saw Lewis (2000) give to the worry that causal
trumping or preemption—cases like the one in which two stones are thrown
accurately at a bottle a split second apart—can render false the counterfactual
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that had the first stone not hit the bottle, the bottle would not have broken.
The latter is false because the second stone would have broken the bottle. In
cases of trumping and preemption, the event would have occurred anyway.
Recall Lewis’s view that we might rescue our intuition that the first stone was
the cause by saying that a different breaking occurred—taking events as fragile.
On the other hand, we might rescue our intuition that the first stone was the
cause with the counterfactual claim that the bottle would not have broken at
just that time in just that way—making our counterfactual fragile. I defended
the counterfactual view of dependence, and yet I want to permit saying that in
those two possible worlds (the one in which the first stone strikes and the one
in which it misses while the second one breaks the bottle), something could
be the same. For example, a bottle collector is disappointed in the same way,
and to the same degree. In the two possible worlds in which I am crushed
by different heavy objects, certain mental states might come about that are
identical either way, for example, my wife will be upset with the hassle of
dispossessing the car. In case the bottle collector is differently disappointed in
each world—perhaps he lingered longer on the possibility of fixing the bottle
that Suzy’s stone broke, but not the one Billy’s stone broke—he might write
the same letter of complaint to the city council citing broken glass and calling
for better nighttime lighting in the local park to dissuade wayward youth.
These examples invoking people shouldn’t make us think that the only true
switches in nature are the mechanisms from which representational systems are
built,3 or artifacts of human design (literal switches the council might turn on
to light the park). Written words and machine states are surely paradigmatic
cases of effects where differences of input within a certain range really make
no difference. But this is no reason to think that earlier in the causal chain
3 Although I think switches could go some way toward a realist account of certain intuitions
that tend to motivate antirealism, I leave that aside. In any case, the claim is not that
similarity, or what I’ve just called proximity of causal powers, is somehow mind-dependent.
Entities have causal powers independently. I am simply teasing out how such causal powers
amount to bringing their bearers under kinds. Recall that it says nothing substantive (though
nothing false) about kinds or about similarities to claim that they have the same kinds of
effects or similar effects. Instead, similarity and kinds can be understood in terms of possible
partial sameness in their effects.
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producing a representation, two otherwise strictly distinct entities might both
apply a critical force to flip the same switch, and I see no reason not to think
switches are much more widespread and simple, as examples of molecules
and protoplanetary disks suggest. Switches certainly seem characteristic of
complex systems, however. Indeed, this may be what makes them systems in
the mechanical rather than merely thermodynamic sense, viz., the capacity to
accommodate a range of inputs and produce the same effect.
Anyway, the fact that some effects of distinct entities might be identical
should be no problem for the counterfactual rendering of dependence. The
claim that distinct entities can have some identical effects is not incompatible
with the requirement that distinct entities have distinct whole sets of effects.
Indeed, the fact that some effects are multiply causable explains why, when
investigating the causes of an event, we often have to look more widely at
the causal network than the branch in the causal network springing from a
single effect. We triangulate, so to speak, the actual cause by additional fragile
counterfactuals.4
The upshot is that kinds and similarity can be further analyzed this way:
for an instance of a causal power or property to be more or less proximate to
another is for there to be more or fewer possible switches that a member of
the kind can operate,5 and every switch makes its actuators of a kind, albeit
4 Suppose Suzy pleads not guilty to breaking the bottle, saying that Billy threw a stone
that might equally have broken it. And suppose no ballistic evidence, no difference in the
shatterings, can determine which stone broke the bottles. Still, we can question Billy, hook
both witnesses up to lie-detectors, check the security cameras, etc. Unless the entire local
causal network is made of switches multiply actuatable by the same two entities—the camera
doesn’t have adequate frame rate or resolution, Billy and Suzy don’t have 20/20, and so on,
for each way the two throws influenced the world, as though an entity could preempt all the
effects of another—their twoness will be discernible. Even supposing causal influence is only
ever had on switches “all the way down”—imagine that our apparently analog weigh scale,
at the atomic grain-level or finer, is really pixelated, made of tiny steps each actuated at
its own critical threshold—to further imagine that this might mean two entities could differ
indistinguishably would be like imagining that protons could be dented or scratched in a way
that could never be discovered. According to Alexander’s dictum, it just becomes difficult to
maintain that such differences exist. Certainly, we needn’t worry about them.
5 At this point, I am inclined to think it makes no difference whether the claim is about
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“wispy.” To imagine a wispy kind, consider a case where almost anything with
mass and acceleration might flip some other switch in nature. Someone is in a
bad mood, perhaps, and a fly or someone’s snoring could set that person off.
This is not to suggest that such a fly or snore would have what is considered
to be the proper function (see Millikan, 1984, 2017; Kingsbury, 2004, 2006,
2008) of setting someone off. The point here is to characterize the limiting
case on a spectrum of similarity when similarity is characterized on the basis
of sameness of effect. The psychological example above should not pose a
problem, but we can imagine non-psychological examples of multiply causable
effects. Of course, switch-actuators of this kind only support a single axis
of induction (all x-switch-actuators have mass and acceleration greater than
y)—not enough similarity to make them normally worth tracking for cognitive
systems undergoing selection. Of course, kinds, in the more ordinary sense
of the word, are often multifunctional; their members have many proximate
causal powers. If the condition on kinds is that under a particular circumstance
members have one of the same effects, and the condition on indiscernibles is
that they have all of the same effects in every circumstance, then more “robust”
kinds will be those that have more of the same effects in more circumstances.
And, at last, we can now also sensibly say that members of a kind tend to
have similar effects, because we can characterize similarity of effects in terms
of sameness of further effects.
6.2 Variation and Reduction
I concluded the last chapter by noting that the attempt to distinguish between
variation and multiple realizability, even if it was successful, wouldn’t advance
the debate between antireductionists and reductionists as I understand it. Let
actual switches, merely nomologically possible ones, or metaphysically possible ones. I take it
as plausible that the number of switches that could be built in any given possible world—even
by a divine agent otherwise obeying the laws in that world—that could be actuated by both
a fly and an elephant is less than the number of switches that could be built and actuated by
the housefly and the horsefly. Metaphysical possibility is tied down by nomological possibility
in this way, and nomological possibility is tied down to actuality. Or so I suspect, and beyond
that, defer.
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me say a bit more about what I mean, and hence, by contrast, why running
together variation and multiple realizability makes a difference to that debate.
Polger and Shapiro say,
The identity theory holds, according to us, that there are important
and explanatory mind-brain identifications. This is a significantly
more modest view than has been frequently attributed to identity
theorists, but still one at odds with realizationist or functionalist
theories according to which multiple realization is so ubiquitous
that no interesting or useful mind-brain identifications could be
discovered. We do not deny that multiple realization occurs; we
deny only that it occurs to an extent that renders the identification
of psychological kinds with brain kinds impossible or unimportant.
(p. 144)
Of course, Polger and Shapiro are right to note the history of the Multiple
Realizability claim in connection with antireductionism. But they think, “the
claim that multiple realization is incompatible with identification and reduction
is most plausible if the variation is both frequent and large. If the differences
between realizers are few or small, this opens the door to useful psycho-neural
identifications” (p. 56). Correspondingly, Polger and Shapiro take variation
to be a “mere fact” (p. 80) that requires no further explanation. But note
that if the status of a kind in relation to physics rested in some way on the
degree to which its members varied, it would seem as if reductionism and
antireductionism could both be true—one in some bits of the world, and one in
another. This may be what Polger and Shapiro have in mind when they say that,
“textbook ‘all-or-nothing’ identity and functionalist theories are themselves
idealized—caricatures, even” (p. 39). Of course, there could well be a separate
debate to be had about whether to be an eliminative reductionist about a
certain thing or kind, say, minds. In any case, Polger and Shapiro accept that
their modest identity theory means that kinds like corkscrews differ from kinds
like gold with respect to reduction. Multiple realizability being rare wouldn’t
preclude antireductionism. Thus carving out a modest identity theory in the
logical space only does so within the antireductive camp. The division is a
disagreement within antireductive physicalism as a broader metaphysical thesis
that not every kind is a physical kind and that not everything is identical with
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its realizers. The modest identity theory is that some higher-level kinds are
identical with lower-level kinds. The contrasting thesis is simply that most
or perhaps all higher-level kinds and things are distinct from physical kinds
and realizers. Moreover, on Polger and Shapiro’s view, the non-co-extensivity
of scientific taxonomies—and attending explanatory relevance of differences—
is the test as to whether realization obtains. But even if distinctions that
appear in one science correspond to those being made in another, this is not
the only tendency in science. Interestingly, the taxonomic test for realization
implies that the richer our scientific taxonomies, the more such realization
so defined there is, and thus the more putative irreducibility there is. It is
reasonably clear that our systems of kinds have changed and will likely change;
they are, perhaps irrevocably, relative to our form of life at a time.6 “Mere
variations”—differences that are not categorized at any finer grain-level—could
be so categorized, and “multiple realizations”—differences that are categorized
at a finer grain-level—might not have been. Sub- and cross-classification may
be possible that nonetheless leave a superclass intact, which Polger and Shapiro
recognize.
By contrast, reductionism as I understand it—or, at any rate, the reduc-
tionism I am advocating—takes the claim that “everything is physical” to be
totalizing, and denies that there could exist any things whose beings somehow
went beyond their physical bases. It would be strange indeed if the amount of
that sort of reduction changed with the progress of science. Rather, on that
way of drawing a line between two views, it would be impossible for the truth
of the physicalism in dispute to hold in different bits of the world. Since the
reductionist believes the antireductionist is mistaken in their general theory
of how “levels” of reality are related, the reductionist’s claim ought not to be
that some—even many—cases of putative multiple realizability turn out not to
involve reduction-blocking patterns of variation. That modest claim would be
too modest. The reductionist should claim that no patterns of variation among
kind members block their reduction to physics. The disagreement between
6 After all, what makes distinct entities similar to a given degree is the extent of overlap
between the sets of switches each can actuate, including our instruments and cognitive
systems, which are changing.
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Polger and Shapiro and me is thus foremost7 about whether there are ever any
patterns of variation that block reduction, and patterns of variation which do
not.
To shoulder that burden, reductive physicalists still have to be able to
explain how multiply realizable kinds reduce to physics. Furthermore, members
of kinds that “merely vary”, like isotopes of gold, can be further sub- and
7 There is one other less serious element to the disagreement. As I showed in Chapter 4,
antireductive moves can be made in terms of other synchronic dependence relations. The
reductionist about composition presumably thinks wholes are identical with all their parts,
and likewise for constituted things and their complete constituents, and so should think
realized things are identical with their total realizers. There are reductive realization theorists
(myself), and there are antireductive constitution theorists (see Baker, 1999). Of course,
having arisen, the dispute over the license to use a term needs resolving if our work as
philosophers is to be directly helpful outside philosophy where we should not expect those
from other disciplines to specify which of two or many philosophical terms of art they are
invoking. The legacy of a term’s use might be one reason to prefer a continuous use over a
less continuous use. But neither use on offer is entirely consistent with a single legacy. That’s
not surprising, since the need to clarify notions of realization has only come to light in recent
decades, and, having come to light, it appears that previous philosophers have diverged in
much the same way that contemporary philosophers have—viz. differing in their analyses of
the relevance of the sort of “multiplicity” one finds, for example, among camera eyes. As
Shapiro (2000) and Polger and Shapiro (2016) show, Putnam (1979) calls the differences
between octopus and human eyes irrelevant, and they agree with him, while Block and
Fodor (1972), Gillett (2002b, 2002a, 2007), Aizawa (2009), and Aizawa and Gillett (2009)
consider these to amount to multiple realizations of camera eyes. Notice, too, the presence of
antireductionists and non-antireductionists in both usage camps. Polger and Shapiro (non-
antireductionists) follow Putnam (an antireductionist) in their analysis of variation between
human and octopus eyes. Gillett and Aizawa (non-antireductionists), and I (a reductionist),
follow Block and Fodor (1972) (an antireductionist) in our more liberal use of “realization”
in the case of variation between human and octopus eyes. It would be premature to take
“realization” as a signal of antireductive commitments, because distinctions between kinds
of synchronic dependence relations—to the extent they are plausible at all—are orthogonal
to issues of reducibility. So we ought not to make “realization” proprietary in a way that
it is not, and for those reasons, philosophers should not attempt to make it so. Talk of
realization is simply too widespread, among scientists and the rest of the humanities, as well
as philosophy, to expect that we might fruitfully stipulate this meaning. Most importantly,
there are plenty of those who require fit-for-purpose dependence terminology without interest
or perhaps even knowledge of what are largely separable issues as far as conceptualizing
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cross-classified, according to the particles they involve, thereby breaking inter-
taxonomic alignment. The question then becomes, why shouldn’t variation
block reduction? And that question is especially pressing if, as I have argued,
a causal relevance criterion doesn’t secure the distinction between mere vari-
ability within a kind and multiple realizability of a kind as involving different
sorts of synchronic ontological dependence in the first place. Indeed, reductive
physicalists should be able to justify the assumption that the “variation” among
members of, for example, a neurological process kind is compatible with their
reduction to physics.
Ultimately, then, it is the assumption that the physical credentials of kinds
and their status in relation to physics rests in some way on the degree to which
their members vary, that I am challenging. As I understand it and introduced
it, the argument for the Antireduction Thesis involves a further inference from
Multiple Realizability in addition to other premises. So the fact that “many
special science kinds are multiply realizable by distinct physical kinds” should
not be conflated with the thesis that, “many special science kinds are not
reducible to physics.” An inference to the latter involves claiming something
like, “if a kind is multiply realizable by distinct physical kinds, then it is not
identical with any physical kind”—which I deny.
6.3 Variation and Kind Identity
A kind’s multiple realizability, or great variation among its members, does
not block reduction for the same reason that minute variation does not block
reduction. To see this, consider an argument parallel to the one from Multiple
Realizability against reduction:
[Variable Implementation] Many robust scientific kinds are implemented by vary-
ing and thus distinct physical bases which also fall under sub-kinds.
[Unity Condition for Kind Identity] If a kind is implemented by varying and
thus distinct physical bases which also fall under sub-kinds, then it cannot
be identical to any specific physical kind.
physicalism and intertheoretic relations.
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Given Variable Implementation and Unity Condition for Kind Identity, we
would conclude:
[Non-identity Thesis] Many robust scientific kinds are not identical to any specific
physical kind.
This Non-identity Thesis, together with an Identity Condition on Reduction
would lead to the conclusion that many robust scientific kinds are not reducible
to physics. But, of course, few would accept such a Unity Condition for Kind
Identity. We can say that a variably implementable kind, for example, gold,
is not identical with any of its individual implementations, for example the
isotope 197Au, which everyone agrees is a kind of gold, if only a “mere variation”
of gold. But we won’t claim that gold is not a physical kind. And we should
reject the original Unity Condition on Kind Identity for the same reason. It
stated that if a kind is multiply realizable by distinct physical kinds, then it
cannot be identical to any specific physical kind. Except for being clouded
by the historically murky notion of multiple realizability, the Unity Condition
on Kind Identity is no better than the Unity Condition for Kind Identity.
Of course we can say that a multiply realizable kind is not identical with
any one of its members. But nor is gold identical with a particular isotope
of gold. That should not lead us to think that gold is not a physical kind.
Likewise, corkscrews’ not being identical with winged corkscrews should not
lead us to think corkscrews are not a physical kind. After all, winged and
waiters corkscrews are physical, as are their realizers in turn. Combined with
nominalism about classes, the idea is that kinds are groups of things—whether
switch-actuators or switches, I need not presently decide—which are entirely
made up of those things. If something is entirely made of physical things,
it is physical. So, multiply realizable kinds are physical kinds. I’m going to
argue in Chapter 7 and Chapter 10 that the total realizing base of a functional
property actually includes the switches individuative of the property. So even
apparently “wildly” heterogeneous realizers share parts of their bases. Note,
too, that my liberal notion of kindhood is somewhat separate from questions
of how kinds are reproduced and persist, and somewhat separate from the
question of why we care about some kinds—like reproducible ones—more than
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others, except insofar as our own lives and cognitive apparati are among the
realizers of certain kinds by being among the effects individuative of them.
For now, however, the point above amounts to the simple claim that all
physically realized kinds are themselves physical. The question of reduction is
also somewhat separate, although, as I said at the outset to Section 5.1, once
the Non-identity Thesis is denied, it is not clear what condition on reduction
would block reduction. Kim gestures at the same thing when he asks, “what
would be lacking in a reductive derivation if bridge laws were replaced by ‘bridge
principles’ which do not necessarily connect kinds to kinds”? (p. 10) The bridge
principles that reduce generalizations containing kind predicates that pick out
robust kinds like gold, will be most simply written in terms of those predicates
and the (very short) disjunction of physical realizers. On the other hand, the
bridge principles that reduce generalizations containing kind predicates that pick
out less robust kinds like corkscrews, may be most simply written in terms of
those predicates and the (relatively shorter) disjunction of the switches (bottles)
in virtue of which there can be an effect characteristic of the common function.
The switches or circumstances that partly constitute the functional properties
of entities—and, mutatis mutandis, their dispositional, modal, kind, or sortal
properties—may themselves fall under a kind. This idea, of simplifying a
generalization by employing what I’ll call a “circumstantial kind,” may be what
Witmer (2003) has in mind when he denies that psychophysical reductionism
requires bridge principles that link mental properties to disjunctions of physical
realizers, saying that “functional definitions can themselves serve as appropriate
bridge principles” (n. 1 on p. 60).
In asking what would be wrong with the above approach, Kim hints at
something like my argument against the Antireduction Thesis, which he calls
the “disjunctive strategy.” This strategy denies a claim like the one made by
Fodor (1974), that, “if psychology is reducible to neurology, then for every
psychological natural kind predicate there is a co-extensive neurological natural
kind predicate, and the generalization which states this co-extension is a law”
(p. 104). Now, Kim does dedicate a few central pages to arguing that Fodor’s
(1974) view, in particular, provides no justification of the assumption that, in
Kim’s words, “disjunctions of heterogeneous kinds are unfit for laws” (p. 10).
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But the disjunctive strategy is undermined by Kim’s second strategy.8 Kim
can’t, and doesn’t, simultaneously pursue the disjunction strategy and deny the
projectibility of multiply realizable kinds because his other argument against
Multiple Realizability on the basis of the Causal Individuation of Kinds, if it
was successful, would undercut the disjunctive strategy in the sense that the
identity of multiply realizable “kinds” is not in question if they are not kinds at
all. We simply needn’t care about the identity of disjunctive sets as non-kinds.
And Kim explicitly burns the bridges of the disjunctive strategy in that way,
saying,
to dismiss such disjunctions as “wildly disjunctive” or “hetero-
geneous and unsystematic” is to label a problem, not to offer a
diagnosis of it. In the sections to follow, I hope to take some steps
toward such a diagnosis and draw some implications which I believe
are significant for the status of mentality. (p. 10)
Kim then takes his argument from Causal Inheritance and the Causal
Individuation of Kinds to be such a rationale. For Kim, the “local reductions”—
in my view, subclassifications—which figure in the disjunctive strategy simply
motivate splitting the putative functional kind into subkinds that may be kinds,
and eliminating the superkind which is an uprojectible non-kind from the
overall scientific taxonomy. Of course, what is at issue is whether disjunctions
can figure in generalizations and thus constitute projectible kinds, and Kim
thinks not. But as we’ve seen, the failure of the argument from the Causal
Individuation of Kinds to target claims of Multiple Realizability in its valid
scope leaves it susceptible to counterexamples of projectibility of kinds up and
down the scale of “robustness.” Switches—multiply causable effects—explain
such projectibility. So there is no intelligible rationale for banning disjunctions.
Moreover, the overall lesson is that the disjunctive strategy is not only an
option, but that many kinds are basically disjunctive, and this does not rule out
their projectibility. All but the most robust of kinds—qualitatively identical
8 Note that these strategies could be run as a dilemma only by admitting that one of
the arguments fails. What makes it a dilemma, however, is that the reason one of the
arguments fails (that similarity and kinds come by degree), is a reason to think many kinds
are disjunctive. But Kim says none of this.
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things—allow for variation. Stable isotopes of hydrogen can have one neutron
or none in their nucleus, so stable atomic “hydrogen” is deuterium-or-protium.
Hydrogen is nonetheless a physical, projectible, and perfectly scientific kind.
These more robust kinds are just multifunctional kinds, that is, conjunctions of
disjunctions. For example, to be a mammal is to be warm-blooded and nursing,
while, on my view, there are as many ways (in the non-circular sense) to be
warm-blooded as there are distinct warm-blooded things, and as many ways to
be nursing as there are distinct nursing things. The kind is the intersection
of these disjunctive classes. The more they can share effects, the more shared
properties, the greater the number of intersecting classes each member of the
kind is also a member of, and thus the more there are axes of projectibility of
that kind, that is, the more are the generalizations that can be made about each
member. These are what I’ve been calling “robust” kinds. I take it that most of
our “natural” kinds are robust. Still, going in the other direction, we have the
possibility that rather different things can fall under a minimally-projectible
kind. Thus Witmer (2003) says, “While Kim worries that the predicate ‘pain’
hides the disjunctive character of the property, one might just as well worry
that the disjunction predicate used to express the same property imposes a
false impression of unprojectibility” (p. 65).
Not only would the familiar argument from Multiple Realizability to the
Antireduction Thesis “prove too much” (Witmer, 2003, p. 60), it would prove
much too much. Since there is no deeper distinction to be made between
functional kinds and other physical kinds, and since there’s no denying Multiple
Realizability, if we accept Unity Condition on Kind Identity, we would be forced
to accept the doubly disturbing conclusion that chemical properties and the like
cannot appear in laws and are not genuine kinds in the first place. Either what
is wrong with lower-level disjunctions infects higher-level kinds, or whatever is
right with so many higher-level kinds absolves disjunctions. I take the latter to
be the right thing to say.
Let me defend this against a possible objection. Fodor (1997), for example,
thinks there is a crucial difference between open and closed disjunctions, and
the realizations of a psychological kind is an open disjunction due to the nature
of the psychological property, since it is supposedly always possible that it
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might be realized by something else. Even more interestingly, Fodor thinks
functional kinds whose realizers are an open disjunction can be projectible,
whereas it is closed disjunctions that are unfit for laws.
The functionalist assumes that there are laws about pains “as such”;
so [the functionalist] infers that, though pain is multiply based, it
is not (merely) disjunctive. So [the functionalist] infers that pain
is unlike jade in the respects that are relevant to the question of
projectibility. Kim, going the other way around, assumes that pain
is (merely) disjunctive, hence that it is relevantly similar to jade,
and hence that there aren’t any laws about pain. (p. 153)
To Kim’s view that, “What all samples of jade have in common is just
these observable macrophysical properties that define the applicability of the
predicate ‘is jade’ ” (Kim, 1992, p. 24), Fodor replies, “This, I say, is just wrong;
and resolving the metaphysical issues about projectibility that Kim has raised
turns on seeing that it is” (p. 154).
By his own lights, given the success of various special sciences, I think the
burden is on Fodor to say why closed disjunctions are unfit for laws. Fodor
has to demonstrate two things, first, that some kinds (e.g. jade) are closed
disjunctions, and second, that closed disjunctions are unfit for laws. Here is
Fodor’s defense of the first point:
Suppose that, pottering around in the cellar one day, you succeed in
cooking up a substance—out of melted bottle glass, let’s say—that
is, for all macroscopic purposes, indistinguishable from jade. . . .
Have you, then, created jade? . . . . Not on your Nelly. (p. 154)
If you want to make some jade, you have to make either some jadite
[sic] or some nephrite; just as, if you want to make some water,
you have to make some H2O. As with most of the metaphysical
claims one comes across these days, the one that I just made relies
on a blatant appeal to modal intuitions. But I think the modal
intuitions that I’m mongering are pretty clearly the right ones to
have. If you don’t share mine, perhaps you need to have yours
looked at. (p. 154)
I don’t share this modal intuition, so my intuitions need looking at. Fodor
is denying that jade is a functional kind, while claiming that it is a (closed)
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disjunctive kind, and insisting on the difference. What, then, are closed
disjunctive kinds? They are supposed to have all the metaphysical necessity of
water is H2O, but admit of more members. The comparison is apt—but perhaps
not for the reason Fodor thinks—insofar as the putatively closed disjunctive
kind (jade as jadeite or nephrite) seems to have members with particular
chemical identities. That is, jadeite is NaAlSi2O6 or Na(Al,Fe3+)Si2O6, and
nephrite is Ca2(Mg,Fe)5Si8O22(OH)2. The comparison is apt, but the problem is
that water is not H2O (see, for example, Bursten, 2014, pp. 640–641). Rather,
water is composed by oxygen and hydrogen in various polymeric
forms, such as (H2O)2, (H2O)3, and so on, that are constantly
forming, dissipating, and reforming over short time periods in such
a way as to give rise to the familiar properties of the macroscopic
kind water. (Ross and Ladyman, 2010, p. 160)
Likewise, the notation NaAlSi2O6 or Na(Al,Fe3+)Si2O6 doesn’t sufficiently
pick out jadeite (note, the chemical definition is itself a disjunction): it only
gives a rough idea of the ratios of the constituents and what some of the main
bond arrangements are. Bursten (2014) points out that,
compositional ratios are insufficient to individuate fundamental
chemical kinds. The drug thalidomide was prescribed as a seda-
tive until it was found responsible for a number of radical birth
defects. . . It was later discovered that thalidomide has. . . two
different geometric arrangements that are not superimposable. . . .
The difference between the two isomers is not one that can be
accounted for by counting the components of the molecules nor the
components of any part of the molecule. . . . But that difference
makes a difference: one isomer of thalidomide was shown to be
responsible for the birth defects and the other for the sedative effect
the drug was intended to produce. . . . (p. 640)
Likewise jadeite and nephrite are additionally individuated by chemical
and macrophysical properties. Even the latter are a sort of reactivity broadly
construed. Now, if melted bottle glass is to be “indistinguishable” from jade,
that will be because its macrophysical properties fall within the range that
jadeite and nephrite’s properties fall within, for example, hardness and density.
Notably, jadeite and nephrite don’t have the same hardness and density, either
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(they each have a range of densities and hardnesses that do not even overlap).
Historically, then, their being both considered “jade” suggests that the cultural
switches—stone-carving practices—that pick out jade were simply not so fine-
grained as x-ray crystallography methods. So, if you cook up what Fodor says
looks like jade, walks and talks like jade, yes, on your Nelly, you’ve got jade.
Perhaps because jade with a particular provenance has some additional social
function in relation to some tendency to value rare or original things, we might
explain Fodor’s distaste for artificial jade.9 A range of macroscopic properties
(recalling that Fodor’s concoction falls within this range), plus provenance
might make “authentic jade” the multi-functional kind that it is. Still, that
would make “authentic” or “natural” jade a more constrained kind (a less open
disjunction?), but not a closed disjunction.
Or consider the example of the noble gases, plausibly a robust kind, sharing,
as they do, the properties of being gaseous at standard temperature and
pressure, and of being relatively inert. Suppose that, pottering around in the
cellar one day, you succeed in isolating a substance that is, for all macroscopic
purposes, a relatively inert gas at standard temperature and pressure. Have
you discovered a noble gas? Yes. Indeed argon, krypton, neon, xenon and
radon were discovered around the turn of the 20th Century, and grouped in
virtue of their properties more than a decade before anything was known about
the reason for their inertness. Suppose that, pottering around with a particle
9 Of course, one can see how provenance might be a take-it-or-leave it criterion. Indeed,
Canadian nephrite is imported to New Zealand and used in carving traditionally-inspired
designs. Pounamu is the Māori name for native greenstone traditionally used to make tools
and ornaments, but the original New Zealand sources of greenstone are controlled by a
charitable trust. Carvings bearing the supplier’s stamp of authenticity command ten times
the price of carvings made from imported stone, such that either limited supply or a demand
for lower pricing sustains a market for carvings made with Canadian stone. Budget-conscious
Canadian tourists might bemoan the two transpacific voyages made by their souvenirs’
materials, but who will cry for them? Unsuspecting buyers (those who didn’t read the label)
might later regret their purchase. Again, I don’t harbour Fodor’s sympathies, as though
anyone has been cheated. If inefficient, the practice of carving traditionally-inspired designs
out of Canadian stones is legal. And if it could be made in the cellar, or a lab, it would
still be jade. You’re far more likely to get locked up for poaching greenstone with the more
prestigious provenance.
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accelerator, you succeed in cooking up a substance with the atomic number
118. Will you predict that, like its lighter cousins, it is relatively chemically
unreactive? Yes. Can supernovae cook up new elements, enzymes cook up new
polymers, evolution or engineering cook up new organisms and inventions? Yes,
yes, yes, and yes. Will many of these fall under existing kinds? Yes—they will
be elements, polymers, organisms and inventions, among others. Most kinds are
open disjunctions. So is jade. “Scientists discover new type of jade,” is not an
impossible headline, any more than, “Scientists discover new type of antibiotic.”
The only reason you need to “be careful with your inductions,” (Kim, 1992b,
p. 26) like “Jade is green,” is that you can’t trust people to fix the extensions
of their kind predicates in advance of every discovery. Bursten (2014) points
out that the fact that “ ‘topaz’ refers to all colors of Al2SiO4(F,OH)2 where
‘ruby’ refers only to red variants of Al2O,” “counts against microstructural
essentialism” (p. 647). Moreover, as she explains,
the buck simply does not stop there, because color variation in these
and all crystals is not a matter of unprincipled chance. Rather,
color variation is the result of the presence or absence of a few nuclei
of additional elements or of aberrations in internuclear distances in
the crystal structure. (p. 647)
For instance, the brilliant red of rubies is due to the presence of
chromium instead of aluminum in a few of the aluminum bond sites
(and the more chromium, the redder the ruby). The general class
of Al2O3 crystals, with chromium aberrations or without, is known
as “corundum.” The general class might have all been called “ruby,”
but it was not. . . . [The ruby] variation has different reactive
properties than nonchromiated samples of corundum, because if
the aluminum and oxygen in the sample were dissolved, chromium
would precipitate out from the samples of ruby and not from the
other samples. (p. 647)
Bursten (2014) is advocating a multi-grade causal individuation of chemical
kinds. In the case of jade, we might decide either way whether or not “jade”
must be green. Less usefully, we might disagree or remain equivocal. But either
way, there is a kind of stone that is well suited to certain methods of carving
certain kinds of things, and there is sub-kind of stone that is so suited and is
mostly green. The whole point of my account of kinds is that what the kinds
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are (or, more specifically, what projections we can make) depends not only on
the way their members are but on the way the rest of the world is, including us.
It is appropriate that our taxonomies should become more complex as more
switches are employed to measure similarities and differences. But, as noted in
Section 6.2, it would be odd if the discovery of more and more modest multiple
realizability or fine variation was taken as counting against the physical identity
of higher-level classes or kinds.
Recall, Fodor has to maintain the distinction between closed and open
disjunctions, and the prospects for that look grim. He also has to say why
closed but not open disjunctions are unfit for laws. Here’s Fodor’s effort to say
why closed disjunctions are unfit:
It’s not hard to see why it’s so plausible that there can’t be laws
about closed disjunctions. Presumably the nomic properties that
a thing has qua F or G are either properties that it has qua F or
properties that it has qua G. That’s why, if being jade really is
a disjunctive property (if being jade is just being jadite [sic] or
nephrite) then of course there are no laws about being jade “as
such”; all the jade laws are ipso facto either jadite laws or nephrite
laws. (p. 157)
Notice that by referencing a plurality of properties and laws above, Fodor
has slipped into thinking about a greater portion of the distinct causal profiles
of jadeite and nephrite as sub-kinds of jade. Of course, all of F’s properties
will be ones it has by being an F rather than a G. That does not preclude
there being laws about F and G. If we were only ever interested in all the
properties of a thing, we’d only ever be talking about an individual, which is
not itself multiply realizable, and we wouldn’t be making generalizations at all.
A particular realizing basis of a functional kind as an open disjunction, like
pain, would have all of its other properties and obey all of the laws it does in
virtue of being just that instance of pain. By the same reasoning, that would
mean there are no laws about pain; all the “pain laws” would be ipso facto
sets of laws about one or another instance of pain. So Fodor simply gives up
too much here to sustain the projectibility of the open disjunctions he wants
to defend as projectible in the case of the kinds picked out by psychological
predicates. Instead, we’re frequently interested in subsets of things’ properties.
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Interestingly, Kim (1992b) doesn’t think open disjunctions are any different
than closed ones, but all he says is that, “If the list is ‘open-ended’, that’s all
right, too; it will not affect the metaphysics of the situation” (p. 8). So Kim also
thinks Fodor is mistaken on this point. That would make for just one burden
of showing that disjunctions—whether open or closed—are fit for laws. But I
have already said much in the way of alleviating that burden. In Chapter 5, I
claimed that arguments against the projectibility of functional kinds fail. Kim
says, “we need to go beyond a sense of unease with disjunctions and provide
an intelligible rationale for banning them” (p. 8). He provides an argument for
their unprojectibility that hinges on the causal individuation of kinds, which
under analysis, just highlights the gradedness of kindhood in terms of overlap
in causal profiles. The argument fails to demonstrate that single-functional
(or “wispy”) kinds aren’t projectible, even if in fewer predictive dimensions.
We can make generalizations about functional kinds, such as, antibiotics bind
with catalytic enzymes essential to cell wall biosynthesis. And in Section 6.1, I
gave a causal individuation account as to why. Similarity is a matter of degree
because differing things can sometimes have one or more identical effects in
branching causal networks.
Wrapping Up
The upshot is that there are a few reasons to think that multiple realizability is
not special. The first is that we have no good reason to think it is, as I argued
in Section 5.2. Polger and Shapiro provide no way to distinguish variation and
multiple realizability and maintain that realization is an ontological dependence
relation. The second reason to think that multiple realizability is not special is
that we have good reason to think it isn’t: the same causal account of similarity
explains variation both great and small, as I argued in Section 6.1. The
sameness of effects by which similarity can be non-circularly analyzed makes
for a spectrum of robustness of kinds on which both kinds whose members vary
only minutely and kinds whose members vary wildly both fall. If that’s right, it
actually suits the reductionist, who needs in any case to deny something other
than Multiple Realizability. So the third reason to think multiple realizability
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is not special, is that the larger picture in which it is special—antireductionism,
including a modest identity theory—is problematic as a form of physicalism,
as I argued in Chapter 4. The best way to counter the antireductive argument
is instead to deny that variation, great or small, blocks reduction. The identity
of kinds as physical kinds does not rely on their one–one relation to other kinds
all the way down to, say, fundamental particles. Kinds should be identified
with their members. Higher-level kinds are scientific for the same reason that
subclasses of those kinds are: they can be expected to have some of the same
effects. On that account, reductive physicalists can answer Kim’s challenge and
account for the projectibility of multiply realizable functional kinds, as well
as defend the status of higher-level kinds which admit of variation, without




I have said that the trouble with the argument for antireductionism premised on
multiple realizability lies with the further commitment to the Unity Condition
on Kind Identity, and defended the view that kinds, as disjunctions of physical
members, are themselves physical and projectible. Kindhood is a matter of
degree, from qualitatively identical members of the most robust kinds which
are projectible in every way, to members of very wispy kinds that share in
only one effect. How kinds persist or are reproduced is another matter not
of present concern. But antireductionist arguments can be run in terms of
individuals instead of kinds. For example, as we saw in Chapter 4, one might
claim that a desk composed of wood could have been composed by a splinter
or two less, that a statue constituted by some clay would be destroyed if the
clay was squashed, but the clay would not be destroyed, and that by reason of
these cases (and uncountably many like them), the world is full of higher-level
entities bearing non-categorical properties which are not had by the lower-level
things with which they are coincident. Thus, they are distinct, or so the story
goes. In this chapter, I argue that this sort of reasoning is flawed.
To expose the flaw, I explore the way in which Bennett (2003, 2008)
defends an antireductive physicalism in light of the exclusion problem. She
thinks that effects can have more than one sufficient cause without being
overdetermined. That sounds like an odd claim, so in Section 7.1, I explain the
idea. In Section 7.2, however, I will argue that Bennett’s strategy, rather than
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making sense of this non-exclusion claim, either fails to sustain the complete
coincidence of the relevant mental explanandum and its putative physical
explanans, or fails to sustain their distinctness. This amounts to a failure to
sustain the distinctness of the mental and physical generally. I use this case
to diagnose antireductionism’s fallacious inference to distinctness, which I call
the “sufficiency error,” since it involves an unmotivated notion of sufficiency.
In Section 7.3, I show that the sufficiency error is in fact widespread in both
antireductive and eliminative approaches to non-categorical properties generally,
and to minds specifically.
I take up Bennett’s argument in particular because, in it, issues with phys-
icalism clearly cross over with concepts of dependence. The choice between
the two ways of being a “building determinist” that we saw in Section 3.2.2,
comes back into view here, and Bennett’s particular defense of antireduc-
tionism is a perfect way to highlight what’s wrong with our intuitive but
sloppy Circumstantialism about building relations as compared with building
Necessitarianism. The question is whether to be a building “necessitarian”,
counting only the fully sufficient conditions for an entity or property as its
“full” builders, or a “circumstantialist”, counting certain physical things or
properties as the full builders of a further thing or property for which they
are sufficient given some other “background” conditions. As it turns out, the
answer to this question has consequences in terms of the ease with which
we make the sufficiency error. We should be very cautious of counting less
than the complete conditions necessitating an entity as the “full” builders of
that entity, as I signalled in Section 3.2.2. My crucial premise that anything
on which an entity or property depends synchronically is constitutive of that
entity, is a species of necessitarianism. And my crucial premise that entities
and properties are identical with everything they depend synchronically on,
hinges on antireductionism being a mistake.
I will go on to argue in Chapter 10 that restricted constitutionalism—and
the Circumstantialism of which it is a species and with which antireductionist
arguments begin—involves the sloppy notion of sufficiency that leads us astray
with respect to reduction. That is one more reason to prefer one of the two
contentious premises of my main argument, Unrestricted Constitutionalism,
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according to which anything on which an entity depends synchronically is
constitutive of that entity. Further, the failure of both closely related arguments
for antireductionism—on the basis of multiply realizable kinds seen in Chapter 5,
and on the basis of individuals that bear non-categorical properties such as being
multiply realizable—recommends that we believe the other contentious premise
of my main argument, Reducibility. That is, we should think that identity is the
relation between an entity or property and all that it depends synchronically
on. Accepting Reducibility, without requiring that non-categorical properties
be eliminated from our ontologies, is crucial to the inference from our partial
constitution by technologies to the conclusion that we—as legitimate objects
of science—are partly what we make.
7.1 Avoiding Overdetermination
We saw in Chapter 4 that the antireductionist argument rests on claims like
those of Baker (1999) with respect to the coincidence and distinctness of entities.
Coupled with physicalist commitments, such claims amount to a recipe for a
grounding problem and an overdetermination problem (or “exclusion” problem).
It is hard, for example, to maintain the distinctness of the mental and the
physical, the causal efficacy of both, and not worry about what would apparently
be widespread overdetermination of effects by both a physical and a mental
cause. In the case of physical and mental entities, Bennett (2008, p. 281)
renders the problem as a set of inconsistent claims, one of which ought to be
rejected:
[Distinctness] Mental properties (and perhaps events) are distinct from physical
properties (or events).
[Completeness] Every physical occurrence has a sufficient physical cause.
[Efficacy] Mental events sometimes cause physical ones, and sometimes do so in
virtue of their mental properties.
[Nonoverdetermination] The effects of mental causes are not systematically
overdetermined.
[Exclusion] No effect has more than one sufficient cause unless it is overdetermined.
There is actually one crucial ingredient for the problem which is not explicit
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in Bennett’s setup. What would make the effects of mental causes systemati-
cally and thus problematically overdetermined—rather than contingently and
unproblematically overdetermined, as in firing squad cases—is the distinctness
and efficacy of the mental, and its spatiotemporal coincidence with physical
conditions that are also equivalently efficacious for an effect. In order to be wor-
risome causal competitors, the two causes must be spatiotemporally coincident.
Without this coincidence, as we saw in Chapter 4, there is no problem. Of
course, the antireductionist is not without recourse, as I signalled in Section 4.4
and promised to say more about here.
Bennett (2003, 2008) defends an antireductive physicalist “compatibilism”
against the problem by rejecting Exclusion and maintaining that the remaining
premises are compatible. She thinks that effects can have more than one
sufficient cause without being overdetermined. Bennett (2003) begins with
the thought, which I will not dispute, that cases of overdetermination must
non-vacuously satisfy both of two counterfactual conditionals. In the usual
case of physical (p) and mental (m) events that are candidate causes of an
effect (e), the relevant counterfactuals are: if p had occurred without m, e
would still have occurred, and if m had occurred without p, e would still have
occurred. If m and p are separately efficacious for e, it should be possible
for p to occur without m, or vice versa, or both, and if they are to be causal
competitors, given the occurrence of either p or m, e will still occur. However,
one strategy Bennett thinks is open to the compatibilist is to say that p cannot
occur without m because p necessitates m.
All the compatibilist would need to do is argue either that it
is impossible to have the mental event or property without the
physical one, or else that it is impossible to have the physical event
or property without the mental one. These claims would render
[each counterfactual] vacuous, respectively. (2003, p. 483)
Bennett calls this the “vacuity” strategy. Of course, the compatibilist is not
going to claim that m cannot occur without p specifically, since the multiple
realizability of m is the antireductionist’s reason to believe its Distinctness
from p. Bennett says, “It is quite popular for those who deny type and/or
token identity to claim that this kind of asymmetric dependency holds—that
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the physical necessitates the mental, even though the mental does not return
the favor” (2003, p. 484). But the same line of reasoning, at a glance, spells
trouble for the vacuity strategy generally, because “p can occur without m
just as easily as m can occur without p” (p. 485). Bennett offers the example
of the dispositions of keys. Without being changed itself, a key can lose the
disposition to unlock something if the lock is changed. The key alone does
not necessitate the disposition. In other words, “physical events are not less
modally flexible than mental ones. They are just modally different” (p. 485).
But Bennett thinks the vacuity strategy might be rescued. She notes that
just because p might not necessitate m, p in some particular circumstances
will. Returning to dispositions, a key and a particular lock together do seem
to instantiate the key’s having the disposition to unlock the lock. Bennett
acknowledges two further problems at this point. The first is that “taking this
line threatens to undercut the motivations for insisting that the mental and
physical are distinct” (p. 486). Thus,
If there are physical events that do necessitate mental ones, then
those physical events do have the relevant relational properties
essentially, and they are the ones on which the denier of token
identity should be focusing. And while there are other arguments
against identity—namely, the more popular multiple realization-ish
arguments against the downward necessitation from the mental to
the physical—the same point presumably applies, mutatis mutandis,
to them. (p. 486)
In other words, given some circumstances (C) in which p necessitates m,
p-in-C also instantiates the non-categorical properties attributed to m, and it
is not clear why we should not identify m with all of p-in-C. We shall return to
this point shortly.
The second “problem” (although I take it not to be a problem but an
important consequence) is that “rescuing the vacuity claim in this way” involves
saying that “p is not in fact causally sufficient for e” (p. 487). The vacuity is
that of a different counterfactual. The claim, if p-in-C had occurred without m,
e would still have occurred, is vacuous because p-in-C cannot occur without m.
So the vacuity strategy ultimately hinges on the idea that “if a mental cause is
efficacious in bringing about some effect, the only physical causes that are also
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efficacious in bringing about that effect are ones that necessitate the mental
cause” (p. 487).
But this, Bennett thinks, reveals a way that the compatibilist can claim
one of the counterfactual tests is not vacuous, but false, making worries about
overdetermination moot. The compatibilist can say that if p had occurred
without m, e would not have occurred, because “the conditions that must
hold for p to bring about e—physical conditions, note—are basically the same
as the conditions in which p necessitates m” (p. 488). Bennett calls this the
“falsehood” strategy.
Together, Bennett thinks the compatibilist can wield these two strategies
as a dilemma about causal sufficiency. We might adopt a strict notion of
causal sufficiency, “according to which the only thing that counts as causally
sufficient for an effect is a whole big package, consisting of what we might have
intuitively thought of as a cause plus all necessary background conditions and
causal intermediaries by means of which it brings about its effects” (p. 490).
Call this package p*. Then the condition that if p* had occurred without m, e
would still have occurred, is vacuous, and overdetermination is not established.
On the other hand, we might “adopt a rather more permissive notion of causal
sufficiency—a notion on which an event or property can count as causally
sufficient for an effect even though it requires some set of background conditions
and intermediaries in order to bring that effect about” (p. 490). Then the
same counterfactual form, with a narrower set of physical conditions plugged
in—just p—will usually be false, and overdetermination is not established.
Bennett notes how similar the strategies are:
both strategies claim, implicitly or explicitly, that the conditions in
which the physical event or property occurs with the mental one are
the same as the conditions in which the physical event or property
manages to bring about the effect. . . . The only real difference
between the two, then, is the notion of causal sufficiency on which
they rely. The vacuity line relies on a rather strict notion, while
the falsity line allows us to continue on with our somewhat sloppy
notion of causal sufficiency according to which reasonably normal
physical events like patterns of neural firings count as causally
sufficient for action. (p. 489)
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Relatedly, recall from Section 3.2.2 that Bennett (2017) thinks it is “just a
matter of bookkeeping” (p. 54) which of two versions of “building determinism”
one accepts. Building determinism is the principle:
[Building Determinism] “For all x and y, and all building relations B, if x fully
Bs y, there is some z(6= y) such that necessarily, z → y” (p. 51).
Bennett calls her preferred way of being a building determinist, “circum-
stantialism,” which is the principle:
[Circumstantialism] “Let C be some to-be-specified set of background circum-
stances that includes neither y nor anything that fully builds y. For all x
and y and all building relations B, if x fully B’s y, then, [(x+C)→ y]”
(p. 52).
Bennett is not the only one to prefer Circumstantialism. Many theorists
explicitly adopt formulations of dependence relations in this vein. Without
worrying about the details of each of the following formulations, notice the
reference to circumstances, background conditions, or context (the boldface
emphases are mine):
Properties G1-Gn instantiated by individual x’s proper parts y1-
yn realize a property F instantiated by that individual x, under
background conditions B, if and only if, x instantiates F and x’s
proper parts y1-yn instantiate G1-Gn; it is necessary that if y1-yn are
proper parts of x, and y1-yn have properties G1-Gn, and B holds,
then x has F ; and y1-yn having G1-Gn, along with their causal
powers, provide something within the spectrum from aggregate to
composite to mechanistic explanation for x having F, along with
its causal powers, under B, but not vice versa. (Endicott, 2016b, p.
3361)
(Realization) Property/relation instance(s) of F1-Fn realize an in-
stance of a property G, in an individual s under conditions $,
if and only if, under $, s has powers that are individuative of an
instance of G in virtue of the powers together contributed by the
instances of F1-Fn to s or s’s constituent(s), but not vice versa.
(Aizawa and Gillett, 2009, p. 186)
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(Comprising) Powers C 1–Cn, had by individuals s1-sn (or individual
s*), comprise the power C*, had by individual s* under back-
ground condition $, if and only if the mechanisms grounded by
the triggering and manifestation of powers C 1-Cn, under trigger-
ing conditions $t1-$tn and background condition $, would together
implement the mechanisms grounded by the triggering and manifes-
tation of C*, under triggering conditions $t1-$tn and background
condition $, but not vice versa. (Gillett, 2007, p. 202)
(Constitution/Parthood) Individuals s1-sn constitute, and are parts
or constituents of, an individual s*, under conditions $, if and
only if s1-sn are spatially contained within s*, many of s1-sn bear
spatiotemporal, powerful and/or productive relations to each other,
and all the powerful properties/relations of s* are realized by prop-
erties/relations of s1-sn, under $, but not vice versa. (Gillett, 2013,
p. 323)
As Bennett (2017) puts it, “what we call the building base is [frequently] not
sufficient-full-stop for what it builds; some kind of appeal to the circumstances
in which it exists or obtains is required” (p. 54). But the other way to espouse
Building Determinism is to say,
[Necessitarianism] “For all x and y and all building relations B, if x fully B’s y,
then, necessarily, x→ y” (p. 52).
The bookkeeping options here, I submit—and I think Bennett would agree—
are exactly analogous to the strict and sloppy options for conceiving of what
counts as causal sufficiency. After all, on Bennett’s view, causation is a
building relation. The sloppy notion of causal sufficiency is thus a special
case of Circumstantialism, which counts just some intuitive core—say, a key,
or some neural goings on—as the “full” builders, and the strict notion of
causal sufficiency is a special case of Necessitarianism, which counts only
those which completely necessitate the built as the “full” builders. And the
reasons to opt for the sloppier Circumstantialism over the apparently cleaner
Necessitarianism is the preservation of the same intuitions and ordinary ways
of speaking that are reasons to permit the sloppy notion of causal sufficiency.
Notice, too, that Unrestricted Constitutionalism is a species of Necessitarianism.
Unrestricted Constitutionalism is the claim that anything on which an entity
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depends synchronically is constitutive of that entity, a premise in my main
argument introduced in Section 1.2, and a notion of constitution at issue in
the debate over externalism, as we saw in Section 2.3.
Likewise, restricted constitutionalism is a species of Circumstantialism.
These are probably the default notions of constitution and building generally.
Bennett (2017), for instance, thinks it “sounds odd” to have a motley of relata
in the first place of a building relation—for instance, physical laws, parts, and
interrelations among parts—all as builders of some entity. Circumstantialism
accords with our intuitions about what the core builders are, and bearers
of the resultant (in the favourable circumstances) non-categorical properties.
Circumstantialism respects the way we normally label, locate and delineate
entities like statues, keys, national flags, minds and people. She says,
I can have intuitive building bases and the somewhat ungainly
implementation of the modal requirement, or I can have a cleaner
implementation of the modal requirement and uglier, more complex
building bases. In the latter case, much ordinary building talk must
be treated as invoking mere partial builders. I have opted for the
former. . . . But nothing deep turns on this. It at most affects
where we sweep various untidinesses. (p. 54)
Actually, what gets swept under the rug is the triviality of the distinctness
upon which antireductionism is predicated. We also have it from Bennett that,
“no one thinks that mere partial builders necessitate what they build” (2017,
p. 49). The idea, then, that full building nonetheless “involves” necessitation,
while being allowed to be considered “filled” by some intuitive but mere subset
of the actually complete set of physical conditions required for, say, a mental
state to be instantiated, means that “full” building only involves necessitation
in the circumstances. Or, to put it more pointedly, only “full”-building-in-the-
circumstances involves necessitation. But then the “fullness” is unmotivated,
except by intuitions. Sheer sufficiency, necessitation, or dependence alone
cannot discriminate any core from among the physical conditions that are
sufficient for and necessitate an entity, or upon which it depends. Bennett
recognizes this when she approvingly adapts the following passage from Lewis
(1973) on causation:
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We sometimes single out one among all the [builders] of some
event and call it “the” [building base], as if there were no others.
Or we single out a few as the “[builders],” calling the rest mere
“. . . factors” or “. . . conditions.” . . . I have nothing to say about
these principles of invidious discrimination. I am concerned with
the prior question of what it is to be [part of the building base]
(unselectively speaking). My analysis is meant to capture a broad
and nondiscriminatory concept of [building]. (2017, p. 55, square
brackets indicate Bennett’s adaptations of Lewis)
Bennett intends the thought here to be a reason to “ignore the problem,”
that is, to be neutral between Necessitarianism and Circumstantialism, because,
she claims, the “same issues arise on either account.” The explanation:
There will be, on either account, a difficulty distinguishing what
are intuitively the “real” builders from what are intuitively some-
thing more like background conditions. This is perhaps clearest
on the account I favor: if x necessitates y in C, it is equally true
that C necessitates y in x. But the very same issue arises on a
necessitarian account. On such an account, complete building bases
will necessitate what they build, but will be complex and often
spatiotemporally scattered. The intuitively “real” or “central” or
“salient” builders can of course be recovered by coupling such an
account with a notion of partial building: perhaps x partially builds
y when it is part of the complete base that necessitates y. . . . But no
such notion of partial building will distinguish the seemingly central
partial builders from the other aspects of the complete building
base that intuitively seem like background conditions only. (2017,
pp. 54–55)
I agree that there can be no distinguishing between parts of a dependence
base on the basis of dependence alone, but that is just a reason not to try
to “recover” the core (or “central”, or “salient”) builders on that basis. In
Chapter 10, we’ll consider other ways “cores” might be delineated, for example,
in terms of which parts are alterable by us for engineering purposes. Since
we engineer technologies, if we depend on them, we engineer ourselves quite
directly. But I am giving a taste of what is ahead. The point here is that sheer
sufficiency, necessitation, or dependence alone cannot discriminate any core
from among the physical conditions that are sufficient for and necessitate an
entity, or upon which it depends.
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7.2 The Sufficiency Error
This unavoidable need for circumstances is a problem for compatibilism. Con-
sider the sloppy notion of causal sufficiency and the corresponding falsity
strategy. When the physicalist holds the sloppy view of causal sufficiency, “he
can think that some physical event p is causally sufficient for effect e, that
some mental event m is as well, and that p fails to necessitate m” (Bennett,
2008, p. 290). But he can only think so if he wants to be extra sloppy, and he
cannot think he has dealt with overdetermination worries while maintaining
any substantive Distinctness. We can, and often do, delineate some intuitive
core p that is merely sufficient in the circumstances for some m, and thus
insufficient for m in other circumstances in which p is also causally insufficient
for e. This much entails the distinctness of m and p. The fact that certain
neural firings that might (partly) realize human pain, ceteris paribus, but that
occur instead in a petri dish, do not realize pain, or cause wincings, etc., only
shows the distinctness of pain and such neural events. But it is trivial to
claim that mental states are not identical to mere subsets of their realization
bases. The dispute between reductionists and antireductionists ought not to
be whether, analogously, wholes are identical with subsets of their parts. The
thought that “p is causally sufficient for effect e, that some mental event m
is as well, and that p fails to necessitate m” (Bennett, 2008, p. 290) is extra
sloppy because there is no basis for claiming that m is sufficient for e in the
same sense of “sufficient” that p is. If m is necessitated by p-in-C, and p-in-C
is fully sufficient for e, then m is strictly sufficient for e, whereas p is only
sloppily sufficient for e. The distinctness of p and m is utterly silent on the
distinctness of m and p-in-C, or of pain and neural-firings-in-context. The
relevant question is indeed whether m is distinct from p-in-C, again, because
the circumstances in which p does not cause e are the same as those in which
m does not occur, and thus does not cause e either. In other words, m causes e
whenever p-in-C causes e and necessitates m. So, and this is crucial, if and only
if they are distinct, m and p-in-C are the relevant causal competitors. They
are the entities whose putative distinctness would be non-trivial, no matter
what sloppy notion of causal sufficiency momentarily obscures that point. The
falsity of the counterfactuals involving just the intuitive core, p, is the falsity
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of the wrong counterfactual. The relevant tests for overdetermination are thus,
“If m had occurred without p-in-C, e would still have occurred,” and “If p-in-C
had occurred without m, e would still have occurred.” Since p-in-C and m are
the causal competitors, it is their distinctness and equal causal efficacy that
are at issue, and the compatibilist claim must be that these counterfactuals
are vacuous because p-in-C necessitates m.
Another way of putting all this is that the falsity strategy collapses back into
the vacuity strategy. What then, is the status of the vacuity strategy? Recall
that the vacuity and falsity strategies can supposedly be run as a dilemma
according to the notion of sufficiency in play. On either the strict or sloppy
notion of causal sufficiency, the compatibilist is supposed to have an answer to
the overdetermination problem. But what gets lost somewhere in Bennett’s
dialectic is the point that the only substantive option of the two—the vacuity
strategy—doesn’t work for the reason Bennett (2003) had noted when she
moved on from it to defend—unsuccessfully—the falsity strategy. “If there are
physical events that do necessitate mental ones, then those physical events do
have the relevant relational properties essentially, and they are the ones on
which the denier of token identity should be focusing” (p. 486). Again, the
usual reason for claiming that higher-level entities are distinct from their lower-
level realizers is that they supposedly have different non-categorical properties.
The mental is supposed to be distinct from the physical because of differing
non-categorical properties, while the very same conditions in which the narrow
physical realizers necessitate the mental are the ones which ground the non-
categorical properties of the mental. Any part of the extra-neural world and
the relations to these that are necessary to make such and such neural firings
realize pain are the ones which ground its being a “pain.” Indeed, these are
two ways of saying the same thing. So the core-realizers-in-the-circumstances
instantiate those properties, and this precludes the line of reasoning by which
higher and lower-level entities are distinct by having distinct properties because
the fully sufficient physical base, not the insufficient subset, can be said to have
the properties it instantiates. After all, physicalism—for example, formulated
in terms of global supervenience—entails that there can be no properties had
by a mental entity (event, property, object, state, or process) which are not
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instantiated by some physical entity (event, property, object, state, or process),
since physical conditions are sufficient and ultimately necessary for the mental.
The central premise in my counter-argument is thus Bennett’s own thought
that, “If there are physical events that do necessitate mental ones, then those
physical events do have the relevant relational properties essentially” (p. 486).
The compatibilist must affirm the antecedent, live with the consequent, and so
undercut her own argument for distinctness.
The upshot is that the cheapened sufficiency brings a cheap distinctness in its
wake, and the inevitable strict sufficiency brings no distinctness at all. Of course
pain is not identical with c-fibres firing if the latter are only partly sufficient
for pain. The question of what the fully sufficient realization base is for a given
mental entity is an empirical question once the mental explanandum and its
properties are stated, although equivocation, ambiguity, or diverging agendas
with respect to the explanandum may give rise to apparently philosophical
debates about what are the total realizers of one’s preferred explanandum taken
to be paradigmatically “mental.” I shall have more to say on this last point
in Chapter 10. But what the total realizers are is a different question than
whether a mental entity is identical with its total realizers. If antireductionism
is to be substantive, the compatibilist must pursue the claim that m is distinct
from p-in-C, or whatever conditions completely necessitate that mental event.
It is not clear that Bennett makes the substantive claim.
There is an analogous objection to her compatibilism that Bennett (2008)
herself articulates. This is the objection that, as a compatibilist, you are
only getting out of the problem—if you are—by giving up on mental
causation. You haven’t said anything about how the mental can
really be causally efficacious, and it is starting to feel as though
its efficacy is only derivative. Isn’t this at best a Pyrrhic victory?
(p. 301)
Bennett’s response is to say, rightly, that “no one can say that mental
and physical causes are completely independent of each other, and yet do
not overdetermine their mutual effects. That is the truth at the heart of the
exclusion problem.” She continues,
Perhaps doing without independent efficacy is a disturbing thought.
But the fact is that it is a mistake to think that a physicalist can say
151
anything else. Physicalists need to bite this bullet for reasons having
nothing to do with the exclusion problem. It is a direct consequence
of their physicalism. Kim is surely right that physicalists need to
accept something like his “causal inheritance principle”. . . . (2008,
p. 301)
In other words, Bennett thinks the exclusion argument “is a good argument
for the claim that the mental is nothing over and above the physical” (2008, p.
282). Indeed, Bennett’s point in that chapter is to say that the compatibilist
strategy is not open to the dualist and that the compatibilist means something
“much weaker” than what the dualist means by endorsing Distinctness, namely,
“that mental events and properties are not truly distinct existences that can
be snipped away from their physical bases” (2008, p. 284). The thought is
that, “despite not being identical, the mental and physical causes are not
exactly distinct, either” (2003, p. 480). “The nonreductive physicalist is simply
asserting that mental and physical properties are numerically distinct” (2008,
p. 286).
But what does this double standard for distinctness come to? The thinking
is elaborated somewhat by Bennett in a slightly different context. The principle
that “built,” or “nonfundamental,” entities posited by a theory “do not count
against the simplicity of a theory” explains why the physicalist says that these
entities are nothing over and above their realizers; they are “ ‘ontologically
innocent’ (Lewis 1991, 81), ‘no addition to being’ (Armstrong 1997, 12), and
even an ‘ontological free lunch’ (Armstrong 1989, 56)” (Bennett, 2017, p. 220).
Bennett says, “Nonfundamentalia are no addition to fundamental being, which
is all parsimony cares about” (2017, p. 220). On the other hand, the very
same principle supposedly justifies the antireductive physicalist’s contention
that minds, for example, and other nonfundamentalia,
are an addition to being full stop. They are numerically distinct
from—and thus in that sense “something over and above”—whatever
builds them. What I am suggesting is that. . . nonfundamentalia
do “count ontologically” toward the total number of things. If
you are counting up how many entities or kinds of entity exist
according to a theory, you have to count them all, nonfundamental
and fundamental alike. (2017, p. 220)
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I grant that fully built entities are ontologically innocent with respect to their
synchronic builders. But that’s because the liberal way of counting in question
is not, contra Bennett, a matter of having “extra ontological commitments”
(2008, p. 223). Considering Alexander’s dictum (that to exist is to be causally
efficacious), we should say that the “distinctness” of the mental and physical is
as genuine as the distinctness of their causal efficacies. To deny the latter is to
deny the former, and we’ve seen that mental causes are not efficacious for their
effects independently of the physical conditions necessitating the mental: “the
mental and physical causes are not exactly distinct, either” (2003, p. 480). So
they are not genuinely distinct existences. What other distinctness could there
be? None. I deny, then, that the “not truly distinct existences” (2008, p. 284)
can amount to any “ontological” distinctness.
My objection, then, is that the compatibilist is only getting out of the
overdetermination problem by giving up or seriously compromising Distinctness,
and that such a Pyrrhic victory is not a victory for antireductionism at all.
The distinctness of antireductionism as a theory rests on preserving both
Distinctness and genuine Efficacy.1 And if these are not preserved, there is no
overdetermination worry, and thus no need to deny Exclusion—the idea that
no effect has more than one sufficient cause unless it is overdetermined.
When it comes to putatively non-categorical properties, there is an untidi-
ness that should not be swept anywhere, and we should remain cognizant of
the problem, not ignore it. The epistemic and pragmatic quandary (discovering
and listing all of what something depends on) is not escaped by the logical or
1 Bennett (2003) calls herself a recent convert to compatibilism, and says at the outset
that she is “not entirely convinced by it, but I do think that it is more compelling than
anything else that has been suggested” (p. 473). I take her to mean other antireductionist
strategies, so, on her own view, she is the reductionist’s most worthy opponent, which is
good for me, if I’m right that there’s a problem here. And when Bennett (2008) reminds
us that “Nonreductive physicalists. . . typically endorse Distinctness for a combination of
reasons having to do with the purported multiple realizability of mental state-types, and
with the semantics of mental terms,” she also notes that, “I myself think that there are
many interesting complexities here, and suspect—somewhat heretically—that the distinction
between reductive and nonreductive physicalism is probably not metaphysically very deep”
(p. 285), and “whether mental and physical properties are numerically distinct matters less
than whether physicalism is true” (p. 286).
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conceptual sloppiness of allowing a partial list to “count” as complete. More
importantly, I submit, the main problem with Circumstantialism is that our
drive to preserve certain intuitions is complicit in causing deep and widespread
confusion about higher-level entities’ relations to lower-level ones, for example
mind–body or mind–physical world relations. I have been piecing together the
view that the extended mind debate, a theory of mind–body relations, and
nothing less than a coherent notion of physicalism, hang on a crucial point that
is obscured by one of these bookkeeping techniques. Circumstantialism gives
up the co-extension, and thus any reason to believe in the complete coincidence
of, the mental with some core physical conditions or “full” builders plugged
into the formulation. But this point is easy to miss, obscuring the fact that
the distinctness claim then being made is not the relevant one. After all, the
mental remains co-extensive (and thus completely coincident) with some wider
physical conditions, and so the latter conditions are the relevant would-be
causal competitors with the mental entity they necessitate, and they are the
ones from which the distinctness of the mental would amount to a substantive
thesis. Necessitarianism, on the other hand, reinstates the co-extension (and
coincidence). In doing so, it makes more obvious what the relevant distinctness
claim is that a substantive antireductionism would have to make. And that
claim is at once less plausible, given that fully sufficient physical conditions
necessitating the mental are the same ones that instantiate the properties by
which it was supposed to be distinct from the physical.
In short, one ought not to premise one’s antireductionism on the claim that
some higher-level entity is not identical to some physical conditions that are
not sufficient for the properties of that higher-level entity. Or, if that’s the
substance of “antireductionism,” the view is trivial, and not at all at odds
with a physicalism according to which either the same higher-level entity with
the relevant properties is identical with an extended set of physical conditions,
or according to which the narrow physical conditions that are not sufficient
for their non-categorical properties simply do not “have” such properties. If
physicalism is true at all, everything is physical, so apparently “non-categorical”
properties just are distributed physical properties, and the physical bases which
instantiate them are by definition not the narrowly delineated entities we
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intuitively attribute them to. Rather, those properties are instantiated by
distributed physical entities. This is the substance of the extended identity
theory I am espousing. Non-categorical properties are ruled out as appropriate
or coherent grounds for substantive distinctness claims about entities to which
they are attributed, because whenever such properties are non-categorical, they
are, by definition, not instantiated by the intuitive “core” of the realization
base about which the non-identity claim is being made, and the question of
their identity is no more at issue than the question of my identity with my left
toe.
The choice between sloppy and strict notions of sufficiency, then, is no
innocent matter of bookkeeping. The sloppy notion produces unwarranted
distinctness claims and results in puzzles that still plague our thinking, especially
about minds. In slogan form, we might say the problem comes from trying to
squeeze a big property into too small a physical base. Call this the “sufficiency
error.” The error is that we tend to take as an explanandum some property or
entity with certain properties, then intuit—or “invidiously discriminate,” to
borrow Lewis’s (1973) phrase—some physical core that we take to be “sufficient”
(though only in the circumstances) for that explanandum. Next we note that
the physical core is not fully sufficient for the properties we nonetheless attribute
to it and on which we base the explanandum’s distinctness from its physical
core. Finally, we take that distinctness, whose triviality is overlooked, to tell
us something general about, for example, mind–physical world relations. To
put all of this another way, the error is to attribute non-categorical properties
to entities, use those properties as a basis for claiming that such entities are
distinct from physical conditions not sufficient for those properties, overlook
the fact that non-categorical properties are by definition not coincident (or
co-extensive) with the narrow physical conditions they have been attributed to,
and, finally, to think that the distinctness of such entities from mere subsets of
the conditions sufficient for them has anything to do with the distinctness of
those entities from physical conditions generally.
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7.3 The Ubiquity of the Sufficiency Error
Ordinary boundary-drawing and property attribution may not be a problem on
its own. It is the further inferences we might draw from such ordinary practices
that are problematic. Once we no longer draw such inferences from the trivial
distinctness of entities bearing non-categorical properties from mere subsets of
the physical conditions fully sufficient for those properties, there is no strong
pull to eliminate such entities or properties from our theories, since they are
ontologically innocent. (Instead the question is whether there is any regularity
worth tracking). So the scope of the sufficiency error is potentially as wide or
wider than the problem of special composition, but the conclusion is not that
there are no ordinary objects. I think, rather, that ordinary objects and indeed
all non-categorical property-bearers are either not quite what we ordinarily
think they are, or not quite where we ordinarily think they are.
Chronicling the role the sufficiency error plays in philosophical confusion
would be a project unto itself. But let me mention a few other cases. First,
I had to make the sufficiency error repeatedly—in claims usually signalled as
questionable by labelling them “putative”—in Section 4.1 and Section 4.3, just
to get the grounding and overdetermination problems off the ground. Indeed,
the sufficiency error is the recipe for these problems. I risked making the
sufficiency error when claiming that one or more multiply-actuatable switches
are what make something a member of the kind that it is. I appealed to
the switches the thing could or would operate. But this just means that a
thing’s functional and kind properties are themselves modal properties, as
are dispositional properties. Equivalently, its modal properties are its kind
properties.2 The point is just that the narrow builders or core realizers, or what
2 Quine (1969) makes a similar point when he says,
what qualifies a thing as soluble though it never gets into water is that it is of
the same kind as the things that actually did or will dissolve; it is similar to
them. Strictly we cannot simply say ‘the same kind’, nor simply ‘similar’, when
we have wider and narrower kinds, less and more similarity. Let us then mend
our definition by saying that the soluble things are the common members of
all such kinds. A thing is soluble if each kind that is broad enough to embrace
all actual victims of solution embraces it too. (p. 16)
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we consider to be the kind members, alone are not sufficient to instantiate these
properties. Switches are part of the circumstances that instantiate entities’
non-categorical properties.
Consider now the way the sufficiency error can motivate epiphenomenalism
or eliminativism instead of antireductionism in the face of the exclusion problem.
Prior et al. (1982) famously generalized the exclusion-style considerations
against the causal efficacy of all dispositional properties. On my account, they
should have given up Distinctness instead of Efficacy. We can affirm the causal
efficacy of dispositions by identifying them with causally efficacious physical
conditions, since causal impotence just spells non-existence for dispositions
(and any such “epiphenomena”). Instead, in upholding distinctness, Prior et al.
(1982) make the sufficiency error. First they say,
For each disposition we can specify a pair of antecedent circum-
stances and manifestation which together determine the disposition
under discussion. In the case of fragility, the pair is (roughly) <
knocking, breaking >, in the case of water solubility the pair is <
putting in water, dissolving > and so on for the other familiar cases.
By “a causal basis” we mean the property or property-complex
of the object that, together with the first member of the pair—
the antecedent circumstances—is the causally operative sufficient
condition for the manifestation [of a disposition]. (p. 251)
Notice here the narrow delineation of the “causal basis”. In case it wasn’t
clear, they say explicitly, “The basis is rather responsible for the manifestation
in the appropriate circumstances” (p. 253). So the causal basis, on their usage,
does not include those circumstances. However, they argue that “these bases are
distinct from their attendant dispositions. . . ” (p. 251), which, given physicalist
commitments like Completeness, Nonoverdetermination, and Exclusion, would
entail the impotence of dispositions. The reason given for the distinctness is,
once again, the idea that nothing about the object—say, its having “molecular
bonding α” (p. 253)—is essential to its being fragile. But this is too hasty.
After all, the disposition is not completely coincident with the causal basis
from which it is being claimed to be distinct. That distinctness is trivial, and
the partial sufficiency bases for a property are not causal competitors with
the complete sufficiency base; only entities that are distinct and completely
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coincident are causal competitors. And there is no reason given to think a
disposition is distinct from its causal-basis-in-the-circumstances. But, owing to
the distinctness from the causal basis alone, the idea is:
This causal basis is a sufficient causal explanation of the breaking
as far as the properties of the object are concerned. But then there
is nothing left for any other properties of the object to do. By the
Distinctness Thesis the disposition is one of these other properties,
ergo the disposition does nothing. (p. 255)
There may be nothing left for any other properties of the object to do.
But the distinctness of the property from the causal basis in the object is not
equivalent with the disposition’s being a property of the object alone. Quite
the opposite. The trivial distinctness is predicated on the causal basis being
inessential for the property. The sufficiency error is even more clear in the
following inference:
the causal basis is part of the explanation and part of the cause of
the disposition’s manifestation; hence the disposition is not. (p. 255)
The “explanation” here, of which the “causal explanation” via the “causal
basis” is only a part, is what might be called metaphysical explanation. The
“causal basis” is just part of the total explanation of the manifestation—that
is, the rest of the explanation of the manifestation (a glass breaking) involves
circumstances such as the object’s absorption of some appropriately inertial
energy, such as its own, that of a rock, or a mechanical wave like that of sound.
The two senses of explanation at work—partial and complete—also underlie
an equivocation on “responsibility.” We’re told, “If dispositions must have
causal bases, then any object with a disposition must have a property—the
basis—responsible,” in this case, for a glass’s being at a time such that if it
were dropped at that time, it would break (p. 252). But as Prior et al. (1982)
themselves say, “The basis is rather responsible for the manifestation in the
appropriate circumstances” (p. 253). In a world with nothing else, a glass with
α is not fragile. So the fragility of the glass is not a competitor with α in the
manifestation of breakage, because α is not strictly sufficient for anything’s
fragility. For this reason, it is not relevant to deny the identity of fragility with
such a partial metaphysical explanation of breaking as α.
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In short, if we go in for Circumstantialism about the intuitively central
builders, explanation, most responsible basis, etc, we must be careful, when
attributing properties to such cores, not to draw certain inferences about
the irreducibility (antireductionism) or causal impotence (eliminativism) of
properties or their bearers. If we instead adhere to the stricter Necessitarianism,
in which an entity depends on, is constituted by, realized by, or composed of
(and, on my view, is identical to), all of some intuitively-core-constituents-in-
the-circumstances, then it is far clearer that neither the distinctness nor the
efficacy of the fully sufficient physical basis as compared to its intuitive core
is at issue, since they are not completely coincident. The substantive issue is
instead whether the entity is distinct from the total realizers; but none of the
arguments for antireductionism target this substantive distinctness.
And, crucially, if one wants to claim that an entity is not identical with
the wider set of physical conditions strictly sufficient for it, reasoning that
those physical conditions amount to an entity that have further non-categorical
properties, for example, of the property of being otherwise realizable, then one
simply repeats the sufficiency error on a bigger scale.
Thus, there is no tension between the conjunction of Unrestricted Consti-
tutionalism together with Reducibility and the claim that what it is to be a
member of a kind is to share in one or more of the same effects. My defense of
multiple realizability is actually compatible with the mereological essentialism
I recommended in Section 3.3.3 when I questioned Bennett’s assertion that she
“could probably be in exactly the same qualitative state of pain even if one or
two fewer neurons were firing” (2017, ch. 3, note 19). Once the explanandum
is fixed, any superficial tension disappears. That is, if the question is whether
the kind of state, as singly or multi-functionally characterized, is multiply
realizable, the answer is yes. If the question is whether the state’s complete
causal profile could be the same if its realization base was altered (such that
any of its properties changed), the answer is no. When Bennett says “exactly
the same” state—qualitative or otherwise—I take that as a reference to an
instance, the identity criterion for which is its complete causal profile, rather
than a functional kind, the membership criterion for which may be only its
partial causal profile.
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Nor, then, does antireductionism follow from something like the subset
strategy recommended by Jessica Wilson (2011). The idea is basically that
the conditions (putatively) sufficient for the causal powers characteristic of a
mental state are also (putatively) sufficient for additional causal powers, such
that the instance of the mental causal power is both numerically identical with
an instance of a physical power, and not identical with the realization base. But
I have been arguing that whatever the disposition, property or causal power is
here, it is instantiated not only by the intuitive base—say, a corkscrew, a key, or
some neurons—but by the bottles, locks, and, in the neural case, extra-neural
circumstances. So the relevant question, to which differing answers would make
a substantive difference between antireductionism and reductionism, is not
whether a single property is identical to an entity with a set of properties. The
relevant identity question for properties is whether the property is identical with
a physical property, and the only satisfactory answer is that, being physically
instantiated, the property itself is physical. Indeed, this means the identity
question with which Putnam (1967) begins his discussion, “Is the property
of having a pain at time t a brain state?” (p. 158), if it is not ill-formed, is
too easily answered, “no.” The relevant identity question for a mental state,
object, process or event is whether it has all the same properties as a physical
state, object, process or event. Only physical conditions that are fully sufficient
for a property instantiate and thus “have” that property, strictly speaking,
despite our ordinary attributions of non-categorical properties to subsets of
those physical conditions. So, for example, if we claim that a corkscrew is not
identical with the chunk of metal we call a corkscrew because that same chunk
of metal “has” other causal powers, namely, the property of being a paperweight
under certain other circumstances, we’re simply being doubly sloppy: once
when we attribute the property of being a corkscrew, and again when we
attribute the property of being a paperweight, to a core which is actually
sufficient for neither property. And again, it is nothing against the physical
identity, nor even against the reducibility, of corkscrews or paperweights or
mental states that they are distinct from mere subsets of the physical conditions
necessitating them, and distinct from supersets of physical conditions sufficient
for other properties, too.
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Most importantly, it is a sufficiency error that the sets up the mind–body
problem. It goes like this. Begin with the question of how the mind could
possibly be explained by physical conditions. Then offer up a woefully in-
sufficient set of physical conditions—whether synapses, or, by analogy, the
English-speaker in Searle’s (1980) “Chinese Room,” or gears in Leibniz’s mill
(see Rescher, 1991)—as an example of an incomplete and thus failed explana-
tion. Then, take that incomplete explanation as evidence for the distinctness
of the mental and physical generally. Our intuitions about the boundaries of
the higher-level things we want to explain, their central (narrow) constitutents
or “core” (insufficient) realizers, are complicit in a simple and very widespread
fallacy about the non-identity of higher-level entities and properties with their
constituents or realizers.
Wrapping Up
In Chapters 5 to 6, I have argued that antireductionism premised on multiple
realizability fails. The multiple realizers of a kind, or variation among its
members, are compatible with a kind’s being physical and projectible. In this
chapter, I’ve argued that the non-categorical properties that we attribute to
entities—whether modal, sortal, dispositional or functional properties—are no
basis on which to premise any substantive distinctness of those entities from
their physical constituents or the realizers of those properties. Doing so involves
a fallacy I call the sufficiency error. And I have briefly sketched the breadth of
the sufficiency error; it is very common.
Having been alerted to the sufficiency error, we should be very cautious of
counting less than the complete conditions necessitating an entity as the “full”
builders of that entity. We should expect that any projectible non-categorical
properties we attribute to ourselves and to our experiences—properties that
something might have—depend on more than the core physical parts we might
ordinarily take ourselves to be constituted or realized by. Having cleared the
conceptual terrain in this way, we can begin to see why we are partly constituted
or realized by what we make. As I will go on to argue in Chapter 10, these
issues are at the heart of the question of extended minds, since the sufficiency
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error is baked into the internalist’s position. Restricted constitutionalism—and
the Circumstantialism of which it is a species and to which antireductionist
arguments fallaciously appeal—involves an unmotivated notion of sufficiency
that leads us astray with respect to reduction. That is one more reason to
prefer Necessitarianism, and with it, one of the two contentious premises
of my main argument, Unrestricted Constitutionalism, according to which
anything on which an entity depends synchronically is constitutive of that entity.
Further, the failure of both closely related arguments for antireductionism
recommends that we believe the other contentious premise of my main argument,
Reducibility. That is, we should think that identity is the relation between
an entity or property and all that it depends synchronically on. Accepting
Reducibility, without requiring that non-categorical properties be eliminated
from our ontologies, is crucial to the inference from our partial constitution by
technologies to the conclusion that we—as legitimate objects of science—are




In Chapter 3, I surveyed a few dependence relations and introduced what
Bennett (2017) thinks they have in common. There are similarities between
dependence relations and they form a resemblance class. In Chapter 4, I showed
that similar puzzles and problems arise in the case of each synchronic dependence
relation, and the crux of the issues and their solutions is independent of the
specific synchronic dependence relation terminology in which the problems
are couched. The problem arises when we claim that an entity or property is
distinct from its parts, constituents, or realizers. In Chapter 5, I examined
the role that multiple realizability has played in motivating antireductionism.
In Section 5.2, I argued that multiple realization is indeed ubiquitous, and in
Chapter 6, I argued that that it blocks reduction if and only if supposedly
garden-variety variation blocks reduction, which it doesn’t. The disjunctiveness
of a kind is no barrier to its being physical, nor to its reduction. In Chapter 7,
I argued that a widespread fallacy I call the sufficiency error involves an
equivocation—between sloppy sufficiency-in-the-circumstances and sufficiency
full stop—when inferring the non-identity of an entity with physical bases that
are merely sufficient-in-the-circumstances for it. We sloppily say that an entity
“has” certain non-categorical properties while claiming that a mere part of its
physical base doesn’t, thus applying a strict sense of sufficiency to the base.
The resulting non-identity of an entity with a mere subset of its dependence
base does not secure antireductionism as a substantive metaphysical thesis.
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But if entities are to be identified with their complete synchronic dependence
bases, then partial synchronic dependence is partial identity. I take these to be
good reasons to think synchronic dependence relations are identical.
I return now to Bennett’s (2017)1 class of building relations and offer, in
this chapter and the next, an original argument to the effect that synchronic
dependence relations are an important subclass of building relations, and
that these relations are in fact identical with one another. Though I depart
from Bennett on antireductionism, and although my claim that synchronic
dependence relations are identical goes much further than what Bennett is
willing to say about the unity of building relations more generally, I am once
again engaged with Bennett because she is the main philosopher to have worked
on this latter issue in depth. She clearly asks, about building relations, the
question I have about synchronic dependence relations: just how similar are
they, and how many are there, really? Bennett argues building relations are
similar, but not one thing. I argue synchronic dependence relations are very
similar, and actually one thing. I’ll mention a few other somewhat relevant
views, but they are only in the rough vicinity of the view I reject. Bennett,
on the other hand, gives detailed arguments against monism about building
relations, and since those arguments are made strictly in terms of synchronic
dependence relations, if they work, they would work against the view I endorse.
So they are the extant considerations to grapple with, although I come up with
some others myself.
If I’m right, then it doesn’t matter whether claims about externalism are
made in terms of constitution, composition, realization, or identity. To claim
that we have technological parts is to claim that we are partly constituted by
technologies, which is to claim that properties attributable to us are partly
realized by technologies. And both are to say we are partly technological. In
this chapter and the next, I explain and defend that view, as I said I would in
Section 2.3 when showing that externalists drift among synchronic dependence
terminologies and attending underdeveloped concepts, but that this drift is not
a fatal flaw for externalism.
In Section 8.1, I begin by discussing the way in which building relations are,
1 Every reference to Bennett in this chapter is to Bennett (2017).
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as Bennett puts it, “tainted” by causation. But in Section 8.2, I argue that
causal taint does not render causation and synchronic dependence inseparable
as subclasses of building or dependence, and that, contra an alternative view
offered by Ross and Ladyman (2010) in their analysis of debates over EM, the
question of whether something is a cause or constituent of another thing is
indeed quite sensible, as both sides of the EM debate assume. I agree with
Bennett that the members of a class of building relations, including causation,
are not identical with one another, although for different reasons than Bennett.
In Section 8.3, I discuss what it means for relations to be identical, and provide
a general defense of pursuing the question of whether synchronic dependence
relations are identical. What is at issue is whether or not there are any real
disagreements to be had about which synchronic dependence relations obtain
(or not) between, for example, the cognitive or mental and their physical bases.
In the next chapter, I discuss Bennett’s main reasons for rejecting monism
about building relations. In Section 9.2 and Section 9.3, I argue that those
reasons do not count against the identity of specifically synchronic dependence
relations, making that thesis a live option. In fact, some of the same considera-
tions can be turned into an argument for the identity of synchronic building
relations.
8.1 Causal Taint
Bennett argues that, “the standard distinction between causal and noncausal
determination is both less clear and less useful than typically assumed” (p. 67).
She reasons that building is “causally tainted,” in two ways. Building is
causally tainted, first, in the sense that the class of building relations includes
causation; on Bennett’s view, causation is necessitating, asymmetric, and
generative. It should be obvious that I agree there is a resemblance; both causal
dependence and synchronic dependence are dependence relations. And although
“resemblance classes are cheap” (p. 70), Bennett convincingly argues that the
resemblance between causation and other forms of dependence is theoretically
useful in that there are instructive analogies between the two. Indeed, I
have employed these analogies when defending the counterfactual analysis of
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dependence in Chapter 3, and, in Chapter 7, when attacking inferences involving
equivocations between sloppy and strict notions of sufficiency, be it causal or
synchronic sufficiency. However, similarities between causal dependence and
synchronic dependence simply do not entail that the distinction is less clear
and less useful than typically thought, even if it’s common to overlook the
similarity.
But what about Bennett’s second reason to believe the distinction between
causal and non-causal determination, or between causal and synchronic de-
pendence, is unclear? Building relations, Bennett argues, are causally tainted
in a second way, because many building relations obtain in virtue of causal
facts. According to Bennett, “causation taints the building family by infecting
specific other building relations” (p. 99). There are three grades of this second
kind of causal taint, or “involvement.” These grades of causal involvement lead
Bennett to what appears to be a stronger conclusion, that, “causation cannot
be separated out from vertical building without leaving an incomplete class
that fails to carve at the joints” (p. 83). This claim appears to be stronger
than the claim that the distinction between causal dependence and synchronic
dependence is “less clear and less useful than typically assumed” (p. 67).
I’ll revisit the inference to either conclusion in a moment, but first, what
are the grades of causal involvement in synchronic building? The first way in
which synchronic dependence holds in virtue of causal facts is due to the causal
individuation of, for example, functional properties. A first-order property
is said to realize a second-order functional property just in case the former
plays the causal role individuative of the latter. Not only do I endorse a causal
individuation of functional properties, I have endorsed causal individuation of
everything—individuals, kinds, and properties of all sorts. Things are what
they do. The fact that we sloppily attribute properties to mere subsets of the
physical conditions strictly sufficient for those properties presents us with an
apparent choice, which I have until now left aside, as to which conditions are
strictly sufficient for those properties. I’ll say more about this apparent choice in
Chapter 10 in relation to mental states. But briefly, we might say that what is
actually sufficient for what we call a corkscrew to be a corkscrew is, at any given
moment, human beverage-storing practices. Or we might say, a thing has the
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proper function (see Millikan, 1984, 2017; Kingsbury, 2004, 2006, 2008) of being
a corkscrew in virtue of having successfully functioning corkscrew ancestors.
In that case, having a certain ancestry is perhaps a property instantiated by
a four-dimensional entity. I’m ambivalent here, as I don’t think the choice
is a dilemma. Rather, I think each set of physical conditions instantiates
different properties. The shorter-duration and wider physical base consisting of
unactuated switches perhaps instantiates a disposition. The longer-duration set
of physical conditions instantiates a thing’s “having” a certain etiology. Then,
whether being a corkscrew—or a belief, for that matter—is having a disposition
or having a certain etiology is a terminological decision. Less plausibly, we
might think that being a corkscrew is either. I say “less plausibly” because,
while the extensions of these two properties are likely to overlap, that doesn’t
mean they aren’t individuative of theoretically distinct kinds. Of course there
is also a kind that corresponds to the conjunction of these two properties, being
both a thing with a certain etiology and with a certain disposition. What to
name these kinds, I don’t care. Suppose there is a kind that admits of “swamp”—
spontaneously and accidentally generated—corkscrews by requiring just the
disposition, and another that admits of broken corkscrews by requiring just the
etiology, and yet another that admits of neither (requiring both the etiology and
the disposition). But in no case is anything temporally or spatially extrinsic
to the physical conditions strictly sufficient for the property or properties in
question. It’s just that the spatiotemporal dimensions of the physical conditions
instantiating the disposition are spatially protracted, and the ones instantiating
the etiology are temporally protracted. Those conditions instantiating a thing’s
“having” a certain etiology and disposition are protracted in both spatial and
temporal dimensions.
I think the first grade of causal involvement is just the same as the third,
so I’ll discuss the third grade now, coming back to the second grade afterwards.
Bennett argues that building relations can hold over an interval, and I agree.
She says,
consider pretty much any ordinary nonfundamental thing, and any
ordinary nonfundamental property it instantiates. Consider, again,
your chair. Its solidity and ability to bear your weight is microbased
in ongoing causal processes at the microlevel, not in properties
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statically possessed by stationary particles. The fact that it exists
arguably does as well. (p. 99)
The explanation is that
Atoms come together to form molecules as their electrons are at-
tracted to and repelled by each other. All the little bits—not that it
is really little bits—are constantly moving and causally interacting.
When atoms bond it is not as though one sticks a hook into the
other and stays that way. (p. 99)
And this is not a special case, nor is it particular to, say, composition.
Pretty much all the kinds of building that counted as canonical
back in [Bennett’s] Chapter 2 often hold in a temporally extended
fashion, in virtue of the causal activity of the builders. Certainly
composition, grounding, and microbasing do. (p. 99)
Indeed, all of the relations I introduced in Section 3.1 hold in a temporally
extended fashion. Realization is causally infected no differently. The physical
conditions instantiating the functional properties realized (partly) by first-order
properties obtain either in virtue of a more broadly temporally extended state
of affairs—an interval that includes causal interactions—or a more broadly
spatially extended state of affairs. But even the latter is not momentary or
temporally unextended. For example, the first-order properties that realize
second-order properties are themselves not properties instantiated instanta-
neously, but by physical conditions extended through time. There would be no
realization relation in a world stripped of causal interactions.
As for the second grade of causal involvement, Bennett introduces it by
asking us to imagine
pulling ingredients from the pantry and baking a cake. In such
cases, we start with some things, and use them to make something
else. . . . The cake is made from the flour, sugar, eggs, and whatnot.
As that sentence shows, we very naturally use various building
locutions when we describe cases like these. Yet they involve causal
processes that occur over time. . . . It is so natural to use building
talk to describe these kind of diachronic causal processes. . . . (p. 86)
168
Bennett calls this “diagonal” building. Now, Bennett actually agrees with
the first stage of a possible objection, that “such talk is made true by a
combination of building relations that are not diachronic and diachronic [causal]
relations that are not [vertical] building relations.” She just doesn’t think that
this entails that a diagonal building relation between eggs and cake doesn’t
exist. Bennett thinks an untenable appeal to parsimony would be required,
without which the fact that such truth conditions can be given is otherwise
“compatible with either of two quite different attitudes toward or views about
diachronic building”:
One view is that there are no diachronic building relations, even
though there are true tensed sentences about building. The other
view [Bennett’s] is that there are diachronic building relations, but
they are not fundamental. (p. 92)
Bennett says the latter, because she thinks building relations are themselves
built (ch. 7). Now if diagonal building is built, note that it is built both causally
and from synchronic dependence that obtains in virtue of causal facts (the
cake’s atoms partly compose it over its interval, rather than instantaneously).
But in that case, diagonal building can thus be distinguished from causation and
from building relations tainted by the third grade of causal involvement, since,
ex hypothesi, it is built from both. On the other hand, I’m not sure the second
grade of causal involvement is clearly distinct from the third grade of causal
involvement, for the same reason that the first grade of causal involvement
isn’t: temporal properties are instantiated by conditions which are temporally
protracted compared to the conditions to which they are attributed. To see
this, note that Bennett characterizes the first stage of the objection to diagonal
building as saying that our ordinary diagonal “made from” talk is “simply
stating that things with temporal properties [egg proteins that came from eggs]
stand in a purely vertical, synchronic building relation to something else [the
cake]” (p. 87). Ignoring that the synchronic relation isn’t actually pure in this
way, the point about a cake or its parts having the temporal property of being
made from eggs highlights what I want to suggest about the time interval of
the conditions sufficient for such a property. To put it simply, it takes eggs
to make a cake that is made out of eggs. The property of being made out
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of eggs which existed at t1 that we might attribute to a region of spacetime,
“cake”, at t2 is a non-categorical property for which the latter region is not
sufficient. It takes actual eggs to sufficiently instantiate such a property. The
property of being made of proteins with certain dispositions (which might have
been synthesized by clever chemists to sell to vegans), on the other hand, is a
different property, protracted spatially and/or temporally elsewhere.
In any case, I agree that synchronic dependence relations involve causal
relations in the sense that causal relations are parts of composed, constituents
of constituted, or realizers of realized things. But what of it? Bennett acknowl-
edges:
The claim that some building relations are partially defined in
causal terms, or hold partially in virtue of various causal facts,
does not entail that causation itself is a building relation. . . . So
there is room for an opponent to agree with me that building is
causally tainted in the second sense while denying that causation
itself counts as a kind of building.
What such an opponent needs to do is provide a reason for ruling
out causation proper that does not also rule out the causally tainted
building relations that she does accept. This requires a bit of care.
For example, it would be of no use to argue that causation is not
a kind of building because causation is not synchronic—neither
are the relations invoked at the second and third grades of causal
involvement. Probably what such an opponent wants to do instead
is deny that causation is a member of the class of relations that
make for relative fundamentality, an issue that I have postponed
discussing. (pp. 100-101)
Now, note that Bennett thinks relations involving causation by obtaining
over an interval are thus not “synchronic.” I disagree, but this particular
disagreement is merely terminological. Of course, we need some name for these
relations. “Diachronic” has sometimes been used (Kirchhoff, 2015), but that is
confusing, because “diachronic” is usually reserved for relations between causes
and their effects (see Horgan, 1993; Kim, 1999, 2003; Leuridan, 2012; O’Connor
and Wong, 2005; Pereboom, 2002; Rupert, 2010; Sober, 1999; Wilson, 2014,
2015). And Bennett uses “diachronic” to refer to causal, as well as diagonal
building relations. “Non-causal” won’t work if it implies what both Bennett
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and I reject—that these relations do not, in some sense, involve causation. I
distinguish between causal and another subclass of dependence relations, and
yet I do not claim that the latter is “non-causal,” precisely because I think
what I’ve been calling synchronic dependence holds over intervals of time, and
that causal interactions can be constitutive of entities. Calling synchronic
dependence “non-causal” would obscure that. On the other hand, I do think
it is a mistake to call the causal interactions that are constitutive of entities
causes of those entities, because I take it that they do not occur before the
entity they constitute, but they occur as the entity they constitute occurs, and
I maintain that this is an important difference in explanatory practice, a point
I’ll further defend shortly. So I’m going to stick with my usage of “synchronic,”
if only because, as far as I can tell, while the literature is settled on how to
use “diachronic,” it is not settled on Bennett’s use of synchronic to mean
instantaneous as opposed to covarying over an interval, and the latter is at least
consistent with some philosophical uses, and more in line with ordinary use.
Ylikoski (2013) refers to constitution as “synchronous,” for example. What is
synchronous needn’t be instantaneous. For an ordinary example, synchronized
swimming is an activity and is not instantaneous at all, let alone essentially so.
The movements of the swimmers covary not at a single time, but through time.
By contrast, effects at a time vary in relation to causes at a previous time. The
particles and the chair, if they are distinct, stand to one another more like
synchronized swimmers stand to one another than they do like paradigmatic
causes—such as stone-throwings—stand to an effect—such as a bottle breaking.
Terminological choices aside, there is room to agree that what I call syn-
chronic dependence relations involve causal interactions, and let Bennett define
building as the entire class of dependence relations, including causation, and
yet still hold that there are two more unified subclasses of dependence relations:
causation on one hand, and the rest, on the other. To see this possibility quite
clearly, take Bennett’s own map of the conceptual terrain:
Let A be the class of purely noncausal vertical building relations.
Let B be the class of causally tainted building relations—those that
hold partially in virtue of the obtaining of some causal facts. Let C
be a class only including causation itself. The claim that building
is causally tainted in the first way is the claim that the union of A
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and B and C is unified. The claim that building is causally tainted
in the second way is the claim that the union of A and B is more
natural than either A or B alone. (Indeed, a large part of the point
of the second kind of causal taint is simply that class B exists.)
(p. 100)
Granting all that, there is room to think, as I do, that B, and perhaps also
the union of A and B, is clearly and usefully distinct from C. I have nothing
more to say about what belongs in A (Bennett mentions set formation (p. 100)),
and thus nothing more to say about the A–B class. The synchronic dependence
relations I have focused on—realization, constitution, and composition—the
ones primarily employed in the EM literature, all involve causation, and are
thus members of B.
Recall that there were actually two flavours, shall we say, of the conclusion
drawn by Bennett. The conclusion presented at the outset is that the usual
distinction between causal and other building relations is less clear and useful
than ordinarily assumed. Soundness here hinges on exactly what is typically
assumed about that distinction. However, Bennett’s second grade of causal
involvement appeals to ordinary diagonal building talk, such as “made from”.
For philosophical examples, new mechanists clearly have a four-dimensional
notion of constitution when they talk about the constitution of dynamic
processes and systems (see Craver, 2014; Baumgartner and Casini, 2016;
Gillett, 2013; Kirchhoff, 2015; Ylikoski, 2013). And as an example of building
relations holding over an interval, Bennett cites the well-known four-dimensional
view about persistence through time. She also cites van Inwagen (1995), who
thinks some x’s compose a y just in case their (temporally extended, of course)
activities constitute a life. Thus polling both the everyday and philosophical
notions of dependence, it’s not clear what ordinary assumptions are being
made about the clarity and usefulness of the distinction between causation and
other building relations, such that the distinction is less clear and useful than
ordinarily assumed. The conclusion encountered later in the same chapter, has
a stronger flavour. It is that the class of purely non-causal building relations
fails to carve at the joints, because it excludes a whole bunch of ordinary ways
of thinking about building. That might be true of the A class. But, for the
reasons just given, it’s not clear that our ordinary distinction carves out just
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the A class, and even if it did, that point would be moot as to the theoretic
utility of the B class or the A–B union.
Of course, if there is no distinction that can be made between causal
dependence and other dependence relations, then the stronger of Bennett’s
conclusions is all the more warranted. But I maintain that there is a clear
distinction between causation and the rest, despite their similarity, and despite
causal involvement in the latter. Indeed, the fact that all of the putative
synchronic dependence relations relevant to the EM debate involve causation
goes to show that they are unified even further, because they are all tainted
in the same way, while causation isn’t. But let me now defend the view that
causation and synchronic dependence are distinct.
8.2 A Plurality of Building Relations
Even the above suggestion that any purely non-causal A class of relations is
not useful says nothing about the clarity or usefulness of a distinct class of B
relations, or the union of the B and A classes (if the latter has any members).
The worthwhile point about causal involvement in synchronic dependence
relations, or, as I shall now put it, the observation that causal interactions
among parts or constituents can constitute or realize higher-level entities or
higher-order properties, is meant to illuminate the existence of that class, and
certainly does not show that that class is not clear or useful. Strangely, then,
the only thing that would show that the B class of relations, the class I am
interested in, is not clear or useful, would be if causal and constitutive species
of dependence could not be distinguished at all. But surely the very existence
of the B class depends on there being a distinction between it and the C
class—the class that isolates causation.
However, something in the vicinity of the view that there is no useful
distinction between causal dependence and constitutive dependence specifically,
arises within the EM literature. In The Extended Mind collection edited
by Menary (2010), Ross and Ladyman (2010)2 defend the view that mature
sciences make no use of such a distinction. They suggest the distinction
2 Every reference to Ross and Ladyman in this chapter is to Ross and Ladyman (2010).
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belongs to a scientifically naïve “metaphysics of domestication” that takes our
ordinary spatial metaphors too seriously. They claim, “The causal–constitutive
distinction thus is not drawn in physics” (p. 162). As they see it,
Chemistry explains recurring properties of water samples by refer-
ence to underlying properties of hydrogen and oxygen atoms and
the way they combine to form molecules of H2O. For example, the
question of what makes water a solvent of common salt is answered,
in broadly causal terms, by appealing to the chemical properties of
the oxygen and hydrogen molecules. However, the metaphysician
insists that the question of what constitutes the water is altogether
different. This is held to concern what substance or matter makes
up the water, and appeal is to be made only to the existence, rather
than the causal powers, of the hydrogen and oxygen atoms. How-
ever, this special sort of explanation is foreign to sciences, especially
as they mature. (p. 158)
According to any metaphysician I’m familiar with, the existence and the
causal powers of hydrogen and oxygen atoms are not dichotomized this way.
We’re then given a somewhat more plausible characterization of the view the
authors oppose:
Domesticating metaphysicians seek to account for the world as
“made of” myriad “little things”. . . . Their causal powers are usually
understood as manifest in the effects they have on each other when
they collide. Thus the causal structure of the world is imagined to
be based on emergent or reducible consequences of reverberating
networks of what we call “microbangings”—the types of ultimate
causal relations that prevail among the basic types of little things,
whatever exactly those turn out to be. (p. 159)
Of course, the interactions between the particles manifestly posited by
contemporary physics are not just collisions. I’m not sure who they are, but
these metaphysicians, unlike the metaphysician of H2O encountered the page
before, do seem to acknowledge the causal powers, and not just the existence,
of what they consider to be constituents of the world. Still about these
metaphysicians, Ross and Ladyman say,
This picture, familiar as it is, finds absolutely no corresponding
image in contemporary fundamental physics. The types of parti-
cles which physical theory describes do not have spatiotemporal
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boundaries in anything like what common sense takes for granted
in conceptualizing everyday objects. . . . (p. 159)
Again, it is hard to judge whether or not contemporary physics corresponds
to a view which is not itself clear. When Ross and Ladyman say the (singular)
“metaphysical notion of constitution or composition is an abstraction that
does not correspond to any general idea that figures nonmetaphorically in
science,” since they do not further characterize that notion, it is hard to know
whether their criticism sticks to some target. Adams and Aizawa are the only
“metaphysicians” Ross and Ladyman cite, saying that their “discussions of
constitution appear to be wholly based on naive objectification of everyday
containment metaphors” (p. 161). Adams and Aizawa (2008) say,
Consider the expansion of a bimetallic strip in a thermostat. This
process is causally linked to the motion of atoms of the air in the
room the thermostat is in. The expansion of the strip does not,
thereby, become a process that extends into the atoms of the air
in the room. It is still restricted to the bimetallic strip in the
thermostat. (p. 91)
Ross and Ladyman respond that such claims do not admit of “any possible
translation into the terms of a physical theory; the claims are irreducibly
metaphorical” (p. 161), whereas I don’t see Adams and Aizawa’s claim as
requiring translation: they are already speaking in the same terms as much
of our physical theorizing. Now, if Adams and Aizawa would deny Ross and
Ladyman’s claim that, “even a fully general theory of cognition—as information
processing by relatively autonomous goal-driven systems—need incorporate
no single overarching account of limits on the boundaries of cognitive systems”
(p. 156), then it would appear that they take themselves to be asking the
(naïve) question of “where cognition takes place against a fixed background
arrangement of objects” (p. 155). Ross and Ladyman “don’t think there is any
such matter of fact, as a special case of there being no fact about where minds
are located at all. To talk about the location of the mind is simply to resort to
metaphor” (p. 156). Adams and Aizawa, however, don’t take themselves to be
answering any such question about “fixed background arrangements of objects”
when they talk about the location of cognitive processes, as a generalization
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about the locations of cognitive processes, simply because whatever it is that
is not “fixed,” if it is physical, needn’t be unlocated. To make claims about
the (singular) location of the (singular) mind may be to make a certain kind of
factual mistake, but it has nothing to do with metaphor.
But suppose someone thinks that water is constituted by the existence
of H2O at an instant, rather than by the causal powers of hydrogen and
oxygen. Or suppose someone thinks that particle collisions generally explain
macro-level phenomena. Even so, a few bad explanations aren’t enough to
motivate the general discontinuity Ross and Ladyman see between what they
variously call common sense, folk wisdom (p. 157), natural language, everyday
objects, containment metaphors, and metaphysics on the one hand, and mature
science on the other. Moreover, the uselessness of the notion of constitution,
making-up, and containment does not straightforwardly follow from misuses of
those notions. But that seems to be what Ross and Ladyman think follows
from the fact of the bad explanations they have in mind. After dismissing
microbangings, they claim,
Indeed, it is no longer helpful to conceive of either the world, or
particular systems of the world that we study in partial isolation,
as “made of” anything at all. The basic structure of reality as
described by fundamental physics can only be accurately rendered
in mathematics; to attempt to translate it into the terms of natural
language is at once to resort to metaphor, which no amount of
elaboration in a metaphysical tone of voice can render plausible as
a literal account.
The causal–constitutive distinction is part of the metaphysics of
domestication. (p. 160)
It simply doesn’t follow from the failed explanatory power of “microbang-
ings” that the world is not made of anything at all, or that particles have no
spatiotemporal boundaries. Even the mathematics which, in Ross and Lady-
man’s view, literally describes fundamental physical processes (p. 163), employs
variables for time and spatial dimensions in terms of which spin, trajectory,
velocity, acceleration can be rendered.
At another point, Ross and Ladyman seem to take the uncontainedness of
phenomena and the dissolution of the causal–constitutive distinction to follow
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from the very same point we saw Bennett make above, that, in my words,
causal interactions can be constitutive of entities. Ross and Ladyman say,
water is composed by oxygen and hydrogen in various polymeric
forms, such as (H2O)2, (H2O)3, and so on, that are constantly
forming, dissipating, and reforming over short time periods in such
a way as to give rise to the familiar properties of the macroscopic
kind water. . . . The causal–constitutive distinction dissolves because
the kind water is an emergent feature of a complex dynamical
system. It makes no sense to imagine it having its familiar properties
synchronically. Rather, the water’s wetness, conductivity, and so on
all arise because of equilibria in the dynamics of processes happening
over short but nonnegligible time scales at the atomic scale. (p. 160)
Indeed, except as an abstraction, it makes little sense to imagine water
having its familiar properties at an instant, or “synchronically” so defined. That
is not how I’ve been using the term, of course. That aside, the reasoning about
the causal–constitutive distinction doesn’t go through. I deny any premise to
the effect that if the properties of water arise from a complex dynamical system,
then the causal–constitutive distinction dissolves. I affirm something more like
the opposite, that if anything is a property of a complex dynamical system,
then those causal dynamics are constitutive of that property. Imagine Smithers,
the boss at a nuclear plant. Smithers instructs an operator, Homer, saying, “if
the temperature rises above this threshold indicated on the dial, then push
this red button to stop the meltdown.” Imagine that the temperature does
indeed rise, and Homer, thinking he has understood the instructions, pushes
the button, and the meltdown proceeds anyway. At the inquiry, Smithers
says something like the following. My instruction in the form of a conditional
statement expressed a dependence which is neither causal nor constitutive. As it
happens, the red button actually needed to be pushed prior to the temperature
rising above that threshold, but as a student of mature science, I’m unpracticed
at using the naïve containment metaphors enshrined in tensed speech about the
interdependence of phenomena. But that is as it should be. It’s up to everyone
else to figure out the temporal relation between the relata of dependence talk
or between the antecedent and consequent of the conditionals that express such
dependence.
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Of course, Smithers is a straw man. But the point of knocking him down is
to exemplify the way in which the causal–constitutive distinction tracks the
difference between the dependence I have on my parents’ having met, and
the dependence I have on my kidneys. Knowing how something came about
versus how something works is the difference between being poised to engineer
preventions as opposed to cures, and not because these are “folk” or otherwise
unscientific entities. In fact, Ross and Ladyman help themselves to alternative
but prototypically “vertical” or non-causal turns of phrase such as giving rise
to or arising from. And they do so when claiming that, “Chemistry explains
recurring properties of water samples by reference to underlying properties of
hydrogen and oxygen atoms and the way they combine to form molecules of
H2O” (p. 158, my emphases). It would be an obvious (in both the ordinary and
scientific sense) mistake to replace these synchronic dependence locutions with
talk of water being an effect of these dynamics as long as there’s a difference
between the way water “emerges” from—or just is—these dynamics, and the
way H2O results subsequently from hydrocarbons that have undergone oxidative
reactions. It is perhaps confusing, but unimportant, that the former sort of
emergence is sometimes referred to in terms of synchronic “effects.” That
is a terminological issue I set aside except to note that on the majority of
uses, causes precede effects. Either way, we need ways of referring to those
things which determine something future to them, and those which underlie
something contemporaneous with them. The reasoning is simple. I take it that
we in fact deal successfully with higher-level entities, properties, and kinds,
and that we need to refer to them to do so. We do so both scientifically and
“ordinarily.”3 I take it that these higher-level things, A, often come apart, and
can be explained in terms of lower-level states of affairs, B—entities, properties,
kinds, and interactions thereof. I take it that both A and B have also been
determined or otherwise brought about by past states of affairs, C. And I
3 I will not further defend herein what I see as the continuity between “folk” and “scientific”
knowledge. Suffice it to say that I think scientific vocabularies and mathematics extend
natural language and scientific practices codify otherwise ubiquitous cognitive processes
of hypothesis-making and belief falsification. I thus imagine the mostly-shared project of
growing human knowledge to be best served by inclusive dissemination of scientific history
and of contemporary research projects.
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take it that for any given A, the B states of affairs are distinct from the C
states of affairs. And if they are distinct, then it matters, in everyday and
scientific explanatory practice, whether the red button is among the C states
of affairs or the B states of affairs. And if so, then it can matter to employ
dependence terminology which does not obscure this difference, depending on
what one’s audience already knows. The most self-contained (pardon the pun),
explanations and hypotheses employ a clear distinction.
The lesson we should draw is that the difference between whether a given
property, phenomenon, event, object, process or state is a cause or a constituent
of some A depends on what A is. The question is thus relative to the explanatory
frame, but not insignificant. Moreover, the difference is not between what sorts
of relata can be determinative of other sorts of relata, but whether the relata
are contemporaneous. The question of whether they are contemporaneous,
of course, involves asking just what is sufficient to instantiate the property
to be explained, or the properties individuative of the entity to be explained.
And, as is by now well-rehearsed, whenever properties look non-categorical
to the entity to which they are being attributed, we should expect to suck
up more of the world in a complete explanation of those properties. Finally,
the fact that synchronic dependence relations are tainted by some degree of
causal involvement means that it won’t do for the internalist to simply point
out that the brain is in causal interaction with its surrounding in order to
show that externalists commit a coupling–constitution fallacy. The internalist
must either show that causal interactions never constitute anything, or show
that most externalist explananda occur after the putative constituent on
which they depend. Either that, or provide the yet-to-be specified criteria of
the constitutive over and above synchronic dependence, an issue to which I
shall return in Chapter 10. Of course, such a criterion, as I pointed out in
Chapter 2, would make the EM theorist guilty of something more like a fallacy
of composition than a coupling–constitution fallacy.
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8.3 Parsimony Versus Pluralism
Despite their similarities, causal and synchronic dependence relations are
distinct. But the question remains whether synchronic dependence relations
are distinct. Before turning to that question in the next chapter, first let me
say more about what it means to call synchronic dependence relations identical,
and why it matters. Recall from Section 3.2 that Bennett (2017) thinks a class
should answer to some ordinary concept and be theoretically useful. Aside from
whether or not I’m right to suggest that dependence alone captures the class
of building relations, let’s grant that building construed either way answers to
our ordinary concept of what it is for one thing to account for another, and is
theoretically useful in some way. Bennett argues that building can be leveraged
in a deflationary account of relative fundamentality (ch. 6), and that the shared
features of causation and synchronic forms of building make for instructive
analogies between the two (ch. 4). Still, a more detailed taxonomy could be
even more theoretically useful. For example, suppose building relations can be
further classified as causal and synchronic relations. Then it would be open
to us to ask how many members there are in each of those classes. I will
defend a restricted version of the view that synchronic dependence relations
are identical. I claim that at least composition, constitution, and realization
have the same features and obtain between the same relata. The view, as a
result, is deflationary about the differences between these relations insofar as
it does not take them to be differently ontologically committed in contrast to
one another. Discovering that synchronic relations are identical would make
for further theoretic utility. It would cut short the sort of dispute we saw in
Section 5.2 about the prevalence of multiple realizability, unite philosophical
discussions as they have fractured into their preferred terminologies and versions
of all-too-similar puzzles, and preempt the possibility of fracturing the EM
debate in a similar way.
By contrast, the view I reject is that composition, constitution, and re-
alization essentially describe different states of affairs, or that when used to
express a dependence between the same relata, these differing dependence
locutions would describe different worlds. This view is one according to which
it is mistaken to say that some wood realizes a table; mistaken to say that a
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brain constitutes a mind; mistaken to say that a piece of marble composes a
statue. Or if an entity, M (a mental state), is both composed by some things
and realized by something, M will not stand in these relations to the same
entities; M may be composed of a (neurons, perhaps) and realized by P (the
property of being such that it stands in certain input–output relations with
other states), and a and P are distinct ontological commitments. Synchronic
Dependence Relation Pluralism can thus be characterized as the conjunction of
distinctness theses about as many relations as there are that are in fact distinct
from one another:
[Synchronic Dependence Relation Pluralism] If y is composed of xxs, y is
neither realized nor constituted by anything identical with the xxs, and
the xxs, if they constitute or realize anything, do not realize or constitute
anything identical with y. Likewise, if M is realized by P , M is neither
composed of nor constituted by anything identical with P , and P , if
it composes or constitutes anything, does not compose or constitute
anything identical with M . Likewise, if A is constituted by B, A is
neither composed of nor realized by anything identical with B, and B,
if it composes or realizes anything at all, does not compose or realize
anything identical with A.4
While I don’t know of any rigorous defense of Synchronic Dependence
Relation Pluralism about composition, constitution, and realization, I know
of no defense of the thesis that they are identical, and almost certainly not
so detailed as this undertaking. Moreover, Synchronic Dependence Relation
Pluralism about those relations is a rather natural position—almost, I suspect,
the de facto one. I suspect many would be inclined on intuitive grounds to
think I’m mistaken to lump together those relations I do. One interlocutor’s
reaction was to say that it sounds “messed up” to say that some table is realized
by some wood. Now, one can run afoul of best practice for separate normative
or epistemic reasons—as Bennett (p. 61) points out, explanations can be better
or worse on the basis of “Gricean” considerations such as what the audience of
4 Like others working in this area, I can be understood as using singular terms for
convenience, but P and B could stand for a plurality of realizers and constituents respectively.
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an explanation already knows. One can also be wrong for purely grammatical
reasons, the way it is mistaken to say, “ya done good,” in English, or “le chaise,”
in French. Indeed, I do think synchronic dependence locutions have tended
to vary somewhat in their uses. But these practices have not settled into
even a rough convention such that they can be trusted to do any explanatory
work in the epistemic sense noted above, and I don’t take myself to be in the
business of stipulating how these terms might be used more precisely. On
the other hand, more importantly, the general picture of parsimony I have in
mind may be permissive about terminology while being deflationary about the
ontological commitments of dependence claims made with different synchronic
dependence locutions. Note, then, that as I refer to Synchronic Dependence
Relation Pluralism, I will assume, but omit, the “ontological” qualification. It
is nevertheless important to keep in mind, because the denial of a plurality
of ontological commitments made in various synchronic dependence terms is
compatible with a permissive stance toward the differing roles the terminology
might play in certain yet-to-be-settled epistemic dimensions.
Despite a dearth of explicit adherents, Synchronic Dependence Relation
Pluralism is a possible position in the logical space. For one, Bennett does not
endorse monism about her class of building relations. Now, Bennett’s pluralist
view about building, plausible as it is given the inclusion of causation, is not
explicitly pluralistic about composition, constitution, and realization. On the
other hand, her reasons to reject the identity of building relations are generated
by issues about synchronic dependence relations, specifically, set formation,
composition, and grounding. So she is certainly a pluralist about any class
of relations that includes those relations, even if there was such a class that
did not include causation. But I do not quite attribute to her the view that I
reject, since she says nothing explicitly for or against the identity of the three
relations my positive claim is about.
That Synchronic Dependence Relation Pluralism is a possible position in
the logical space is further illustrated by Jessica Wilson’s (2014) and Koslicki’s
(2015) rejections of the view that instances of grounding are identical. Of course,
although these latter positions are explicitly pluralistic about grounding, it
is not clear as to whether they are the target view. Insofar as Wilson (2014)
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and Koslicki (2015) each reject the view that there is a single grounding
relation encompassing composition, constitution, realization, set formation,
the determinate–determinable relation and the species–genus relation, it is
unclear whether either philosopher rejects the view that there could be a single
synchronic dependence relation encompassing some subset of those relations.
Similarly, van Inwagen (1995) has rejected, if somewhat passingly, the view
that instances of the parthood relation are identical. But I draw the opposite
lesson from the same example. The deflationary move I want to make with
synchronic dependence relations generally is even more obviously plausible
among parthood relations insofar as we certainly needn’t multiply the terms
for “part.” Since one can apparently say true things about all sorts of relata
using part–whole terminology, it is not clear that the differences in the relation
borne between all sorts of wholes and their parts is in every case something
other than the differences in the parts.
Finally, Polger and Shapiro (2016) can be understood as holding the view I
reject. We saw their view of realization in Section 5.2. Their way of denying
that realization obtains as often as we might think suggests that they are at
least implicitly committed to Synchronic Dependence Relation Pluralism. They
say,
Gillett’s (2002, 2003) account [of realization] lumps together several
distinct dependence relations. If an account of realization is not
discriminate, then learning that x is realized by y would be unin-
formative. It would just tell us what we already knew—viz., that x
depends on something else. (ch. 2, n. 14)
The distinct dependence relations Polger and Shapiro (2016) have in mind
are composition and constitution. The idea seems to be that if the composition
relation holds between two relata, the realization relation does not, and vice
versa. On their account, this is not because of some linguistic rules governing
which relata can enter into each relation, and probably not even because of
considerations as to what would or would not be informative in one epis-
temic context or another. Rather, on their view, it’s mistaken to say that
aluminum, for example, realizes a corkscrew when in fact it composes the
realizing mechanisms of that corkscrew, because of the way the world is, or
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perhaps because of the way nature is jointed or the way kinds are related, such
that each dependence locution serves aptly and exclusively to describe differing
states of affairs. The differences are metaphysically deep. For example, the
realizing mechanisms of the corkscrew may be reducible to the materials that
compose them, while the corkscrew is not reducible to the particular realizing
mechanisms, or so it seems, when the realization base is narrowly construed
according to our circumstantialist intuitions.
Again, the point here is that Synchronic Dependence Relation Pluralism
is a possible position in the logical space. The position may indeed be the
default view; it is prima facie plausible, and likely defensible. So if I’m right
that it’s mistaken, it is a worthy target. The monism I recommend would
also unite philosophical discussions as they have fractured into their preferred
terminologies, while pre-empting the possibility of fracturing the EM debate in
a similar way.
Wrapping Up
I’m in the midst of arguing that it doesn’t matter whether claims about
externalism are made in terms of constitution, composition, realization, or
identity. In this chapter I have begun to explain that view. In Section 8.1, I
began by discussing the way in which building relations are causally tainted.
But in Section 8.2, I argued that causal taint does not render causation and
synchronic dependence inseparable as subclasses of building or dependence.
The question of whether something is a cause or constituent of another thing is
indeed quite sensible. In Section 8.3, I discussed what it means for relations to
be identical, and provide a general defense of pursuing the question of whether
synchronic dependence relations are identical. In the next chapter, I discuss
Bennett’s main reasons for not embracing monism about building relations.
I argue that those reasons do not count against the identity of specifically
synchronic dependence relations; in fact, some of the same considerations can
be turned into an argument for the identity of synchronic building relations.
Chapter 9
The Identity of Synchronic
Dependence Relations
There are quite obvious similarities among the synchronic dependence relations
set out in Section 3.1. I’ve argued further in Chapter 4 that very similar puzzles
arise when one takes higher-level things to be distinct from their lower-level
physical bases, no matter whether these are thought to be realizers, constituents,
or parts. But as I argued in Chapter 6, the irreducibility of higher-level kinds
to physics is premised on the Unity Condition on Kind Identity, which is a
mistaken requirement that each higher-level kind be identical to a lower-level
one. As I argued in Chapter 6, multiple realizability is no more a problem
for a kind’s being physical than variation. As I argued in Chapter 7, the
distinctness of higher-level individuals from their lower-level constituents is
otherwise premised on an equivocation between strict and sloppy notions
of sufficiency. The failure of arguments for antireductionism suggest that
complete synchronic dependence is identity. Further, I’ve argued in Chapter 8
that synchronic dependence relations, though causally “tainted,” are tainted
in the same way, and that the distinction between causal and synchronic
dependence is nonetheless intelligible and explanatorily ineliminable. In this
chapter, I argue that the synchronic dependence relations most encountered
in the philosophy of mind and the EM debate (constitution, composition, and
realization) are identical with one another.
Interestingly, the opposite thesis seems to be commonly assumed but not
explicitly or rigorously defended. The flip side of the same situation is that
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whether or not my view is entirely unique, my argument for it is. So there
is a significant unexplored feature of the philosophical landscape—a sort of
unclimbed peak. The reason to explore these issues is that, if I’m right, then the
literature on synchronic dependence relations is needlessly and detrimentally
fractured and extensive, and, in contrast, the EM debate can remain unified
in an important way. As much as it would be clearer if EM theorists stuck
to just one way of referring to the synchronic dependence they claim often
holds between cognitive processes or mental states and extraneural entities
normally considered to be part of the environment, this apparent waffling is
merely apparent. It is not a deep problem in the sense that whether cognition
is constituted by extraneural entities or whether it is realized by them are
not different questions. They are one and the same question. While I think
Clark and others are actually safe not to worry much about their chosen
dependence locutions, I will explicitly argue for the identity of these relations.
That enables inferences from premises stated in one synchronic dependence
locution to conclusions stated in another. Indeed, the corollary view that
partial constitution is partial identity is crucial in my inference from our partial
constitution by technology to our partial identity with technology.
First, in Section 9.1, I’ll describe two theses Bennett (2017) rejects about
building, and contrast these with the thesis I endorse about synchronic depen-
dence relations. Then, in Sections 9.2 and 9.3, I’m going to explore the two
reasons Bennett thinks that although building relations, including causation,
are unified, they are not versions of a single relation that is in some sense
more natural or fundamental than the rest. I argue that these considerations
don’t count against the possibility that synchronic dependence relations are
identical. In Section 9.4, I consider two other possible ways in which synchronic
dependence relations might differ. Although Bennett (2017) seems not to make
much of these differences, and Bennett (2011) rejected their significance, I take
one of them seriously: the idea that synchronic dependence relations differ in
virtue of the relata they take. Indeed, it is surprising to claim that composition,
constitution and realization have the same features and are co-extensive insofar
as realization is prototypically a one–one relation between properties, consti-
tution is a one–one relation between entities, and composition is a many–one
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relation between parts and wholes. Actually, none of these terms are restricted
to those uses. But even so, I argue that these differences among relata are
superficial and fail to underwrite any deep difference between the sorts of
synchronic dependence that obtain between them.
9.1 Characterizing Dependence Relation
Monism
Bennett (2017) cashes out the thought that “there is a most general building
relation of which the others are versions” (p. 22) in two ways. First Bennett
characterizes what she calls “generalist existence monism” (p. 23)—which I
have been and will continue to simply call “monism”—about a class of relations.
Since I advocate monism about a different class, I’ll paraphrase Bennett’s
(p. 23) formulation in order to abstract away from the case of building:
[Monism] Some single relation is really the only relation there is.
The second way to think “there is a most general building relation of which
the others are versions” (p. 22), is a view about the class which Bennett calls
“generalist priority monism”—but which I’ll just call “generalism.” Paraphrasing
Bennett’s (p. 23) formulation again, generalism about a class of relations is the
view that:
[Generalism] There is a most general relation that is more natural or fundamental
than the specific class members.
For example, think of age-relatedness, and the more specific relations, “a
minute older than” and “a century older than.” These two relations cannot hold
between the same specific relata, or, again, these two expressions cannot be
true of the same individuals (at least, not within the same frame of reference).
But if individual a is a minute older than individual b, it is also true that
a is older than b, and if individual c is a century older than individual d,
it is also true that c is older than d. The truth of the same more general
expression is ontologically innocent in respect of any of its species; we get
that truth “for free” from either state of affairs. So, for example, we might
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think that causation and composition are species of a more general relation,
dependence, such that whenever a either composes or causes b (but not both),
b depends on a. Again, if composition is a species of dependence, it would
be a setback to theoretical utility if we thought we were disagreeing were one
of us to say that a certain table partly depends on its legs and another were
to say that it is partly composed of legs. Obviously, we’ll accept some form
of generalism about age-relatedness; the point of using the clear examples
just given is to demonstrate what is at issue, even while the relation among
synchronic dependence relations is not so clear.
Bennett (2011) defended the possibility that Generalism might be true
of building relations. She provided only a hint of how one might defend
Monism about building, which we’ll see in Section 9.4. However, Bennett
(2017) thinks Monism, and even the weaker Generalism, are likely false of
building relations. Again, of course, the conclusion I endorse—that synchronic
dependence relations are identical—is not the one Bennett rejects. Bennett
rejects Monism and Generalism about building, including causation. I reject
those theses about building for some of the same reasons as Bennett does,
but neither mine nor Bennett’s reasons are reasons to reject Monism about
synchronic dependence. I will nonetheless discuss Bennett’s reasons to reject
Monism and Generalism about building, since the same reasons might be
turned into an argument against the view I do endorse. That is, if one rejects
Monism and Generalism about a class of things on the basis of deep differences
between the members, one would reject their identity with one another for the
same reasons. My main purpose in what follows, then, is to argue that there
are no deep differences between synchronic dependence relations.
I should also note at this point that neither Bennett’s characterization of
Monism nor of Generalism is quite the claim I defend about synchronic depen-
dence. Her official formulation of building relation monism says that, “There
is really only one highly general building relation that somehow underwrites
all the more specific talk” (p. 23, my emphases). I don’t feel the need to posit
anything further or more real than, for example, constituents or parts to do this
underwriting. Neither would Bennett, presumably; she argues (2017, ch. 7) that
building relations are themselves built by the relatum in the first place of the
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relation. But that’s precisely why I’m unwilling to say some general dependence
relation is more natural or fundamental than the specific. And I’m ambivalent
in such contexts about what there “really is” (2017, pp. 13, 23, 25), as a
consequence of the permissive form of physicalism I endorse. That physicalism
is at once “reductive” in the sense that it takes higher-level things to be nothing
over and above their parts, constituents, or realizers. But because they are
nothing over and above finer-grained descriptions of the same states of affairs,
coarse-grained things are welcome for pragmatic reasons in a perfectly scientific
ontology, without any necessary sacrifice to explanatory or predictive accuracy.
Again, we needn’t be eliminativists about higher-level things. Likewise for
sets, classes, kinds, properties, and relations. So the claim that synchronic
dependence relations are identical is somewhat different than Bennett’s official
formulation of building relation monism. There really is composition and there
really is constitution and there really is realization—indeed they’re the same
and these terms are co-extensive.
9.2 An Objection from Failed Asymmetry
In this section and Section 9.3, I will resist the two objections to Monism
and Generalism about building that Bennett canvases. Despite the differences
between Monism about building relations and the thesis that synchronic de-
pendence relations are identical, the arguments we’ll see against the former are
relevant to the latter because those arguments are made in terms of synchronic
dependence relations. Specifically, these objections involve composition, set
formation, and grounding. As in Section 3.3.2, I feel compelled to face the
objections in the terms in which they have been made, even though I have
restricted myself to discussing those dependence relations most invoked in the
EM literature. I am compelled for two related reasons. The first is that I take
it to be an open question whether my arguments have any bearing on set forma-
tion and grounding, and I suspect they do. Secondly, if they do, considerations
in those areas would have analogues with respect to composition, constitution
and realization. Of course, it’s also possible that this is precisely where the
analogy might break down. For example, even if set formation and composition
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aren’t versions of one relation, that wouldn’t tell against the identity of the
three relations my positive claim is about. One might just dismiss the examples
to follow as irrelevant to my conclusion, given the tentatively more limited
scope of my claims. On the other hand, I’m not convinced the examples work
in their own right, and if they don’t, I don’t need to retreat to the disanalogy
of set formation or grounding with the relations I have focused on, and I can
continue to think that my positive claims might extend to further relations. So
let’s hear the arguments.
One objection to Monism and Generalism Bennett offers is motivated by the
worry that two building relations might hold in opposite directions between the
same two distinct relata. The example Bennett is concerned with is Schaffer’s
(2010) “priority monism”:
[Schaffer] thinks that the entirety of the universe grounds the ex-
istence and properties of, say, this cup. The cup is built out of
the One, rather than the other way around. Yet it is also the case
that the cup is part of the entirety of the universe—that the One
is composed of the cup, the desk on which it sits, my car, and
everything else in the universe. So the cup (along with a lot of other
things) bears the composition relation to the One, but the One
bears the grounding relation to the cup and its properties. (2017,
p. 27)
Then, the concern is that, “any highly abstract, very general relation
that holds whenever a more specific building relation [holds] will fail to be
asymmetric. . . if it is possible for two different specific building relations to
hold in opposite directions between the same entities” (2017, p. 26). She
illustrates this with respect to disjunctions:
every disjunction of any asymmetric relation and its (asymmetric)
converse fails to be asymmetric. If a is older-or-younger than b, b
is unsurprisingly also older-or-younger than a. In short: because
disjunctions of asymmetric relations can fail to be asymmetric,
and all building relations are asymmetric, disjunctions of building
relations can fail to be building relations. (2017, p. 27)
Indeed, suppose that older than and younger than are versions of a common
relation “different in age to.” If a is older than b (and not vice versa), then b is
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younger than a, (and not vice versa), and a is different in age to b, and, crucially,
vice versa. So the relation of which the asymmetric relations are versions is
itself symmetric. Note that even being asymmetrically related to fails to be
asymmetric: if a is asymmetrically related to b, then b is asymmetrically related
to a. Now, supposing that Generalism about building is to be understood as
committed to the general’s sharing all of the features of the specific, then such
a special (as I’ll call it) generalism is false in these cases. So be it. However,
notice that the same line of reasoning above should be taken to show that such
a special generalism is false of the relations “older than” and “younger than.”
That’s an odd result which is not entirely consistent with the broader idea of
things’ being varieties of some general thing.1
Now, the examples of building relations holding in opposite directions
between the same two distinct relata could be resisted just because they “involve
substantive and controversial claims that are endorsed by only a handful of
people” (2017, p. 28). But Bennett does not dismiss the examples in this way,
1 I leave this point aside, except to note the following. Bennett thinks that Generalism is
plausible of the unity of species of a common genus, whereby some features are fundamental
to all the species of the genus (2017, p. 24). So it’s inconsistent to hold that Generalism is
true in those cases, but that the reasoning to failed Generalism on the basis of the symmetry
of the general relation, “goes through regardless of whether the general relation is taken to
be a determinable, a genus, or even a mere disjunction” (2017, p. 26). After all,
Determinables need not share the formal properties of their determinates;
genuses need not share the formal properties of their species; disjunctions need
not share the formal properties of their disjuncts. (2017, p. 26)
The idea that Generalism is plausible of genera must rest on a somewhat different gloss
on “generalism” than the idea that generalism is false of building. I’ve marked one of these
generalisms “special generalism.” The very example of asymmetric relations is supposed to
show both that the disjuncts or species cannot be “versions of a more general relation,” in
the special sense, while presupposing that they are versions of a relation, in some other sense.
So the point can only be that whatever Generalism is plausible in cases of species–genus
unity ought not involve the claim that a genus has all the features of its species. So when
Bennett says, “if all building relations are asymmetric, and the general relation that holds
whenever a more specific one does is not asymmetric, then it is not a building relation,” on
her definition of building, I can agree, but deny that this is a problem. Again, that special
sort of generalism is also false of younger-than and older-than, which are quite obviously
“species” or “varieties,” in some sense, of a common relation, if they are not the same relation.
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and nor do I. Bennett also admits that,
in order for these examples to tell against generalism [and Monism]
about building, it has to not only be claimed that the relevant
relations hold in the relevant directions, but also that they are both
building relations. So it may be possible to avoid the cases by
denying that one of the relevant relations really counts as a version
of building. (2017, p. 28)
For the sake of argument, I have been supposing that Schaffer’s grounding
and composition do share formal features. I think they are both synchronic
dependence relations expressible in true counterfactuals. However, the asym-
metric relation in the cup’s partly composing the One is not necessitating (only
full builders necessitate what they build). As I pointed out in Section 3.3, when
building is partial, it is obviously asymmetric, but not necessitating. But when
building is complete, it is necessitating, but not obviously asymmetric. For
instance, if x fully composes y, then if not x, then not y, is true. But it is
also true that if not y, then not x. By contrast, consider partial dependence.
Take the brain without which I would not exist. It is not necessary that if
I do not exist, that brain does not. It might be pickled. But take all those
conditions without which I would not exist. Now it is true that if I did not
exist, necessarily, not all those conditions would exist. This highlights the real
reason to resist the example. As Bennett says,
in neither case is it quite true that y is B1-built from x and x is
B2-built from y. Rather, it is only true that y is B1-built from x
and x is partially B2-built from y. In the Schaffer case, for example,
the One grounds the existence and nature of the cup, while the cup
plus everything else in the universe composes the One. The One is
only partially composed of the cup. (2017, p. 28)
On the other hand, since everything fully composes the One, and the One
fully grounds everything, we still have apparently asymmetric, and necessitating
relations that would be versions of a single or general relation which is symmetric.
But—and this is the crux of the matter—the symmetry of that general relation is
the right result. If we want to say two things mutually fully build each other, we
should say that any general relation of which both building relations are species
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is symmetric. That’s the right thing to say because if everything composes the
One, and the One grounds everything, we should also say that everything is
the One, and the One is everything. Full synchronic building, as I argued in
Chapter 7, is identity. In Section 3.1.5, I pointed out that the identity relation
supports counterfactuals that make identity look like a sort of dependence:
if a bucket of water is a bucket of H2O, then delete that H2O and you will
have deleted that water, and vice versa. As for fundamentality, we should
say the water and the H2O are equifundamental. The equifundamentality just
follows from the indiscernibility of identicals, and the symmetric dependence
is just a trivial self-dependence. Whether to call it dependence is much like
the question of whether to call the general relation of which two asymmetric
building relations are species or versions, “Building”. I recommend that we
do, simply to highlight the feature shared by partial and complete dependence
relations—they make appropriately fragilized counterfactuals true. Further,
since nothing can be part of a whole that does not exist, wherever there is
partial dependence, there is complete dependence. Or, to put the same thing
another way, if something partly depends on another thing, then the former
also partly depends on more.
Still, Bennett doesn’t want to call such a relation “Building” because a
symmetric identical or general relation would lack the theoretical utility of
indicating relative fundamentality. Recall from Section 3.2.1 that Bennett
takes building to explain relative fundamentality; the “input” relatum of all
building relations is more fundamental than the “output” relatum, and that’s
all there is to fundamentality. However, notice that if it could both be true
that the cup is more fundamental than the One, and that the One is somehow
more fundamental than the cup, these claims cannot involve the same sort of
fundamentality. Bennett is aware of this, saying that—“relative fundamentality
claims are, in the first instance, indexed to particular building relations” (2017,
p. 163). Thus she says, “Strictly speaking, there is more than one kind of
relative fundamentality” (2017, p. 163). So the sense in which the One is
more fundamental than the cup is different than the sense in which the cup is
more fundamental than the One. But note, too, that special generalism about
relative fundamentality, as indexed to such a variety of building relations, is
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suspect just in case special generalism about her class of building relations
is suspect. That is, a general more fundamental than relation will fail to be
asymmetric if building relations can hold in two directions between the same
individuals. There can be no general relation of fundamentality that a bears
to b by building b, if b ever builds a. On the other hand, the very relativity,
we might say, is at odds with the notion of fundamentality. Or, it is a very
deflationary notion of fundamentality if all there is to some a’s being more
fundamental than b is its building1 b, and yet b can build2 a. If building
relations can hold in opposite directions between the same two distinct relata,
the result that the general relation of which they are versions would not share
the formal features of its species means that building relations are unable to
index any notion of fundamentality that possesses any more unity or theoretical
utility than the genus of building relations itself. After all, notice that relative
fundamentality is to be understood in terms of building, and building is always
asymmetric because relative fundamentality is asymmetric.
So the possibility of distinct building relations holding in opposite directions
between two relata does not tell against their being species of a general relation.
But would it preclude their being the same relation? That is, if grounding and
composition are both species of synchronic dependence, and hold in opposite
directions between the same two distinct relata, then it looks, at first blush,
that there is more than one relation here. However, the problem for being
a pluralist about the relations between the cup-and-everything-else (that is,
everything) and the One is that they always go together, they are sufficient
for and necessitate one another, and that makes them very hard to tell apart.
And if they are identical, then everything and the One do all the same building
as well as stand in all the same relations. On the other hand, if we are to
insist on the distinction between the One’s grounding everything and the cup’s
composing the One, then we must insist on the distinction between everything
and the One. But if we do, we have a grounding problem. What makes
the difference between everything and the One? Surely everything withholds
nothing from the One, and there’s nothing more to the One than everything.
Moreover, we now have an unavoidable choice that looks difficult to motivate
either way.
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To see this, suppose the cup depends on the One, by being grounded in
it. The cup also depends on what we usually think of as the cup’s parts and
interrelations thereof—a hunk of material impermeable to water and shaped
roughly in a hollow cylinder enclosed but on one end. Now, because the cup is
part of the One, the One seems to help compose itself by grounding its own
parts, and everything seems to help ground itself by composing its own grounds.
Now, Bennett argues (ch. 7), successfully in my view, that building relations
are themselves built by the builders. Bennett’s first defends “anti-primitivism”
about building—the view that building relations are themselves built. She
then defends “upwards” anti-primitivism, which is a view about what builds
building relations. She thinks that if a builds b, then a also builds the fact
that a builds b. So, what builds the fact that the hunk and the rest compose
the One? Bennett wants to say, the hunk and the rest. What builds the fact
that the hunk composes the cup? Upwards anti-primitivism says, the hunk
alone. But what builds the fact that the One grounds the cup? I suppose that
if building obtains here, which it does ex hypothesi to launch the objection in
the first place, the One is relatively more fundamental than what it grounds
and thus it alone builds that grounding relation. At a first pass, then, it looks
like we need the hunk and the rest, as well as the One, to build the relevant
building facts. But that seems to multiply conditions unparsimoniously, since
the hunk and the rest fully compose the One and thus necessitate it, and the
One fully grounds the hunk and the rest, thus necessitating them. Suppose,
then, that we prefer to say that the hunk and the rest do all the building work:
they compose the One, they build the fact that they compose the One, and
in building all that, they build the fact that the One grounds the cup, and
the fact that the hunk composes the cup. But the choice of basic building
blocks is actually not so clear. That’s because the claim that a builds the fact
that a builds b is clearly a claim about full building. What then, builds the
asymmetric but non-necessitating relation that obtains between mere partial
builders and what they help build? For example, suppose some xxs compose
y. What builds the fact that one of the xs partly builds y? Obviously, x
partly builds that fact, but not fully. The full builders of that fact are actually
the full builders of y. In other words, the fact that x builds y is not fully
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built—does not obtain—until y is fully built. So there’s a clear sense in which
the partial building relation is only fully built by the full builders. But that
arguably undermines the “upwardness” of building building relations; it runs
up and back down again. So it looks like we could equally say the One does all
the work, and makes all the building facts, including the partial ones, obtain.
The difficulty of deciding the priority is a prima facie reason to think we’ve
taken a wrong turn somewhere. But even leaving that aside, the point is
that the need to give priority to one of the putatively distinct relata as far as
building the building relations that hold in opposite directions between them
tells against the very worry that building relations might hold between the
same two distinct relata. And if the One and everything that composes it are
distinct, we must give priority to one or the other as far as building the building
relations between them, on pain of double-building all the building relations
(an overdetermination problem). Either way, to give priority suggests one or
the other of the relata, but not both, does all the building. In other words, anti-
primitivism (upwards or downwards) about building is incompatible with the
possibility of two asymmetric, necessitating, and generative relations holding
in opposite directions between the same two distinct relata. This harkens back
to the point about relative fundamentality being no notion of fundamentality
at all. Any case in which these building relations appear to obtain will be
one in which, facing the aforementioned grounding problem head on, and in
the absence of anything to ground a distinction between parts and the whole
they are strictly sufficient to compose, we should deny the distinctness between
them.
All this time we’ve been talking about all of the One grounding the cup (and
the rest). On the other hand, suppose that we could stipulate mutually exclusive
criteria for parts and grounds that would exhaustively and non-redundantly
divide the aforementioned hunk of material from the rest of the One, and have
the hunk composing the cup, but make a different grounding claim, namely
that the rest grounds the cup. But now we no longer have the same worry
about a general relation that holds between the same two distinct relata. The
rest grounds the cup while the hunk composes it, while both compose the One.
Now the cup’s “inner” composition and “outer” grounding look much like the
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constitution of an entity according to restricted constitutionalism as a form of
Circumstantialism. The question then becomes something else entirely. Recall
from Section 4.3 that the special composition question can also be phrased
as a grounding problem: in virtue of what do some x’s compose a y? In the
context of the present considerations, it takes certain background conditions
for some things to compose a cup. After all, if a cup’s disposition to hold water
depends on the nature of water, it’s not as if a world devoid of all but the
aforementioned hunk of material to which that disposition-in-the-circumstances
is attributed instantiates the relevant disposition. Dependence alone does
not mark the boundary between the hunk and the rest, since the cup’s being
what it is depends counterfactually on both. As I will argue in more detail in
Chapter 10 in the case of constitution, it’s not clear what else could be added.
The upshot so far is that if grounding and composition hold in opposite
directions between two relata, and if such complete composition and com-
plete grounding are versions of a general relation, that general relation isn’t
always asymmetric. But this isn’t a problem. Counterfactual dependence is
antisymmetric and reflexive, that is, symmetric in the case of identity. And
the possibility of apparent mutual synchronic dependence doesn’t tell against
the identity of the dependence relations in question, since it is implausible to
simultaneously hold the relata as distinct (such that the relations could be),
hold that building relations are built by one relatum (such that the whole lot
isn’t infinitely overbuilt), and hold that both relations are building relations. In
other words, one finds an asymmetry of the dependence between distinct relata,
or a symmetrical dependence between mutually necessitating relata which are
not distinct, but no evidence of any deep distinction between composition and
grounding.
9.3 An Objection from Failed Extensionality
Another objection to Monism and Generalism about building relies on a pair
of examples.
a and b together compose the fusion a + b and set-form the set
{a, b}. (Bennett, 2017, p. 25)
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The fact that a figure f is equilateral and the fact that f is a
rectangle together set-form {the fact that f is equilateral, the fact
that f is a rectangle}. But the same two facts ground the fact
that f is square. In such cases, the same input builds two distinct
outputs. . . via a single building relation. (p. 25)
These examples are a problem for both Monism and Generalism, when com-
bined with a plausible principle of extensionality. In mereology, extensionality
is the principle that wholes with all the same parts are identical. An analogous
principle here would be that,
[Extensionality] “two distinct things cannot be built of the very same builders”
(p. 25).
In other words, given something like Extensionality, what we have is an
inconsistent set of claims:
(1) a and b build c (completely);
(2) a and b build d (completely);
(3) c and d are distinct.
Of course, in case one of the building relations above is causation, it is not
plausible to deny that c and d are distinct. So Monism and Generalism about
a general relation that includes both causation and synchronic species will not
obey Extensionality. Dependence, we can now see, doesn’t obey Extensionality.
That is certainly a reason to deny that causation and synchronic dependence
relations are identical, and that is plausibly why causal and synchronic species
of dependence are explanatorily ineliminable, as I argued in Section 8.2. But in
the case of synchronic dependence relations, c and d are co-located by definition,
since both are co-located with a-and-b. In such cases, we might plausibly deny
(3), and say that the set of two facts, {the fact that f is equilateral, the fact
that f is a rectangle} is the fact that f is square. Or consider a play that
has as its parts exactly two acts, and an audition that has as its constituents
exactly the same two acts. According to Extensionality, we must simply say
that the play is the audition and the audition is the play. Otherwise, we have
distinct but coincident entities whose differences are not accounted for by their
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parts. Alternatively, if the intuitive differences between facts and sets or plays
and auditions has any merit, by Extensionality, we should question whether
we are dealing with entities with all the same parts. Of course, the problem for
Monism and Generalism disappears if they have just some of the same parts.
And it isn’t obvious that the entities in the examples above do have all of the
same parts. For example, Bennett passingly cites Lewis (1991), who thinks that
the set {a, b}, has as its parts not a and b, but the singleton subsets {a} and
{b}. In that case, if the fusion a+ b is distinct from the set {a, b}, we can say
that is because they are built from different things, namely, mereological parts
on the one hand, and subsets on the other, not necessarily because mereological
parts stand to mereological sums in a different relation than subsets stand to
larger sets. Then the question becomes whether {a} and {b} have as parts
only a and b. My answer, as already indicated in Section 3.3.3, is that for any
notion of set formation that resembles building, a is not sufficient to set-form
{a}, unless the empty set itself is an ontological free lunch; one way or the
other, you need the empty set. If a is sufficient for {a} because the empty
set is free, then {a} is nothing over and above a. If {a} is something over
and above a, then a is not sufficient for {a}. Likewise, if there’s a difference
between the play and the audition, it will be because of differences in parts, for
example, because the audition includes the casting director, whereas the play
includes the whole audience (or none of it), or is only what it is due to some
circumstances which differ from those which make the audition what it is.
The upshot is that Monism about synchronic dependence relations is not off
the table for reasons of Extensionality if one is prepared to deny that completely
co-instantiated entities can ever be distinct, which I am, as I defended at length
in Chapters 4 to 7. But all this points to something stronger than a defense
against the objection. The same considerations can be turned into a positive
argument for Monism about synchronic dependence relations. The problem,
recall, is that
it is at least somewhat odd to think that the same input, plugged
into the same nondisjunctive relation, can generate two very dif-
ferent outputs. Oughtn’t there be something else that makes the
difference? (Bennett, 2017, pp. 25–26)
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Indeed, there ought to be, or there is no difference. But now the very
same question can be pressed to the pluralist, who insists on the difference.
The pluralist has a new grounding-like problem (see Sections 4.2 and 4.3).
Admitting the complete synchronic co-instantiation of nonetheless somehow
distinct entities, the question arises, in virtue of what are entities with all the
same parts (or building inputs) distinct? To accept Synchronic Dependence
Relation Pluralism and to think the same builders build more than one thing is to
think the relation itself makes the difference between the built things. Standing
in putatively different relations to their parts, such as composition in one case,
and set formation in another, must apparently make the difference between
distinct co-instantiated entities—one composed and the other set-formed from
all the same parts. The differences between these completely co-instantiated
entities must be grounded, not in their grounds, but in their groundings—in
their relations to their completely shared parts. A special grounding relation
must hold between an entity on the one hand, and its relation to its parts on
the other. Thus, in light of Extensionality, the burden falls to the pluralist to
make sense of the idea that differences between entities could depend on which
dependence relation they have to their parts, rather than on their parts alone.
But what do the realization, constitution, or composition (or grounding, or set
formation) relations themselves add to being that the realizers, constituents, or
parts (or grounds, or members) do not? Any positive answer would be at odds
with anti-primitivism about building relations. The best answer is nothing,
since, after all, full builders are supposed to necessitate what they build. The
positive argument for Monism about synchronic dependence relations, then,
is this. Since “no one thinks that mere partial builders necessitate what they
build” (p. 49), and since “two distinct [synchronic] things cannot be built of
the very same builders” (p. 25), then, if “a and b together [necessarily] compose
the fusion a + b and [necessarily] set-form the set {a, b}” (p. 25), then a + b
is not distinct from {a, b}. So a and b together putatively both compose and
set-form just one thing. Being identical, a+ b and {a, b} stand in all the same
relations to a and b. If they have the same features, which they do, and are
co-extensive, which they are, then composition and set formation are identical.
Now, if the pluralist precludes the above argument by retreating from the
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claim that a and b necessitate the fusion and necessitate the set—claiming that
they necessitate the fusion or the set, or neither, but not both—they get out
of this grounding-like problem by giving up the Extensionality-based line of
reasoning against Monism. As in the case of the play and the interview, the idea
that the latter are distinct involves appealing to different things making them
what they are—for example, an interviewer partly makes the interview what it
is, but not the play what it is. So although the objection from Extensionality
backfires, the pluralist might retreat to the claim that a set of builders which
fully compose, constitute or realize something, at most only partly compose,
constitute or realize something else. Or the pluralist might claim that certain
builders are only involved in one kind of building.
9.4 An Objection from Differing Relata
This brings us to the last putative differences between the synchronic depen-
dence relations most relevant to the externalism. Bennett (2011, 2017) explores
two putative axes of difference between building relations. One is what she
calls the relata axis. She explains,
as I have characterized them, the relations take different kinds
of relata. Composition and constitution operate on objects. But
realization and microbased determination operate on properties,
property instances, or states of affairs. Grounding perhaps operates
only upon facts. And set formation can operate on anything: there
are sets of sets, sets of events, and sets of spoons. (2017, p. 16)
This difference between the relata that various relations take strikes me
as the most deeply held intuitive difference between building relations. In
Section 8.3, I pointed out that it can sound “messed up” to speak of realization
as a relation among entities, for example, to say that some wooden legs (partly)
realize a table. In other contexts, on the other hand, philosophers seem to
do this all time. It is common to talk of physical states or events realizing
mental states or events, and it is common to talk of a plurality of realizers of a
single realized thing. For example, Shoemaker (2003) introduces the idea of
realization, saying,
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One way of characterizing physicalism is as the view that mental
states and events are “realized in” physical states and events. What
does “realized” mean here? One common view, often advanced
by functionalists, says that a mental property is a “higher-order
property,” the property of having one or another of the first-order
properties that satisfy a certain condition, and that realization is
the relation the first-order properties satisfying that condition stand
in to the higher-order property. (p. 1)
Robert Wilson (2001) also allows states to be realized (p. 5). To add further
permutations, Wilson speaks of “physical states constituting a total realization”
(p. 9), and of “properties usually taken to physically constitute an individual”
(p. 16). On my view, of course, none of these uses are inherently problematic.
The point is just that, as Bennett puts it,
It’s not so clear these relations take such different relata. Certainly,
it’s not so clear how to use the English words. I have already
mentioned that some people use “realization” in a quite general
way. . . . We—philosophers as well as ordinary people in ordinary
contexts—use verbs like “compose” and “part” and “constitute”
and “ground” in a lot of ways that permit a lot of relata. (2017, p.
17)
Additionally, what Bennett calls the unification axis of difference between
building relations is their logical form—whether or not they take a plurality
in the first position. Those that do, Bennett calls unifying in the sense that
they wrap many things up into one. Proper composition, for instance, is a
many–one relation, while constitution and realization are (often, though not
always) one–one relations. Again, it is common, perhaps even equally common,
to hear talk of constituents (see Section 3.1.2), and not unheard of to speak
of realizers, as we saw above. Again, for example, Gillett’s (2002a) account
is directly targeted against the “flat” view of the “standard account”, that
realization is a one–one relation between properties.
Now, Bennett (2017) is a pluralist about building for the separate reasons
we saw in Sections 9.2 and 9.3 to do with the asymmetry and extensionality of
building she thinks ought to be preserved. She is a pluralist about building,
but not because of the relata and unification axes. Bennett (2017) actually
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says, “I continue to think that the first few arguments I discussed [on the basis
of the two axes of difference] are not successful. . . ” (2017, p. 24). Still, the
idea is that,
it is surely necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, that identical
relations be extensionally equivalent and share all formal properties.
So, quite generally, there are two easy strategies for arguing that
two relations are distinct. First, we can look for ordered pairs in the
extension of one relation that are not in the extension of the other.
Second, we can launch what amount to Leibniz’s Law arguments
by pointing out that one relation is, say, transitive and the other is
not. (2011, p. 96)
Applied to the case of building relations, the reasoning is this:
The relations have different logical form, and take different kinds
of relata. For example, recall that composition is a many–one
relation on objects, and realization a one–one relation on properties
or property instances. So they are not extensionally equivalent, and
violate Leibniz’s Law in other ways as well. Presumably it follows
that they are distinct relations. (2011, p. 96)
Bennett (2011) is quick to point out that this does not entail that Generalism
is false. After all, the idea that building relations are species of a common genus
or determinates of a common determinable which is somehow more fundamental
or natural than its species or determinates is perfectly compatible with the
distinctness of its species or determinates. To reject Generalism, one would
have to additionally think that “the differences between the standard building
relations show that they cannot be determinates of a common determinable
that is more fundamental than they are” (2011, p. 96). But that is not plausible.
Other quite natural relations take relata from a variety of ontological categories,
and can be plural or singular. Bennett says,
consider the identity relation. Everyone thinks that the identity
relation holds between relata of all sorts of ontological categories.
This stapler is this stapler, the number four is the number four. . .
and so on and so forth for events, states of affairs, properties, tropes,
relations, and whatever else your ontology contains. It is not the
case that there is one identity relation on material objects, and a
distinct one on, say, states of affairs; it is the same relation. (2011,
p. 98)
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So Generalism about building isn’t refuted because of the axes of appar-
ent difference between building relations, and neither is Generalism about
synchronic dependence relations.
I don’t think Monism about synchronic dependence is refuted by the
apparent differences either. But because Bennett accepts different arguments
against Monism, she only hints at how the counterargument on the basis of
these differences might go. She says in passing that, “Matters are actually more
complicated than I am letting on, but let us grant for the sake of argument that
such reasoning successfully shows that the relations are distinct” (2011, p. 96).
She then adds in a note that, “It is actually left open that all of the different
relational predicates refer to the single fundamental determinable relation that
I explore. . . ” (2011, n. 35 on p. 96).
This is the view I advocate about differing synchronic dependence locutions.
I’ve done quite a bit of groundwork on this point in the last two sections. In
Section 9.2, I argued that when complete mutual dependence holds between
two relata, they are identical. In Section 9.3, I argued that the Extensionality
principle—that two distinct synchronic things cannot be built from the very
same builders—together with the thought that full builders necessitate what
they build, and the thought that building relations are themselves built by the
builders, entails that anything completely built by the same set of builders is
identical.
In both cases, the fact that nothing could make for distinctness between
the relata without adding to one of them makes them identical. Of course, if
we have mere partial builders, the story is different, but the objections do not
arise. The cup’s partly composing the One and part of the One grounding the
cup doesn’t show that composition and grounding are distinct. Likewise, a
and b fully composing a+ b and partly set-forming {{a, b}} doesn’t show that
composition and set formation are distinct.
So, synchronic necessitation doesn’t circle up and down between a distinct
input and output, and synchronic necessitation doesn’t fork upward into distinct
outputs. A similar strategy works for denying any deep difference between
building relations on the basis of having different logical forms and taking
different relata. I will argue that synchronic building doesn’t string up and
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up between distinct relata, and it doesn’t run up in parallel between distinct
relata. Let me explain.
The unification axis might be taken to show that chains of differing syn-
chronic dependencies “string up” in series. The idea that constitution is a
one–one relation between entities, while composition is unifying—a many–one
relation between entities—results in the idea that, for example, some atoms
compose a piece of marble which constitutes a statue. Hence the string: the
xx’s compose a y, and y constitutes a z. Even so, here’s an argument to the
effect that the xx ’s both compose and constitute z, and that composition and
constitution are identical as a result.
(1) a composes b.
(2) b constitutes c.
(3) If a composes b, and if b constitutes c, and if a = b, then a constitutes c.
(4) If a composes b, and if b constitutes c, and if b = c, then a composes c.
(5) a = b.
(6) b = c.
So,
(7) a = c, and a constitutes c, and a composes c.
(8) That is, composition and constitution obtain between the same relata.
(9) That is, composition and constitution do not differ in the relata they
take.
Further,
(10) Composition and constitution, as synchronic dependence relations, have
their other features in common.
(11) If relations obtain between the same relata and have the same features,
then they are identical.
So,
(12) Composition and constitution are identical.
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The first two premises belong to the pluralist, so I assume them for the sake
of argument. The third and fourth premises follow from the indiscernibility
of identicals. The argument for (5) and (7)—the identity of wholes with their
complete parts and the identity of constituted things with their complete
constituents—was the subject of Chapters 4 to 7. Recall from Chapter 4 that
distinctness results in grounding and overdetermination problems, and recall
from Chapter 7 that arguments for their distinctness trade on equivocations
between strict and sloppy notions of sufficiency for the properties that putatively
distinguish them. Premises (8) and (9) are restatements of the intermediate
conclusion (7), but I state them this way to make it obvious how they and
(10) jointly satisfy the conditions in (11). Premise (10) is a statement of my
view that synchronic dependence relations share features, and is similar to
Bennett’s own view that the class of building relations is unified. Premise (11)
is a version of Bennett’s claim that “it is surely necessary, though perhaps
not sufficient, that identical relations be extensionally equivalent and share all
formal properties” (2011, p. 96). I treat extensional equivalence and the sharing
of formal properties as sufficient for the identity of relations, simply because I
cannot imagine what else would differentiate relations, so I must leave it to
anyone that still wants to insist on Synchronic Dependence Relation Pluralism
to fill that in. By my lights, then, the argument is sound: constitution and
composition are identical.
In the case of realization, the idea is that realization is a relation among
properties, rather than entities. The first thing to note, of course, is that real-
izing and realized properties don’t float free of entities; they are instantiated
by entities and individuative of them. So it’s as if we have parallel synchronic
dependence relations. Realization runs alongside constitution (or composition)
insofar as properties of constituents (or parts) realize of those of the constituted
(or composed) entities. Again, however, pluralism here rests on the distinction
between properties and entities. Of course, a given entity may have many prop-
erties, and thus not be identical with just one of them, so denying distinctness
between entities and properties is not quite as straightforward as denying the
distinctness between a whole and its complete set of parts. And yet, unless
we want grounding and overdetermination problems (or the causal impotence
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of properties), physicalists should think that real properties are efficacious
and ontologically innocent with respect to their instantiations. Thus, if some
set of physical conditions is strictly sufficient for many properties, then the
instantiating entity should be identified with all of its properties, such that
partial identity obtains between the entity and each of its properties, just as
partial identity obtains between a part and the whole it composes. Again, there
is no reason to think the partial identity relation is distinct when it obtains
between a set of properties and a member of that set, as opposed to between
an entity and one of its properties, or as opposed to between a whole and one
of its parts.
Now, isn’t it a corollary of all this that complete and partial dependence
have different extensions and features? They do. And yet, given all the xx’s
that necessitate some y, that is, given y (xx’s = y), the fact that an x takes
part in composing y is no addition to being; that relation is an ontological free
lunch. And the relation does not obtain without the existence of the dependent
relatum. In short, without existing, no thing can depend on anything else. So
the part–whole relation itself depends on the whole, and there’s a sense in which
the particular features of partial necessitation, partial synchronic dependence,
or partial identity relation—features such as the asymmetry of the one-way
counterfactual conditional that express the relation—are made by the whole
set of parts. It is part of the identity of wholes which come apart that they
cannot exist without their parts. Still, a whole instantiates both the identity
relation between itself and its complete set of parts, as well as partial identity
with—or partial synchronic dependence on—each of its parts. The identity
relation is distinct from the partial identity relation, just as any proper part
is distinct from the whole. In that case, there are two qualitatively distinct
synchronic dependence relations, partial and complete. But notice that this
distinction cross-cuts realization, constitution, and composition. The relations
of complete realization, complete constitution, and complete composition are
the identity relation, and are thus identical. The relations of partial realization,
partial constitution, and partial composition are the partial identity relation,
and thus identical.
Finally, a quite general way to see the trouble with Synchronic Dependence
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Relation Pluralism is to note that in each case that was supposed to show the
difference between the relations, we find more than one putative synchronic
dependence relation necessitated by the same state of affairs. It’s not the case
that there’s some realization over here, constitution over there, and composition
over yonder. The relations are instead spatiotemporally coincident.
But let me spell that out just a little further. First, again, no one posits
realization as a relation between uninstantiated properties. Second, it would
not be sensible to think that an entity is either composed or constituted, but
not both, such that composition and constitution were never spatiotemporally
coincident. If a constituent was partless, it would be fundamental. The
constituted thing would be partless, and arguably fundamental as well (being
fully necessitated by the partless constituent). For example, a statue constituted
by some marble that was not itself composed of anything would make the statue
fundamental. Third, the non-coincidence of composition and constitution would
make composed things unconstituted, and thus arguably either non-existent (as
the compositional nihilist thinks), or, again, equifundamental with the parts.
If a fusion doesn’t constitute anything, it would just be the parts, which are
fundamental, and so would the fusion be.
Thus, attempting to separate the obtaining of realization, constitution
and composition in space and time would yield things without properties and
properties attached to nothing, the impossibility of building statues, and tables
about which we’d have difficulty saying whether they were non-existent or
fundamental.
At any rate, I won’t pursue this possible strand of pluralism further, because
no one actually appears to posit constitution as a relation between partless
entities, and only very few people think parts never constitute a new thing.
Those that do, of course, either think the composition relation never obtains
such that composition could be a relation distinct from other synchronic
dependence relations (compositional nihilists), or they think, as I do, that
complete parts/constituents compose/constitute things, but that those things
are nothing over and above those parts/constituents.
Again, however, on the standard approaches we’ve already seen, the pluralist
can go in for the distinctness of the relations predicated on the distinctness
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of spatiotemporally coincident entities and properties—the picture in which
relations circle back down, fork upward, string up and up, or run up in parallel
between levels. But holding those relations distinct shoulders the same burdens
of holding the relata distinct. That is, it faces grounding and overdetermination
problems. In short, there are no synchronic dependence circles, forks, strings,
or train tracks that do not collapse because of the ontological innocence of the
relata involved. So the relations aren’t distinct.
Finally, there’s no upward convergence from distinct parts of a physical
base to a single entity. This last picture of the difference between synchronic
dependence relations has already arisen briefly in Section 2.3 and the end
of Section 9.2. I will save most of my denial that this picture is plausible
for Section 10.1, however, I want to introduce it while the other pictures are
fresh and say why, even if it is plausible, it doesn’t amount to a distinction
between the three relations I claim are identical. On this picture, relations
converge upward from distinct relata in the first place of the relations to the
same relatum in the second place of the relations. For example, suppose
that a brain state realizes a mental state in some circumstances which, let’s
suppose, “ground” the mental state’s being the state that it is. The first
problem with this is that it doesn’t amount to a difference between constitution,
composition, and realization. No one seems to think that a statue is composed
of marble while being constituted by the circumstances in which the marble
exists. Realizers, constituents and parts are instead all held to be among the
core, central, or most salient builders of an entity, while Circumstantialism
about these relations names the equally necessary background conditions just
that. Suppose we called the job of the circumstances “grounding.” Insisting
on Circumstantialism about composition, constitution, and realization might
be a way to insist on a real difference between those three together on the
one hand, and, say, grounding on the other. Still, even if it’s somehow wrong
to believe Unrestricted Constitutionalism—that anything on which an entity
depends synchronically is constitutive of that entity—it wouldn’t be mistaken
because some of the things on which an entity depends are not constituting it
but actually composing or realizing it, but because some were grounding it.
Moreover, it’s not obvious that synchronic dependence relations are really
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divisible this way. For one thing, that would make Circumstantialism more
than a matter of bookkeeping, and hinges on Circumstantialism about those
relations being plausible at all—an issue I have covered in detail in Chapter 7.
The second problem with the upward convergence picture, then, is that it
becomes difficult to see how grounding could be defined so as to exclude
constituents and parts. The problem is stipulating or discovering where the
boundary between parts/constituents/realizers and grounds lies, hence the
classic EM question, “Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world
begin?” (Clark and Chalmers, 1998, p. 7). Understandably, constitution and
realization have explicitly been used across this boundary, as in, respectively,
semantic externalism (see Section 2.2), and the notion of “total realizers” of a
mental state (see Shoemaker, 2003). Finally, note a methodological principle
that Bennett (2017) recommends, given unity in the class of building relations:
“One should not break the analogy without argument” (p. 78). So the burden
to justify a double-standard lies with anyone who would motivate the difference
between two subsets of synchronic dependence relations by way of being a
circumstantialist about some while being a strict necessitarian about one or
more others.
Wrapping Up
In short, we have plenty of reasons to think composition, constitution, and
realization are identical in that they obtain between relata that are ontologically
innocent with respect to one another and are spatiotemporally coincident, and
no good argument for Synchronic Dependence Relation Pluralism. That means
it doesn’t matter what synchronic dependence terminology externalist claims
are made using. Together with the Reducibility claim I have been defending,
the interchangeability of these terms means that from our partial constitution
or realization by technologies, we can infer our partial identity with them. But
I only hinted at why we should deny the “convergence” picture of the difference
between, for example, constituents and grounds. More needs to be said about
this problem of knowing where the boundary lies between “core” and “total”
realizers, or the real constituents and mere circumstances. And that brings us
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squarely back to the EM debate.
Chapter 10
The Metaphysics of Extended
Minds
In Chapter 2, I argued that the debate over externalism is a special case of
diverging notions of constitutive dependence, kinds, and the proper objects
of science. I have argued since that various dependence locutions used in
physicalist explanatory projects look related, and give rise to the same puzzles
when paired with antireductionism. A solution to one problem promises to be
a solution to many, independently of the synchronic dependence locution in
which those problems are stated. That is also a reason to believe the synchronic
dependence relations are closely related. Since dependence, coincidence, and
distinctness are the common ingredients for these problems, those ingredients
should be inspected. Given that physicalism is a well-motivated thesis, we
should not drop the dependence of higher-level things on physical matters.
One of the usual arguments for distinctness is predicated on the multiple
realizability of higher-level kinds—the idea that since functional kinds admit
of diverse realizers, the kind is not identical with any single physical base,
and that each member is distinct from its physical base because it has the
property of being of that kind while its physical base supposedly does not.
But similarity and kinds can be explained in terms of multiple-causability,
switches in nature. Even though switches, and thus multiple realizability, are
ubiquitous, kinds don’t fail to be physical; they can be identified with their
members or perhaps with the switches that individuate them. Functionalism,
and even the possibility of “wispy” one-dimensionally projectible functional
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kinds, is thus compatible with a coherent physicalism that does not result
in overdetermination by insisting on the distinctness of higher-level entities,
kinds and properties from lower-level physical conditions. Further, there is no
valid inference to antireductive physicalism from the failure of narrow physical
bases to have the non-categorical properties we ordinarily say the entities they
(partly) instantiate “have.” The inference is what I call the sufficiency error.
So we have no reason to believe that higher-level entities are not identical with
their lower-level parts, constituents, or realizers, while the idea that everything
is physical, that everything real is causally efficacious, and the causal closure
of the physical world, suggests their identity. The solution to various puzzles
of material constitution is thus not to distinguish between higher-level things
and their complete parts, constituents, or realizers. Now, a further feature
uniting these relations is that they are causally tainted. But even though causal
relations can be constitutive of higher-level entities, there is an important
distinction between how given states of affairs over their duration are brought
about prior to their beginning, and what makes them up for their duration.
The causal/constitutive distinction is not meaningless. The distinction between
constitution, composition, and realization, on the other hand, is much less
clear. Synchronic dependence relations are identical insofar as wherever there
are properties there are entities, and vice versa, and so wherever there is
constitution there is realization, and vice versa. The relations are coincident
and instantiated by relata which are ontologically innocent with respect to one
another. So whether or not externalism is true doesn’t hinge on whether it is
put in terms of parts, constituents, or realizers, implementation, physical base,
etc. Rather, the truth of externalism hinges on whether members of conscious
kinds—whether mental states, cognitive processes—have properties whose
instantiations are partly extraneural and about which fruitful generalizations
can be made. And they do; traditionally, intentional states are characterized by
non-categorical properties, and there is no reason to believe that such properties
should be disqualified in advance as objects of scientific enquiry. Indeed, we
already use them in both ordinary and scientific explanatory and predictive
practice.
It remains to apply these arguments in more detail to the questions left over
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from Chapter 2’s initial pass at an argument for externalism. In Section 10.1,
I argue that there is no clear competitor to Unrestricted Constitutionalism
as I introduced it in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. In Section 10.2, I further
defend this notion of constitution against a certain intuition and a certain
assumption that together tend to promote internalism. The intuition is that
we could be brains in vats, which can be taken to show that we could be wrong
about everything, such that what explains offline and illusory experiences is
what explains apparently veridical experiences. Then, assuming that brains
primarily explain offline and illusory experience, brains explain experience
generally. I deny that the intuition shows that we could be wrong about
everything, and thus deny the analogy between offline/illusory experiences
and veridical ones. I then challenge the assumption that even offline/illusory
experiences are completely explained by the brain. As a result, I argue in
Section 10.3 that externalism need not claim that paradigmatically cognitive
processes and mental states occur in the brain, which concedes too much to
internalism. In case the resulting cognitive kind is thought to be too slippery,
I apply the defense of kinds characterized by non-categorical properties to
the mental, the cognitive, and minds, in contrast to eliminativism about the
latter. In Section 10.4, I conclude by arguing that externalists should bite the
bullet with respect to the “bloat” objection—roughly, that anything might
be cognitive—and account for the counter-intuitiveness of my view and the
intuitiveness of internalism in terms of differing epistemic salience within the
ontological dependence bases of higher-level things.
10.1 Revisiting the Unrestricted Constitu-
tionalism Premise
I begin by re-assessing, in light of the preceding chapters’ exploration of
synchronic dependence relations, the claim that anything on which an entity
depends synchronically is constitutive of that entity. By, “entity,” I intend
to include objects, states, processes, events, phenomena and experiences. By
“synchronically,” I mean, for a thing’s duration. Here is the argument for that
claim, which I introduced in Section 1.2.
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[Differentiability Condition] If constitution is best analyzed simply as synchronic
ontological dependence, then anything on which an entity depends syn-
chronically is constitutive of that entity.
[Non-Differentiability of Constituents and Background Conditions]
Constitution is best analyzed simply as synchronic ontological
dependence.
So,
[Unrestricted Constitutionalism] Anything on which an entity depends syn-
chronically is constitutive of that entity.
Strange as it might appear, Unrestricted Constitutionalism is not without
precedent. About causation, Lewis (1973) says,
We sometimes single out one among all the causes of some event
and call it “the” cause, as if there were no others. Or we single out a
few as the “causes,” calling the rest mere “causal factors” or “causal
conditions.” Or we speak of the “decisive” or “real” or “principal”
cause. We may select the abnormal or extraordinary causes, or those
under human control, or those we deem good or bad, or just those
we want to talk about. I have nothing to say about these principles
of invidious discrimination. I am concerned with the prior question
of what it is to be one of the causes (unselectively speaking). My
analysis is meant to capture a broad and nondiscriminatory concept
of causation. (1973, pp. 558–559)
And Bennett thinks Lewis’s point can be adapted with respect to building
generally. If Lewis accepted the analogy, he would presumably be a building
necessitarian (see Section 7.1) and thus a necessitarian about constitution.
That is, he would endorse Unrestricted Constitutionalism. On the other hand,
my view that nothing differentiates constituents from other members among
a set of physical conditions on which an entity depends at some point in its
duration is by no means the ordinary one. Consider Gillett’s formalization of
the constitution relation:
(Constitution/Parthood) Individuals s1-sn constitute, and are parts
or constituents of, an individual s*, under conditions $, if and
only if s1-sn are spatially contained within s*, many of s1-sn bear
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spatiotemporal, powerful and/or productive relations to each other,
and all the powerful properties/relations of s* are realized by prop-
erties/relations of s1-sn, under $, but not vice versa. (2013, p.
323)
Here, the extent of the realization base—of those properties individuative
of the entity—is the measure of the spatial (and, we might add, temporal)
extent of the individual. Now, one might think the spatiotemporal containment
condition does the required work. But it actually does nothing to justify
our intuitions about entities’ narrow boundaries as against mere background
conditions. I accept the spatiotemporal containment condition, and I prefer
strict Necessitarianism. The strict necessitarian can accept Gillett’s condition;
the necessitarian just thinks the spatiotemporal boundary of the constituents is
much broader than we intuitively think it is. Ostensibly, the extent of cognitive
processes and mental states are in question in debates about externalism.
The extent of entities is precisely the question, not an answer to how to
differentiate constituents from other parts of the dependence base. Since
Gillett’s definition requires that the constituents’ properties must realize all of
the constituted entity’s properties (under certain conditions), it assumes the
admittedly common-sense difference rather than motivates it. So the extent of
constituted things is generally at issue insofar as there is an important choice to
be made between Circumstantialism and strict Necessitarianism about the full
builders of entities whose non-categorical properties are ordinarily attributed
to physical conditions manifestly not sufficient for those properties.
I know of no other formalizations to which the same considerations do not
apply. In particular I have in mind Craver’s (2007) “mutual manipulability”
account of constitution, and Baumgartner and Casini’s (2016) abductive theory
of constitution, both of which require, like Gillett’s account, that constituents
be spatiotemporally contained within the constituted. Or consider Baker’s
definition of constitution:
certain kinds of intentional states, certain kinds of social and politi-
cal entities and certain conventions. . . are essential to national flags:
nothing is a flag without them. For any primary-kind property G,
such as the property of being a national flag, call the milieu required
for something to have G, “G-favorable” circumstances. G-favorable
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circumstances are the total background conditions that must obtain
for something to have G. For any particular place and time, the
presence of G-favorable circumstances is necessary for the property
G to be instantiated then and there; but the presence of G-favorable
circumstances by itself is not sufficient for G to be instantiated then
and there. An informal idea of material constitution is this: where
F and G are distinct primary-kind properties, it is possible that an
F exists without there being any spatially coincident G. However,
if an F is in G-favorable circumstances, then there is a new entity,
a G, that is spatially coincident with the F but not identical to it.
(Baker, 1999, p. 147)
Again, the spatial coincidence of G with F is merely stipulated. Baker
thus assumes, rather than does anything to motivate Circumstantialism about
the dependence relation being defined. Note, too, that there’s little more at
the heart of these definitions than a notion of ontological dependence. Baker
says roughly that a thing in some circumstances is sufficient for the existence
of another thing (and that the circumstances are necessary—note how close
we are to providing necessary and sufficient conditions for the second thing).
Gillett (2013) interdefines constitution and realization, and Aizawa and Gillett
(2009) defines realization using the in virtue of locution, for which they are
criticized by Endicott (2016a), who suggests that realizers explain the realized
(see Section 7.1). But this doesn’t help. As Bennett says,
The problem is that such talk [of dependence being explanatory]
is ambiguous. In one sense, adding an explanatory requirement to
my characterization [of building relations, including constitution
and realization] would add nothing; in the other sense, adding an
explanatory requirement is neither plausible nor well-motivated.
(2017, p. 61)
Understood in a metaphysical sense, “explains” works just the way “in
virtue of” does. Understood in an epistemic sense, the characterization is
not plausible, because, as we saw in Section 5.2, such explanation is context
sensitive. Explanation, in the epistemic sense, and dependence are related, of
course. Suppose ontological dependence grounds the truth of such explanations.
In that case, dependence does the explaining; dependence explains, in both
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senses, “explanation,” in the epistemic sense. And Wilson and Craver (2007)
make the same point about realization that I’m making about constitution:
A second possible restriction on the realization relation would be
to make it constitutive—that is, to require that the realizer of O’s
having P be wholly contained within O’s spatial boundaries. (p. 95)
But, they continue,
it is plausible to argue that if realizers are to be metaphysically
sufficient for the properties and activities they realize, then they
must extend beyond the boundary of O and beyond the relationships
that exist among the things inside O. (p. 96)
So we don’t, so far, have a notion of constitution on offer that doesn’t
boil down, in one way or another, to synchronic ontological dependence. Cer-
tainly, the realization relation can’t non-trivially constrain the extent of the
constituents while the constitution relation constrains the extent of the realiz-
ers. In the formalizations we’ve seen, without something more to constitution
than dependence, nothing rules on the boundary between constituents and the
required circumstances. The intuitive boundary can be drawn differently, or
the constituents and circumstances relabelled, and the definition of constitution
would equally apply. That’s to be expected, as far as the present view is
concerned. That is, there isn’t much that can be added, except, as I have
argued, the synchronicity of constituents with what they constitute. And
without something more to constitution, we’re left with a notion that applies
equally to what we intuitively think of as background conditions.
Here’s a further strategy I can think of for attempting to carve out the
core realizers or constituents of a higher-level thing. I said in Section 7.3 that
non-categorical property-bearers are either not quite what we ordinarily think
they are, or not quite where we ordinarily think they are. We can either take a
spatiotemporal region as an entity and attribute to it just those properties for
which it is strictly sufficient, or take a property as our explanandum and end
up with all those conditions sufficient for it. But what about taking multiple
properties usually attributed to some intuitive core, and, despite knowing that
the entity individuated by those properties is not wholly coincident with that
core, asking whether there is overlap at the core with the sets of fully sufficient
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conditions for each property. The picture here is of a Venn-like diagram where
a shape for each property represents the spatiotemporal extent of its realizing
base. Might the core be the overlap of all these shapes?
Probably not, for at least two separate reasons. First, it’s conceivable
that some properties attributed to the core may require different parts of it
and so not overlap within the wanted core (even if they overlap outside the
wanted core). In case of non-overlap, however, according to this strategy, we
would have to choose among “cores” and lose certain properties which we could
not even sloppily attribute to the chosen core. Non-overlap looks especially
plausible in the case of rather more spatiotemporally strange entities, such as
persons. Consider my having a particular eye colour and my having a certain
intelligence whose realizations presumably have little to do with one another.
Or consider my shirt’s being partly grey and partly maroon. On the thought
that it takes some light to realize a thing’s being coloured, the overlap is in
the wrong place; the overlap of the physical bases of these two properties is
beyond what we think of as the shirt. Thus, notwithstanding the possibility of
non-overlap, the second and more damning issue with the Venn strategy is that
it is doubtful whether, for every given set of properties, their physical bases
will overlap such as to guarantee just the core we want. It’s plausible to think
that, frequently, certain conditions which are intuitively background conditions
and not among the core parts, constituents, or realizers of an entity will be
commonly required for all of the properties of that entity. Bennett (2017),
for example, says, “it might seem natural to say that being taller than is an
internal relation, the obtaining of which is fully grounded in the heights of the
relata. But in fact, its obtaining also depends on the curvature of spacetime”
(p. 54). If that’s right, then the curvature of spacetime is among the realizers
of a whole lot of properties, and thus among the core realizers of some entities,
even on the picture of the core as the overlap in the conditions necessary for a
set of properties.
Although it would not obviate the point that the entity individuated by
those properties is not strictly contained within the region of overlap, still, if
this strategy worked even roughly, it might go some way to explaining our
intuitions about the boundaries of entities, because conditions like the curvature
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of spacetime would be ones we could take for granted. While the curvature
of spacetime is ontologically salient to the “metaphysical” explanation of size
relations, it won’t be salient to most explanations in practice. Likewise, there
may be other, non-dependence based ways to differentiate among the complete
dependence base or total realizers of an entity, for example, Otto’s belief about
the museum. The belief depends on biological Otto, on his notebook, and on
the museum, among other things. There are dozens of ways we might carve
up these physical conditions. There are the parts of a thing that are more or
less closely interacting, moving about together, and so forth. In particular, I’ll
revisit the morally salient subset of the total realizers in Chapter 11.
What about the boundaries of a system? I’ve spent quite a bit of time
talking about entities and their properties in general, and while it’s true that
much of the extended mind debate is transacted in terms of entities such as
cognitive processes and mental states, some of the debate has turned on the
question of the boundaries of cognitive systems. Is there a difference among
sorts of entities as far as considerations of sufficiency for their properties—for
example, between systems on the one hand, and events, processes, objects
and states on the other? One thought might be that the proper parts of
our cognitive systems are those which are portable and thus available when
needed, as well as trustworthy—criteria we saw in Section 2.3 suggested by
Clark (2010c, p. 79). Could some portable system be the core we intuit? As
Ross and Ladyman (2010) put it,
the ubiquity of the containment metaphor derives from the fact
that as tool builders we humans are naturally interested in isolating
systems in such a way that we can transport them around without
significantly changing the kinds of processes we can use them to
effect (Cartwright 1989). But modeling the world in terms of
the affordances it offers for human manipulation at the special
spacetime scales in which we plan and execute actions is not the
way to construct objective accounts of the universe. (pp. 161-162)
Actually, the ubiquity of the containment metaphor derives from the fact
that entities and properties are spatiotemporally located. But the idea that we
isolate systems, transport them, and use them to effect particular processes
has some apparent merit as a basis for individuating a core cognitive system.
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Unfortunately, this doesn’t secure the desired ontological result. Consider
portability to be a disposition. According to Prior et al. (1982), “For each
disposition we can specify a pair of antecedent circumstances and manifestation
which together determine the disposition under discussion. In the case of
fragility, the pair is (roughly) < knocking, breaking >” (p. 251). In the case of
portability the pair is (roughly), < applying a relevant force, moving relative
to some context of interest >. That the movement in question is relative
to a context of interest and that the force be relevant is crucial of course.
Otherwise, Mount Everest is portable, given its disposition to move when a
force is applied (eg, the inertial and gravitational forces acting on the Earth as
it rotates, revolves around its barycenter with the Moon, and orbits the Sun).
Our cognitive systems don’t exactly “have”—all on their own—the property of
being portable.
To repeat, the overlap strategy doesn’t help us say what the “true” ontolog-
ical constituents of Otto’s belief are, as compared to the mere circumstances
it depends on, absent some other stipulation about constitution, and we’ve
seen that one such stipulation—a portability criterion—fails because it invokes
a property that depends on wider circumstances than the thing to which we
attribute that portability.
All this might seem to suggest that a definition of constitution one way
or the other is merely stipulative. In that case, the circumstantialist might
dig in her heels and complain that the necessitarian begs the question about
constitution as much as the circumstantialist would by adding (yet to be
seen) non-dependence based criteria to her definition of full building, proper
constitution, or core realization. I seem to be saying that what are normally
considered background conditions are actually constituents if constitution is
just a synchronic dependence relation, and that constitution just is a synchronic
dependence relation. As I noted in Section 2.3 (Footnote 5), it might seem
like the restricted and unrestricted notions of constitution could co-exist if
theorists simply made their claims more precisely in terms of either. Wilson
(2007), for example, argues that we can account for the truth of the claims,
“This water is nothing more than the molecules that constitute it,” and, “This
statue is something over and above the marble that constitutes it,” in terms of
221
differing notions of constitution. The key difference between these notions of
constitution is the sort of “necessitation,” involved. The former “compositional”
notion of constitution involves intrinsic necessitation. The latter “ampliative”
notion of constitution involves extrinsic necessitation. A thing or things, x or
the xs, compositionally constitute(s) y if,
x is in some intrinsic state(s), or the xs that compose y are arranged,
during p such that x itself, or the xs themselves, necessitate the
existence of y. (p. 17)
By contrast, x or the xs ampliatively constitute(s) y if,
x (the xs) is (are) in extrinsic conditions during p that themselves
necessitate the existence of y. (p. 18)
I said earlier that Unrestricted Constitutionalism could be understood as
the claim that “anything on which an entity depends synchronically is compo-
sitionally constitutive of that entity.” So it might seem as though the claim
that “not everything on which an entity depends synchronically is ampliatively
constitutive of that entity” is not in direct conflict with Unrestricted Consti-
tutionalism. But, on my view, it remains true that whenever something is
constituted at all, some physical conditions are compositionally constitutive of
that entity. So the ampliative constituents of an entity are also compositional
constituents of it. And one who doubts the very existence of the boundary
between the ampliative constituents and the remaining conditions on which an
entity depends will think that anything on which an entity depends synchroni-
cally is, taken by itself, ampliatively constitutive of that entity. According to
Unrestricted Constitutionalism, we can account for the truth of the claim about
the water and the claim about the statue, if they are true, by reading them
more precisely in terms of partial and complete constitution. On that view,
some water (or any entity) is nothing more than the conditions that completely
constitute it, and a statue (or any entity) is something over and above any
conditions that only partly constitute it.
So the disagreement between Unrestricted Constitutionalism and its denial
is about whether the fully sufficient conditions on which an entity depends
synchronically can be differentiated as concerns the relation of synchronic onto-
logical dependence in which they stand to the constituted entity. Unrestricted
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Constitutionalism is the claim that they cannot, and its rival is the claim
that they can. I’m thus not merely widening the definition of constitution
to include something else; I’m attempting to cast serious doubt on whether
there really is anything else. That is, I’m questioning whether there is more
than one relation of synchronic ontological dependence at all, let alone more
than one sort of constitution. If there’s only one sort, then there will only
be one sensible definition of constitution. And I think what we tend to call
background conditions fit the definition of constituents insofar as the latter
have been sensibly defined in terms of synchronic ontological dependence, which
is that aspect of constitution on which there is some consensus. Even those
definitions that assume Circumstantialism undermine it by failing to offer a
definition that picks out the truly constitutive physical conditions from the
apparently background ones. Circumstantialism is, again, the principle that,
“Let C be some to-be-specified set of background circumstances that
includes neither y nor anything that fully builds y. For all x and y
and all building relations B, if x fully B’s y, then, [(x+C)→ y].”
(Bennett, 2017, p. 52)
But for all Circumstantialism about constitution says, the museum (x)
might fully constitute a belief about itself (y) in the circumstances in which
there is Otto and his notebook (C). So, without specifying the C/x bound-
ary, there is already a point in favour of Necessitarianism and Unrestricted
Constitutionalism.
And there are two additional points working against the circumstantialist’s
picture. The first arises with attempts to specify the to-be-specified C, which,
note, is to correspondingly specify x. Recall from Chapter 2 that it looks
like Clark is plausibly a circumstantialist about constitution when he says,
“Chalmers and I thus offered an argument (which one may accept or reject:
that is, of course, another matter) concerning conditions not of ‘being cognitive’
but for incorporation into a cognitive system” (Clark, 2010a, p. 84). While
I have countenanced that view as a kind of Circumstantialism, specifically, a
restricted constitutionalism, for the sake of argument, it’s actually not clear
that Clark’s criteria work the way he implies when he offers “criteria to be met
by nonbiological candidates for inclusion into an individual’s cognitive system”
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(Clark, 2010c, p. 79). To see this, recall from Section 2.3 that Adams and
Aizawa’s (2001) mark of the cognitive—being non-derivedly representational—
was a criterion of kind-membership. As such, the question of the mark of the
cognitive is orthogonal to the question of the physical extent of a given member
of the cognitive kind. So, too, with any criteria for kind-membership. Now, why
think that Clark’s criteria work as marks of the cognitive rather than marks
of the constitutive? For one thing, because the notebook’s being “reliably
available and typically invoked”, and its information being “automatically
endorsed,” deemed “trustworthy”, “easily accessible as and when required,”
and “consciously endorsed at some point in the past,” (p. 79) look, on closer
scrutiny, more like properties which, even allowing ourselves to be sloppy, are
attributable to the Otto–notebook coupling rather than to the notebook alone.
For another, Clark’s are criteria for integration into something cognitive, rather
than criteria for constitutive relations generally. We would presumably need
different criteria for deciding the constituents of cognitive systems as opposed
to tennis balls or economies, but these differences shed no light on what is
common to each such putatively differing “constitution” relation, which is
synchronic ontological dependence expressible in counterfactuals. So, arguably,
the property of being reliable is one to be explained constitutively rather than
explaining constitution. Reliability picks out an instance of a kind-member,
rather than the true constituents of that member. Even supposing we take
Clark’s view as offering criteria, not for being cognitive, but for being part of
something cognitive, it is not clear that such criteria are consistent with the way
relational predicates work. For example, if one thing is more fundamental than
another, to the left of it, younger than it, or an ancestor of it, it’s not clear how
being reliable, or blue, or large, or roughly spherical, or any additional property
a thing might have, would make a difference to its relative fundamentality,
age, or genealogical relation to another. Those relations obtain, or do not
obtain. Of course, there might be properties that obtain whenever a relation
does, for example, being in a relation to something else is to “have” (or partly
instantiate) the property of being in that relation. So failing to have that
property is to fail to have that relation. But why should a constitution relation
obtain between the notebook and Otto’s belief just in case those properties
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of the Otto–notebook coupling cited by Clark obtain? It would be as odd to
stipulate this ad-hoc species of synchronic ontological dependence as it would
be to stipulate a relational predicate for things’ being blue-and-to-the-left-of or
large-and-more-fundamental-than. Rather, blue-and-to-the-left-of is a prima
facie unparsimonious relation that fails to carve at the joints, so to speak.
Further, even allowing such ad-hoc relations and defining cognitive con-
stituents as those which are depended-on-and-reliable-and-available-and-trusted-
and-so-forth, certain infrastructural elements of Otto’s world we might intu-
itively think of as circumstantial—roads, address systems, and gravity—might
be reliable, available, trusted, and so forth.
Further still, the apparent intuitiveness of Circumstantialism is actually just
a restatement of our habit of sloppy property attribution, and this intuitiveness
hardly works in favour of circumstantialism if intuitions conflict within broadly
circumstantialist positions. Intuitions ostensibly conflict in the extended mind
debate over what and how many criteria to add to carve out from the truly full
builders just the “full” builders we might want. The mere fact of this divergence
highlights the ad-hoc and unparsimonious nature of stipulating a constitutive
relation picked out by additional properties of that which is constituted. And
the ad-hoc and unparsimonious nature of any specific stipulation counts against
its plausibility as an account of what is “constitutive” generally. So, the first
thing working against the circumstantialist is simply this. As already pointed
out, there is no positive account of the difference between the core realizers
or salient constituents and mere background within the analytic metaphysics
literature. There is nothing further within the extended mind debate to furnish
such an account. And the lack of a plausible account makes it at least a little
dubious that one can be given.
The other thing counting against Circumstantialism, including restricted
constitutionalism, is worse. Recall that Bennett (2017) only slightly prefers
Circumstantialism for its apparent intuitiveness (p. 54), but that it is mostly a
matter of bookkeeping, and where we sweep various untidiness. By contrast, I
don’t think the untidiness of non-categorical property attribution should be
swept away at all. What finally tips the balance in favour of the necessitarian
is once again the point that, as Wilson (2001) puts it,
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core realizations in themselves are not metaphysically sufficient
for the properties they realize, but must be part of some larger
functional system. This point is of some significance in itself be-
cause it is core realizations that are typically invoked in discussions
of reductionism, realization, and functionalism, especially in the
philosophy of mind, even if no one really believes the sufficiency
thesis to be true of them. (p. 14)
Now, Wilson (2001) infers from his similar diagnosis that non-reductive
physicalism might be revised. As I understand it, on his view, wide realizations
don’t reduce to the constituents of the bearer of the realized property, because
Wilson counts those constituents in the traditionally more narrow way. On my
view, those constituents are only partial ones, in much the same way that “core”
realizers are not sufficient for what they realize. I take the same considerations,
by contrast, to be reasons to reject anti-reductionism. I have argued that the
sloppy notion of sufficiency operant in anti-reductive arguments, once pressed,
just shows that entities and properties either cannot be held to be distinct
from their physical bases, or cannot be held to be coincident with physical
conditions that are merely partly sufficient for them. In other words, where a
property has wide realizations, the constituents of the entity that bears the
property are as wide as the realizers, and reduction proceeds. That is not a
matter of bookkeeping, but has significant ramifications for our total view of
the world as populated by physical things.
Most importantly, then, working against Circumstantialism, is the fact
that in sweeping into the circumstances those conditions it takes to be untidy,
Circumstantialism actually helps the antireductionist sweep bad inferences—
sufficiency errors—under the rug. On the bookkeeping metaphor, circumstan-
tialism cooks the books. It is complicit in fraud. The sufficiency error is to
infer, from the distinctness of an entity with a narrow set of physical conditions
not strictly sufficient for the non-categorical properties attributed to it, a thesis
about the nature of the world which is thought to be substantive. The antire-
ductive physicalist’s thesis is that everything is physical and yet (somehow)
not every thing is a physical thing, to put it starkly. The antireductionist, of
course, would like to put it less starkly, replacing the first “is” with heretofore
ambiguous dependence language like “supervenes on the” or “is realized by.” I
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have argued that if it is substantive, antireductive physicalism is not coherent,
and if can be made coherent, it is not substantively antireductive. Of course,
we can go on talking like circumstantialists and refrain from the bad inferences,
as long as we recognize the sloppiness of our usual non-categorical property
attributions. Being inexact, Circumstantialism is not exactly false; it is perhaps
a shorter-hand way of representing the situation. It’s just that the sloppy rep-
resentation easily leads to the sloppy inference. But I take such a point against
the theoretic utility of an ontological dependence relation—gerrymandered so
as to include the notebook while excluding the museum as constitutive of Otto’s
belief—to be enough to show that the burden falls to the circumstantialist to
say why the necessitarian is misusing the word “constitution” when claiming
that, for example, museums are constitutive of beliefs about museums. That
is, the burden falls to the circumstantialist to show that constituents can be
differentiated in some way that retains that feature of constitution which we do,
as far as I can see, overwhelmingly agree on—that constitution is a synchronic
ontological dependence relation—and which is reflected by its typical use in
the English language.
It is from these considerations that I derive the Unrestricted Constitu-
tionalism premise as a conclusion. I argued above that nothing differentiates
constituents from other members among a set of physical conditions on which
an entity depends for its duration. If so, then anything on which an entity
depends synchronically is constitutive of that entity. This definition of con-
stitution means that it won’t do for the internalist to simply point out that
the brain is in causal interaction with its surroundings in order to show that
externalists commit a coupling–constitution fallacy. The internalist must either
show that causal interactions never constitute anything, which would be hard
to do (see Section 8.1), or show that most externalist explananda occur after
the putative constituent on which they depend.
10.2 Brains in Vats
An intuitive objection to externalism has been looming for some time. It is
the objection that the brain primarily explains experience. I’ll argue that,
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depending on how it is understood, the objection fails in one or more ways as a
counterargument to externalism, and the reasons it fails are reasons to recognize
the explanatory significance of the world for experience in general, and so to
think, first, that online cognition and veridical experience are paradigmatic
of the cognitive and mental. Second, the same are reasons to think that even
offline cognition is partly constituted by the world.
Suppose one grants the definition of constitution as offered. Still, one might
complain that even among constituents so defined, when it comes to cognition,
there are more and less important constituents, to put it roughly. The intuitive
objection is thus premised on the apparent fact that cognitive processes can
occur, as it is usually put, “offline.” We can certainly think about things that
are absent, abstract, or non-existent. We can reason, plan, imagine, and dream
in apparent isolation from the world. Even in apparent contact with the objects
of experience, we can hallucinate, confabulate, experience powerful illusions,
and fail to perceive what others do. Because the brain alone explains these
cases, it is thought, the brain primarily explains cognition in general. Of course,
the thought that if the brain completely or primarily explains experience in
offline and illusory cases, then it does so in general, is true only on the crucial
assumption that our full range of experiences are analogous in some important
way. Why think they are? Here, I take the idea to be that if we can hallucinate
and experience powerful illusions, then it might be that even apparently normal
waking experience is more akin to dreaming than it is to experiencing what the
world is really like. Indeed, we might only be dreaming. The idea that we might
only be dreaming is the idea with which Descartes began his Meditations, and
this strangely powerful intuition, that we could be wrong about everything we
perceive, is brought to life in the film The Matrix (Wachowski and Wachowski,
1999) in which whole human organisms are kept in tanks and are plugged
in at the bases of their skulls to a machine which provides all the necessary
signals to induce an experience of a life more like the one we have (or think
we have). The idea is that, for all I know, my mental life might occur in a
very different world than the one in which I think it occurs. This is precisely
the sort of radical doubt that is widely recognized as either poor evidence of
anything, or incoherent and self-defeating. The idea that we might be wrong
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about everything infects the basic thought that my mind could be realized by
a brain-in-a-vat—indeed, that the realization of my mental life involves a brain
at all. In short, it would be very odd to think that we could be wrong about
everything else our mental lives depend on, but that we are right about our
mental lives’ dependence on brains, and use those claims to motivate a further
claim about the explanatory primacy of brains.
The externalist doesn’t face the same problem as long as the externalist
denies either one of the things causing trouble for the internalist. On one hand,
the first route would be to deny that our mental duplicates could be realized by
brains-in-vats. On the other hand, if one accepts the possibility of our having
envatted mental duplicates, two subsequent routes appear. One is to deny the
explanatory primacy of brains by doubting that we have brains at all. The
last route is to deny the analogy between illusory and veridical experience,
despite the possibility that we can be mistaken in serious ways about the way
the world is.
Perhaps surprisingly, I don’t think the externalist should deny that it is
possible for our mental lives to be duplicated, perhaps even by brains in vats.
After all, if anything is, brains are largely composed of the sort of multiply
actuatable switches that I have posited to explain multiply realizable kinds.
So at least my argument for externalism should be able to countenance the
possibility of mental duplicates. And as much as internalism is easy to grasp in
terms of the doctrine that my mental life could be realized by a brain-in-a-vat,
the two claims are not equivalent. It is certainly a consequence of my mind’s
being just the activity of my brain that my mental life could be realized by a
brain in a vat. But internalism is not a consequence of that possibility. However,
nor do I think that possibility should take us down the subsequent second route,
casting doubt on internalism by doubting everything including our having
brains at all. Since that route secures nothing, it doesn’t secure externalism
either. Rather, the externalist should take the last route. The externalist need
not deny the possibility of our having envatted mental duplicates in order to
break the analogy between two ends of what the externalist can argue is a
spectrum of cognitive success in dealing with the world; whatever it might
“really” be beyond our present ken, we are in analogous epistemic predicaments.
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However, this point is subtle. For, even if the consequences of generalized doubt
are incoherent, the fact that I make serious errors in perception and judgement
of the world are a reason to doubt that any given “veridical” experience of the
world corresponds to the way the world is. So the concern about “veridical”
experience is not so easily dismissed, and there is a bit more work to do.
Notice that for both us and for our putative envatted mental duplicates, the
world seems at least to many of us to be such that our mental duplicates could
be realized by brains in vats. And yet it seems to both me and my mental
duplicate that we are not envatted. It also seems to us that we sometimes
dream and have illusions, and sometimes, as we might ordinarily put it, have
better contact with reality. One feature of my dreams is that they can be
very disjointed. And, ex hypothesi, this must be a feature of the dreams of my
envatted mental duplicate. He can tele-transport and fly. People, places and
things readily transmogrify. Dreams may seem real to dreamers, but can be
unstable relative to waking experience. Likewise, our mental duplicates think
they both dream and have waking experience, as we think. And it seems to
us, envatted or not, that there is, as we might ordinarily put it, some truth
of the matter as to our being right or wrong about our non-envattedness. If
we seem to have experiences which are in more or less contact with reality,
and there seems to be a truth of the matter as to which is which, then we
must admit a meaningful distinction between illusory and veridical experience.
So, envatted or not, we have a meaningful distinction between illusory and
veridical experience.
But hang on. Might we deny the above conditional? Not easily. What could
make the distinction not meaningful? The distinction would not be meaningful
only if we were wrong about there being some truth of the matter as to which
experiences are illusory and which are veridical. But of course there seems to
be a difference. In that case, we can be mistaken. But we can only be mistaken
if there is a truth of the matter. This is a reductio of the claim that there is
no truth of the matter as to whether things are as they seem combined with
the plausible thesis that there seems to a truth of the matter. Formally, the
reductio can be rendered this way:
(1) There seems to be a truth of the matter about whether things are as they
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seem.
(2) There is no truth of the matter about whether or not things are as they
seem.
(3) If there seems to be a truth of the matter about whether things are as
they seem when there is no truth of the matter about whether or not
things are as they seem, then we can be mistaken about the way things
really are.
So,
(4) We can be mistaken about the way things really are.
(5) If we can be mistaken about the way things really are, then there is a
truth of the matter about whether things are as they seem.
So,
(6) There is a truth of the matter as to whether or not things really are as
they seem.
The above is valid but the first and final claims are contradictory. The
problem with the claim that there is no truth of the matter as to whether or
not things really are as they seem is a special case of the problem with the
claim that there is no truth. If it is true, then it can’t be true. It is incoherent.
Likewise, we have no way to sensibly make the claim that there is no truth of
the matter as to whether or not things are as they seem. It would be no good
to claim that there does not seem to be a truth of the matter, for it seems to
me that there is, and to call me wrong in this case is to call me right. In this
case, I can’t be wrong. The very fact that there seems to be a truth of the
matter about whether or not things are as they seem is a logical guarantee that
there is. Of course, it is more coherent to think the way things are explains the
way they seem than vice versa. It’s natural to think that something’s being
must be ontologically prior to anything’s seeming to be. So the way things
seem must sometimes be a guide to the way they are, and that is so because
the way things seem depends on the way they are.
Let’s consider why that should be the case. If we have a meaningful
distinction between illusory and veridical experience, and I’ve agued that we
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do, then, with respect to the seeming possibility of brains in vats realizing our
mental duplicates, we have a nested dilemma about the nature of the world
and our epistemic predicament in relation to it. Either the worlds in which my
non-envatted and envatted mental duplicates differ, or they do not. Presumably
they differ, if the possibility of my having an envatted mental duplicate is
to have any force whatsoever in sustaining the analogy between illusory and
veridical experience as evidence of the explanatory primacy of brains, since, if
the worlds do not differ at all, they are the same, and thus cannot be ruled out
as ontologically explanatory of sameness of experience. So the worlds differ, on
the whole. If they differ, then it is possible in principle for someone to discern
the difference between envatted and non-envatted worlds. But if it is possible
in principle for someone to discern the difference between the envatted and
non-envatted worlds, then either it is possible for us to discern the difference,
or not.
Now consider what has to be the case in order for brains in vats to be
unable to know that they are envatted, and hence for it to be possible for us
to have envatted mental duplicates—after all, I don’t know I’m in a vat, so
neither does my mental duplicate. It is not simply the case that we might
never discover something the way that bats might never discover colour. Our
technologically extended discriminatory apparati, whether imagined or real,
are growing. A deceiving demon has to tread very carefully here. Recall also,
that it’s crucial for the internalist that the brain-in-a-vat be a brain in a vat, or
internalism is false. Thus suppose remembering is a brain-bound process, as the
internalist thinks. Since our mental lives are such as to seem not to be envatted,
envatted brains’ storing memories would heavily constrain the way that an
evil demon—or God in the Cartesian picture, the machine in The Matrix, or
the television producers of The Truman Show—must interact with the pineal
gland, brain, or caged organism they deceive. The demon-producer-machine
must remain faithfully “deceitful”, lest cracks in the structure of the “spoofed”
world be noticed by the caged minds. On a sort of dualist picture, then, the
demon is as faithful as God is in upholding the regularities of our experience.
He must even fake occasional benevolence in order to pursue his malicious
agenda, which is to us, ex hypothesi, indistinguishable from God upholding
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her laws, pursuing benevolence but sometimes having to allow evil. Now,
elsewhere in the causal network as upheld by the being whose ultimate designs
elude us, the difference must reveal itself; angels, for example, might know
whether or not we are deceived. On a physicalist picture, the mechanisms of the
faithfulness by which deceptive neuroscientists or artificial intelligence deceive
us presumably depend on further regularities or laws of nature. Their machines
must work in a regular and predictable way just so that the machines can be
programmed to stimulate my brain while I think I am talking in just such a
way as to make it seem that I am talking. In any case, the agent additionally
has to have thoroughly constrained capacities to manipulate or otherwise move
through its world. In the film The Truman Show (Weir, 1998), Truman, a
captive and unwitting television star whose surrounds are curated and whose
life is broadcast around the clock, is dissuaded in various ways from making
certain exploratory efforts, but Truman behaves in unpredicted ways that make
the ruse difficult to secure. Truman becomes suspicious about a number of
inconsistencies, and an enlightened angel of sorts (a sympathetic co-star) tells
Truman the truth. In The Matrix, a pill allows the protagonist, Neo, to wake up
in his vat. (Here, since the pill is an illusion, the idea can only be that it is a sort
of mental placebo. Neo’s thought that the pill could have the effect of revealing
things as they really are is enough to produce the exploratory motor-neural
activities that actually wake Neo in his tank. Or something like that.) But in
the case of our mental duplicates, the deceiving demon-producer-machine can
afford no such accidents. The deceiver must faithfully preclude the possibility of
our emancipation in order to dupe our mental duplicates. But notice that these
regularities are themselves discernible to us, particularly on the assumption
that we are brains in vats with brain-bound remembering. If the fabric of our
“illusory” experience is woven tightly enough, then there’s an important sense
in which the “mistakes” we have no hope of correcting aren’t mistakes. Nothing
makes them mistakes except the possibility of correcting them because they
fail us in some way. But, again, ex hypothesi, our mental duplicates’ belief that
the earth rotates on its axis doesn’t fail them any more than that belief fails
us. The fully regular and constrained world is good enough to guarantee our
knowledge of just that much reality.
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On the other hand, suppose the fact of a difference between worlds with
mental duplicates entails its being possible for its subjects to discover which
sort of world they inhabit. If they make the discovery, then these worlds would
no longer be mental duplicates.
The point is that in each case, our overall epistemic predicament is entirely
analogous. To recap, in case the difference between the worlds is utterly
indiscernible to anyone, ever, there is no mental difference between those
worlds—our mental duplicates’ beliefs are as right and wrong as ours. In case
we are deceived but could never know as much, we can be sure about all that
must be the case in order to prevent us from knowing we are deceived, which
is everything we know in the vat, including that our perceptual experiences
are in differential contact with the world, so to speak. Our mental duplicates
dream in disjointed ways and sometimes briefly mistake shadows of shrubs
for shadows of dogs, and so forth, but, by contrast, much of their experience
is of and made possible by faithful deception. In case the envatted worlds
could diverge mentally because of unfaithful tells of truth, the beliefs of the
enlightened mind change, but the epistemic predicament doesn’t. In Plato’s
famous allegory in which some people are chained such as to only be able to see
shadow puppets cast by firelight onto a cave wall, the freed cave-dweller doesn’t
initially trust his bewildering sunlit experience. Having noticed our mistakes,
we should think our revised beliefs are falsifiable. But we can be certain of
our fallibility, and so can our mental duplicates in vats. Again, that we might
discover we are brains in vats just means that much of what we believe we’ve
discovered is open to revision. Having revised our beliefs, we can be certain
that we are fallible. Either we’re not fallible at all, or we can be certain of
being fallible, and in that, we’re not completely fallible. We’re right about that
much, in the most absolute possible way. Descartes’ certainty that he was a
thinking thing is a special case of this point, but we can be sure of somewhat
more with respect to our epistemic predicament. So, whatever the world might
really be, we have a spectrum of perceptual success in dealing with it.
There’s a problem with the inference from the fact that we can be wrong to
the worry that we might always be wrong. It is not coherent to think that we
could be wrong about everything. So the conditional, “if we could be wrong at
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any moment, then we could be wrong at every moment,” is false. But it was a
premise in what I imagined to be the argument defending the analogousness
of online and veridical experiences with offline and illusory experiences. And
that analogy was crucial to the substance of the objection to externalism—the
thought that if the brain primarily or completely explains experience in illusory
cases, then the brain primarily or completely explains experience in general.
10.3 The Boundaries of the Paradigmatically
Mental
Returning to the objection to externalism with which I began Section 10.2, it
can be reconstructed this way:
(1) In offline and illusory cases, the world is not primarily, if at all, responsible
for the character of our experiences.
(2) But brain activity certainly is; where there is no brain, there is no
experience that we know of.
(3) If the brain, not the world, is completely or primarily responsible for the
character of our experiences in offline and illusory cases, then the brain
completely or primarily explains experience in those cases.
(4) If the brain completely or primarily explains experience in offline and
illusory cases, then the brain completely or primarily explains experience
in general.
So,
(5) The brain completely or primarily explains experience in general.
The conditional (4) is dubious because of the disanalogy between offline and
illusory experience and veridical experience, the denial of which is self-defeating.
The falsifiability of our beliefs is evidence of a spectrum of cognitive success in
dealing with the world, and the spectrum is evidence of the disanalogy between
the two ends of the spectrum.
That problem aside, now notice the ambiguities in such an argument in
the case of “responsible” and “explains.” The argument is strongest when
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“responsible” is read in the sloppy, rather than the strict sense of sufficiency.
The externalist denies the premise read in the strict sense, but will readily
admit that human experience partly depends on human brains, and that the
world (understood as wholly distinct from brains) is insufficient for experience.
But even granting (1) read with a sloppy sense of responsibility, a valid further
inference to (5) requires that we read “explanation” in the conditional (3) as
either incomplete metaphysical explanation or explanation in the epistemic
sense. Then, however, explanation in the conclusion must be read in the same
partial or epistemic sense. Hence why I render the objection as I understand it
using “primarily,” which involves some notion of salience.
But explanation in the merely epistemic sense yields no ontological con-
clusion, and internalism is an ontological thesis. Why think externalism and
internalism are ontological theses? For one thing, because they are in conflict.
If externalism and internalism were just claims about what sorts of things are
most epistemically salient in explaining our mental lives, rather than phys-
ically necessary and sufficient for minds, then both sorts of explanation, or
either, or neither, may be salient to an audience, and their claims needn’t be
in conflict. A metaphysician might care about both explanations, those in
well-understood simple worlds with poorly-understood complex brains might
tend to find taking brains apart illuminating, those in dynamic and poorly
understood complex worlds with simple well-understood coordinative discrimi-
natory and goal-seeking circuitry might find taking apart the world illuminating,
and neither physics nor neuroscience explains anything to someone all-knowing.
Here and now, externalism is as a merely epistemic thesis is also true. Because
minds depend on wide physical conditions, and because those have largely been
ignored in contemporary sciences of mind, it is especially salient to correct
that. It’s salient if we’re going to be self-reflective about something we do
already; engineer our own experience. (And I’m inclined to think we should
be self-reflective, a point I’ll assume without further argument here.) The
nature of the world is what makes our explanations in the epistemic sense
better or worse, and the nature of the mental according to externalism as an
ontological thesis is such that, given the prevalence of internalism as a doctrine,
externalist explanations in the epistemic sense are likely to be illuminating.
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So if externalism as an ontological thesis is right, externalist explanations in
the epistemic sense are guaranteed to be appropriate at times such as this,
whereas there is no such guarantee for epistemic internalism unless ontological
internalism is true.
So the epistemic version of the objection is less than what the internalist
needs to show, and the externalist rejects it anyway, because, if ontological
externalism is true, externalist explanations will almost certainly be the better
ones in some situations.
But what of an ontological reading of the objection? Now, if “responsibility”
is read in the strict sense, the externalist can plausibly deny (1). That is, the
externalist denies that even “offline” experiences really do occur completely
in the brain. Here one only needs to accept externalism about meaning, and
take the line on synchronic dependence that I defended above. Put another
way, content externalism and Necessitarianism together yield the view that
the things our mental states are about are constitutive of our mental states. I
take externalism about meaning to be independently plausible and accepted
widely enough that I need not rehearse arguments for it: intentional states
are about what they are, mental states mean what they do, and cognitive
processes have the content they have, at least partly in virtue of the world in
which they are situated. That is why, in Section 2.3, I lumped the view, which
I called “restricted” externalism—that the notebook, but not the museum,
is constitutive of beliefs about the museum— together with internalism as
regards their notions of constitution. Both hold that some system—the brain in
one case and brain–body–technology couplings in the other case—are properly
constitutive of mental states or cognitive processes or systems. But both views
either fail to motivate the difference between constituents and other parts of
the physical bases on which these entities depend, or they make the sufficiency
error.
To see this, consider Menary’s claim that, “Active externalism is to be
distinguished from an externalism where the contents of beliefs are dependent
on my history. The external features are distal, not having a synchronic effect
on the organism.” (2010, p. 2) Menary’s characterization of the difference
between externalism and active externalism brings to light the sufficiency
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error that the latter makes. No waterless hunk of spacetime is sufficient for
beliefs about water. Rather, if we say that an organism’s belief about water
means what it does in virtue of its past, we posit a temporally broader entity,
encompassing the organism’s life history, thus including water as a constituent,
synchronic within the relevant temporal horizon. On the other hand, we can
say that the belief means what it does in virtue of a spatially wider swathe of
the world, including water.
This apparent choice between theories of meaning might look like the choice
between perdurance and endurance theories of persistence through time, and,
correspondingly, eternalism and presentism as theories of time. But that is
actually a separate matter, about which I shall say more in a moment. Rather,
I think these two broad sorts of theory of meaning aren’t in conflict, but have
differing explanatory targets. The first is an answer to the etiological question
of how I came to have the disposition to, for example, seek out water when
thirsty. The second is an answer to the question about what instantiates beliefs
about water having the property of being beliefs about water at a given time
or over a shorter duration. These two answers track two ways for God to
create my present belief that water is thirst-quenching. She can do it the
good-old fashioned way, and breathe into being all the necessary conditions
starting sometime in my infancy or as far back as back goes. Then, even in
the absence of present water (if God was to delete it), if we still wanted to
say that there came to be beliefs about water, what makes the belief about
water is a temporally extended process of which water is a part. Call this
belief an “orphan” disposition. On the other hand, God can create my body
and water-including surrounding out of nothing beginning a moment ago and
instantiate my beliefs about water as functionally characterized in terms of, for
example, my disposition to drink water when thirsty. Call this belief a “test-
tube” disposition. In answer to either question about what makes an orphan
belief or a test-tube belief a belief about water, considerations of sufficiency
should lead us to conclude that water is a constituent of both sorts of beliefs
about water. Even if we say the orphan belief has the property of having a
certain causal relation to water, what is sufficient to instantiate that property
is nothing less than that causal history. Either way, no utterly waterless hunk
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of spacetime instantiates the property of being an intentional state about water.
The reason a brain isn’t sufficient to make a certain belief the belief that it is is
mutliple causability—the fact that one could have a certain brain state because
of something else entirely. What makes the mental state the belief that it is
thus involves more of the causal network of which the brain is a part. What we
can’t say is that a given neural state has the property of meaning something for
which it is insufficient, and treat the wider conditions which make the belief
what it is as irrelevant to constituting it.
Or, not obviously. I’ve been speaking as if four-dimensional objects exist.
Supposing they don’t, and thus supposing the present is all there is, the
presentist would do well to have a story about how a present world could
instantiate beliefs about presently non-existing things. For example, the
presentist thinks that my water-including past no longer exists, so that water
in my past constitutes nothing present. In other words, the presentist perhaps
thinks that four-dimensional objects are really changing three-dimensional
objects supervening on agents and dynamic physical conditions. If the present
external world is waterless, the presentist explains my belief that water is
thirst-quenching by saying that some present, albeit potentially distributed,
property of the world is what makes my belief about water mean what it does.
Having water in its past is a property the present world has. Or, the world
is such that water was, among other things, a liquid at standard temperature
and pressure, thirst-quenching, etc. But in that case, what is now constitutive
of beliefs about water, what makes them now mean what they do, is still a
swathe of the now-waterless but nonetheless well-watered world.
Let’s consider another example, since beliefs about water are perhaps odd
examples. After all, it may be enough that I am largely constituted by water,
in the ordinary sense that water is partly constitutive of the cytosol, interstitial
fluids, and blood which are, among other things, constitutive of me. In other
words, just my body (in the ordinary sense), might be enough world to make
my beliefs about water mean what they do. Instead, imagine Otto-and-his-
notebook as survivors of an apocalypse that sees the demise of the museum.
Do the same considerations apply? Is Otto-and-his-notebook enough world for
Otto’s belief to mean what it does about the museum? I think not. Consider
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the truth conditions of Otto’s belief. Whether or not the truth-conditions of a
belief are the same as its meaning is a matter I set aside. But the property
of meaning x needs physical instantiation, and truth conditions are physical
conditions (I take it that “truth supervenes on being” (Bigelow, 1996, p. 38) in
one way or another). Moreover, falsity supervenes on being, so that the absence
of a truth condition is itself a physical condition. So it is plausible to think that
the truth conditions of a belief and the conditions that instantiate its having the
property of being the belief that it is might overlap. And the truth-conditions
of post-apocalypse-Otto’s belief about the museum’s past location are broader
than his notebook. Is the claim that the Museum was on 53rd true just in case
a notebook makes it? Is it true just in case millions believe it? No. There are
obviously many ways to make a notebook say that the museum is on 53rd. But
there is no way under determinism to bring about the entire post-apocalyptical
world without also making it such that the Museum was on 53rd. In the
post-apocalyptical world, whatever else might eventuate, there will be effects of
the Museum’s having been where it was. For example, light reflected from its
roof will still be travelling toward Alpha Centauri. So the claim is true, on the
presentist’s account, just in case all of the relevant portion of the present world
over which the Museum’s location had any influence is such that the Museum
was on 53rd. A world in which Otto’s notebook is wrong can be brought about
under determinism from a world in which the Museum never existed, but no
world can be brought about under determinism which is such that the Museum
was on 53rd when it never was. If the truth conditions and the instantiation of
the belief’s meaning what it does are physically overlapped conditions, then,
the idea is that some portion of that larger world constitutes the belief’s having
the meaning that it does. I don’t think I need to say what portion. Semantic
externalism is first and foremost a claim about where meaning ain’t, to play
on Putnam’s famous claim that meanings “just ain’t in the head!” (Putnam,
1975b, p. 144) On any conception of how intentional states mean what they
do, nothing purely neural will suffice to explain (in the metaphysical and thus
also the epistemic sense) how an intentional state means what it does.
Again, Unrestricted Constitutionalism as a form of Necessitarianism about
meaning entails that the constituents of beliefs are more widespread that
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brains. Recall now from Section 2.1 the idea presented by Clark and Chalmers
(1998) that a process or state should be considered “cognitive” or “mental”, if
some functionally equivalent process or state in the brain would be considered
cognitive or mental. In fact, an argument for externalism doesn’t require that
premise. Although it would depart from Clark and Chalmers (1998), given their
appeal to the functional parity of extended cognitive processes with (putatively)
brain-bound ones, an argument for externalism might just as well begin with the
premise that there are cognitive process and mental states, full stop. In a sense,
the parity principle concedes too much to internalism by allowing putatively
brain-bound processes to set the standard for what is cognitive (e.g. Gallagher,
2013). Instead, as Menary (2010) summarizes, second-wave arguments have
tended to focus less on parity and more on “complementarity”—the idea that
extended cognitive processes may be functionally novel. We’ve now seen two
compatible ways to deny that paradigmatically cognitive processes occur in the
brain. The first, as we saw in Section 10.2, is to deny that processes putatively
occurring in the brain are paradigmatic of the cognitive. The second is to
deny that such processes really do occur completely in the brain, which is a
consequence of Necessitarianism about meaning.
Let me make a few final notes in defense of this view. The claim that there
are cognitive processes and mental states, full stop, without any mention of
where they occur, somehow appears to be less self-evident than the version
of the premise inspired by Clark and Chalmers (1998) which linked cognitive
processes and mental states with brain processes and states and set up the
parity-based argument for Extended Mind. At least, a concern resurfaces about
the notion of scientific kindhood in play—the other sticking point in the debate
over Extended Mind that we saw in Section 2.1. All I have argued is that
functional kinds, and mutatis mutandis, other non-categorical properties, can be
projectible, and that we needn’t take an eliminative stance toward them. Still,
eliminativism about particular kinds and properties isn’t, on the account of the
reducibility of functional properties I have given, in general tension with that
account. Rather, whether a given kind or property can be reduced or should
be eliminated is a matter of the particular kind or property. But that makes
the burden of disqualifying extended members of mental or cognitive kinds
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heavier. The physical nature of similarity as I understand and have defended it
means that internalists can’t make a general argument for eliminativism about
extended cognitive systems on the basis of the supposed homogeneity of natural
kinds, and then claim that only brain states form a natural kind and as such
are properly cognitive and mental, as Adams and Aizawa (2010) try to do. This
would eliminate a working concept and recycle the terminology unjustifiably,
as if to change our existing concept into something more respectable, and it
would fall short of showing that, as the concept now stands, the mental is
not projectible, and that what is projectible does not extend. Rather, I think
we have reason to see human–technological couplings as partly constitutive of
our mental lives and as projectible: after all, wholes with mass-produced or
stock-standard parts are at least as similar and behaviourally stable as their
biological parts, as I noted in Section 2.1 when challenging Adams and Aizawa’s
(2001) speculation that human–tool couplings could not figure as objects of
science because they would work differently than biological objects of science.
Still, countervailing intuitions persist. Failing to disqualify externalism on
the basis of projectibility, we might wonder if all the same considerations could
be turned into a reductio in favour of eliminativism about any notion, including
“mind”, that admits of strangely extended members—as kinds characterized
by non-categorical properties do—by adding some premise to the effect that
Necessitarianism and Unrestricted Constitutionalism specifically are just plain
ridiculous. The thought here is that of course any respectable properties must
belong to neatly circumscribable or easily appreciable spacetime regions. I’ve
been tempted by this line of thought, but ultimately, I am not moved by it. I’m
compelled to reject the implicit premise that would complete the reductio. The
idea that respectable properties must belong to neatly circumscribable regions
would eliminate all non-categorical properties, and is thus far too damning of
what are, if existing scientific practice is anything to go by, darn good objects
of scientific enquiry and explanation, from fragility to beliefs. Here, I’m echoing
Fodor (see Section 5.3), without thinking it’s just a mystery that different
things can (partly) be corkscrews or intentional states. Actually, what explains
their being so are wider circumstances. Necessitarianism is vindicated by its
explanatory power in precisely those cases of projectibility that eliminativism
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would like to ignore and that antireductionism would invalidly premise itself
upon.
10.4 Biting a Little Bloat
Necessitarianism and Unrestricted Constitutionalism stand. Failures, like the
ones we saw in Section 10.1, to provide a clear basis for isolating the ontologically
core constituents or realizers of non-categorical property-bearing higher-level
entities, suggest that the complete constituents or total realizers of our mental
lives are instead divisible in terms of epistemic and pragmatic salience to us.
And this is exactly what the externalist should say in response to the so-called
“bloat” objection. That objection is roughly this:
The coupling argument brings out the extent to which the mark
of the cognitive bears on the bounds of cognition. If Clark and
Chalmers opt for the simplistic view that anything that is causally
connected to a cognitive process is part of the cognitive process,
then there is the threat of cognition bleeding into everything. This
is sometimes called something like “the problem of cognitive bloat”
or “cognitive ooze.” These names do justice to the ugliness of the
view, but not to its radical nature. The threat is of pancognitivism,
where everything is cognitive. (Adams and Aizawa, 2001, p. 57)
The answer is to bite the bullet, though not quite one of the calibre shot
above. Note once more that extended mind theorists make no inference from
a thing’s being cognitive and interacting with another thing to the latter’s
being cognitive (see Section 2.3). So let’s be clear that “everything is cognitive”
does not follow from cognitive things’ being identical with, constituted by, or
realized by physical conditions more broadly distributed than traditionally
supposed. For one thing, being cognitive is a property of a whole for which each
of its parts are individually insufficient and thus do not in any sense have. Not
every part of a big red thing is big and red. Likewise, pencils are not cognitive
even when coupled to the mathematician. Nor are neurons cognitive. Detached
brains are not cognitive, and for that reason, even calling brains in general
cognitive is just as sloppy as calling pencils cognitive would be. That aside,
the argument put forward here—that anything on which an entity depends
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synchronically is constitutive of that entity—nonetheless sucks up potentially
large swathes of the physical landscape. However, not only is every part of a
cognitive thing not cognitive, there are also plenty of things obviously not part
of present cognitive processes or mental states, even if only because they are
outside the rearward light cones of present mental lives. What’s happening
today at the center of Alpha Centauri, 4.37 light years from Earth, is of no
present consequence, although in 4.37 years, light from those events might
come to partly constitute someone’s (somewhat mistaken) thought that they
are small. In fact, the ingredients for just that thought are staggering relative
to everyday appreciation, if nonetheless dwarfed by the cosmos. While there
is no threat of the pancognitivism described above, there is a sense in which
the externalist should bite the bullet. Indeed, the point is that our everyday
property attributions involve a sort of inaccuracy which leads to confusion if we
take them at face value. No wonder the view on the table is counter-intuitive—
that much the externalist should unflinchingly admit. The sufficient physical
conditions for Otto’s belief about the museum as functionally individuated
include not only the notebook, as Clark and Chalmers argued. For the same
reason they include Otto’s notebook, they include the museum. They’re both
on the metaphysical ingredient list, so to speak, of the property in question.
We can explain our intuitions about the core realizers of our lives rather
differently. Mental constituents may differ in their epistemological status,
relative to an enquirer, without differing in their ontological status relative to
the thinker. Recalling Lewis’s liberal position on the causes of an event, let me
once more adapt something he says about intuitively strange causes, such as
absences. Lewis (2000) says,
One reason for an aversion to causation by absences is that, if there
is any of it at all, there is a lot of it—far more of it than we would
normally want to mention. At this very moment, we are being kept
alive by an absence of nerve gas in the air we are breathing. The
foe of causation by absences owes us an explanation of why we
sometimes do say that an absence caused something. The friend of
causation by absences owes us an explanation of why we sometimes
refuse to say that an absence caused something, even when we have
just the right pattern of dependence. I think the friend is much
better able to pay his debt than the foe is to pay his. There are ever
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so many reasons why it might be inappropriate to say something
true. It might be irrelevant to the conversation, it might convey
a false hint, it might be known already to all concerned. . . . Of
course, such reasons for refusing to say what is true are not confined
to causation by absences. “Counterfactual analysis of causation?—
Yeah, yeah, my birth is a cause of my death!” said the scoffer. His
birth is indeed a cause of his death; but it is understandable that
we seldom say so. The counterfactual dependence of his death on
his birth is just too obvious to be worth mentioning. (p. l96)
Interestingly, Lewis’s example of “being kept alive by an absence of nerve gas
in the air we are breathing” is arguably an example of synchronic dependence.
Or, whether the absence of nerve gas is a cause or constituent of my being alive
hinges on clarifying the temporal extent of my being alive as the explanandum.
The absence of nerve gas throughout my writing this chapter is a constituent
of my writing this chapter. The absence of nerve gas at my birth in 1982 is a
cause of my writing this chapter.
Sometimes citing absences sounds odd, sometimes not. We wouldn’t nor-
mally say what I just did about this chapter, but we would say someone’s
absence from work gets them fired. That absence is quite real—it is just the
same as that person’s being at the golf course. In this case, we cite the absence
because it doesn’t matter whether the truant was at the golf course or the
bar. Citing the absence of nerve gas is easier than listing everything that is
here instead. And if doing so sounds odd, it isn’t because absences are unreal,
but because so many absences go without mentioning. Where I am, there
isn’t normally nerve gas all over the place, whereas employees are expected
to go to work. And as with absent causes, we ignore all sorts of synchronic
dependencies that are obvious. What’s interesting—what makes externalism
both important and controversial—is that this tendency to ignore constituents
is so pervasive as to make unfamiliar dependence claims sound mistaken, when
by all accounts of constitution as synchronic ontological dependence, they
can in fact be true. In some ways, it is the unrecognized brick-and-mortar




In this chapter, I began by arguing that there is no clear competitor to
Unrestricted Constitutionalism. I’ve defended that view against an intuitive
objection which fails to show that the possibility of our being brains in vats
means we could be wrong about everything and that the brain thus explains
experiences in general. Further, I’ve deployed Necessitarianism about meaning
to challenge the assumption that even offline/illusory experiences are completely
explained by the brain. The upshot is that externalism need not claim that
paradigmatically cognitive processes and mental states occur in the brain.
While that is counter to existing assumptions, I noted that kinds characterized
by non-categorical properties, such as the mental, the cognitive, and minds,
in contrast to eliminativism about the latter, are already well established in
science. Finally, I’ve argued that externalists should bite the bullet with respect
to the “bloat” objection, and account for the counter-intuitiveness of their view
and the intuitiveness of internalism in terms of differing epistemic salience of
conditions within the ontological dependence bases of higher-level things. Of
course, the brain is justifiably at the bleeding edge of a rather wider epistemic
frontier of explaining our minds. Indeed, I think this is what explains our
having certain intuitions, which should not be taken as a total guide to the
ontological facts, about the core realizers of our minds. It’s perfectly sensible
to go on studying the neural parts of the mind. It’s not, however, sensible to
claim that the mind is the brain, nor by contrast to claim that because it’s
not, that the mind is not identical with any physical conditions. And because
individual minds, and mind as a kind, are identical with physical conditions,
minds needn’t be eliminated from our ontology. Likewise, I take it that there
are other interesting subsets of the complete realizers of our mental lives. As
I argued in Section 10.2, internalism must be an ontological thesis. And if
externalism, as an ontological thesis, is right, then just about any of the actual
physical conditions on which our mental lives depend might be interesting.
We’ll explore one such subset in the next chapter.
Chapter 11
Core Selves, Dynamic Selves
Clark and Chalmers (1998) say,
Does the extended mind imply an extended self? It seems so.
Most of us already accept that the self outstrips the boundaries
of consciousness; my dispositional beliefs, for example, constitute
in some deep sense part of who I am. If so, then these boundaries
may also fall beyond the skin. The information in Otto’s notebook,
for example, is a central part of his identity as a cognitive agent.
What this comes to is that Otto himself is best regarded as an
extended system, a coupling of biological organism and external
resources. To consistently resist this conclusion, we would have
to shrink the self into a mere bundle of occurrent states, severely
threatening its deep psychological continuity. Far better to take the
broader view, and see agents themselves as spread into the world.
As with any reconception of ourselves, this view will have significant
consequences. (p. 18)
In other words, if technologies can partly constitute human cognitive pro-
cesses, Clark and Chalmers (1998) think they can partly constitute human
minds, and thus human selves. Similarly, this project began with the thought
that human beings are creatures with technological parts. We are technological
beings, with mental lives partly constituted or realized by technologies. From
the outset it was clear that a way to show that technologies are part of us was
to show that technologies are parts of our minds, given the plausibility of a
strong relation between our minds and selves. Owing to that plausibility, I
have spent the most time on what I argued in Chapter 2 are the underlying
issues with the idea that our minds have extraneural constituents.
247
In Chapter 2, I sought to characterize the argument for Extended Mind and
externalism generally and show that that disagreements about externalism are
cases of deeper philosophical disagreements which infect philosophical debates
more widely. Those disagreements involve diverging notions of scientific kinds,
and issues around the synchronic dependence relation or relations that obtain
between higher and lower-level entities and properties—whether identity, con-
stitution, realization, or composition. I have since been arguing for Reducibility
and Unrestricted Constitutionalism. That is, I’ve advocated the identity of
higher-level entities and properties with everything they depend upon, which
includes anything without which they would not be the entities that they are or
have the properties they have. The dependence of entities and their properties
on physical conditions fails to carve out just those conditions we typically
attribute many properties to. This view has the counter-intuitive consequence
that minds and selves, as special cases of higher-level things, are not bounded
within those conditions we typically think, since they are bearers of a great
many non-categorical properties. Non-categorical properties can nonetheless be
projectible, and we needn’t take an eliminative stance toward them in advance.
I now want to speak about our selves, if only because it is natural to speak
about persons or selves when it comes to ethical matters. To that end, this
chapter is intended as an epilogue loosely tying the issues I’ve covered in detail
to the question of who we are and to those ethical issues that motivated the
project at the outset. I say, “loosely,” not because there is no tight connection
to be explored, but because I have invested the most time on those issues I
thought would most advance the debate. In closing, then, I will quicken the
pace at the unavoidable expense of depth. I hope I have moved carefully enough
to this point; I know I have moved slowly and I am grateful to my readers for
having made it to this point.
We’ll see in Section 11.1 that there must be a very close relation between our
minds and our selves if our selves are to be targets of praise and blameworthiness
at all. I think we are minds, and our minds—whether at any one time or over
time—are identical with extensive physical conditions that include technologies.
Before turning to consider the ethical ramifications of this view, I make one
further argument that the biological body isn’t the core realizer of mind and self.
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Ubiquitous and thus easily overlooked phenomenological considerations as to
our personal boundaries are at odds with the conservative notion of the human
animal as coincident with its biological tissue. I argue in Section 11.2 that
phenomenology suggests that our bodies are dynamic—supporting the extended
thesis. The embodiment and embeddedness of minds, together with the thesis
that our bodies are dynamic, yields a picture of minds as dynamically embodied
and embedded. Our particular mental lives would fail to be duplicated if our
biological duplicates were to be transplanted into different technical carapaces
and wider, partly technological circumstances. In every case of psychological
continuity there is also circumstantial continuity constituting a person’s being
of a kind with their past and future selves. Tissue-like technologies, as life-
supports, may be proper objects of moral concern.
Likewise, in Section 11.3, I suggest that it is plausible and worthwhile to
distinguish another morally salient subset of the complete constituents or total
realizers of our minds and selves from the rest. Technologies are among those
special constituents of our mental lives which we design. That is, technologies
are among both the constituents of our mental lives, and among those things
we have responsibility for. While this subset of the constituents of our mental
lives does not map cleanly onto the conditions necessary and sufficient for it,
such subsets may help to explain our circumstantialist intuitions. Though
explicable, these are the intuitions whose grip on us I hope to have loosened in
the previous chapters, clearing the way for a fresh perspective on our minds
and selves. I close with a few ruminations about the moral implications of our
sizes as extended (and overlapped) beings.
11.1 Dynamic Selves
We usually say we have minds. Thus, assume for the moment that we are not
just minds. And it is natural to speak of persons, rather than minds, when
it comes to ethical matters. A common theme among theories of personal
identity is that selves or persons are the bearers of rights and responsibilities
and the objects of praise and blameworthiness. A prevalent “methodological
assumption that has been retained by most theorists on identity and ethics
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since [Locke],” is that “a theory of [personal] identity’s plausibility depends
significantly on how well it accounts for our practical concerns” (Shoemaker,
2016, sec. 1). Our normative practices serve as either a kind of test for the
plausibility of any such theory, or perhaps as the very grounds of the “identity”
relation in question. Of course, this connection between persons and ethics is
why I’m interested in the idea that we are partly what we make: technologies
are an ethical matter.
The inference from our minds’ partial constitution by technology to the
conclusion that we are partly what we make, would only require that we are at
least partly our experiences—that we are at least partly mental. Indeed, there
must be a strong mind–self relation if selves are to be the objects of self-concern
and of praise and blameworthiness. To see this, note that on most accounts,
moral responsibility presupposes conscious agency. Locke (1841) famously
linked personal identity with ethical and practical concerns when he defended,
according to Shoemaker (2016), “a crucial condition of moral agency, namely,
self-reflective consciousness” (sec. 1). And although the debate on moral
responsibility, according to Mackenzie (2014), tends to focus on “identifying
the necessary and sufficient conditions, with respect to an agent’s current
motivational structure, for a particular choice or action to be autonomous, or
one for which the agent should be held responsible,” Mackenzie points out that
“our actions and choices at a particular time are intelligible only in the context
of our personal histories,” and that these “are also directed towards a future
that we aim to realize through agential activities like planning. . . ” (p. 154).
So, moral agents are those which are autonomous and have some continuity
between states or stages of conscious agency. Persons or selves must have—or
be—minds if persons or selves are to be the objects of ethical and practical
concerns. Otherwise, we should stop speaking about persons in connection
with these matters, and just speak about minds. If that were the norm, the
conclusion that our minds are partly what we make would be sufficient to
highlight the strong connection between technologies and ethical matters. But
speaking about minds as the objects of ethical and practical concerns is not
the norm.
It thus seems that I should say something more about the relation between
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minds and selves. However, there is an extensive literature on personal identity.
Having focused on the extended mind and issues having to do with multiple
realizability and synchronic dependence, it would be difficult to do justice to
the personal identity literature, despite the fact that the issues overlap. Any
analysis of selves as higher-level things requires the very tools I have attempted
to sharpen. But that analysis must be left for another occasion. So, rather
than conducting an extensive survey of the literature or constructing a careful
account of selves, what I do want to draw out of the literature is the point that
the substantiveness of certain debates about what we are presupposes mind–
body distinctness. For example, the apparent conflict between the broadly
“Animalist” claim that we are human animals and the broadly “Lockean” claim
that we are the minds of human animals is greatly softened or dissolved if the
minds of human animals are identical with the physical conditions on which
they depend, and if these conditions significantly or completely overlap with
the conditions on which being a human animal depends. Likewise, as a subset
of Lockean views, the broadly “Narrativist” claim, that the self is a sort of
mental construct, is at odds with other views only on the assumption that
mental content is distinct from its total vehicles—an assumption I hope to have
undermined.
To see this undermining at work more specifically, it will be instructive
to consider the features of broadly Lockean and Animalist positions that
appear to generate tensions between them. On Lockean views, I am the “same”
person as I was yesterday and will be tomorrow just in case those persons are
uniquely psychologically continuous with one another, “where psychological
continuity consists in overlapping chains of strong psychological connectedness,
itself consisting in significant numbers of direct psychological connections
like memories, intentions, beliefs/goals/desires, and similarity of character”
(Shoemaker, 2016, sec. 2.1, summarizing Parfit, 1986, p. 207). Now, most
parties to the debate, including Lockeans, think minds depend on physical
conditions, brains not least. So one objection to psychological criteria is that,
“if Lockeans distinguish between persons and human animals, their view implies
that whenever any person thinks some thought, a human animal also thinks
this thought,”(Parfit, 2012, p. 7) which generates too many thinkers, too many
251
persons, attending overdetermination problems, and the problem of knowing
which we are. Lockean views supposedly have this problem because,
If persons are, in the Lockean sense, entities that can think about
themselves, and whose continued existence essentially involves psy-
chological continuity, a human embryo or fetus is not a person. But
this fetus is, or becomes, a human animal. This animal’s body,
Lockeans claim, later becomes the body of a Lockean person. . . .
It would be convenient for Lockeans if this animal retired from the
scene, by ceasing to exist, thereby leaving its body under the sole
control of the newly existing person. But that is not what happens.
Most human animals continue to exist, and start to have thoughts
and other experiences. (Parfit, 2012, p. 7)
But, as Parfit (2012) notes, Lockeans can claim that persons are “phase
sortals” of human animals in much the way that teenagers are. Sortals provide a
criterion for what is to be counted, and phase sortals apply to something during
part of its existence (see Grandy, 2016). Alternatively, a certain kind of Lockean
can claim that human animals constitute persons under certain circumstances
(see Baker, 2000). For Baker (2000), a person “has causal powers that a body
would not have if it did not constitute a person” (p. 109). Accordingly, there
should be just one set of causal powers here. That phase sortals are not causal
competitors with what they are phase sortals of is perhaps most easily seen on a
four-dimensional model. The partial spatiotemporal coincidence of the parts of
a human animal with the parts of a Lockean person for its duration is no more
a problem than the coincidence of two streets at their intersection as far their
slippery pavement’s being causal competitors in a traffic accident, or between
a movie and one of its scenes as far as being causal competitors for a certain
outburst of laughter. Parfit (2012) himself thinks Lockeans needn’t retreat
to this line, however. Instead—although, I would argue, analogously—Parfit
(2012) thinks Lockeans can claim that we are the thinking parts of human
animals. Again, because there aren’t too many digesters when an animal
digests food by having digestive parts, there aren’t too many thinkers when an
animal thinks by having thinking parts.
These moves, however, highlight the main objection to Lockean views.
The Animalist now objects that we aren’t essentially Lockean persons. As
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Shoemaker (2016) puts it, “I am many things, including an adult, a professor,
a driver, a voter, and so forth. None of these is my essence, however, for I
either did or could exist without being them,” and,
just as I was once a teenager, and before that an adolescent and a
child, wasn’t I also an infant, and ultimately a fetus? Furthermore,
suppose I were in a horrible accident and went into a permanent
vegetative state (PVS). Wouldn’t I then be in a PVS? (sec. 2.2)
The same sort of objection applies to the constitution view. And one might
object to Parfit’s (2012) “thinking parts” view in an analogous way, asking, “is
it really a serious view” that we are “about four inches tall and weigh less than
three pounds”? (Olson, 2007, p. 76). Likewise, to the claim that we are minds,
the objection as summarized by Parfit (2012) runs, “we can’t be our minds,
since we have arms and legs and our minds don’t” (p. 19).
Animalism, then, is the view that I am the “same” person as I was yesterday
and will be tomorrow just in case my past, present, and future biological organ-
isms are continuous with one another. The apparent trouble with Animalism is
that it runs counter to intuitions about what would matter to us in imagined
transplant, transport, upload, and duplication cases, which variously ask us
to imagine our psychologies realized by a body different from the one we have
now. Animalism seems to imply that if my brain was to be put into your
body, upon waking you would think you were me, but you would be mistaken.
“As many Animalists concede, this widely held belief, which some call the
Transplant Intuition, provides a strong objection to their view” (Parfit, 2012,
p. 10). Animalists are forced by their transplant intuitions to concede that
identity might not be what matters ethically: “the Biological Approach does
have an interesting ethical consequence, namely that those practical relations
are not necessarily connected with numerical identity” (Olson, 1999, p. 70).
Notice that I’ve been putting “same” and “identical” in quotes when dis-
cussing “identity” over time. That’s because there’s an important distinction
between synchronic identity and putative “diachronic identity.” No one thinks
a person at various times is the same in the sense of obeying Leibniz’s Law,
the indiscernibility of identical things which have all the same properties. But
some theorists do think there is a special kind of identity which is a sort
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of “numerical” identity such that a person at one time can be “one and the
same” as a person at another time. Shoemaker (2016) refers to “a criterion
of diachronic numerical identity, a criterion of what makes something one
and the same thing as itself at different times” (sec. 2.3). And Parfit (1986,
p. 201, 2012, p. 5) explicitly holds that numerically identical things may be
qualitatively distinct. Gallois (2016) says,
To say that a and b are qualitatively identical is to say that a
exactly resembles b. To say that a and b are numerically identical is,
at least, to say a and b are one thing and not two. Whether a and
b can have all their qualities in common without being numerically
identical is controversial. Nevertheless, it seems that a and b can
be numerically identical without being qualitatively identical by
having different qualities at different times. (sec. 1)
But this last claim is in clear conflict with another definition, according
to which, “Numerical identity requires absolute, or total, qualitative identity,
and can only hold between a thing and itself” (Noonan and Curtis, 2017, sec.
1). Now, although we can still formulate puzzles about persistence conditions
of entities in other terms, this particular issue is merely terminological. The
relation that obtains between me now and the baby I was is quite simply
something other than numerical identity in the strict sense. For that reason,
speaking of personal “identity” can simply be misleading. Strictly speaking,
identity is not at issue. And clearing that up alone may help to clear up the
apparent tension between views about what we are. For example, when I say,
“I was once a baby,” I say something that looks like an identity claim. If it is
the claim that, “I presently have the property of having been a baby,” we’ll
say it’s true, but it makes no claim that a relation of numerical identity in
the strict sense obtains between the person I am now and the baby that the
person I am now was. Tenses do the required job of noting the passage of time
and change. On the other hand, if “I was once a baby” is the claim that I am
strictly the same as the baby I was, then it is false.
Note, too, that it may be plausible that differing practical and ethical con-
cerns would tend to track differing “units”—entities differing in their properties,
which is to say, partly in their spatiotemporal extents. For example, certain
other-regarding concerns may tend to track something like “person-lives” (see
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Schechtman, 2014), conferring rights on fetuses, young babies, and human
organisms in permanent vegetative states, as a way of protecting not a present
but a possible future Lockean person. Shoemaker (2016) calls the relevant
units, “living human beings”, “Lockean persons”, and “selves,” and additionally
calls momentary experiencers “atoms” (sec. 3). Many “self-regarding” concerns
(working, planning, delaying gratification), tend to track a Lockean person—
an entity consisting of states which are psychologically continuous in some
way. The latter concerns are sensible, assuming it is sensible to care about
other persons at all, and given that I am uniquely epistemically positioned to
knowledgeably influence the experience of future participants in a particular
person-life (the one of which I am a part). But the explanation for that unique
influence is causal. I, now, needn’t be strictly identical with any future self.
And, in fact, “self”-regarding concerns seem to differentiate any overarching en-
tity from its smaller temporal parts, such that we distinguish and differentially
treat today’s self from tomorrow’s, and each of these from a distant future
self. Each instance of any such unit, such as a person-life, or any other whole
temporally extended four-dimensional entity, is unproblematically identical
with its whole self in the strict sense. But each of that whole’s temporal
parts are only part of the whole. So I can’t be strictly identical with a future
person in virtue of being part of a whole life of which it is a part. The relation
in question—whether between temporal parts, or between phase sortals, or
between what is constituted at one time versus another—is not strict identity.
I said above that puzzles about persistence through time can be formulated
even once we insist on a particular use of the term “identity.” For example,
about putative four dimensional entities, we can ask a question analogous
to van Inwagen’s special composition question (see Section 4.3). That is the
question of when or why the composition relation obtains between parts and
some whole. Why take that particular spacetime worm, Paul Hubble, and
not a different spacetime worm, like my left half plus the moon from 1992 to
1994 combined with your pet rat’s yesterday afternoon nap, as an object of
explanation, prediction, and practical or ethical concern? We can also ask,
what makes distinct phase sortals sortals of one other thing? And Olson (2007)
raises a grounding problem for the constitution view of persons, asking,
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If the same atoms can compose two things at once, what could
make those two things qualitatively different? What could give
them different mental properties, or different persistence conditions,
or different modal properties? (p. 63)1
Thus, for each way of distinguishing between Lockean persons and animals,
there is a grounding problem. If Lockean persons are phases or temporal parts,
or spatial parts of animals, then the distinction is clear enough, but we can ask
what makes them parts of one thing at all. If Lockean persons are constituted
by animals, we can ask what makes them two things at all.
But the grounding answers to each either trivialize or undermine the dis-
tinctness. First, in answer to the special four-dimensional composition question,
there needn’t be any metaphysical restriction on composition such that we
insist there is no such entity composed by an assortment of spatiotemporal
parts of me, the moon and an event, in order to give an answer as to why
we ignore the latter’s existence while caring about, for example, a person-life.
Rather than strict identity, one of the relations between me now and me
yesterday is similarity, which can be cashed out in terms of dispositions to
have one or more of the same effects on various multiply actuatable switches
(see Section 6.1). Similarly, Millikan (2017), for example, thinks of changing
individuals as “historical” kinds, members of which cluster closely in property
space. The temporal parts of Paul Hubble, taken as a person-life, fall under a
kind and are projectible in various ways. So the four-dimensional object they
compose is worth tracking. And some subsets of those temporal parts (say, my
teenage years) fall under more than one kind and are even more projectible.
These temporal parts also stand in unique causal and epistemic relations to
one another: again, I am uniquely epistemically positioned to knowledgeably
influence the experience of future participants in the person-life of Paul Hubble.
Grounding answers that can be given about constituted things similarly triv-
ialize or undermine the distinctness of Lockean persons and bodies. Although
1 Olson (2007) also raises other grounding problems. He asks, “What could give us identity
conditions different from those of human animals?” (p. 63). He goes on to characterize two
further objections to the constitution view. He says that it has no satisfactory answers to the
questions, “under what circumstances does constitution occur?” (p. 66), and, “The question
is now what makes it the case that animals constitute us. Why not things a bit larger or
smaller than animals?” (p. 73). All of these, I think, are grounding questions.
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the constitution view of persons—as a species of Circumstantialism—provides
no answer, according to the Necessitarianism I have been advocating, the same
atoms can’t compose two things at once without instantiating all the same
properties. On one hand, the realizations of differing property instances have
differing physical extents. On the other hand, any thing to which we attribute
more than one property instance is one and the same as the complete realizers
of those properties.
What grounds the similarity among temporal parts, what instantiates
the sortalish properties of a human animal’s being a person at a time, and
what makes it the case that a person and human animal coincide (to the
degree that they do), are in each case those conditions usually relegated by
Circumstantialism to the background.
Putting this together and returning to the apparent disagreements between
Animalists and Lockeans, we can now see that when we distinguish between a
partly coincident or putatively coincident Lockean person and a human animal
(recalling that the boundaries of each are in dispute), we are not multiplying
entities, but cross-classifying things. The mere fact that the class of Lockean
persons is not identical with the class of human animals does not mean that a
certain Lockean person is not identical with a particular human animal—that
is a question of their properties.
If we make the Animalist move and claim that I am not a Lockean person
because I was once a baby, we use “I” to refer to something with the property
of having been a baby. But if the animal-in-the-present-conditions is sufficient
for such a property and is also sufficient for being a Lockean person, then the
“I” refers to something with both properties. On the other hand, if we insist
that “I” refers to the temporally extended animal life which has a baby as a
temporal part, then we should also say that I am partly a Lockean person.
Either way, when we say we were babies, I don’t think we make identity claims
between our now-selves and the babies we were. I think we use “I” in the
former way, to refer to something presently instantiating the property of having
been a baby. But if I am wrong, that is a linguistic matter. Either way, we are
animals and Lockean persons (thinkers).
If we make the Lockean move and claim that I am not an animal because I
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would survive various transplants that my body would not, we either use “I”
to refer to something with certain mental properties (beliefs, desires, goals), or
to refer to a temporally extended thinker. If it is the former, then the physical
conditions instantiating those mental properties presumably include, among
other things, a particular bunch of biological tissues. I am partly those tissues.
If it is the temporally extended thinker, that thinker once again has biological
tissues as a temporal part, even if it has other physical conditions as temporal
parts, and the temporally broader entity is partly those tissues. Either way, we
are thinkers and animals.
To see this point in action, consider whether standard transplant intuitions
would withstand the physical details of such procedures. Thus imagine trans-
planting my brain. It could well turn out that, after overcoming the challenges
of wiring everything up correctly to compatible tissue, a period of intense
therapy would be required to remap and recalibrate schemas and procedures
in the brain to work with the almost certainly different host of bodily inputs.
It is not hard to imagine that the initial state of this mind would be utter
confusion. People who have just one sense modality restored often find the
resulting cacophony of stimuli overwhelming. Even if this brain had all the
plasticity of a baby’s brain, it might take years to acclimate to the new body
(as it does for babies, who don’t remember these developments). Meanwhile,
memory traces, if ever reconstructed, might seem like recollected dreams or déjà
vu, hardly straightforward replicas of the experience of “this same person.” A
new person, strictly speaking, would be born in the process. And the difficulty
of transplanting our minds suggests that if we do value psychological continuity
so highly (even if all we’re really doing is caring about a different experiencer
whose pain and suffering we have particular influence over), we should value
the extended bodies and communities and context on which psychological
continuity depends. I mention communities and context, because the best hope
of psychological continuity through transplant or transport would be one’s
community’s support through rehabilitation and reaffirming or rebuilding one’s
sense of past.
Notice, too, that a body, my body at that time—the physical conditions
instantiating my mental life at that time—does survive. Even brains in vats
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have to be hooked up to a world to be persons. And my new body is the
“same” as my old one in the same way that a thing at one moment is ever
the same as a thing at another moment. They are similar enough to be
projectible. Ex hypothesi, the progenitor and inheritor of a mind share mental
properties. And they are in causal continuity. After all, there are mechanisms
involved in copying, uploading, or otherwise transplanting the mind. There’s
no metaphysical difference between the continuity of a mental life during well-
known metabolic turnover and the continuity of a mental life during, as I
shall now put it, technological turnover. And the possibility of being not just
transplanted but duplicated wouldn’t change anything, except that, prior to
being copied, I would have two people’s futures to worry about, and after being
copied, two people would praise or blame me for certain features of their lot in
life. Analogous biological processes would have the same consequence. Suppose
we reproduced by asexual budding and inherited, along with our parent’s DNA,
a copy of some of their memories, desires and beliefs. These offspring would be
very similar to their parents, without strict identity being at issue, whether
the parent continued to live or not. Again, the claim cannot be that, when
a mind is transplanted or copied or otherwise changed in some respect, the
inheritor(s) are the same, in the strict sense, as the progenitor(s). They are
just that similar.
The upshot here is that, as a special case of the mind–body problem, the
apparent choice between physical or mental continuity as the grounds for
our self and other-regarding practices is premised on construing an overly
narrow physical basis for minds. So-called “transplant” thought experiments
are supposed to show that psychological and not biological continuity is what
intuitively matters to our self and other-regarding practices. What transplant
thought experiments actually show—in showing that psychological continuity is
what matters for self and other-regarding practices—is not that psychological
continuity can be divorced from physical continuity generally, but that the




I have suggested that we, our selves, are embodied minds, although as a
physicalist, I take it that the “embodied” bit is redundant. The extent of that
embodiment has been the topic of the thesis to this point. The properties we
attribute to our minds, mental states and cognitive processes, are instantiated
more broadly than the brain. And if we are embodied minds, what goes for
our minds goes for our selves. I said in Section 10.1 that a system to which
we attribute portability is not strictly sufficient for that property. Our brains
don’t exactly “have”—all on their own—the property of being portable.
Nor do our biological bodies “have”—all on their own—the capacity to
move. Technologies are quite clearly among those conditions instantiating
the portability we attribute to the putatively core cognitive system, agent, or
organism. We can’t go just anywhere. Where we can go is determined by
flesh and blood, to be sure, but also by “the environment.” But it’s not the
case that a human organism’s capacity to move around in a context, inclusive
as it is of that context, nonetheless enables us to clearly distinguish the two,
the way we might distinguish a goldfish and its bowl of water—the medium
and the extent of its swimming capacity. Or if it does, in the human case,
the distinction does not carve out a naked ape-like organism. So not only
does the organism not have, all on its own, the capacity to move, technologies
clearly travel along within a core to which that disposition might ordinarily be
attributed. What moves is technological. But it does not even have a consistent
skin-like boundary. Human movement does not carve out, say, clothed apes.
In the human case, it is not a fixed body, clothed or otherwise, that moves
against a fixed backdrop that partly constitutes its mobility. Rather, “agent”
and “environment” are dynamic and interwoven. What moves drags along
what we might have called bits of the environment with it. Backpackers, for
example, seem like rather portable humans, nonetheless dragging along with
them clothes, contact lenses, cameras, guidebooks, passports and credit cards.
Conversely, travellers make well-travelled cities what they are as much as cities
ground the possibility of travel. Human mobility within an elaborate network
of people and technological structures is perhaps more analogous to a fetus’s
capacity to move within the womb. The fetus is attached to the womb by an
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umbilical cord that shifts with it, and as it moves, the fetus changes the shape
of the amniotic sack and the womb. And as the fetus goes where its mother
goes, where the Earth goes, we go; its future is ours. In the case of space travel,
what we call the body of the astronaut is tethered by a technological umbilical
cord to the mothership, itself tethered by radio waves to the Earth. At the
scale of the commute or the trip to the grocery store, the situation is the same.
My sitting at a desk and applying my mind to certain questions—like the
question of what physical conditions are presently attempting to answer that
question—depends, as a temporally extended process, on there being a desk in
a heated room and brain-fuelling food in the cold fridge. Our stomachs reach
out through our forks, and our distribution and agronomic systems, to the soils
and seas our lives grow out of. These causal interactions are constitutive of
our mental lives as temporally extended things.
And there is good phenomenological evidence for the dynamicity of any
putative core as far as it might be phenomenally-given. Merleau-Ponty (1996)
explored this point in some depth, saying,
A [person] may, without any calculation, keep a safe distance be-
tween the feather in her hat and things which might break it off. She
feels where the feather is just as we feel where our hand is. If I am
in the habit of driving a car, I enter a narrow opening and see that
I can “get through” without comparing the width of the opening
with that of the wings, just as I go through a doorway without
checking the width of the doorway against that of my body. The
hat and the car have ceased to be objects with a size and volume
which is established by comparison with other objects. . . . The
blind [person’s] stick has ceased to be an object for him, and is no
longer perceived for itself; its point has become an area of sensitivity,
extending the scope and active radius of touch, and providing a
parallel to sight. In the exploration of things, the length of the
stick does not enter expressly as a middle term. . . . The position of
things is immediately given through the extent of the reach which
carries him into it, which comprises besides the arm’s own reach
the stick’s range of action. . . . To get used to a hat, a car or a
stick is to be transplanted into them, or conversely, to incorporate
them into the bulk of our own body. Habit expresses our power
of dilating our being in the world, or changing our existence by
appropriating fresh instruments. . . . But this power of habit is no
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different from the general one which we exercise over our body: if I
am ordered to touch my ear or my knee, I move my hand to my ear
or my knee by the shortest route, without having to think of the
initial position of my hand, or that of my ear, or the path between
them. (p. 143)
Whatever other conclusions Merleau-Ponty derived from these observa-
tions together with his other views, I think they show that our minds are
dynamically embodied. Suppose the phenomenal character of an experience2
can differentiate—among all of what that experience depends upon for its
duration—the conscious contents of that experience from its unconscious vehi-
cles. I say “conscious,” and “unconscious,” to make the distinction explicitly
mutually-exclusive, whereas the vehicle/content distinction doesn’t clearly do
this. On an account in which the museum is partly constitutive of Otto’s
belief about it, the museum may be thought of as being among the vehicles
of the belief if vehicles are taken as a special case of constituents and defined
as anything on which a meaningful thing depends for its duration. So I will
always say “unconscious” vehicles when excluding the conscious contents on
which an experience nonetheless also depends for its duration such that it has
the property of being about anything at all. The unconscious vehicles of an
experience are distinguishable in the sense that the character of experience
counterfactually depends on them, and yet we aren’t aware of them while having
just that experience. Now, if we want to use the character of experience to
mark this distinction, then technologies are frequently among the unconscious
vehicles of our mental lives.
This should come as no great surprise if we accept that our biological
tissues are often among the unconscious vehicles of our mental lives, because,
as Merleau-Ponty suggests, there is no difference between our powers of habit
with respect to sticks as compared to knees. But I will say a bit more in defense
2 I am using “experience” in a very general sense to signal that which has the property of
being conscious. This is something of a departure from its use in traditional epistemological
debates between empericism and rationalism about whether knowledge is attained primarily
or only via “experience” or “reason,” as mutually exclusive faculties of mind. I would rather
use “perception” for the empiricist’s source of knowledge, so that thinkers can be also be
said to experience dreams and “offline” reasoning.
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of that claim. Merleau-Ponty seems a little indecisive in the above passage on
what our “bodies” consist in, at first describing instruments as incorporated
“into the bulk of our own body,” and later speaking of our bodies in the ordinary
sense. But if we want to use the character of experience to mark, or help
to mark, the distinction between our “bodies” as unconscious vehicles and
the “world” we experience, then, since technologies are frequently among the
unconscious vehicles of our mental lives, it follows that our bodies, as far as
they might be phenomenally-given, actually comprise habituated technologies,
and to a surprising extent.
Why think there is no difference between our powers of habit with respect
to technological as opposed to biological tissues? First, there is no obvious
phenomenally-appreciable difference between what it is like to learn to use
hands, as opposed to learning to use the things in our hands. Consider ten-
finger typing. Once proficient, ten-finger-typists don’t have to work backward
from the intention to type a string of words to the first word in the string, to
the first letter that composes it, and then to the location of that letter on the
keyboard. And since developing motor skills particular to keyboard use, typists
don’t have to work backward from the intention to press a key to checking
where their fingers are in space as they inch a finger toward a target while
monitoring it via multiple sense modalities. And since developing a basic body
schema, most folks don’t have to work backward from seeing a finger to making
sure it belongs to them. All that goes on neurologically when a ten-finger-typist
records their thoughts are transparent to the conscious volition for which the
goal, in this case, the expression, is its object. And much of what goes on
physiologically—finger flexion and extension—is translucent to this volition. I
say “translucent,” because although unnoticed ex hypothesi in the experience
in question, it is not unnoticeable—it is available to be noticed as required.
But, and this is the point, a properly integrated keyboard is as transparent or
translucent to the experience as finger flexions are.
Pain does not supply a reliable phenomenal distinction between what it is
like to have a genetically-given body and what it is like to have a technically-
extended one. Not having nerve endings in a bat is like having a leprous
foot wherein bacteria have caused peripheral sensory nerve damage, but not
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yet motor nerve damage, and having such a foot just shows a changeable
interface for different functions (walking versus tissue damage detection), the
way the spaces in a revolving door are at times continuous with the interior of
a building and at other times continuous with the exterior. For the function
of tissue damage detection, this leprous foot might as well belong to anyone,
and the damage is anyone’s to see, but for the purpose of walking, the foot
extends the agent as well as it can for as long as it can. Poor performance
is relative to a Sorites scale in the center of which we can call it a toss up
whether something belongs within a creature’s agency or not. In that case, a
prosthetic leg or a pacemaker might make for a more whole or lively life than
being stuck with a leprous foot or cardiac arrhythmia. Even if, again, some
difference between how brains interact with their biotic body and how they
interact with habituated technological extensions turned out to involve different
brain matter, neither brain-based explanation is likely to appeal to the termini
of nerves in a way that could reliably specify a strictly biotic boundary between
agency and world. Nerves don’t extend to the very surface of our skin, but
the epidermal layer that covers them is not typically excluded from our sense
of our body. Hair and whiskers are non-metabolizing biomaterial structures
produced by animals to (in part) extend touch sensitivity. Whiskers still belong
to cats, not cat habitats. Shells belong to snails, barnacles, and turtles all the
way. Photoreceptive neurons in our retinas are far from the bleeding edge of
vision, light having first been modulated by a variety of non-nervous structures,
which we consider to be part of the organism. Whether the discarded mollusk’s
shell belongs within the bounds of the agency of the hermit crab that takes it
up and inhabits it, in the absence of access to phenomenal experience of the
crab, would be hinted at by empirically-discoverable functions. Can the crab
predict or learn to predict what spaces it can fit through? If it can, and humans
certainly can, what further motivation do we have to say that a hermit crab or a
spectacle-wearing organism walks around, not with an extended body, but with
a piece of the environment perched on it? It would be a benevolent environment
that nicely refracts the rest of itself into my eyes, furnishing a custom acuity for
the particular focal range of my cornea and lens array. Rather, the glasses are a
hard-won part of this seeing organism. Of course, we might draw a line between
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the biotic and the technic in terms of modes of production and inheritance.
But modes of production and inheritance can’t be what determines what is
part of my body and what is not, since there’s a very real sense in which ‘I’
didn’t make my own eyes. The collection of organs that became part of ‘me’
included eyes before it had much in the way of agency. If being made by the
agent is a criterion for parthood within agency, then spectacles are more a part
of the spectacle-wearing optician than their own eyes, which might better be
described as their mother’s. Rather, the tissue-likeness of spectacles and other
prosthetics consists in their part in the organism’s seeing function.
Ten-finger typists experience themselves as willing sentences onto the screen.
We don’t usually say they fire neurons and twitch muscle fibers; to say so is not
only “pointlessly complex” (Clark and Chalmers, 1998, p. 13), it’s mistaken or
at least involves mismatched grain-levels of description. Whole agents don’t
fire neurons at all; other neurons do. Similarly, when we say the cricket or
baseball batter hits the ball, we can and should omit “with the bat.” The
implicitness goes to the point that there is no batter without a bat. Or, we
might have specified any number of other particulars that usually go without
saying, if we felt the need to emphasize them, such as, “having judged the ball’s
speed,” or “with oxygenated blood carrying adenosine triphosphate circulated
to striated muscles.” Again, just like the swing, these processes are subsumed
under the whole process as parts of it; they are not something the batter or the
organism does, they are the batting that individuates the organism as a batter.
Although we could describe the same event as, “The batter swung the bat and
the bat hit the ball,” we would only do so to suspend our attention in mid-air,
so to speak, to emphasize what hangs momentarily in the balance between the
whole batter and the ball. We wouldn’t mean that agency is transferred to the
bat as if hitting the ball becomes a goal for the bat upon being swung. Nor
do batters experience their agency as so transferred. A properly integrated
keyboard or bat is as translucent to this willing, this intention, as are a typist’s
or batter’s fingertips, tendons, forearm muscles, and elbows (although not
invisible like their motor cortex). Practised batters can keep their eyes on
the ball and practised typists can keep their eyes on the screen. This thesis
as it now stands nearing completion comprises nearly a million characters. I
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estimate that, once note-taking, editing-while-writing, multiple re-edits, and
deletions of large portions of draft material are taken into consideration, I have
made at least five, and perhaps as many as ten times that many keystrokes.
Just imagine—as far as doing so is even possible—if “I” had had to think about
each of those millions of keystrokes. But I didn’t, and there is no inner thing
that did which can itself properly be called “thinking” or “I.” Instead, I think
about whole propositions, and write them down, and the I that does these
things has fingers and a computer among its parts.
The phenomenally-appreciable shifting locus of our attention and intentions
is a measure of the degree of integration of technologies. The less we notice
our extensions, the better they work for us; the more under our control, the
less noticeable technologies are. Over-attending to the steps of an already-
internalized procedure can famously lead to “choking under pressure” (see
Beilock and Carr, 2001). Subsequently, integration is a measure of the extent
of our agency versus sources of activity that are not our own. The ownership
is constantly contested in a tug of war that happens across a variety of scales
in time and space, private and public. We can lose touch with our extensions.
The momentary disorientation when a keyboard key sticks unexpectedly, or the
surprise when a bat splinters, or a “no internet connection” warning appears,
is like the surprise when our foot slips, or our knees buckle unexpectedly. Our
bodies betray us, and we disown them until they cooperate again. Notice
the differing attribution of agency: normally, I do the running, except when
my knee acts up. Normally, I do the surfing, until the network acts up. We
might never notice our bodies if they didn’t get sore, hungry or tired because
we wouldn’t need to, and we might never notice our familiar tools if they
didn’t break (if sometimes only relative to the emergence of “better” tools).
Interestingly, when we under-attend to procedural execution, we can become
too rigid, unable to easily adapt to changes, and unable to later recall elements
of a performance in order to improve (see Langer and Imber, 1979). In order
to maintain flexibility within a realm, a well-entrenched bad habit in the form
of one’s swing might have to be worked over if one wanted to achieve a better
swing. In this working over, allocating our limited attention and intention
is a balancing act. We can lose touch with, or might need to loosen our
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grip on our extensions, the way we temporarily do when changing keyboard
layouts, the speed of a mouse cursor, the thickness of automotive brake pads,
the height of shoe heels, or the stiffness of paintbrush bristles. We get brake
work done and then have to recalibrate our footwork, using vestibular, visual,
and proprioceptive feedback. Whereas our intentions normally go straight to
where the rubber meets the road, they temporarily retreat to attend to the
recalibration where the pads meet the disk (this might feel like our foot on the
pedal). Likewise, having an injury, undergoing a growth spurt, becoming fitter
or fatter, all require that we modify our schemas and procedures. Judging
whether you can jump a gap when your fitness is downgraded is like judging
whether you can shoot a gap through the roundabout in your new mini van.
But don’t inspect muscle fibers or cylinders to help you make the call. Just
practise with forgiving gaps until your judgement is invisibly calibrated as your
extensions become translucent.
Any phenomenally-given body we have expands and contracts. Whatever
it is about our brains that makes what psychologists call procedural memory
possible, neuroscience will have a story about. But introspection can’t tell us
whether there are one or two stories to be told—one about strictly biotic body
schemas as related to strictly bodily procedural learning and corresponding
skill execution (say, clapping and walking) and another story about technic
schemas as related to technical procedural learning and corresponding skill
execution (say, batting a ball and riding a bike). Whether there is one flexible
body schema, or two (or more), or one kind of procedural memory or two (or
more), the point is that the interface of our agency with the world is flexible,
both ways.
Rather, the phenomenological continuity, shall we say, between biological
body use and habituated technology use would be explained by their having the
same neurological basis. And in fact there probably isn’t, say, a technological
cortex adjacent to the visual and motor cortices. For one thing, there is no
clear developmental case for a technological cortex. For example, if the human
body schema was hard-wired in utero, the integration of keyboards and the like
would be all the more likely to involve some further neural resources. But it is
a matter of debate whether the human body schema is hard-wired. The main
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reason to think it might not be is that, as Price (2006) summarizes, “Reports
of congenital phantoms have led a number of experts to infer that neural
representations of the body are hard-wired and underwritten by a genetically
encoded blueprint” (p. 312). But Price questions whether phantom pain in
reportedly mentally “complete,” but actually missing or malformed limbs of
people with congenital amputations really demonstrates that some of this
mapping is baked in. He suggests how an alternative model could account for
even these strange cases:
It is proposed that body image develops in two stages: first, in utero,
a primitive bilateral body image is constructed, driven by spon-
taneous limb movements. Second, after birth, visual and sensory
information can lead to the development of phantoms by means of
mirror neurons and the incorporation of prosthesis into body image.
This hypothesis is capable of explaining all cases of aplasic phan-
toms without recourse to an independent genetically determined
neural representation of self. (p. 320)
I think Price is interpreting the available research very well. But even if
embryogenesis provided us with some modest genetically-determined neural
representation of our biological bodies, that would fall short of demonstrat-
ing distinct neural bases for biotic-body-learning and technic-body-learning,
because even a soft wired schema would have to be changeable. Evidence
popularly summarized by Doige (2007) suggests that “spike-timing-dependent
synaptic plasticity” (the tendency of connection strength between neurons to
increase when their action potentials spike closely in time, a principle summa-
rized in the slogan “neurons that fire together, wire together”), is a mechanism
for associative learning and even cortical remapping, where neural resources
are reorganized to serve new functions when input conditions or output require-
ments change. So, even if grasping nothing and grasping things were in some
way different neurological processes, both involve neuroplasticity. Doige also
summarizes related research that seems to bear out phenomenal experience
wherein attention to the instrument being integrated is greatest during learning.
As familiarity with a task grows, connections are strengthened, and yet later
simplified to an efficient form. Attention during learning, and later trimming
of neurological resources to the bare essentials suggests that proceduralization
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during a learning phase is scaffolded by resources that are later reappropriated
and put to other use, as if the familiar does not command attention so that
attention can oversee other familiarization.
Further, soft wired body schemas would have to be able to be built upon
procedurally, because, although babies’ brains might, for example, have plenty
of soft wiring genetically dedicated to their hands, they don’t grow fingers in
utero that are any more under their command to touch thumb to forefinger
than able to pinch a crayon. So what is generally known as procedural learning
has to be able to build on any putatively given body schema. If preliminary
wriggling and twitching served to check and calibrate the schema, still, generally,
learning to use hands in so many cases seems to be the same as learning to
use the things hands use. People don’t acquire the necessary motor control
for writing, typing, batting, or riding a bike before trying their hands at these
activities. So not even soft wired body schemas would show that procedural
learning (of routines which are by definition not hard-wired) involves distinct
resources in the case of biotic and technically-extended procedures.
Finally, extreme altriciality (protracted development requiring protracted
postnatal investment from conspecifics) in the human case is consistent with the
“same-neurology” hypothesis for biotic and technic integration I’m advocating.
If biotic body-use and technology-use were separate neural bases for our abilities,
we would have some more explaining to do, because they could have been
separately optimized by selective processes in the course of human evolution.
In the absence of any advantages as far as merely biotic bodily skills that might
be conferred by altriciality—protracted in humans far beyond that of our great
ape cousins—selection would plausibly have pressured human neonates to keep
up with their cousins’ earlier perceptual and motor development if it could
do so without precluding their ability to learn new technical tricks later on.
Rather, it seems like altriciality is a package-deal, such that the flexibility of the
resources that underpin both biotic body-use and technology-use is a setback
for walking and a leap forward toward one of the traits walking on the moon
requires. The ability to learn is a short-term metabolic cost to the group, and
its greatest asset over the longer term. As the schemas and procedures of our
ancestors were decreasingly fixed by their genetics, they became increasingly
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flexible and capable of being culturally modified. Flexible brains like ours
require protracted sociocultural sheltering, but for this tradeoff of longer boot
up and sociocultural induction, our minds are poised to exploit novel spaces
and subsequently extend the sheltering effect that buys us more time to learn.
So our bodies as they would be phenomenally-given are flexible and often
technically extended. That makes sense, given the probably shared neurological
basis of the flexibility and a plausible cognitive evolutionary story as to why
our biology is technological: our biological tissues are adapted to technology
use because technologies are adaptive. At best, in defense of our traditionally
rigid view, our biotic bodies are slightly less changeable than our technically-
extended bodies in a few contingent ways. We are embodied minds, and that
embodiment is dynamic.
11.3 Shared Tissues and Humane Futures
Now, the analogy between prosthetics and tissue in the case of what look like
personal devices, however counter-intuitive, might seem even less clear in the
case of shared technologies, like corporate buildings and public roads. But
actually, what I kept back for rhetorical flourish here is that not only does the
view entail the possibility of human organisms’ having shared tissues, but it
allows that these may be among the most habituated of all; they are the ones
upon which the character of our experiences and thus our particular mental
lives and selves depend unconsciously most of the time. In fact, the analogy
with tissues here is deeper, in the sense that our dependence on them, not
just for our particular lives, but for anything like our lives at all, is deeper.
We individually own certain living investments, our hearts, legs, best shoes,
and the tools of our crafts. Yet so many of our personal devices—cheap and
broken down, disused or under-used belongings that clutter our lives—are
what can be thought of as metabolic wastes. (In contrast to the metabolic
wastes of our biotic tissues, of course, much technological waste is toxic to other
organisms.) In continuity with the other wastes we produce, and as opposed
to the tissues we grow, so many of our personal belongings are things that
either do not qualify as tissue defined as homeostatic metabolic capital (living
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investments), or are only “tissues” insofar as vegetative or cancerous tissues
are. Many shared tissues, on the other hand, are clearly living investments.
There aren’t as many shared structures as there are personal tissues that we
could dispense with and still lead anything close to the particular lives we lead,
or have the experiences we have. My community’s food systems, institutions,
transportation and communication networks are part of me because they make
up the livelihood of the “we” in which both my agential and mental being
have life and breath. To have a human life and mind is to be woven into a
radically joint venture which is fundamentally technological, so that, to the
cognitive process resulting in the thought that “I’ll have to leave for my meeting
right after breakfast,” the presence of the milk in my fridge, the car in my
driveway, roads and petrol stations, and a chair in a room with lights in the
university building, are not contents, but unconscious vehicles. And few of
these are “mine.” In fact, many of us have house and car payments to make.
The ownership—in the sense of ultimate power or control—is shared.
But that is not to say these shared tissues are the best tissues. I thus want
to close by noting a particular consequence of this broadened way of looking
at ourselves. As I said in Section 10.4, despite the surprisingly wide extent
of the total realizers of our mental lives, there are interesting subsets of the
total realizers of our mental lives. For example, I think it is very interesting
that technologies, especially the ancient and mundane, can be among those
conditions of our mental lives that we don’t notice at one time, while designing
them at another. As we saw just above, our phenomenally-given bodies are
dynamic such that technologies often fall under the subset of the total realizers
of our mental lives that we might call their unconscious vehicles, and yet the
same parts can at other times fall under another interesting subset of the
total realizers of our mental lives. They fall under those conditions within our
influence. Add to this the widespread idea that moral responsibility presupposes
agency and that the extent of our agency is the extent of our moral responsibility.
These extents plausibly track the epistemic horizons of our influence—those
outcomes we can be said to have designed, or ought to have designed in the
sense that we might have known what they would be. For example, we use the
concept of ecological footprint to evaluate the impact of our ways of life on the
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planet. These footprints do not belong to a merely metaphorical “foot” that is
incidental to us and beyond our control. Rather, since technology is more like
tissue than like parts of the environment, our ecological footprints reflect our
very size as organisms. And we can know ourselves and see ourselves in this
way, because, as I have argued, that is the way we are. We can see ourselves
as technologically extended, for example by recognizing the sloppiness of our
ordinary boundary drawing.
Now, the particular facts underlying the generalization that we are partly
what we make are that you may be partly what I make, and that I may be
partly what you make. Things of our making will certainly be among the
realizers of our offspring’s mental lives. This means we are shaping each other’s
minds in ways that we are often unaware of. We are often unware in two senses.
First, we so quickly habituate technologies—and many of these from a very
early age—that we not only become unconscious of them, but we forget life
before them. While we perceive the world through technologies—they extend
our discriminatory apparati—they constrain our imaginative possibilities. When
someone says, “I can’t live without my smartphone,” they reveal a mental
state whose realizability includes a technological apparatus. We are different
creatures with different minds when we change our technological bodies. Indeed,
that person could not live without a smartphone, grocery stores, petrol stations,
and a great many other tissues or tissue-like apparati. Our particular mental
lives would fail to transplant to bodies without these appendages, in which our
minds would be made anew. Unsurprisingly, Westerners born since the 1990’s
find it difficult to imagine life without the internet. I only faintly remember.
And we can all imagine what it is like to be an illiterate medieval peasant
about as well as we can imagine what it is like to be a bat. That seems
irrelevant in the sense that it is not desirable to recreate medieval life. But the
general point is relevant insofar as, reflecting on our own experiences, we may
want to, as far as it is possible, preserve what is worthwhile even as we seek
to reduce conditions of suffering. At least, we ought not to conflate novelty
with progress. In conflating these we set ourselves up to forget, even if by
nostalgically misconstruing, the goods we already had.
Second, as designers of technology, we may be unaware that we are building
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each other’s minds. And this is why it matters to get the causal/constitutive
distinction right for the temporal frame of some given explanatory target.
When we make things, we are plausibly not responsible for all of the effects of
doing so a million years hence. But we are plausibly partly responsible for the
states of affairs of which our creations are parts soon afterward. The results
of my productive activity are fairly proximate effects of that activity. But
the mental states of which those same results become a part are not further
causal “effects.” They are as proximate in time as the results of my productive
activity. And our mental lives are plausibly more predictable if we could grasp
this point about the breadth of the conditions upon which our minds depend.
As such, human experiences are among the things we design or ought to have
designed in the sense that we might have known what they would be, not as
distant effects but as immediately constituted by the results of our productive
activities.
The upshot is first of all that if we can learn to see ourselves in this broadened
way, we might take our technical carapaces more personally. Second, it may
be that our mental health declines as our technological extensions grow, as
popularly claimed in media and books like The Shallows (Carr, 2010), and
increasingly corroborated by research (e.g. Takeuchi et al., 2018; Shakya and
Christakis, 2017) in the relatively new but suddenly ubiquitous arenas of gaming
and social media. More generally, our embodied mental health—our cognitive
abilities, imaginations, happiness, and our anxieties—is partly constituted by
the functioning of our tissues, including technology. Since our minds are dear
to us, being partly what we make is a reason to take our jobs as designers of our
selves more seriously. And since our similar genetic cores give rise to flexible
phenotypes that are non-viable as organisms until extended technologically,
the rest of us is up to us to make. Human organisms are polymorphic, and the
question we get to ask, and ought to ask is, what kinds of creatures do we want
to be? Do we want to be Homo technologicus automobilis sapiens, sitting in
traffic on the way to work to pay for the cars that all too often tear themselves
to shreds, with our brains on board? We might want to be healthier. In light of
Western lifestyle diseases—autoimmune disorders, obesity and diabeties, heart
disease, some cancers, anxiety and depression—we know our health is partly
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constituted by the modes in which our stomachs reach out through our forks,
and our distribution and agronomic systems, to the soils and seas our lives grow
out of. And we might want to be smaller. If we notice that the technological
tissues with which we make our lives are grown and require maintenance, that
they occupy precious biocapacity, we might ask whether the quantitatively
burgeoning Western life is qualitatively richer, in more respects than heart
disease and anxiety, than the multitude of lives one Western life supplants or
limits. The beauty of the fact that we can share huge parts of ourselves and our
minds means that we can share resources. We can cultivate more life—more
mental life—out of less stuff, if our personal unshared tissues are minimized. It
might be that less stuff of certain kinds could be more flourishing all around.
Of course, if extended self-awareness was to lead some of us to pursue simpler
lives, that wouldn’t be enough. This self-awareness needs a systemic, political
inflection, because of the systemic nature of present ecological destruction and
because the technological appendages that make our lives are often corporate.
Present ecological ailments are not primarily epistemic failures of an otherwise
rational corporate coordination of human activity. While ecological damage is
often foreseen, consequences merely accrue, first because of our misshapen senses
of responsibility (rooted in sufficiency errors), but also, and I think relatedly,
because there is no robust coordination between epistemic elements of society
that take a wider and longer view of nutrient cycles, and executive elements of
society that could correct the market forces shaping the way we make our lives.
We already know these forces undervalue “natural capital” and externalize
the costs of undermining and overburdening “ecosystem services.” Like the
dissonance between our glorification of freedom and avoidance of responsibility,
the relationship between economics and ecology is oddly troubled. Eco-nomics
is housekeeping. Eco-logy is the study of homes. Shouldn’t we keep house
according to our study of home? Yet too often, we are using an incomplete
construal of our niche to think about markets. Our shared lives, considered
on ecological terms, have their full-fledged niche within the world only in
combination with one another and with technology. We need an economics,
say mega-economics, whose calculus aligns with the full extent of our corporate
tissues and shared total way of life—our full-fledged niche. We ought to redefine
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wealth as healthy tissue, and reconsider its source in the ultimate cooperation
of diverse and modest organisms. As long as we are trying to build healthy
societies on a flawed model of what it is that we share as humans, my view is
that we’ll struggle to build institutions capable of coordinating our complete
extended corporate existence.
Wrapping Up
I’ve argued in Section 11.1 that there is a close relation between our minds
and our selves as bearers of praise and blameworthiness. Most plausibly, we
are minds, which are extensive physical conditions that include our bodies and
technological carapaces. In every case of psychological continuity there is also
circumstantial continuity constituting a person’s being of a kind with their past
and future selves. I argued in Section 11.2 that phenomenological evidence of
our personal boundaries suggest that our bodies are dynamically extensible.
The upshot is that our particular mental lives would fail to be duplicated if our
biological duplicates were to be transplanted into different technical carapaces
and wider technological circumstances. Thus, in Section 11.3, I suggested that
it is plausible and worthwhile to distinguish another morally salient subset of
the complete constituents or total realizers of our minds and selves from the
rest. Technologies are among those special constituents of our mental lives
which we design, which has moral implications for our sizes as extended—and
overlapped—beings.
To sum up, everything is physical. When we take apart big or complicated
things—whether events, processes, systems, objects or states—we find smaller
or simpler things. But unlike some physicalists, I don’t think it makes much
sense to deny that complicated things are sets of simpler things, their relations,
and interactions. The latter are all physical and located in space and time,
and so are complicated things, like us. But the natures of these complicated
things, or what it is that we want to explain about them, show that, very
often, those things are either not quite what we think they are, or they are not
wholly where we think they are. Sometimes things aren’t what we thought.
There is no lumniferous aether or phlogiston. But often, complicated things
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elude identification with their sets of simpler things, relations and interactions,
not because they don’t belong in predictively successful models of reality, but
because they aren’t wholly where we tend to look. Our minds are like that, and
so are we. These may seem mysterious because minds are not just brains. They
are actually brains embodied and embedded in a world. And our particular
minds are brains technologically embodied and embedded in a technological
world. That means we are partly what we make. And the fact that this comes
as a surprise means our self-engineering could be more self-aware, and should
be more self-reflective.
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